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This research work, conducted across the two shores of the Mediterranean, explores 
the spatial upheavals produced in the Mediterranean region by migrants’ movements 
taking place in the aftermath of the revolutionary uprisings and the Arab Spring, 
teasing out their interconnections. Assuming a spatial gaze, defined here as a 
counter-mapping approach, this work investigates the ways in which migrants 
coming from Tunisia and from Libya in 2011 and in 2012 troubled the existing order 
of mobility, forcing the migration regime to reassess its strategies of capture. I 
mobilize some Foucaultian conceptual tools – as “governmentality” and “regime of 
truth” – in order to critically account for the instabilities that percolate the migration 
regime. The work takes into account the spatial transformations generated by the 
Arab Uprisings and by the migration turmoil both in Tunisia and on the northern 
shore of the Mediterranean: migrant struggles, economic projects of development 
and the migration crisis of the politics of the humanitarian are the three main axes 
along which the analysis develops. Also the Mediterranean Sea, as a contested space 
of mobility, is at the core of this work: I bring attention to the politics of (in)visibility 
that characterizes the politics of control in the Mediterranean and migrants’ 
strategies, highlighting the transformations occurred in the last two years. This work 
is a contribution to critical analyses of migration governmentality that stress the 
spatial upheavals that practices of migrations produce into the politics of mobility 
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The Arab Uprisings and practices of migration troubled the Mediterranean order of 
democracy and mobility, producing spatial upheavals which reverberated also on the 
northern shore of the Mediterranean. This statement, far from being a radical/specific 
interpretation of those events, is shared by different political perspectives and actors 
–Liberal analysts, Left movements, policy makers and scholars: the European Union 
was taken by surprise by the sudden outbreak of the Arab Spring [Peters, 2012] 
which marked the reawakening of the Arab history and its “1848” [Badiou, 2012]; a 
wave of popular discontent of unexpected magnitude shook the Arab world and in 
the face of that Europe needed to change its approach [EC, 2011]; there was a 
tsunami of  young Tunisians [Aita, 2013] and Tunisians struggling and fighting 
against unemployment [Boubakri, 2013; Carrera, den Hertog, Parkin 2012]. All 
these analyses highlight that both the Mediterranean and European spaces were 
shaken by the unfolding of revolutionary events and by the “domino effect” that they 
triggered. 
This work investigates the political and spatial upheavals that took place across the 
Mediterranean, centring on the connections between practices of migration and 
revolutionary uprisings and looking at the resonances on the European space. 
Actually, it addresses events that are still underway, since despite the change of 
political regimes and the revolutionary uprigings which led to the fall of 
dictatorships, the political and spatial turmoil sparked off has still not come to an 
end. This research has been conducted across the two shores of the Mediterranean – 
in Italy, Tunisia and France –and assumes a spatial gaze, taking together the 
struggles for democracy in the Arab countries with practices of migrations across the 
Mediterranean. These two phenomena remain fundamentally disconnected in most 
analyses, where migration is seen as the troubling factor for a smooth transition to 
democracy that could take place (by Liberal analysts) or as the uprising of young 
precarious Tunisians (by activists). In this way, it could be argued that the migration 
turmoil is emphasized and regarded as a challenge to the stability of the 
Mediterranean region, but at the same time it is presented in total continuity with 
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previous migration movements and economic factors [Fargues, Fandrich, 2012]. 
What emerges is the image of an upheaval that, despite its recognized unexpected 
occurrence, is definitively reabsorbed and included into the existing economic 
geographies. 
The linchpin which sustains this research on migrations and revolutionized spaces is 
the turbulence that took place in 2011 and in 2012 in the Mediterranean region and 
was characterized by what I call a “twofold spatial upheaval”. Indeed, migrations 
and political uprisings during the Arab revolutions should be both considered as 
practices of freedom that “disturbed” and broke the spatial and geopolitical stability 
of the Mediterranean. Although related and strongly connected, however, the two 
movements in question–migrations and the revolutionary uprisings – have their own 
specificity, so that it’s not possible to fully conflate Tunisians’ strategies of 
migration into the same narrative of the social unrest taking place in Tunisia against 
the regime. For this reason, a spatial gaze on the Mediterranean turmoil needs to 
explore the interplay between migration movements and revolutionary uprisings, 
paying attention to the ways in which migrations brought and disseminated that 
upheaval also on the northern shore. As I will show in the third chapter, the angle of 
the economic crisis could be a strong vantage point from which to analyse both 
migration movements and the uprisings in some Arab countries as struggles and 
practices of freedom against the government over lives and conditions of labour 
precariousness.  
This work looks at Tunisians’ migrations taking place after the outbreak of the 
revolution as “strategies of migration” for enacting the freedom (in this case, the 
freedom of movement) that Tunisians won through the revolution, unsettling in this 
way the pace of mobility established by migration policies and by economic bilateral 
agreements [Mitropoulos, 2007; Sossi, 2012a]. By “strategy” I don’t mean a planned 
set of actions but a practice that is undertaken by some people for getting another 
space to live or for doing what “authorized mobile people” ordinarily do, namely 
getting round. However, the fact of situating this research on migrations in the frame 
of the Arab revolutions allows it to be shown that it is not migration per se that is a 
“strategy of freedom”, since migration is also a phenomenon largely included and 
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enhanced in the global economy of labour. Therefore, any migration movement 
needs to be grasped in the light of the political, geographical and social context in 
which it takes place, exploring to what extent it exceeds or disrupts existing 
economies of mobility and techniques of bordering. Thus, as far as the Tunisian 
revolution is concerned, undocumented migrants who left after the fall of Ben Ali 
could migrate just because of the revolution and their practice of migration could be 
seen as a way to enact and carry on the revolutionary demands of freedom and 
democracy, thus shaking the conditional and selected access to mobility set by Euro-
Mediterranean agreements. Moreover, the revolutionary political framework in 
which these practices of migration is situated, requires that we shift from the border 
as an exceptional site and as a limit, investigating migrations in the light of broader 
social and economic issues, as I explain in the third chapter referring to projects of 
development. 
The proliferation of Mobility Partnerships, economic agreements and 
Neighbourhood policies between the European Union and the countries of the 
Maghreb region in the aftermath of the Arab revolutions, signals the restructuring of 
migration governmentality in the face of those spatial upheavals. By migration 
governmentality I refer here to the multi-layered and heterogeneous set of 
technologies, discourses and policies, concerning the production of borders and their 
differential functioning, and at the same time the regulation of people’s movements. 
Taking on a Foucaultian perspective, this assemblage of political technologies is 
however seen as a contested field, whose global dimension, as well as its stability, is 
constantly challenged by conflicting actors and interests and by migrants’ 
turbulences. 
A gaze on the transformations underway in the field of the politics of mobility and 
on the deep destabilization of governmental cartography of migrations makes it 
possible to take in reverse the migration regime, crumbling its supposed solidity. To 
take it in reverse means also investigating what - beyond the way in which migration 
governmentality narrates itself -it effectively produces: in this regard, one of the 
main arguments of this research is that the migration regime produces precarization 
and interruptions. In fact, it fragments people’s journeys through administrative 
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measures or identification techniques, imposing indefinite stop-overs or putting them 
in a “bounce-game” – made up of bureaucratic hindrances, national boundaries, 
labor contracts and juridical decrees. And at the same time, it “precarizes” migrants’ 
lives, or better, it introduces differentiated forms and degrees of economic and 
existential precarization, according to a variable range of mobility profiles ranging 
from “economic migrants” to “mobile person/non-migrants”. 
Focusing on migrants’ spatial upheavals, this dissertation tries to challenge 
governmental-based approaches, punctuating the way in which (some) migrant 
movements do not follow the governmental map and enact their own geographies, 
forcing power to invent new mechanisms of capture and to arrange new narratives. 
In this regard, the conceptual argument that sustains this research is that a spatial 
perspective on undocumented migrations enables us to concentrate on the effects of 
unauthorized mobility and border enforcements: what turbulences (some) practices 
of migration engender, what interruptions they produce in the mechanisms of 
governmentality, and how power invents new technologies and rationales of 
bordering. In other words, a spatial gaze on what I call the “migration strugglefield” 
[see chapter 1] in its contested and always changing frame, provides us with a 
fruitful insight on the huge ‘productivity’ of borders –tracing exclusive spaces of free 
mobility, or zones of detention – in the face of “disordered” practices of mobility and 
on their contested functioning.  
Starting from this background, I mobilize two main analytical tools: governmentality 
and counter-mapping. As I illustrate in the first chapter, taking on governmentality as 
a grid does not mean assuming a governmental perspective. In the last decade the use 
of Foucault’s analyses of governmentality have blossomed in Migration Studies, in 
order to stress the multiplication of actors at play in the government of migrations 
[Bigo, 2002; Inda, 2005; Kurz, 2012; Lippert, 1999; Van Munster, 2009]. However, 
the critical and genealogical implications of Foucault’s reflections on 
governmentality tend to get lost in these analyses and what emerged are rather the 
proliferation of border controls and the existence of a global migration regime. In 
fact, Foucault’s analysis of governmentality cannot be detached by the task of 
making unacceptable the mechanisms of power he describes. Drawing on Foucault, 
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this work treats the grid of governmentality from a quite different angle, unfolding 
the constitutive dimension of struggles –and in this specific case of struggle over 
mobility – in the production of a field of governmentality. This latter is not the sum 
of governmental programs but the temporary outcome of a strugglefield formed on 
the one hand by mechanisms of capture, monitoring and containment, and on the 
other hand by strategies of migration that in part are managed and needed, but in part 
exceed or escape the conditions of authorized mobility. In the case of Tunisian 
migrations taking place in the aftermath of the revolution, they troubled and made a 
mess of the pace of migration governmentality, challenging, through their own 
movements, the “conditional spaces” of free mobility [see chapter 1] in the 
Mediterranean region and in the Schengen area. Further, taking a Foucaultian 
approach to governmentality means putting the shaping and the transformations of 
subjectivities within the frame of migration governance at the core of the analysis. 
Instead of taking for granted the subjects involved and subjected to the migration 
regime, such an approach questions both mechanisms of power and the production of 
subjectivity, bringing to the fore a subject that is not the subject of right [Foucault, 
1996a].  
The counter-mapping perspective that I undertake is part of the spatial vantage point 
that, as mentioned above, is a keystone of this work. And countermapping refers 
simultaneously to two orientations. On the one hand, it centres on some cartographic 
practices that have challenged governmental maps on migrations, bringing to the fore 
the struggle over (in)visibility upon which migration governmentality is predicated. 
On the other, it addresses a non-cartographic engagement which consists 
fundamentally of dislocating the analytical posture usually adopted for looking at 
migrations: firstly, it means gesturing towards the subjects and the spaces where 
mechanisms of governmentality impact, to see what are the effects and how they are 
resisted by migrants; and secondly, it implies seeing how migrants sometimes trace 
“another map”, performing unexpected geographies, that cannot be encoded into the 
cartography of government. Indeed, in order to trace its own map, migration 
governmentality needs to spy, hijack and capture the migrant’s knowledge.  
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The present changing political context in which this analysis is situated – the Arab 
Uprisings and their Mediterranean disseminations – requires problematizing how to 
deal with events underway. In this regard, Foucault’s suggestion of a history of the 
present represents a particularly useful insight for undertaking a close scrutiny of the 
“twofold spatial upheaval”, which is the subject of this work, to grasp the 
singularities and the “discordant” practices of freedom [see chapter II] that would not 
and could not fit into traditional political narratives [Foucault, 1984b]. To put it 
bluntly, unlike mainstream scholarship on the Arab Spring [Basbous, 2012; 
Benhabib, 2011; Peters, 2012], this work resists framing the Tunisian uprisings 
according to the script of the transition to democracy and the paradigm of the 
“Enlightenment of the Arab people”. Rather, this makes question what new kinds of 
practices of democracy are at stake, and to what extent they resonated far beyond 
those spaces, unsettling in part the tenability of the European model of democracy. 
Similarly, Tunisian migrations are not addressed as a massive flow of people in 
search of European wealth which accelerate the crisis of the new-born democracies 
through their disordered mobility. Instead, migrations are taken into account here as 
practices of movement that in some way push forward and enact concretely the 
freedom conquered in Tunisia. 
Grappling with a history in and of the present means disengaging from the 
conceptual governmental grid on migrations, as well as from the teleological 
political narrative of democracy and secularism [Buck-Morss, 2009]. There is no 
exemplar model to apply or from which to learn: this could be the general formula 
for summing up the attitude that a history of our present requires. Instead of looking 
at political practices and events and searching for what we want to find there – 
something that confirms and is in continuity with the existing political frames – it 
should explored how current movements disrupt or drift away from established 
epistemic and political scripts
1
. Or it should be investigated how certain political 
                                                          
1It is important to underline that Foucault didn’t go to Iran in order to search for an alternative 
political paradigm. In fact, his reports on the Iranian uprisings were not made for opposing an 
“exotic” model to the western political movements: instead, Foucault was interested in revolutionary 
events that could not so immediately “translated” into the grid of the western political thought. Thus, 
the Iranian context is not analysed by Foucault as an example to take; rather it needs to be understood 
in the wake of what MatthieuPotte-Bonneville has defined “an oblique relationship to politics” [Potte-
Bonneville, 2004] that characterizes Foucault’s perspective, meaning by that an analyses and an 
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paradigms are deeply resignified by the events of the Arab Uprisings. In this regard, 
Foucault’s writings on the Iranian uprisings constitute an important reference for 
thinking of a “diagnostic of the present” [Foucault, 1968a]: for instance, Foucault 
caught substantial differences between the Western revolutionary model, that 
“tamed” the events into a rational and progressive history, and the Iranian uprisings 
in which the revolution is not limited to the fall of the dictatorship, but includes 
another way of conceiving the political, deeply restructuring the relationship with 
modernity, religion and transformation
2
. In the case of the Arab Spring and migrants’ 
practices in the aftermath of the fall of the regimes, this analytical posture in the face 
of the events makes us interrogate what kind of democracy is envisaged by those 
upheavals. 
From this point of view, Foucault’s history of the present enables us to disconnect 
the analytical gaze from the validation of established teleological narratives which 
fix in advance the future outcomes of those events [Foucault, 1978c, 1979a, 1979b]. 
Indeed, Foucault’s use of history has a strategic and political function which consists 
in highlighting the disconnections and the discontinuities between what is happening 
and what we would like or we expect to take place: the concept of history which 
underpins a diagnostic of the present is not grounded on any permanent feature, 
rather it aims at locating and producing discontinuity within historical progressive 
and secular narratives [Foucault, 1984a]. And consequently, making a history of and 
in the present involves showing the opening of new political practices and narratives. 
To phrase it from a slightly different angle, migrants’ spatial upheavals make us 
question the adequacy of the framework and the grammar through which we look at 
the instabilities that migrations produce [Asad, 2009]. Thus, the simultaneous 
challenging of Western political narratives for reading the Arab uprisings and of 
Migration Studies’ Eurocentric epistemology, brings us to question what I call the 
“methodological Europeanism” that posits Europe as the blueprint for framing 
                                                                                                                                                                    
attitude that “forces” the reader to (re)invent his own use of that political referent. In fact, as Foucault 
himself remarks in an interview of 1981, Friendship as a way of life “There ought be an inventiveness 
special to a situation like ours […] the program must be open” [Foucault, 1996b, p. 312]. 
2
In this regard, what Foucault highlights in the events of the Iranian revolution is the refusal of the 
Iranian people to play the game of politics, as it was traditionally structured, and to accept that regime 
of truth: “Le people Iranien fait le hérisson. Sa volonté politique est de ne donner pas prise à la 
politique » [Foucault, 1979b, p. 702].  
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migrations and as the yardstick for understanding the orientation of political 
struggles [Garelli, Tazzioli, 2013]. However, the attention to languages and practices 
that cannot and should not be encoded into ordinary political frames, does not 
requires, and does not lead me in this work, to emphasize their irreducible distance 
and differences. Rather, by bringing out the “discordant” practices of freedom 
enacted by migrants in relation to existing orders of political claims, the challenge is 
whether those movements instantiate new languages and put into action new 
modalities for thinking of and enacting political practices that in part could respond 
to the crisis of traditional concepts and models of politics. 
To come to grips with the discontinuities that strategies of migration and political 
turmoil enact in relation to the political narratives we are accustomed to, means also 
focusing painstakingly on the ongoing changes in the strugglefields we examine. 
This is particularly true in the field of migration, where the transformations and the 
multiplication of policies, law and technologies of bordering change rapidly– in 
order to keep up with practices of migration that try to dodge controls. Thus, in order 
to tackle the changing nature of borders and migration policies, in this work I use the 
technical device of chronologically situating the episodes that I take into account as 
well as the political strategies that I investigate. But this choice depends also on 
another factor, concerning migrations themselves. Undocumented practices of 
migration –or at least, those that are object of this analysis – tend to be quite elusive, 
since the possibility of staying on the public and visible scene is far reduced in 
comparison to other (political) practices. As I show in the first and in the fifth 
chapter, the temporality of politics also turns out to be deeply different from other 
struggles. Hence, it follows that the theoretical and political challenge consists in 
understanding what “traces” remain in the face of the elusiveness of some migrants’ 
practices. What lasts and what, in the end, cannot be fully recaptured by 
governmental strategies: this is the question to raise two and a half years after the 
“twofold spatial upheaval”, interrogating whether or not the “other maps” enacted by 
Tunisian migrants have been retraced by governmental maps. In other words, as I 
explore in the second and in the fifth chapter, what is at stake in the problematization 
of the temporality of migrant struggles is the possibility, despite their elusive 
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character, of not reiterating the existing thresholds of perceptibility and recursive 
political frames.  
Political epistemology and militant research: challenging migration knowledge-
based governance 
If we concentrate on the strugglefield between migrants’ practices and knowledges 
on the one hand, and the unceasing production of governmental knowledge and maps 
on the other, what is also needed is a radical questioning of the politics of knowledge 
about migrations. Indeed, this work inquires into the deadlocks and the difficulties of 
doing critical research on migrations that neither reiterates nor fosters the regime of 
truth and knowledge that shapes migration governmentality. This question underlies 
all the chapters, problematizing from time to time what “analytical posture” should 
be undertaken in order not to corroborate the same order of discursivity upon which 
the government of migrations is predicated. This broad issue concerns the political 
epistemology of migration knowledge [Davidson, 2013; Mezzadra, Ricciardi, 2013]. 
By political epistemology I mean an analytical perspective which on the one hand 
brings out the conceptual and the discursive field through which the “worldmaking” 
of migration governance is performed, and on the other makes clear that discourses 
and categories are the crystallized outcome of power-knowledge relations. As I 
explain in the first and in the third chapter, the productivity of the regime of truth of 
migration governmentality consists in a disciplining functioning, which partitions 
migrations into an array of “mobility profiles” which then correspond to different 
rights to move and stay in space –economic migrants/asylum seekers/rejected 
refugees/high skilled migrants. However, a political epistemology on migration 
knowledge should not stop at this task: it should aim at destabilizing the internal 
coherence of the existing regime of discourse, and not being complicit with its 
reproducibility [Butler, 2006b]. Instead of positing the all-catching power of 
categories in fixing and partitioning people into profiles, political epistemology 
brings to the fore the instabilities and crises that crack their functioning, generated by 
practices of movement that exceed clear-cut boundaries. But what does this actually 
mean and to what extent one could destabilize the epistemology of migration 
governmentality? As I argue in the first chapter, to ask this is to address the 
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possibility and the effectiveness of critique, questioning if a critical knowledge 
production could generate interruptions in some mechanisms of the discursive 
regime of migration governance. Critical accounts and radical theories of migration 
seem to be easily “accommodated” within the “disciplinization” of migration, which 
has been institutionalized through the growing centrality played by Migration 
Studies. Instead, if we follow what I call “the dislocation of the uses”, maybe a quite 
different perspective emerges. As the perspective of countermapping suggests 
[chapter 5], to shift from the paradigm of critique to a focus on the ways in which 
some knowledges could be “used”, acquired, or put at work in unexpected contexts 
and diverting their original function. This is not to argue a neutrality of categories 
and discourses through which migrations are narrated, but rather to point at the 
leeway that always exists for disrupting from the inside a given regime of truth
3
. 
The invention of another language or narrative on migrations should not be limited 
to an oppositional gesture which produces new categories without challenging the 
“field of stabilization” and the “style of reasoning” that underlie the rationale of 
migration govermentality [Davidson, 2004; Hacking, 2004a]. It is the chain of 
equivalence through which some categories and discourses are linked one to the 
other that determines the consistency of the “migration regime” and the naturalized 
assumption that migration is a phenomenon to be governed. Moreover, it’s not even 
a mere question of vocabulary: in fact, if the overproduction of categories that fix 
people to a certain profile is certainly the most visible element, this nominalist 
inventiveness is associated with a specific regime of truth that frames the meaning 
and the boundaries about which subjects should be labelled and governed as 
migrants [see chapter 1]. And the discursive domain itself cannot be taken as a self-
standing reality, but rather it should be always analysed in relation with non-
discursive practices that influence its limits and conditions of emergence and of 
“truth” [Foucault, 1968b; 1980b]. Thus, in the field of migration the point is not to 
assume the narrative of migration governmentality as an autonomous reality, 
measuring its gaps with the realm of political practices: instead, the issue is to locate 
                                                          
3
This argument is predicated upon the idea that neither a critical attitude nor radical theories really 
“disturb” the governmental maps of migration, since critique could be easily integrated and valorised 
in the present governmental or academic knowledge setting. 
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the mutual reinforcements and to understand how to disjoin a politics of 
transformation from the regime of discourse and truth that is currently at play. 
Against this background, this work engages with the issue of political epistemology 
following two directions. In the third chapter I bring into focus how at some points –
in this case during the Libyan “migration crisis” – the mechanism of partitioning and 
categorizing misfires, since the complexity of practices of migrations exceed the 
sharp boundaries of categories and profiles “crafted” to regulate them. In the fourth 
and in the fifth chapter I frame the question from the standpoint of counter-mapping, 
assuming it as an example of a critical knowledge production within and against a 
given regime of knowledge – in this case, cartographic rationality – pointing at 
possible leeway for counter-acting some technical devices. However, the main limit 
of such an approach relies on the cartographic anxiety of making all visible 
[Gregory, 1994; Painter, 2008]: thus, what I suggest is that a counter-mapping gaze 
should resist filling in all the voids –see, the “silences” and the “shadow zones” – of 
a map, tuning in to migrants’ regime of (in)visibility. In a nutshell, a political 
epistemology in the field of migrations interrogates the possibilities of disengaging 
from the regime of truth of migration governmentality. 
The other related point consists in problematizing the way in which critical analyses 
on migrations enshrine or are captured in a regime of knowledge that updates and 
improves governmental “maps”. In this regard it could be argued that in the field of 
migration an apolitical approach is precluded by nature; first of all because migration 
governmentality necessitates of an in-depth knowledge of migrants’ strategies and 
stories; secondly, because migrant struggles exceed the grammar of traditional 
political claims. Taking migrations makes us see the points of fracture and the 
reassemblages of power mechanisms.  
Particularly, what is important to highlight are the main difficulties and issues at 
stake in envisaging a critical approach on migrations that, besides not fostering 
governmental knowledge, produces concrete effects at the level of the politics of 
knowledge. The specificity of a militant research approach consists in struggling 
over the knowledge production on migrations in the light of migrant struggles and 
political experience “on the ground” [Malo, 2007; Colectivo Situaciones, 2007; 
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Counter Cartrographies Collective, 2012]. In other words, militant research doesn’t 
aim at all to “make the law” on struggles. Instead, it involves making those 
movements and struggles resonate within the domain of knowledge production in 
order to unsettle and denaturalize existing political-epistemological pillars (for 
instance, migration as a phenomenon which has to be managed) and producing new 
cartographies to talk and engage with migrations. Nevertheless, a tricky issue that, I 
contend, characterizes a militant research approach on migrations concerns the 
theme of the distance that is at play, as I indirectly illustrate in the third and in the 
fourth chapter, between the dynamics and the political stakes of migrant struggles on 
the one hand, and the field of research on the other. Actually, what is at issue here is 
not the gap between theory and practice but, rather, the non-reciprocal position 
between undocumented migrants who are out of the “social contract” of citizenship, 
and others, including critical researchers, which complicates the concrete 
possibilities to tune in to the rhythms, the goals and the languages of migrants’ 
claims. Without providing a solution to such a question, this work suggests that it is 
necessary to keep this impasse in the foreground, in order not to fully and 
immediately encode practices of migration into our own political vocabulary. And 
secondly, it gestures towards the crafting of a knowledge practice stripped of the 
“comfort of critical distance with regards to the object” [Colectivo Situaciones, 
2003]. To put it differently, from this standpoint the question becomes not so much 
to get rid of these distances and gaps, but rather to put them to work to make visible 
how (some) migrations play in a discordant way in relation to dominant maps and 
languages. For this reason, in the fifth chapter I talk about “unspeakable maps” as 
migrants’ enacted geographies that in part should and could remain “opaque” to the 
grasp of the cartographic gaze. Translating this into political terms, it means not 
flattening migrants’ practices of freedom into pre-established and ordinary political 
codes, and instead letting appear how they destabilize and trouble those frames.  
 
THESIS OUTLINE: 
In the first chapter, I mobilize the Foucaultian concepts of governmentality and the 
politics of truth in order to grasp the functioning of the so-called European 
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“migration regime”, looking at how it has been unsettled and rearranged in the wake 
of the Arab Uprisings. The main argument of this chapter is that the very notion of 
migration governmentality cannot be taken for granted, and that the temporary crisis 
generated by migrants’ spatial upheaval during the Arab Spring, shows that the 
(migration) “regime” is ultimately a set of responses to practices of mobility. In 
order to develop this point, the chapter engages with a critical analysis of the 
Foucaultian notion of “governmentality”. Starting from this general background, the 
chapter interrogates the effectiveness of a critique of governmentality, whilst also 
examines how migrants’ practices ‘interrupt’ some mechanisms of the migration 
regime. In this regard, a critical account is made of the way in which migration and 
citizenship studies conceive of migrants’ political subjectivity. The chapter proceeds 
to explore the “politics of (un)truth” which is at stake in the government of refugees, 
focusing on the Tunisian refugee camp of Choucha. The thesis I advance is that an 
analysis of the (discursive and non-discursive) technologies governing migrations 
allows us to see the transformations at stake in the government of mobility at large.  
The second chapter is formed of three analytical snapshots that map the “bank 
effects” of the Arab revolutions on the Northern shore of the Mediterranean, arguing 
that more than tracing similarities between those uprisings and European 
movements, we should highlight the way in which the former unsettled and impacted 
on the European space. It centres on what I call “discordant practices of freedom”, 
namely Tunisian migrant struggles and strategies of migration which enacted 
freedom in ways that are neither compatible with nor readable by the paradigm of 
representation. The first snapshot takes into account the so called “North Africa 
emergency” declared by the Italian government, focusing on the spatial 
transformation that it generated. The second snapshot refers to the multiplication of 
migrant struggles and escapes in Italian detention centres after the outbreak of the 
Tunisian revolution. The third snapshot turns attention to occupations of symbolic 
buildings and structures – a church and a crane occupied by migrants in Italy just 
before and after the Tunisian revolution. In the last section, the chapter reflects on 
the necessity of complicating and problematizing the spread discourse on freedom of 




The third chapter deals with the spatial economy and the new economic spaces 
produced or transformed in Tunisia and in the Maghreb region in the aftermath of the 
revolutionary uprisings. Democracy, crisis and transnational areas are the three 
central issues around which this chapter is structured. In the first section, the 
migration-development nexus is analysed in the light of the discourse on democracy 
and the script of “democratic transition” through which Europe looks at 
revolutionized Tunisia: the main thesis of the chapter is that democracy, promoted 
through economic projects of development, is functioning as a “strategy of 
containment” of would-be migrants. In the second section of the chapter, I explore 
the centrality of the notion of “migration in crisis” in the redefinition of the 
relationships between practices of mobility and economic crisis in the Libyan and in 
the Tunisian context. The final section addresses the ongoing project, proposed by 
Tunisia, of a Maghreb space of free mobility, a transnational area which would 
challenge Europe's leading economic and political role in North Africa. 
The fourth chapter focuses on the politics of migration controls and the regime of 
(in)visibility in the Mediterranean. Starting from the general spontaneous strike that 
took place in September 2012 in the Tunisian village of El-Fahs after the shipwreck 
of a migrant boat close to the island of Lampedusa, the chapter focuses on the 
current political and academic debate on migrants’ rescue and deaths at sea. It brings 
attention to the politics of (in)visibility that underpins migration governmentality. In 
particular, by mobilizing a counter-mapping approach, I make a distinction between 
the production of “another map” and the practice of “mapping otherwise”, 
addressing both political campaigns against the deaths at sea and Tunisian migrants’ 
struggles: if the mapping otherwise relates to the counter-uses of cartographic or 
governmental devices – thus, acting from within the regime of discourse and 
knowledge that we want to challenge – “other maps” consists of counter-maps 
performed by migrants themselves through their “noisy” practices that do not 
respond to the same regime of (in)visibility as the former. The chapter proceeds to 
examine the issue of violence of/at the borders. The main theoretical argument is that 
migration policies, by referring to “life”, generate and implicate different meanings 
and forms of life. Indeed, the “right to life” that is claimed by humanitarian and 
governmental actors in the face of the deaths at sea, overshadows the different 
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degrees and conditions of life that subjects are “entitled” to live, since the selective 
politics of mobility - through the politics of Visa – fixes the boundaries and the 
thresholds of what is to be considered a “liveable life” for migrants and non- 
migrants. Finally, the chapter tackles the question of the violence at/of the (maritime) 
borders concluding through the struggle of the families of the disappeared Tunisian 
migrants and their discordant voices “off the map”. 
The fifth chapter engages in a counter-mapping approach to some migration 
governmentality mechanisms (deportations, departures, border crossing, border 
controls, temporality of politics) looking at how they are acted and impact on the 
southern shore of the Mediterranean, taking as a case-study the Tunisian 
revolutionized context. The first part consists of a theoretical analysis of the most 
advanced governmental maps on migration flows (like the I-Map which has 
produced a reorientation in migration policies through a regulation of migrants’ 
routes, more than a government of borders); and at the same time it looks closely at 
the existing counter-mapping practices on migration, highlighting also the limits of a 
political practice based on “countering” the existing narrative on migration. The 
second part of the chapter consists of a non-cartographic practice of counter-
mapping, which tries to unpack the five abovementioned mechanisms of migration 
governmentality, shifting the gaze to the southern shore of the Mediterranean and 
arguing that some events and issues related to those mechanisms cannot be grasped 
if situated in the European space. 
- The conclusion is situated two and a half years after the outbreak of the Arab 
revolutions, and it tries to take stock of what has changed in the migration 
strugglefield with the twofold spatial upheaval, and what “traces” it has left. 
However, as I clarify in the conclusion, the end of this work does not correspond to 
the end of the political turmoils related to the Arab Uprisings; on the contrary, at the 
time of writing these continue to trouble the Mediterranean space. Starting from that 
consideration and from the “not-ended” character of the twofold spatial upheaval in 
the Mediterranean, I take into account the main theoretical issues that come out from 
the chapters. In particular, I focus on topics and problems that were not explicitly 
thematized in the beginning, but that have emerged throughout the chapters and that 
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constitute the main problematic stakes that arise from the analysis. The thematic of 
the regime of (in)visibility that underlies the counter-mapping approach developed in 
the fourth and in the fifth chapter, is here tackled from a slightly different angle, 
namely perceptibility. Then, the perspective of counter-mapping is reframed from 
the standpoint of Tunisian migrants’ enacted geographies in the European space, 
interrogating what, two and a half years after the revolution, has not been 
recuperated by governmental maps. The third main point raised in the conclusion, 
concerns the reflections, developed especially in the first chapter, around the 
question of the exclusionary subjectivity and the exclusive political space that most 
critical analyses on citizenship and migration postulate. The theme of the “crisis” 
and of its articulation with the government of mobility concludes this work, drawing 
on the reflections made in the third chapter. In this last section I address briefly how 
the economic crisis is producing a reorientation of migration patterns in the 
Mediterranean region, with some European workers going to North African 
countries in order to find a job. This focus enables a pushing forward of the non-
cartographic countermapping gesture staged in the fifth chapter and that consists in 
“decolonizing” Migration Studies, challenging the idea of Europe as the centripetal 















Interruptions of/at the borders. Working (with) Foucault between migrants’ 
upheavals and politics of non-truth.                                                                      
                                                                   « Ce que je cherche. c’est le mouvement de remontée 
historique                                                                            
                                                         avec projection sur un espace de possibilités politiques.  
                                                  C’est le mouvement que je fais » (M. Foucault, 2012a) 
Preamble: 
20th September 2011: The detention center of Lampedusa – the southern outpost of 
Europe – is burnt by Tunisian migrants refusing to be deported to Tunisia and 
pushing to move away, most of them towards France, others to northern Europe. 
Lampedusa’s residents respond by sparking off a guerrilla campaign against 
migrants, and the Italian government moves Tunisian migrants into floating-prisons, 
while the island is declared a “non-safe harbour”. These striking events were part of 
what, on the European side, was designated as the “Arab Spring” or the “North 
Africa emergency”. Instead, as I explained in the Introduction, in this work I will 
talk about a “twofold spatial upheaval” referring to the political and spatial turmoil 
taking place across the Mediterranean in 2011 and 2012. I refer to the upheavals 
triggered by Arab Uprisings and to practices of migration, which represented the 
most tangible “bank-effect” of revolutionary uprisings on the northern shore of the 
Mediterranean: Tunisian and “Libyan” migrants troubled the pace of selected 
mobility, forcing governmental actors to invent new geographies of power and 
rearranging the geometries of the European space of free mobility. After the 
outbreak of the Tunisian revolution, thousands of Tunisian citizens left Tunisia by 
boat towards Europe and almost 27,000 of them reached the Italian coasts. 
Meanwhile, due to the Libyan conflict, nearly 1 million people crossed the border 
between Libya and Tunisia: many of them have since been stranded as asylum 
seekers in Choucha refugee camp at the Ras-Jadir post along the Tunisian frontier 
with Libya, while around 25,000 arrived in Italy claiming asylum
4
.  
                                                          
4
 http://www.storiemigranti.org/spip.php?article1049  
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This preamble could have started with another date, the 5
th
 of April 2011, when the 
Italian government signed a bilateral agreement with Tunisia to manage arrivals of 
Tunisian migrants, partitioning between those arrived by that date, who could obtain 
a temporary humanitarian permit and the others, who became “clandestine”. Or also 
three other dates could have started the chapter: the 12
th
 of February, when Italy 
declared the state of emergency on the national territory and the 7
th
 of April when, 
bizarrely, the decree was extended to the “territory of North Africa”, or finally the 
2
nd
 of August when, as a response to the spread of struggles, escapes and riots in 
migrant detention centers, the maximum length of detention was increased to 
eighteen months. But despite all these possible landmark dates to get the narration of 
this twofold spatial upheaval underway, I do not focus on the events created by 
governmental statements, juridical decrees or exceptional measures. Rather, I trace a 
map of those spatial upheavals starting from and following the migration turbulences 
produced in the Mediterranean space at the times of the Arab Uprisings. In other 
words, the map that I will try to trace in the next chapters aims at providing an 
alternative cartography of the Mediterranean instabilities to the map produced by 
governmental agencies. A map of snapshots that in some way retraces, fosters and 
runs after the spatial and political transformations triggered by those movements.  
However, in order to trace “another map” of the Mediterranean focusing on the 
spatial upheavals produced by the Arab uprisings and by migrants’ practices, we 
should also look at how power counter-acted those turbulences. Migrants’ practices 
do not take place in a vacuum, hence bordering and containment responses cannot be 
overlooked. 23
rd
 September 2011: all migrants detained in the center of Lampedusa 
are moved onto boat-prisons located in the sea off Palermo. A few days later, all of 
them are deported to Tunisia. 
Chapter structure: 
This chapter is formed by two main sections corresponding to the ways in which I 
work with Foucault and I make Foucault play in this analysis: a critical account of 
migration governmentality and an investigation of the politics of truth at stake in the 
government of migrations are the two main tenets against which I mobilize the 
Foucaultian tools. After specifying the way in which I conceive the use of a 
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Foucaultian approach in this work, in the first section I deal with the notion of 
migration regime, challenging its supposed stability and all-encompassing grasp: 
instead of dealing with migrations taking for granted the borders of the political and 
starting from the existence of a border regime
5
, I will reverse the gaze looking at 
migration governmentality as a complex and temporary assemblage of strategies for 
taming and channeling the migration turbulence [Papastergiadis, 2000]. Then, 
drawing on a Foucaultian perspective, I will move on by questioning the subject that 
most of the analyses on migrations and theories on radical democracy presuppose: in 
fact, a critical engagement with the issues of borders and migration should unsettle at 
the same time a governmental based approach and the normative assumption of a 
“lacking” subjectivity that implicates the perspective of the State – the migrant seen 
as a subject in search for political recognition. Grounding on the idea that migration 
governmentality rests on a regime of truth, in the second section of the chapter I do 
an in-depth analysis of the discourse of truth that is at stake in the government of 
would-be refugees. I will conclude by arguing that the specificities of the production 
of truth at stake in migration governmentality need to be taken into account also for 
complicating the genealogy of the citizen-subject.   
Migrations and borders are topics that Foucault never tackled; although, especially 
concerning borders, many scholars draw attention to passages in Security, Territory, 
Population where Foucault stresses how the management of the circulation of goods 
and people plays a central role in the functioning of liberal societies [Elden, 2007; 
Fassin, 2011; Mezzadra, Neilson, 2013a; Walters, 2011a]. The lectures at the 
College de France on The Birth of Biopolitics where the figure of the migrant is 
framed in terms of human capital is assumed both in Foucaultian scholarship and in 
migration studies as an important reference [Cotoi, 2011; Nail, 2013; Read, 2009]. 
                                                          
5
 A similar move is undertaken by those scholars who mobilize a “regime analysis” of migrations, 
looking at the government of migration as a space of negotiating and conflicting practices [see among 
others, Hess, Karakayali, Tsianos, 2009 and Karakayali, Tsianos, 2010]. This works is in part situated 
in that perspective, assuming migration controls as the effect of conflicts and practices for taming 
practices of mobility; but at the same time it engages more closely with the Foucaultian notion of 
governmentality, through which subjectivities are not assumed as what power tries to capture or 
govern (postulating their substantial autonomy and  their being-already-there) but rather as the 
outcome of that specific and strategic games between freedoms and power relations. Thus, more than 
taking migrants’ subjectivities as a starting point, this analysis explores “the ambiguous position of 
subjectivity”, meaning by that the complex articulation between how it is produced within the 
strugglefield of power relations, and how it is productive [Read, 2003]. 
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However, the way in which I mobilize some Foucaultian methods and categories 
neither interrogates what Foucault said on the topic of borders and mobility, nor does 
it take the Foucaultian toolbox as a univocal analytical grid overcoding present 
events [Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: Hindess, 1997]. Indeed, this work essentially 
grounds on the perspective of a history of the present(s); and this is the reason why 
one of the preliminary questions is to problematize what it means to work with 
Foucault in the present. However, the stake is not to justify using Foucault to come 
to grips with contemporary political issues and events, or to demonstrate that his 
tool-box is more usable than others. Rather, what is in need of clarification is the 
very notion of the “use” of Foucault that has gained ground in the last decade 
[Artieres, Potte-Bonneville, 2007; Barry, Osborne, Rose, 1996; Burchell, Gordon, 
Miller, 1991; Elden, Crampton, 2007; Potte-Bonneville, 2004]. Thus, before delving 
into the specific topic of this research, I linger both on the idea and on the practical 
engagement of “using the Foucaultian tool-box”.  
There is no grid for the present(s): “make the map, not the tracing”. Intermezzo on 
the “use” 
In the last two decades, a growing literature has mobilized Foucault’s work, making 
it travel in other spaces and contexts or deploying it to analyse social phenomena not 
discussed by Foucault himself [Bygrave, Morton, 2008; Dillon, Neal, 2008; Inda, 
2005; Jones, Porter, ; 1994; Rose, 1999; Stoler, 1996; Young, 2001]. However, 
confronted with that, today what needs to be interrogated concerning the “use” of 
Foucault is the pertinence of a Foucaultian grid to travel across domains and spaces. 
Actually, the approach of a history of the present should refuse to instantiate a main 
signifier of intelligibility, turning instead to the tracing of a cartography in-the-
making; a map produced from within the present and attentive to the discontinuities 
produced in the strugglefield of power relations. In addition to that, it should be 
considered that no single “grid” touches the complexity of economic processes, 
regimes of truth and mechanisms of subjectivation through which the current 
geographies of power work. To the contrary, as Foucault himself contends, the 
critical force of an analysis relies precisely on the refusal to superimpose another 
unifying grid or principle of intelligibility: actually, there is not a truth or a set of 
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principles to oppose to the present regime of veridiction, since it’s not in the name of 
another constrain of truth that a real political transformation could be envisaged. 
If the choice of the Foucaultian tools to put to work cannot be made other than case 
by case, a general orientation could however be suggested: especially in the analysis 
of migrations, what makes the difference between one critical reflection and another 
is the kind of gaze that is exercised, or better its orientation. For instance, some 
scholars tend to give prominence to the ordinary working of border mechanisms and 
their displacement before and after geopolitical boundaries – through the 
implementation of the visa system or techniques of control-at-a-distance - while 
others stress the violence of/at the borders and the production of a border spectacle. 
Both these perspectives bring out relevant aspects of the functioning of the migration 
regime: what makes the difference between these two approaches is, I suggest, the 
orientation of the analytical gaze that in one case focuses on the differential working 
of the boundaries, while in the other centres on the general mechanisms of control. In 
fact, any analytical gaze builds upon a certain regime of (in)invisiblity, partitioning 
between zones of invisibility and visibility that determine which subjects are in the 
focus of the analysis, who is left off the map and what mechanisms of power are 
visibilized. In the domain of migrations, the thresholds of visibility determine what 
practices are considered “political” and what are instead unheard or “noisy”; what 
techniques of b-ordering remain in the shadow and what subjects become visible on 
and off, according to the logic of labour migration.  
I suggest that working with Foucault should avoid falling into what William Walters 
called the risk of “applicationism” [Walters, 2012]. Without translating Foucault’s 
thought into a multifunctional task, such an analytical posture consists in detecting 
and troubling the thresholds of perceptibility and acceptability of power
6
, assuming 
as a vantage point the limits of power and its margin [Foucault, 1980a] to see how 
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 This is an issue that recurs many times in Foucault’s work for describing both uprisings and 
struggles – like for instance in the case of the writings on the Iranian revolution – and his own work. 
In an interview of 1978, Foucault defines his work as an attempt to “displace the forms of sensibility 
and the thresholds of tolerance” clarifying that “people should not find in my books some suggestions 
that allow them to know what to do. Rather, my aim is precisely to make it that they don’t know any 
more what they are doing: that acts, gestures and discourses that until then seemed to go without 
saying, have become problematic, dangerous and difficult”. From this standpoint, also the meaning of 




the “inside” is produced and sustained by processes of exclusion and by resistances 
[Foucault, 1995, 2006, 2008]. Getting closer to the issue of migration, I contend that 
working with Foucault on/at the borders firstly materializes  into analyses that pay 
attention less to borders as such than to the practices of bordering [Balibar, 2004, 
Rumford, 2006, Walters, 2006] namely to the set of techniques that determine the 
“disposition of men and things in space” [Foucault, 2009] and, I would add, their 
conditions of mobility: in this way, borders are not epistemic and geographic codes 
through which the struggles between migration practices and governmental 
“captures” are read but, on the contrary, they are seen as the tangible outcome of 
governmental technologies
7
. Secondly, it consists in taking a step back from the 
narrative of governmentality and its supposed solidity, analysing it in relation with 
other discursive and non-discursive practices. Instead of assuming a functionalist 
approach, which assesses the success of governmental programs on the basis of the 
conformity between texts and reality, Foucault focuses on political technologies, 
suggesting a shift to the strategic reinvestments and to the unexpected effects of 
power’s mechanisms. This entails that “gaps” and “failures” in the mechanisms of 
governmentality are not due to occasional resistances or as side externalities; in fact, 
if the yardstick for assessing analytics of government is its effectiveness, this would 
coincide with falling into the trap of trusting in a progressive rationalization of 
technologies [Lemke, 2013; Murray Li, 2007; Patton,1996, Walters, 2012]. On the 
contrary, working with Foucault requires us to take resistances, escapes and practices 
of migrations as constitutive part of the strugglefield of governmentality: the clashes 
and the frictions between governmental programs and their realization on the ground 
signal that governmental strategies are situated and respond to strategies of migration 
[Bojadzijev, Karakayali, 2010; Mitropoulos, 2007].  
Did Foucault decolonize politics? 
This analysis does not concern migrations per se but migrants’ spatial upheavals in 
connections with the Arab Uprisings. This makes arise the so widely debated 
postcolonial question about Foucault’s work: why and how to mobilize Foucault, 
considering that he was largely criticized for not taking into account the colonial 
                                                          
7
 As Didier Fassin points out, “the government of immigration is thus an exemplary case study for an 
anthropology in the margins of the state” [Fassin, 2011, p. 217]. 
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question and, more broadly, for not “complicating” its genealogies with non-Western 
modernities? It is indisputable that Foucault did not take into account non-European 
spaces and did not complicate the genealogy on the modern Western subject with 
other genealogies. However, his philosophical approach is particularly trenchant in 
order not to reiterate existing political cartographies to encode practices of freedom 
that resist being translated into the boundaries of democracy and citizenship as 
conceived by Western political thought.  
Foucault has never directly coped with issues like colonialism, migration, democracy 
and the crisis of the nation state, but in some way it is precisely because he did not 
conceive a theory of democracy or a theory of citizenship that his analysis makes 
appear what exceeds and cannot fit into existing political coordinates. It is not 
because one names and addresses the issues that relate to the blurry domain of 
“postcolonial” that the Eurocentric posture is automatically challenged. In fact, in 
most analyses the scripts of citizenship and democracy are assumed for reading 
underway social and political phenomena by simply “stretching” the borders and 
rearranging the codes of the space of citizenship and democracy, without really 
questioning their political desirability. To put it differently, Foucault allows us to 
disengage from the political conceptual field through which heterogeneous practices 
are usually related each other – freedom and democracy, immigration and 
integration, cosmopolitanism and differences, representation and politics – by 
reformulating politics in terms of power relations and resistances. Both the 
assumption of common political referents – like the state or democracy [Foucault, 
2009, 2010] – and the designation of a pure “political space” are excluded from the 
beginning. Or better, Foucault rethinks less politics through power relations than 
power itself, detaching it as much as possible from a supposed “pure” space of the 
political, framing it in terms of productivity, force and government over life, namely 
as economy [Macherey, 2013]. After all, Foucault’s incisive critique of the idea of a 
rationality
8
 that works as the yardstick of practices and governmental technologies 
                                                          
8
 The critical reference to rationality is a recurring motif in Foucault, as here he succinctly argues “the 
government of men by men involves a certain type of rationality. It doesn’t involve instrumental 
violence […] so the question is: how are such relations of power rationalized?” concluding that 
“political rationality has grown and imposed itself all throughout the history of Western societies […] 
Its inevitable effects are both individualization and totalization. Liberation can come only from 
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[Foucault, 1994d, 1980b] helps us avoid reading the Arab revolutions in terms of the 
route to democracy or according to the script of “secularization”. In this regard, as I 
mentioned in the Introduction, Foucault’s writings on the Iranian uprising are 
particularly illuminating. Foucault refused to look at those events by framing them 
through the existing political paradigms – in that case, the revolution's normative 
historical narrative [Foucault, 1978a, 1978c, 1979]: what Foucault highlights is the 
non-exemplarity of the uprisings and the importance to read political transformations 
through the singularities of the events. Coming back to our topic, while political and 
philosophical Western thought framed and tamed the upheavals through an historical 
progressive telos, the aim of a critical gaze on the Arab uprisings, consists in 
bringing out what escapes, exceeds or does not fit into the existing political narrative 
and in the “thread of history”. This analytical-historical posture is what 
fundamentally characterizes a history of the present [Foucault, 1984b; Revel, 2013a]: 
the reference to events or singularities that outburst, wresting subjects from 
themselves and from the present where we are, indicates that an analysis of the 
present entails a constant dislocation from the space and from the coordinates that 
define the (political) reality to which we belong.  
Struggles over lives: 
Coming back now to the subject of this work, I start from a reflection that concerns 
not migrations but the forms of resistance and the practices of struggles that were 
underway at the time that Foucault was writing and that he considered to be worthy 
of consideration: “In the present struggles it’s no longer a question of taking part in 
the games of power in order to get one’s own freedom and rights. It’s not even a 
question of confrontations within these games but rather to resist the game and to 
refuse the game in itself: the game of the state with its needs and with its citizens 
cannot be played any more” [Foucault, 1978b, pp. 543-544]. To put it differently, 
these struggles convey a disengagement and a subtraction from the “civic pact” 
[Azouray, 2008] and together, a refusal in the face of “knowledges over lives” which 
produce subjects through specific technologies of individualisation and, we should 
add, dispositives of spatialization. Besides, what was at stake in those struggles was 
                                                                                                                                                                    




not only the objectifying gaze of knowledges and powers but also the refusal of the 
effects of power as such, bringing out the illegitimacy which is behind any power 
[Rancière, 2004]. As Foucault points out, “the aim of these struggles is power effect 
as such”, and the fact that its exercise is unbearable [Foucault, 1982, p.780]. Without 
tracing hasty similarities between these different specific struggles, what Foucault 
tends to see as a characteristic matrix of these practices and refusals is, I contend, a 
radical disqualification of power’s legitimacy and of its obligation of truth9, as 
knowledges that categorize partitioning people into “mobility profiles” and that trace 
the spaces and the edges of the political. And it’s just starting from the essential 
reluctance to fit into “the sovereign and representational dispositions” [Mitropoulos, 
2007] that strategies of migration should be read against the backdrop of 
governmentality. 
Governmentality: unpacking the conceptual linchpin of Migration Studies 
In the last two decades migration has become more and more a self-standing 
disciplinary domain – fixed within a proper “drawer of knowledge” labelled 
“Migration Studies” [Mezzadra, Ricciardi, 2013] while in the political debate it 
emerges always in refraction to other “social questions” (security, welfare, social 
integration, terrorism etc.) working as an underlying “hidden” sub-text and as an 
enchaining signifier of all these other issues of government. Migration comes out as 
a political issue situated à la marge of the salient themes and then re-emerging 
instead when an “emergency” is declared.10 Starting from these premises, I turn 
attention to Foucault’s definition of “dispositive”, that has been then reframed in 
critical migration analysis in terms of “regime” [Hess, 2012; Karakayali, Tsianos, 
2010]: “A dispositif is a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble  consisting of 
discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements […] a formation which has as its 
major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need. 
The apparatus thus has a dominant strategic function” [Foucault, 1980b, pp. 195-
                                                          
9
 Coming back to the present political debate, we could add the disqualification of the representative 
democratic forms.  
10
 Referring to our topic, see the “tsunami” invoked by the Italian Minister of the Interior in reaction 
to  the arrival of the Tunisian migrants, or the humanitarian and migration crisis in Libya jointly 
managed by Iom and Unhcr. 
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196]. In this regard, Foucault suggests that “What is needed is a new economy of 
power relations […] taking the forms of resistance against different forms of power 
as a starting point and using this resistance as a chemical catalyst so as to bring to 
light power relations, locate their position, find out their point of application […] 
Rather than analyzing power from the point of view of its internal rationality, it 
consists of analysing power relations through the antagonism of strategies” 
[Foucault, 1982, pp.779-780]. It is precisely by hinging on “destituent” practices 
opposed to the state-citizen game that one could challenge the supposed solidity of  
governmentality, highlighting the ongoing instabilities upon which it is constituted.  
The governmental paradigm has gained a growing and absolute centrality both in 
mainstream and critical analysis on migration. It has become the “encoding frame” 
to think of migrations, and in turn, migration is crafted as an object of government. 
In this regard, I would say that as far as migration is concerned, a univocal “politics 
of translation” is always at stake [Mezzadra, 2007, 2011d]: migration policies and 
critical analysis operate an immediate and full translation of some strategies of 
mobility into migrations to be managed and “migration” is the assumed as the 
natural genitive attribution of governing. And multiplicity of languages is used to 
“speak of” migrations as an object of research and government. Within this frame, 
the Foucaultian notion of “governmentality”, covering a wide range of perspectives, 
from the policy-oriented works and problem-solving approaches to critical 
knowledge and new reflections on citizenship and sovereignty [Aradau, Van 
Munster, 2007; Bigo, 2002, Fassin, 2011a; Lippert, 1999; Ong, 2006, Rudnyckyj, 
2004; Haar, Walters, 2005, Walters, 2011a, Xavier-Inda, 2005]. Governmentality is 
definitely the most used Foucaultian tool in the domain of migrations and borders. 
What all these different approaches to migration that make use of “governmentality” 
have in common is the particular attention paid to the multiplicity of actors forming a 
supposedly coherent “migration regime”, and to the multi-layered structure of 
government together with its flexibility and capacity to re-adapt its strategies. In fact, 
the grid of governmentality makes possible a shift away from a sovereign-centred 
reading of migration – in which the nation state as the main holder of the monopoly 
of migration controls is inscribed into a broader “methodological nationalism” [De 
Genova, 2005, 2010; Giddens, 1973, 1975; Martin, 1974] and “state ontology” 
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[Truong, Gasper 2011]. Moreover, what comes to the forefront through the 
diagnostic tool of governmentality is the diffraction of borders and the non-
coincidence with geopolitical frontiers, produced mainly by the politics of 
externalization [Boswell, 2003] and through the invention of “embodied” borders or 
technological borders working at-a-distance [Amoore, 2006; Ball, 2005]. Finally, 
migration analyses working with the notion of governmentality have closely 
dissected and unpacked the discursive regime of migration agencies, focusing on the 
processes through which some subjects or phenomena become governable. To sum 
up, reading the migration regime through the lens of governmentality means to bring 
together two dimensions: the plurality of governmental actors and the heterogeneity 
of technologies of government, and at the same time the unceasingly redefinition of 
borders and the complexity of a migration “strugglefield” in-the-making, as a 
provisional outcome of practices of migration and techniques of capture (bordering). 
Thus, while the expression of “migration governance” [Betts, 2011, Cassarino, 
Lavenex, 2012; Kuntz, Lavenex, Panizzon, 2011] encompasses the intermeshing of 
different and sometimes conflicting practices into a horizontal and compact image of 
the migration regime, governmentality alerts us to the friability of this regime, 
presenting its supposed consistency as the provisional outcome of conflicting 
discourses, strategies and border struggles [Lemke, 2012]. If we want to trace a 
cartography that shows reinforcements and discontinuities between practices of 
movement and techniques of bordering, we must keep together the two levels of 
governmentality as framed by Foucault. In fact, governmentality refers both to an 
historically determined configuration of power and to a diagnostic tool for setting 
fields of problematization and framing powers and resistances into what I call a 
“strugglefield”11 [Foucault, 1996a, 2009]. In fact, migration controls and bordering 
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 The notion of “strugglefield” designates the strategic configuration of power relations and 
resistances: it frames the very relationship between power and resistances not as a dynamic of 
action/reaction but as an affrontement between forces, and in this way power is nothing but the 
present and unstable “winning strategy” [Foucault, 1978b]. This implicates that a) resistances cannot 
be but internal to pouvoir relations and that b) powers and resistances relate each other according to a 
sort of permanent limit [Foucault, 1978b]. Secondly, the notion of strugglefield conceives of 
governmentality as a conflicting space in which, as Foucault contends, the interrelation between 
government of the self and government of  others is precisely what makes it always possible to find 
leeway of resistances and points of fragility to invert, transform or break the existing configuration of 
power. In fact, the notion of strugglefield foregrounds that subjectivities are not eclipsed in the 
concept of governmentality but rather, are really at its core in the double meaning of « subject » 
(being subject to and being subject of). 
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techniques are constantly forced to reinvent themselves, and reassessing strategies 
and discourses in the face of practices of migration that do not work simply by 
“counter-acting” a border regime that is already there: rather they (sometimes) 
produce “voids” – for instance, crises in the functioning of partitioning categories 
and profiles of mobility – that cannot be filled by subject-positions and existing 
geometries of representation; or they make power respond “within the asymmetry” 
between the mechanisms of capture and migrants’ turmoil in spaces [Revel, 2008a, 
2011; Sossi, 2012a]. It follows that the narrative about who needs to be governed as 
a migrant, and how, and what exactly “governing” means,  constantly changes, and 
these shifts are precisely what should be the object of a genealogical approach. 
Instead, in migration analyses the paradigm of a global government of migration is 
posited in a trans-historical way: the displacements and the transformations of the 




Thus, hinging on the considerations above, the formula of “migration government” 
should not be used as a trans-historical catchword for addressing different contexts,  
in order not to fall into the trap of “presentism”, namely to make an analysis that 
erases the historical “thickness” of concepts and practices. The emergence of 
migration government as an object of the discursive regime and as an overarching 
concept travelling across disciplinary domains is a quite recent phenomenon, dating 
back to the 1950s. It was only through a series of juridical and political steps that 
something like a global migration regime was shaped, reaching its current juridical 
frame and political spread only in the early nineties [Geiger, Pecoud, 2010; Ghosh, 
2007, 2012]
13
 even though a binding international legal regime does not actually 
exist, yet. Only between 2003 and 2005 migration definitively became a central issue 
on the global policy agenda [Kalm, 2008]. Instead, the starting of a global regime of 
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 Addressing neoliberalism, Aiwha Ong contends that “new forms of governing and being governed 
and new notions of what it means to be human are at the edge of emergence” [Ong, 2006, p.4]. 
13
 In particular, the framing of migration government in term of “management” is very recent, as 
Geiger and Pecoud point out: “the notion of migration management was first elaborated in 1993 by 
Bimal Ghosh following requests from the UN Commission on Global Governance and the 
government of Sweden. In 1997 the United Nations Population Fund, together with the Dutch, 
Swedish and Swiss governments, financed the so-called NIromp project (New International Regime 
for Orderly Movements of People) […] The idea was that, in the post Cold-War era, migration had 
the potential to generate real crises and that a global and holistic regime of rules and norms was 
needed to successfully address the phenomenon”. 
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border technologies through the implantation of common standards and 
identification systems and controls at distance traces back to the last two decades of 
the 19
th
 century, as Adam Mc Keown put it: “the global system of migrant 
identification and control is not inherent to the existence of an international system. 
It was a fairly late development […] most of the basic principle of border control and 
techniques for identifying personal status were developed from the 1880s to 1910s 
[…] Migration control did not emerge as a logical or structural necessity of the 
international system but out of attempts to exclude people from that system” [Mc 
Keown, 2008, pp. 2-3, see also Plender, 1972]. 
The quite recent emergence of migration as a stable and coherent object of 
government suggests that the migration regime itself can be framed the in terms of a 
“strugglefield”, in order to stress its contingency and its contested nature14. 
Conceiving of it as a strugglefield means, paraphrasing Foucault, that migration 
policies and migrants’ practices “each constitutes for the other a kind of permanent 
limit, a point of possible reversal” [Foucault, 1982, p.279]. In addition to that, 
“strugglefield” refers to the idea of migration as the outcome of overlapping and 
conflicting social relations, or better as a practice and as a condition which involves 
a complex of social and power relations [Marx, 1990, 1991]. This refers 
simultaneously to two aspects: firstly, it means that being a migrant is not a natural 
condition but it is rather the outcome of political technologies, geopolitical 
asymmetries and class relations which come to “shape” the migrant condition as a 
social total fact [Sayad, 2004]; and secondly, it stresses the fundamental productivity 
of the migration regime in shaping and fixing identities. Nevertheless, it does not 
involve that migrants are merely produced: contrariwise, the strugglefield underlines 
precisely the strategic and conflicting dimension in which the migration game is 
played. Consequently, it is not a “field” perfectly distinct from others: on the 
contrary, as a set of social and power relations it influences and articulates with what 
is supposed to be outside of it. In other words, the notion of “strugglefield” avoids 
any binary division between migrants and non-migrants, complicating their mutual 
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 In this regard, it is important to notice that, as Karakayali and Rigo contend, despite the intention by 
European politicians to establish a common regime of immigration “what has been strengthened was 
the common administrative body of combating migration” [Karakayali, Rigo, 2010, p.131]. 
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and blurred interactions. However, if assumed as a field of social and power 
relations, it follows that what should be investigated about the migration 
strugglefield is its specific productivity. 
In the field of migration studies, the “entry” of governmentality as a grid came to 
foster the logic and the discourse of government, envisaging and speaking of a space 
of managed mobility: the stress on the heterogeneity of actors has on the one hand 
flattened the conflicting dimension underlying the two main questions, “who 
governs?” and “at what price?”, and on the other enhanced the idea of a smooth 
functioning of the mechanisms of control grounded on the coordination of multiple 
agencies. In this way, the productive and troubling force of resistances and migration 
practices within the architecture of migration government is eclipsed: but in fact, 
practices of migration and resistance at the border trouble the tenability of existing 
geographies of power, producing considerable re-arrangements in the “migration 
apparatus” [Feldman, 2011]. By fully assuming the vocabulary of migration policies 
and leaving unquestioned the postulate of migration as a phenomenon to govern, the 
governmentality grid has played as a “reinforcement operator” fostering the scaling 
up and the multiplication of “mobility profiles” (illegal migrant, economic migrant, 
asylum seeker, bogus refugee, refugee, high-skilled migrant…). Against this 
backdrop, I propose to reverse the paradigm of government and its supposed 
consistency: instead of assuming the nexus mobility-government as a point of 
departure, I reframe the notion of migration government in the wake of Foucault’s 
definition of dispositive as a formation having a strategic function. By taking the 
migration regime in reverse and by surprise, critical analysis should crack the 
solidity of any border regime. It means to account for the frantic running-after of 
migration policies and knowledges in order to keep up with a spatial and political 
“mess”. Pushing this perspective forward, taking the governmental frame in reverse 
and by surprise allows us to see the “politics of pillage” which sustains migration 
governmentality: knowledge production on migrations is based on studying, 
capturing and hijacking knowledge of migrations. In fact, the “knowledge based 
governance” could not exist regardless of the (study of) migrants’ strategies and 
practical knowledges in order to invent new mechanisms of capture and for 
anticipating migrants’ border crossing [Karakayali, Tsianos, 2010]. In this sense, the 
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map of migration governmentality is always a “backed-up cartography”: a map that 
pillages subjected or invisible knowledges, in this case especially non discursive 
knowledges, corresponding to migrants’ strategies. Some knowledegs and practices 
remain off the map, in part because they are disqualified by the epistemic and 
political thresholds of the “citizenship order” and in part as strategies of 
imperceptibility enacted by migrants to escape mechanisms of capture [Tsianos, 
2007]. After all, the map traced out by migration policies is a counter-map, since it is 
based on the pillage of those imperceptible knowledges, setting the boundaries to 
transform and translate (some of) these practices of movement into migrations that 
need be governed. In this sense, the theory of the autonomy of migration 
[Bojadzijev, Karakayali, 2010; Mezzadra, 2006, 2011c; Moulier-Boutang, 1998; 
Rodriguez, 1996] could be re-read along these coordinates: it refers less to the a 
temporal primacy of migrations over the politics of controls  than to the fundamental 
“hijacking gesture” through which migration policies act. Indeed, in order to 
concretely produce “migrant subjects”, migration and border policies monitor, 
pillage and run after strategies of migration in order to produce governmental 
knowledge and migration cartography. It is just this off the map dimension that 
interests Foucault when he refers to the “subjected knowledges” that are objectified 
through human sciences and the production of knowledges on life. Off the map, 
more than silenced subjects to be heard or to make speak and to make visible, 
according to the logic of “counter-acts”: instead, subjects and practices off the map 
that produce breaking points into the cartographic order, cracking some thresholds of 
perceptibility or interrupting some mechanisms of capture. Moreover, as off the map, 
practices of struggle could take place without addressing the existing scene of 
political recognition, and in this sense they destitute the legitimacy of power. In this 
light, analyses which centre on struggles for being recognized as political subjects 
[Isin, 2012; Mouffe, 2005; Ranciere, 2006] or as subjects as such [Butler, 2006a] 
take for granted the space where one is supposed to make a claim, the desirability of 
such a (political) space and inadvertently validate the functioning of power.   




However, saying that knowledge on migrations pillages and responds to the 
knowledge of migrations, doesn’t mean that governmental technology works only by 
reaction. In fact, along with that, the technologies of b-ordering and detention – 
indicating in this way the two main functions of borders, namely 
blocking/containing/filtering on the one hand, and disciplining/managing/monitoring 
on the other hand – are characterized by their high degree of productivity [Anderson, 
Sharma, Wright, 2011]. Most importantly, borders  not only cut (across) spaces but 
also produce differences in spaces – differences of status, differences of mobility, 
differences in the ways in which borders are enacted and crossed. To put it 
otherwise, the substantial productivity of borders and their transforming nature go 
along with an unceasing proliferation of borders
15
. First of all, borders are traced 
through the current prolific discursive production of migration agencies which 
responds to the “migratory disturbance”, envisaging new spaces and times of 
governability [Hess, 2012] – externalized protection, circular migration programs, 
mobility channels, and humanitarian corridors. Nevertheless, this productivity of 
spaces should be better qualified: in fact, what is at stake is not only the proliferation 
of borders due to the tracing of spatial zones (zones of humanitarian protection, 
zones of detention and zones of free circulation) but also an even production of 
spaces. Or better, migration policies instantiate “conditional spatialities”, that is 
spaces that exist only for some categories of mobile people: the most pertinent 
example is the access to the European internal space of free mobility that third-
country nationals could gain through the visa; and Mobility Partnership centres 
precisely on facilitating some categories of migrants to get it. However, beyond the 
selective nature of the visa – which depends on a labour contract – actually, even if 
third-countries establish Mobility Partnership with the European Union, migrants 
could not circulate freely in the European space, but only in the member states that 
signed the agreement. Or if we think about the so much promoted Euro-
Mediterranean area of free exchange, it is quite evident that such a space, which has 
not any geographical coordinate, really exists only for a very small percentage of the 
citizens of the southern shore of the Mediterranean: migrants coming by boat are not 
part of that economic and political picture. Thus, first of all borders produce 
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conditional and provisional spaces; but through migration policies and administrative 
measures of deportation and exclusion, they generate also exclusionary “secure” 
zones or spaces of citizenship that emerge as “the result of the restrictions” 
[Karakayali, Rigo, 2010]. But dislocating the gaze towards practices of migrations 
and taking them as a vantage point, the other fundamental issue to rise is that the 
migration regime produces interruptions and introduces different forms and degrees 
of precarization. In fact, as I will show in the second and in the fifth chapter, both 
collective migrant struggles and singular stories, reveal that what characterizes 
governmental technologies for governing migrants is a substantial fragmentation of 
migrants lives and journeys, imposing an uneven and unpredictable pace of 
(im)mobility. Such a fragmentation is produced through administrative measures or 
identification techniques, imposing indefinite stop-overs or putting them in a 
“bounce-game” – made of bureaucratic hindrances, national boundaries, labour 
contracts and juridical decrees. In this way, the consequence is an indefinite 
lengthening of migrants’ (interrupted) movements: thus, more and beyond blocking 
migrants’ movements, what seems to emerge is the “irregularity” of a protracted 
mobility in the twofold sense of the term “irregular”: both as a form of mobility 
“illegalized” and as a production of discontinuity in the movements. At the same 
time, as I said, the migration regime “precarizes” migrants’ lives [Neilson, Rossiter, 
2008], introducing differentiated forms and degrees of economic and existential 
precarization, according to a variable range of mobility profiles which goes from 
“economic migrants” up to “mobile person/non-migrants”. Obviously this second 
aspect – precarization - is linked to the former – fragmentation - since the 
precariousness of the (heterogeneous) migrant conditions is made possible and 
fostered precisely due to the forced fragmentation of lives and journeys. The 
disposability of migrants’ time is coupled with labour policies which push for a 
constant turnover of migrant labour force and hampering instead any persistence on 
the European soil. 
Conditional spaces troubled by Tunisian migrants: 
Tunisian migrants’ spatial upheavals destabilized and also shook for some time such 
a logic: they enacted their freedom of movement through collective departures and 
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careless of the conditional spaces of free mobility traced by migration policies. But 
they troubled the differentiated regime of spaces not because they move illegally – 
this is the case on any undocumented migration, that is not “revolutionary” per se 
since illegalism is also part of migration governmentality; rather, their disruptive 
force relied in the fact of exceeding the expected terms of illegalism itself, arriving 
suddenly in a huge number on the tiny island of Lampedusa, without demanding any 
protection but only to be released for moving on
16
. Moreover, they mocked the pace 
of mobility established by Europe, that after the Tunisian revolution paved the way 
for “ordered” and selected channels of mobility to Europe to guarantee a “smooth 
transition to democracy”. Tunisian migrants troubled the uneven spatialities of free 
circulation because they did not come with the purpose to live in Europe or to find a 
job, as expected by migration policies: most of them, especially the youngest, left 
Tunisia just seizing the opportunity to visit Europe, and especially Paris where they 
had Tunisian relatives or friends. To put it differently, their subversive practice and 
their “scandal” consisted, after all, in inverting the direction of ordinary flows of 
bona-fide travellers – European tourists going to North Africa – by claiming their 
will to travel across Europe.  
Thus, the productivity of borders should be grasped especially “outside and beyond 
the texts”, stepping back from the narratives performed by governmental agencies. 
One clear example of the “governmental phantasy” figured by migration agencies is 
how Iom, envisages scenarios of governability that are not limited to controlling 
frontiers, stepping forward for instance as the main actor of the reconstruction of the 
economic stability Libya: “As almost 11 per cent of the Libyan population, pre-
crisis, was composed of foreigners [...] reconstruction efforts in Libya may encounter 
serious economic and social problems if they cannot attract both skilled and low-
skilled migrants to return to help and rebuild the country [...] Given the situation of 
returnees, further migration is a viable adaptation strategy for many. Provided the 
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 However, such a description could run the risk to corroborate the rhetoric of the invasion: thus, in 
this regard it is important to notice that the total number of undocumented migrants coming from 
North Africa did not considerably increase in 2011 - for instance, the total number of “irregular” 
arrivals by sea in Europe in 2006 was of 60 000 while in 2011 was of 54 000). Moreover, in 2011the 
most of them came from Morocco and not from Tunisia or Egypt [Fargue, Fandrich, 2012]. 
41 
 
current governments were amenable, migrants could return to Libya, to aid in 
reconstruction efforts” [Iom, 2012a].  
On this point, Foucault’s analytics of power certainly brings into focus the 
essentially productive dimension of power’s mechanisms, without however denying 
or overshadowing the repressive local functions at play in a broader economy of 
power. However, the first Lectures of Security, Territory, Population, on the 
relationship between space, circulation and mechanisms of security, adds an 
important contribution [Foucault, 2009]: not only do the politics of migration 
incessantly produce and reproduce borders, but borders themselves are producers of 
differences,
17
 as they complicate and fragment the geometry of spaces. However, 
beyond dodging or interrupting some mechanisms of capture, sometimes practices of 
migrations crack for some moments the governmental matrix and the pact between 
governors and governed, making tangible the unbearable nature of power over lives. 
These interruptions at times take place through the practice of an illegalized mobility 
that does not respect the temporal pace of the selected politics of mobility [Garelli, 
2013], or mess up the very logic of belonging which tries to stretch the borders of 
citizenship, or make unworkable the partitioning between different “mobility 
profiles” (asylum seeker/ economic migrant/ bogus refugee/ high skilled migrant). 
All this was particularly evident with the arrival of Tunisian migrants in the 
European space in 2011 and 2012: what emerged was their will to come and move 
across Europe, practising the same free internal mobility earmarked for European 
citizens. Moreover, they didn’t ask for asylum or protection, rather they staged 
somehow “groundless” practices of movement, an “unentitled” freedom exceeding 
the channels of the expected forms of mobility. “We don’t want to stay in Italy, we 
want to move, going to Europe, to France […] we don’t need anything from the 
Italian government, only to be released from this tiny island and a paper to move”18. 
And at the same time they didn’t see Europe as an idyllic space for human rights; on 
the contrary, they opposed the fake European democracy to the Tunisian 
revolutionary experience: “How is it possible that we are in Europe, the supposed 
place of human rights and we are left in these conditions? Is this Europe? We want 
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 Social and economic differences but also differences at the level of the “pace of mobility”. 
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 http://www.storiemigranti.org/spip.php?article872  
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just to remind that we hosted thousands and thousands of people escaping from 
Libya, and Italians are not able to solve this situation”. 
If we look at these practices through the frame of rights, what gets lost is precisely 
the refusal to play within the space and the coordinates traced by power: in fact, 
more than claiming a right to freely move, Tunisian migrants made a space for 
themselves by taking it over, irrespective of its “legitimacy”, so sweeping away any 
conditionality and exclusionary access that the frame of rights necessarily 
instantiates [De Genova, 2010a; Honig, 2006; Sossi, 2012]. I would read this as 
practices of mobility that refuse to play the game of power – that refuse to make 
claims that are accommodated into the boundaries of visibility and acceptability, e.g. 
the claim to be protected as refugees. Moreover, the formula of the “claim” is in 
itself encapsulated within a regime of recognition that set the tone of what practices 
are audible or visible; thus, the structure of the claim involves that subjects are 
expected to demand in accordance with the terms and conditions set by the 
“governmental pact”. 
A politics of dis-charge: 
Thus far, I illustrated that governmental maps on migration hijack and respond to the 
strategies and the knowledges of migrations. Then, I stressed the substantial 
recalcitrance of migrations taking place in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings in 
fitting into the terms of political recognition and representational politics. Hinging 
on these considerations, I examine the ambivalence that is at play in the effective 
mechanisms of the migration. I would call this ambivalent tactic a “politics of dis-
charge”, meaning by this a technique of government grounded on two simultaneous 
moves: on the one hand, politics of control and humanitarian assistance, and on the 
other  a practice of letting people be undetected, stranded or at the mercy of fate 
(discharging). In other words, what I question is the idea that migrants are precisely 
the subjects that are governed more than others, assuming the notion of 
“government” as defined by Foucault but less in its more formal meaning – 
government means to structure the field of actions of  others [Foucault, 1982, 1997] 
– than in this pastoral version [Foucault, 2009]. This involves that in addition to 
taking in reverse and by surprise the discourse of migration government as 
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“geopolitical phenomenon” – disengaging ourselves from the governmental phantasy 
that migration policies perform – we should question migration governance also as a 
government of conducts of mobility.  
In fact, practices of movements are labelled, fixed and spatialized through “mobility 
profiles” and legal “geographies” [Basaran, 2011]. Categories that, as I will explain 
in the third chapter, in the case of the rejected refugees of Choucha have been 
assumed and then reversed in sign or altered in their function – “We all fled from the 
same war, we need the same solution. Give our lives back”. However, if to embrace 
of the same categories through which people are told and governed by power could 
be tactically useful in some specific moments – especially in the short run, when it is 
a question of claiming rights or protection – the time and the context in which we 
should try to “depart from” from those identifications is one of the main political 
stakes that Foucault suggests to address. In fact, referring to the feminist and 
homosexual movements of the seventies, the French philosopher notices that their 
political force lay not only in their claim to be recognized for their sexual specificity, 
but in going beyond it, disengaging from the very normative frame of sexuality. 
These movements invented and put into practice new forms of sociability and 
existence beyond the codes and the boundaries of the dispositive of sexuality. The 
category of “migrant” is certainly the first “mobility identity” to challenge, both on 
the part of those who write on migration, and by those who are labelled as 
“migrants”. If “who is a migrant?” undoubtedly represents the primary and 
underlying question to denaturalize the normative category of “migrant”, once we try 
to answer this question, we realize that it is almost impossible to abstract from the 
situatedness of specific times and contexts. This difficulty confirms the historical 
fluctuation of the meanings and of the objects of migration government: who is 
“made up” [Hacking, 2004b] and governed as a migrant it changes over time. Thus, 
we could try to sidestep, or better to reformulate the question through two other 
questions. Who today and in this context is “migrantized” (namely, becoming 
migrant) in the face of the current processes of impoverishment? And, jointly: Who, 
today, in this specific political context, is labelled and governed as a migrant by 
migration policies? In other words, the geopolitical location, the mechanisms of 
precarization and the political inscription of bodies into mobility profiles need to be 
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rethought together. Basically, we should take into account the sorting and labelling 
process enacted by migration policies which have the power to “transform” practices 
of mobility into migrations; and simultaneously, we should consider the migrant also 
as a social and economic condition related to an array of mechanisms of 
precarization that bring about a forced and restricted mobility. Forced mobility 
facing the high rate of unemployment, but also forms of mobility more and more 
subjected to binding conditions. Confronted with that, the stake becomes how to 
release from the normative production of mobility profiles; and, related to that, how 
to resist the translation of some practices of movements into migration flows. But in 
the meantime, the concrete processes that redefine the conditions of (im)mobility in 
the light of the economic crisis require an in-depth investigation. Indeed, it is by 
articulating these two interrogations that it becomes possible to disconnect the 
normative force played by the category of the migrant without losing its political 
value. 
Transformative critique and the making of interruptions 
Independently from the degree of friability of the migration regime, those who are 
labelled “migrants” come up against mechanisms of capture and selection. This is an 
order of the discourse which traces a “moral geography” by sorting people into 
exclusionary channels of mobility and corridors of layered protection. In a nutshell, 
migration policies work through the fixation of the “legitimate” (dis)locations of 
bodies in space. Translated in spatial terms, they operate through disconnections and 
displacements of subjects from their ways of being in the space: a set of 
interpositions between subjects and the space where they move on or stay, making 
some people not expected in some spaces. The effects of truth and power generated 
by the politics of knowledge of migration management need to be situated in the 
present scenario of a blooming of writings, videos and reports that denounce human 
rights violations and arbitrary treatment to which migrants are very often subjected. 
As McLagan, and McKee argue in Sensible Politics, “politics revolves around what 
can be seen, felt, sensed. These forms [the medial forms] have force in shaping 
people as subjects and constituting the contours of what is perceptible” [Mc Kee, Mc 
Lagan, 2012 p. 9]. This is an important point, I contend, since it tries to sidestep the 
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primacy of the visible and visibility as the major stakes for a contested politics of 
mobility, reframing the issue in terms of perceptibility. Nevertheless, it remains to be 
questioned if perceptibility itself could be narrowed to and transformed by yet again 
visual practices. Secondly, we should question whether politics is only a matter of 
altering the codes and the thresholds of perceptibility or if such an alteration needs to 
go along with a radical unsettlement of the posture of the subject-spectator, and with 
struggles challenging the actual disposition of bodies and movements in space. It is 
undeniable that the strategy of unmasking power and entering spaces of detention to 
see how migration governance operates beyond the texts, had a considerable bearing 
in criticizing migration governmentality, in a different way from solidarity 
campaigns or humanitarian approaches: through this, violations and violences are 
shown as constitutive elements of the migration regime. In fact, administrative 
arbitrariness in detention centres or the non-compliance of the state with  
international law about rescue at sea, or with  European standards of data gathering, 
should not be seen as a deviation from an ideal global migration regime but as its 
effective “economic operator” [Foucault, 1980a, p. 136]. Finally, if the mechanism 
worked as it was supposed to work in migration policies texts, there would not be 
“illegal” migrations at all. At the same time, if we remain at the level of the texts of 
migration agencies, some intents and cornerstones of the present migration regime 
become unquestioned common narratives: for instance, the aim to promote circular 
migration, in order to make migrants’ labour force disposable for EU member states, 
is at the core of the EU document that in 2006 introduced the concept of Mobility 
Partnership. And it constitutes the bulwark upon which the recent EU Privileged 
Partnerships with Tunisia (December 2012) and Morocco (June 2013) have also 
been negotiated. However, if circular migration is certainly one of the leading 
strategies on paper, it should be investigated which, among the strategies proposed in 
bilateral agreements, are really deployed – for instance, the fight against illegal 
immigration, or the setting of a “pre-frontier”, or the facilitation of visa for certain 
categories of migrants.  
The broader question to raise at this point is the following: “what comes after (and 
alongside) the critique?”, and jointly, “what should a critique trigger?”. Concerning 
the first point, it could be suggested that the growing amount of images and critical 
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analyses that circulate nowadays has paradoxically produced a sort of anaesthetising 
effect, increasing the threshold of tolerance when faced with those images, and 
narrowing the involvement in struggles to a question of “disobedient gaze”. The 
second and related question – “what, today, should a critique of the migration regime 
stir up?” – addresses an issue that is central in Foucault’s reports on the Gip (Group 
d’information sur les prisons): how to make visible the intolerable character of 
power. Rephrasing Foucault’s reflections on the struggles over prisons, it could be 
stated that the goal is neither to make the prisons visible nor to make detainees aware 
of the injustice of the mechanism of detention but rather to make detention 




These considerations on the function of critique lead us to ask from what position 
and in which way to resist techniques of bordering. These questions cannot be 
answered regardless of the specific historical and political conditions affecting 
migrants. Indeed, this point becomes more evident if we consider how migration 
categories impact on migrants in different ways, producing diverse forms of 
existence: migrants off the map, labour migrants, refugees, visa overstayers… And 
this variety upholds the importance of pluralizing and fragmenting the supposed 
compactness of the catch-word of “migrant” in our analyses, just because the “legal 
geographies” and the production of migration categories have tangible effects on 
migrants’ lives, shaping their conditions of mobility. As Foucault underlines, 
resistances to a certain regime of truth cannot come but from the inside of that 
regime, namely by those subjects who are produced by that system of veridiction 
[Foucault, 2009, 2010]. However, one could object that not only migrants but 
anyone is subjected to the politics of mobility, both on a global scale and at the local 
level. Moreover, many of the techniques of surveillance adopted to control migrant’s 
movements are also employed to monitor and manage, in a different way, the 
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 As Foucault put it talking about the activity of the Gip, “our inquiry does not aim at gathering 
knowledges but to increase our intolerance transforming it into an active intolerance” [Foucault, 
1971]. In short, the very strategic positioning of the Gip consisted not in raising awareness about how 
power works in the prisons or in denouncing its arbitrariness, but rather in spilling over the prison 
itself, overstepping the boundaries of that site stressing how that political technology permeates many 
others spaces. This practical-political positioning is related to what I call “a movement-towards-the-
outside” of the prison itself. 
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mobility of the “non-migrants” [Bigo, 2005; Pickering, Weber, 2006]. Nonetheless, a 
distinctive factor could be identified: by translating some practices of movement into 
migrations, migratory policies have a concrete impact on the existence that people 
could effectively live once they are labelled “migrants” by states and governmental 
agencies; thus, it follows that the condition of being governed as a migrant finally 
corresponds to being involved in specific stugglefields that do not concern all mobile 
people. From this perspective, it is necessary to reiterate the question: “who has 
become/is becoming a migrant here and now?”, taking “migrant” in the double 
meaning of subject of migratory policies and subject of the real process of 
migrantization. Challenging, interrupting, criticizing, infringing, escaping, and 
subtracting: all these verbs signal strategies of resistance and different modalities of 
“counter-acting” that we find at play in the forms of struggle and existence of and 
about migrants. To what extent can a critique of the government of migration, as 
radical and troublesome as it could be, be effective in producing interruptions in the 
functioning of migration governmentality? Indeed, an interruption cannot be 
generated other than from within the regime of truth, and consequently by the side of 
those who, from time to time, are labelled as “migrants” or are migrantized 
[Plascencia, 2009]. To put it differently, for a temporary short-circuit to be produced, 
someone has to be in the condition of striving for escape, subtracting from that 
regime because of the unbearable impacts on his/her life. Instead, critique does not 
implicate that one resists, escapes or intends to do that: rather, the critical gesture 
involves keeping at distance. This consideration suggests that one is a migrant when, 
in order to move or stay in a place, needs to resist or dodge the politics of control. 
Take for instance the airport, that is a site of controls “at high density” where that 
fact of all being governed by a global regime of mobility emerges clearly; however, 
at the same time, it makes visible the unequal distribution of the “grip” of the politics 
of mobility as well as the different degrees of tolerance towards controls: despite the 
criticisms against systems of surveillance and forms of remote control, the ordinary 
gestures of showing the passport to national authorities or passing through the body-
scanner are accepted by bona-fide travellers. In other words, people who have all the 
papers to move legally shift from a critique of the intrusive character of controls and 
their “desirability” as dispositives that make freedom possible [Bigo, 2011; Foucault, 
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2009; Mc Grath, 2004]
20
. The ambivalences of the desirability of controls should 
also be considered: controls appear not only useful but also desirable when it 
becomes a concern of public security, when controls are applied for sifting and 
selecting travellers in order to prevent acts of terrorism. If we refuse to take on 
migration as a domain per se, governed by exceptional self-standing laws, and we 
situate it rather in the global labour regime, it becomes perceivable that an ease of 
circulation in space is not necessarily index of a (high) degree of freedom and 
autonomy from the government of mobility [De Genova, 2013a; Mezzadra, 2006]. 
The relative mobility ease of high-skilled migrants all over the world is enhanced by 
economic actors; and thus, it is not so evident that less obstructive conditions of 
movement and the “softness” of controls stand for much freedom from mechanisms 
of exploitation and regulation. As Didier Bigo remarks, “under liberal 
governmentality, mobility is translated into a discourse of freedom of circulation, 
which reframes freedom as moving without being stopped […] freedom has often 
been reduced to freedom of movement” [Bigo, 2011, p.31]. 
Actually, critique can be conceived not as a challenge to the power in place but as a 
critical attitude: in this way, critique is primarily a posture “which consists in seeing 
on what types of assumptions, of familiar notions, of established, unexamined ways 
of thinking the accepted practices are based […] Understood in this sense, criticism 
is utterly indispensable for any transformation” [Foucault, 1994b, pp.456-457]. Once 
posited in these terms, what remains open is the question that Foucault himself 
raises: “what to do then, with this evidence?” which in our case becomes “how to 
link the critique of the technologies of profiling with a possible struggle against 
them?” [Foucault, 1982]. Concerning the government of migrations, this could be 
translated in the attempt to speak of the practices of movement and “spatial 
insistence” [Sossi, 2012c] without translating them immediately into “migrations”, 
trying to break the chain of partitions (economic migrants/refugees/clandestine 
migrant/denied refugee…) and the chain of equivalents (illegal migration = 
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 As Didier Bigo stresses, “the advantage of smart surveillance is that […] for these normalized 
individuals it would seem to be less of a problem. They appear to be free so long as they do not see 
those who are controlling their movements, so long as they are not stopped during their journey [...] 
This attitude in accepting surveillance is related to this sense that comfort is as important as freedom 
[…] reassured that they are like a community of travellers where all bad apples have been prevented” 
[Bigo, 2011, pp. 41-46].  
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phenomenon to govern = dangerous mob) [Laclau, 2007] that from time to time is 
reproduced and redefined. Such a critique could engender some crisis in the 
reiterative mechanism of the worldmaking of migrations [Walters, 2013] – namely, 
in the discursive and non-discursive production of the “world” of migration as an 
object of government. Such a critique shifts from the question “who is a migrant?” to 
the twofold question, always historically and spatially located: who is said to be a 
migrant, here and now, by migration policies? And who has been migrantized by 
processes of precarization? That is, we need to speak of and account for practices of 
movement without translating some of them immediately into “migrations” [De 
Genova, 2013b]. Critique and transformation go together. But practices of migration 
sometimes succeed in making interruptions at/of the borders, without necessarily 
transforming or challenging those borders. To put it concisely, migrants are not 
interested in exploding partitioning categories or in subverting the discursive regime, 
but rather in moving or persisting in some spaces. I think that this is an important 
point to bear in mind and that very often gets lost: by enacting practices of mobility, 
migrants misfire or make spin freely the spatialization of people’s movements that 
migration policies put into place: but they misfire it not because they contest its 
mechanisms or because they enact extreme forms of resistance, but for the simple 
fact of moving or staying. However, I don’t conceive here “interruption” as an event 
which suddenly breaks the political space creating a new order [Badiou, Zizek, 
2009]. In fact, the association between interruption and event should be rethought in 
the light of what we mean by event: “it is not a decision or a fight but a rapport of 
forces that overturns, a confiscated power, a vocabulary that is appropriated and 
turned over against its users […] the forces at play in history obey neither a destiny 
nor a mechanics but the hazard of the struggles” [Foucault, 1984a, p.1016]. From 
this standpoint, interruptions are seen as a force which at some point breaks some 
power’s functioning from within that field of power relations, that is as subjects 
governed by that regime. Moreover, the concept of interruption is posited as a central 
tenet in many philosophical analyses on the subjects’ agency and on the ways in 
which borders and norms are deeply challenged by unexpected acts of discourses 
enacted by those “who are not covered by those norms or have not entitlement to 
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occupy the place of the who” [Butler, 1997, p. 367; see also Isin, 2008, 2012; 
Laclau, 2005; Ranciere, 2004].  
The paradigm of the active migrant-citizen. A critical account 
What all these analyses share, beyond their specific formulations and approaches – 
acts of citizenship theory, radical democracy, performative acts – is the “script of 
interruption” through which they frame the relation between politics and 
subjectivity. By “script of interruption” I mean the bursting into the scene of the 
political by “claimant subjects” who perform “an act that does not exist or an act that 
already exists but that is enacted by a political subject who does not exist in the eyes 
of the law. Presences that defy where an act can be staged” [Isin, 2012]. From such a 
perspective, politics is designated as the action which transforms the space into a 
space for the appearance of the subject [Rancière, 2001]. According to this 
discourse, the moment of the interruption coincides with the emergence of political 
subjectivities. Thus, subjects who are “at the borders” of representative politics are 
supposed to lay claim in order to be counted into the order of citizenship, stretching 
boundaries and norms: migrants become the central figures of these analysis due to 
the “subject position” they embody. These readings have played an eminent function 
in reversing traditional political postures, by drawing the attention to the ways in 
which the “inside” – the space of citizenship – is defeated and rearticulated by the 
“outside” through the acts of those subjects who are excluded from that space.  
The “interruptions” produced by Tunisian migrants in the time of the Arab 
revolutions were predicated neither on the possibility of transforming the regime of 
borders and visibility nor on a claim to be included in the space of citizenship. In 
fact, as Ranabir Samaddar remarks, the emergence of a political subject which is 
“out of place” or “unexpected” in a given political space (as migrants) “exceeds the 
rule of politics” [Samaddar, 2009, intro p.15]: it always comes out as a supplement 
regarding to that space, and it is “fundamentally a matter of non-correspondence 
with the dominant reality. Political subject exceeds rules of politics” [Samaddar; 
2009, intro p.16] this is way the term of citizen cannot encapsulate the huge variety 




Instead, the script of the “scene of answerability” that underlies those analyses on 
citizenship and migrants’ subjectivity leaves a huge array of migrant struggles under 
the threshold of perceptibility, relegating them as pre-political languages. As in the 
case of Tunisian migrants, most of the time undocumented migrants who interrupt 
for some moments the functioning of borders neither engage in an outstanding 
visible claim nor do they perform creative acts: in this sense, the scheme of “agency” 
is grounded on a too “exigent” model of subjectivity, tracing out exclusionary 
borders of what can be defined a political practice and what acts produce political 
subjectivity. This is particularly evident in the case of Citizenship Studies, in which 
migrants’ strategies are generally framed in terms of agency [Coutin, 2011; 
McNevin, 2006; Nyers, 2006, 2011; Nyers, Rygel 2012]. This literature has 
contributed to reformulate the theory of the autonomy of migrations, stripping it of 
the conflicting dimension upon which this latter is predicated. To explain this 
argument I ground on the binary divisions that characterize critical Migration 
Studies, and on the individualism that underlies the category of agency. Migrations 
are usually depicted as phenomena taking place in-between an inside-outside 
political move: migrants are basically those who try to become part of a certain space 
or that stretch the borders of citizenship and belonging. By binary divisions I mean 
also the way of pigeonholing migrants’ practices of resistance according to clear 
profiles of subjectivities fixed in advance: claimant subjects, victims, vulnerable 
subjects, agent subjects. Moreover, such a classification contributes to partition 
between active migrant subjects and “vulnerable” migrants (as for instance 
refugees), tracing a moral cartography of migrations: if the latter are mainly the 
object of attention in Refugee Studies, “active migrants” are of concern in 
Citizenship Studies. This leads to the individualising character of agency: while the 
theory of the autonomy of migrations stresses the collective dimension of migrants’ 
strategies, framing them in terms of “movements”, to the contrary the focus on 
agency brings attention to individual abilities and will in challenging the border of 
the political, reproducing an image of subjectivity grounded on the liberal paradigm. 
As Papadopoulos and Tsianos point out, drawing on the autonomy of migration 
framework, “the concept of migration does not mean flattening out their differences; 
rather, it attempts to articulate their commonalities which stem from all these 
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different struggles for movement […] The supposedly abstract and homogenising 
category of migration does not attempt to unify all the existing multiplicity of 
movements under one single logic, but to signify that all these singularities 
contribute to an affective and generic gesture of freedom” [Papadopoulos, Tsianos, 
2013, p. 185].  
In other words, two different ideas of autonomy sustain migration analyses on 
agency and the theory of the autonomy of migration: while the latter conceives of 
autonomy within the frame of collective movements, drawing on the workerist 
tradition, the former refers to agency for depicting autonomous subjects unsettling 
and addressing the scene of visibility. Secondly, the emphasis on agency and on 
symbolic gestures tends to overlook the material conditions in which many 
undocumented migrants live, and thus the deadlocks migrants can come across in 
enacting public protests. The third element of criticism concerns the temporality of 
struggles: in fact, agency is focused on the punctual disruptive moment of the act. 
Shifting from the moment of border crossing towards the “migrant condition” – as a 
concrete practice of living that (undocumented) migrants experience daily – makes it 
possible to dislocate migrants’ practices on a different temporality, a temporal 
dimension usually dismissed by activists. In fact, once a given discursive frame or a 
political space is cracked by migrants’ presence, what gets lost are the consequences 
of these acts on migrants themselves, given deportability is the primary weapon that 
states have [De Genova, 2010b]. Instead, by assuming “agency” as the prism to 
codify migrants’ struggles, the risk is to reiterate the theoretical gesture that 
designates as “disruptive” and “political” those practices which can easily be 
codified or understood through existing categories. Thus, to dwell upon what comes 
before and after the disruptive moment means to pay attention to the consequences 
of producing interruptions for those who are not part of the “citizen contract”: the 
detainability and deportability of undocumented migrants are the conditions upon 
which the fragmented temporality of migrants’ practices is predicated. Thus, the 
coupling of transformation and interruption can take place only when practices last 
in time: the challenge of the subject position that migrants are expected to fill does 
not necessarily correspond to the production of a different order. Quite to the 
contrary, the condition of being spoken and labelled by power, becoming visible 
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only in a clash with it – in its discourses or through its administrative techniques of 
identification – makes it difficult for destituent practices to transform into constituent 
movements [Balibar, Brossat, 2011]. And also the possibility for subjects to depart 
from migration categories is a quite wearing task. After all, the vanishing presence of 
migrants on the public scene relates to the lacks of traces that their presence leaves 
on the ground: in other words, how to account for subjects who can neither emerge 
on the “scene of address” nor be narrated if not after encountering power? In this 
regard, Foucault’s text Lives of Infamous Men stages this point very clearly: “In 
order for some of them to reach us, a beam of light had to illuminate them, for a 
moment at least. A light coming from elsewhere. What snatched them from the 
darkness in which they could, perhaps should, have remained was the encounter with 
power” [Foucault, 1994c, p.161]. Thus, by narrowing politics to the moment of 
rupture one fails to take into account the intense and more invisible activity of norms 
in shaping subjects. Foucault’s analyses on the production of individuals through the 
working of norms and knowledges, highlights that the focus on subjects making 
interruption of borders cannot be detached from a questioning of the “costs” and 
conditions to become a subject. In other words, the fact of being identified as 
“undocumented migrant” embodies in very concrete conditions of (in)visibility and 
exploitability which shape the leeway of the daily strategies of existence [Sossi, 
2007]. And since a shared or homogenous migrant condition does not exist, the 
supposed subject position of “undocumented migrant” multiplies and corresponds to 
highly different “costs” and conditions of subjectivity.  
The exclusionary space of address: 
Mainstream analyses on citizenship and “its others” are grounded on the idea that 
migrants’ struggles can be ultimately framed as claims to integration within the 
political space of citizenship and to gain recognition as political subjects. Against 
this background, some scholars have started to challenge this paradigm positing that 
citizenship is constantly defeated by migrants that impose to redefine the boundaries 
and the conditions of “being political” [Isin, 2002, 2006; Mc Nevin, 2006; Nyers, 
2003, 2011; Rygel, 2011]. Secondly, they put into motion and stretched the notion of 
citizenship, assuming it not only as a juridical status but as the result of acts of 
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claims. However, what remains unquestioned in these analyses is the validity of the 
paradigm of citizenship for speaking of a multiplicity of migrant struggles that 
actually neither claim for citizen status nor demand to be included in the boundaries 
of civil society. And, ultimately, they postulate a model of political subjectivity and 
of political movement shaped according to the coordinates of Western activism. 
Indeed, as Angela Mitropolous remarks, migrants as ultimately seen as subjects who 
need to struggle to become political and “talking” subjects: “political subjectivity is 
invoked on condition of assuming the perspective of the State” and migration is 
assumed as “implying the absence of political decision and action” [Mitropoulos, 
2007, p.11]. In this regard, let’s turn the attention to the presence of thousands of 
Tunisian migrants in the streets of Lampedusa. March 2011: migrants’ claim “we 
don’t want to stay here – in Italy – we want to move away and go to Europe” 
resounded on the overcrowded island in response to the cameras and journalists that 
were there to foster the “spectacle of the border” [Cuttitta, 2012; De Genova, 2011]; 
troubling at the same time the desirability of (Italian) citizenship – no demand of 
international protection or of institutional assistance – and European geography: Italy 
is not the real Europe. After all, as “sons of the Tunisian revolution” they did not 
come here to see what democracy is, but rather they often present themselves as 
those who made the revolution for democracy in Tunisia, displacing the common 
imaginary of Europe as the most desirable space and of migrants coming from 
nowhere lands to get in contact with the “advanced democratic societies” [Rose, 
1996, 1999].  
This episode raises the following question: is it possible to identify the claims that 
every struggle raises and its space of address [Rancière, 1995, 2004]? Or does it 
mean speaking in the name of the struggles of others? In fact, by deciding in advance 
and from the outside what these struggles stand for, we definitively trace the map 
and the borders of the space of their political movement, weakening their disruptive 
force. Encoding practices into a pre-established language of claims and into a given 
space of address means to translate the “noisy” migrants’ practices into the frame of 
recognition: the “scandal of democracy” [Rancière, 2004] cannot be grasped if 
interruptions of/at the borders are framed according to a centripetal move, that is 
envisaging a democracy-oriented move of migrants’ practices or a direction of their 
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demands given in advance. Indeed, many migrant struggles are not struggles because 
they challenge the discourse or the mechanisms of power, or because they address 
political institutions, but rather insofar as they crisscross and are involved in 
complex strugglefields, namely economic, administrative and discursive borders 
which migrants have to confront and by which they are shaped. Nevertheless, it is 
not only a question of breaking the pre-established set of claims- but also of taking 
into account the capitalistic economy and the international division of labour in 
which migrants are captured as living labour force [De Genova, 2010; Mezzadra, 
2007, 2011c]. This means to reconsider the outside position usually attributed in 
critical literature to undocumented migrants who try to disrupt and stretch the 
borders of the “inside” – the political space of citizenship – as if they would be out 
of any economic-political relation of power: instead, the contested political space 
that both Migration Studies and Citizenship Studies focus on, is situated in complex 
economic relations that by now play at a transnational level, and intertwines with 
many kinds of spatialities – for instance, the economic space which, in turn, is not a 
homogenous space but is formed of different spatial economies. Hence, it becomes 
problematic to pose an “outside” where migrants would be before being “captured” 
or integrated. After all, the degrees of “inside” and “outside” exceed the official 
demarcation of a political space of citizenship: as Partha Chatterjee shows, there are 
citizens who are de facto excluded by the realm of civil society and that conversely 
are subject to the “grasp” of governmental power [Chatterjee, 2005]. Before and in 
simultaneity with struggles that crack the functioning and the legitimacy of the 
borders of the “political” space of citizenship, migrants (as well as non-migrants) are 
within the meshes of multiple powers, among which the economic mechanisms of 
extraction of surplus-value are certainly the most confining [Chignola, Mezzadra, 
2012]. And Foucault’s analytic of governmentality allows challenging any 
inside/outside sharp spatial divide, not only displacing and multiplying the sites of 
power but also positing an inextricable interweave between the economics and 
techniques of government. In fact, in Foucault’s account of governmentality, 
economy is posited as the main knowledge through which governmental power 
works;
21
 its emergence as a discipline corresponds to the affirmation of modern 
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 As Foucault states in the Lecture of the 1st February 1978, “according to me, the fundamental stake 
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governmentality and the functioning of the mechanisms of security. At the same 
time, the economy that Foucault takes into account concerns power relations at large, 
namely the economy of power. In other words, economy stands also for the 
mechanisms and rationalities that determine the coherence of a technology of power. 
Talking about the liberalization of the circulation of grain in the 18th century, 
Foucault persuasively notes that juridical measures and proclamations are 
historically the result of major changes in the techniques of government, beyond and 
more than revolution in theoretical formulations.
22
 Therefore, what is in question is 
not so much the articulation between the political and the economic but their mutual 
constitution and finally the possibility to read the former through the lens of the 
latter. In fact, if it is true that Foucault stresses the autonomy and the specificity of 
power relations [Foucault, 1982, 1994b], the economy of power that he sees 
intermeshed and constitutive of the political concerns the practical governmental 
reason that regulates bodies and phenomena – “the government of men is a practice 
[…] that fixes the definition and respective positions of the governed and governors 
facing each other and in relation to each” [Foucault, 2009, p.12].  
Therefore, against the supposed exclusionary “pure” political space, a critical focus 
on migrations suggests looking at the articulation and at the multiplication of 
different spatialities, challenging the idea of spaces and subjects “out of” the 
political. This point relates to a broader salient issue that migrations foreground: the 
very concept of space requires not only to be pluralized but also “frayed” in its 
supposed homogeneity, especially regarding the differential access to mobility, 
which basically depends on how the “migrant condition” impacts differently on 
people’s lives. From this standpoint, migrations impose on us to shift the spatial gaze 
from the regime of visibility/ invisibility and circulation, towards a comprehensive 
investigation of the conditions at which flows and visibility are produced, 
highlighting “the inequalities of property and the process of labour exploitation” 
                                                                                                                                                                    
of government lies in the introduction of the economy into the political exercise” (Security, Territory, 
Population, p. 76) 
22
 In the well-known passage of Security, Territory, Population on physiocrats Foucault argues “What 
led to the great edicts or “declarations” of the years 1754-1764, maybe through and thanks to the 
relay, the support of the physiocrats and their theory, was in reality a complete change, […] in the 
techniques of government. In other words, you could read the principle of the free circulation of grain 
as the consequence of a theoretical field and also as an episode in the mutation of technologies of 
power” [Foucault, 2009, p.44]. 
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[Tsing, 1997, p.336]. In other words, as Anna Tsing poignantly put it, in looking 
only at the political cartography traced by the liberal discourse on mobility, “we lose 
sight of the material components through which sites are constructed and from which 
convincing claims about scale units and scales could be made […] A focus on 
circulation shows us the movement of people, things and idea, but it does not show 
us how this movement depends on defining tracks and grounds, scales or units of 
agency. Flow itself always involves making terrain” [Tsing, 1997, p.338]. Therefore, 
under what conditions and through what processes does a certain spatial 
configuration come to work as a baseline that posits the thresholds of perceptibility 
of practices and events? In his account of governmental reason and neoliberalism, 
Foucault addresses precisely this twofold issue: the economy of power in which 
freedom, and in particular freedom of circulation, is situated and predicated;
23
 and at 
the same time the kind of subjectivity that is at stake in that economy: what subject 
is produced or regulated by a specific technology of power. Consequently, instead of 
positing a space – the space of free mobility, or the space of citizenship – as a 
bounded unit, and instead of assuming a subject that is supposed to claim for 
recognition an inverse move should be undertaken: one could look at strategies of 
migration investigating he material processes through which, from time to time, 
some people are labelled as migrant-subjects. Ultimately, governmentality as a grid 
for framing power relations brings out that the emergence of processes of 
subjectivation and production of subjectivity are at the core of critical analyses that 
aim at probing the transformations of power. Thus, in order to understand how the 
rationale of migration governance has changed over time, the issue of subjectivity – 
who is labelled as migrant and how migrants crack and exceed mechanisms of 
capture – cannot be left aside. In fact, far from being only the name of the liberal 
diagram of power, governmentality refers to the inextricable intertwining between 
production of subjectivity and power’s regulation: “talking about governmentality I 
refer the whole array of practices through which it's possible to constitute, define, 
organize and play with strategies that individuals, within the scope of their freedom, 
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 M. Foucault, Security, territory, population. Lectures at the College de France, 1977-1978. See in 
particular Lectures of the 18
th
 and the 25
th
 of January : “Freedom […] is nothing but the correlate 
element of the dispositives of security” (p. 48) 
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act on one another and on themselves” [Foucault, 1996a, p.448]24. And placing at the 
core the technologies through which people act upon themselves and on others, it 
makes it possible to come to grips with subjectivity beyond the subject of right, since 
“governmentality, I believe, enables us to account for the freedom of the subject and 
its relations with others; that is, what constitutes the matters of ethics itself” 
[Foucault, 1996a, p.448]. 
Politics of non-truth and « good » stories. The government of would-be refugees 
at the limit of the world’s history  
If we assume that migration governmentality is at the same time a laboratory and a 
litmus paper of wider economies and politics of movement involving also citizen-
subjects at large, it should be investigated whether the government of conducts and 
the production of subjectivities still work mainly through a regime of truth which 
requires subjects to produce a discourse of truth (upon themselves). Or, rather, if in 
some spaces and strugglefields of governmentality there are also other regimes at 
play that do not postulate a subject of truth. In the inaugural conference of the 
Lectures held in Lovanio, Foucault stresses the proliferation of truth-telling as well 
as to the multiplication of the regimes of veridiction in our contemporary societies. 
In that case, the pronoun “our” addressed the European space and its corresponding 
form of subjectivity. However, despite the plurality of the regimes of truth 
mentioned by Foucault, his genealogical account concerns exclusively the 
emergence of the regime of truth underpinning the production of the modern western 
subject. In this regard, it should be considered that in order to grasp the emergence of 
a spatially and historically situated subjectivity it is necessary to intersect both the 
regime of truth and the process of subjectifivation against which, by refraction and 
through acts of radical or partial exclusion, that subjectivity has been shaped. In 
other words, processes of subjectivation cannot be analysed in the void, regardless of 
the “marginal” subjectivities against which the supposedly neutral European citizen-
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 A broad definition of governmentality, not narrowed to the historical emergence of the 
governmental reason in the 18th century, is given by Foucault in an interview of 1981, in which 
Foucault argues: “power is the exercise of something that could be named government in a broad 
meaning […] if you want, it is governmentality in the broad sense, namely the array of relations and 
techniques of power that make possible for these relations of power to be exercised” (Foucault, 
Entretien avec André Berten, 1981in Mal faire, dire vrai).  
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subject is built and fostered. Such a genealogy of the modern European citizen could 
be traced both at the time of the constitution of the national citizen and in moments 
of economic or social “crisis” – like during the Seventies – when the unity of the 
working classes is replaced by an exclusionary politics by which the immigrant is 
seen as an undeserved recipient of social benefits. It should be noticed that the very 
figure of the “immigrant”, as distinct from the foreigner, came to the fore along with 
the consolidation of the citizen’s identity [Noiriel, 1996, Wahnich, 1997]. 
Nevertheless, if a genealogy of the contemporary European subject requires 
complicating it with processes that crafted subjectivity from the “outside” of that 
space, it is not merely by refraction and against border identities – like the immigrant 
and the colonized – that the emergence of the citizen-subject should be grasped. 
Rather, at stake there are more subtle and complex mechanisms: in fact, what is 
interesting is precisely to see for instance how techniques of identification or of 
categorization devised for managing migrations are reorganized beyond their 
original scopes, becoming central tools for shaping and governing citizens’ mobility. 
More precisely, differentiated degrees of citizenship can be instantiated just through 
the production of inner “lacking” and “border” subjectivities. Besides, looking 
closely at the government of “untruth conducts” makes it possible to grasp 
transformations taking place also in the political technology which governs non-
migrants. That is to say, situating ourselves “at the borders” of the regime of truth 
that is supposed to shape the space of citizenship, enables foregrounding 
reconfigurations of power that are at stake also within that space. 
As Ann Laura Stoler remarks, questioning the discursive proliferation on sexuality in 
our societies stressed by Foucault, these discourses “were refracted by men and 
women whose affirmation of a bourgeois self was contingent on imperial products, 
perceptions and racialized others” [Stoler, 2002, p.144]. And the coexistence in 
present societies of subjects whose discourse of truth responds to very different 
injunctions, prompts questioning the pronoun “our” – “our space - bringing out the 
overlapping of heterogeneous but co-interrelated regimes of truth and subjectivation 
in which we are simultaneously entangled. To put it differently, we could rethink 
how mechanisms of truth's production are co-determined in such a way that a history 
of our present cannot carve out autonomous and separate regimes of subjectivation. 
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The plurality of regimes of veridiction goes with the differentiation of spaces, 
suggesting the inevitable plurality of histories that a history of the present involves.  
This digression on the importance of complicating genealogies of subjectivities to 
stress the multiplicity of regimes of truth, introduces technologies for governing 
conducts that although located in “our” present are assembled through dissonant 
regimes of veridiction. The governmentality of refugees and the blurred lines 
between politics of protection, government of the undesirables and detention of 
undocumented migrants, constitute significant sites and mechanisms to tease out the 
coexistence of different regimes of truth; and where the very issue of subjectivation 
through individualization, namely through a discourse of truth of the subject upon 
itself, is at least partially unsettled [Vaughan, 1991].  
In order to go deep into this issue, I turn the attention to a place that is at the edges of 
the Mediterranean space
25
, Choucha refugee camp at the Ras-Jadir frontier-post on 
the Tunisia-Libya border. Limits here invoke the constant production and 
realignment of borders insofar as a process of denomination takes place – in this case 
the Mediterranean space of free mobility – in the name of shared historical/cultural 
legacies. The European and the western space are the two other main bordered 
spaces defining by difference its “others”. But beyond the geographical location, I 
focus on Choucha refugee camp to analyse closely which mechanisms and 
obligations of truth-telling are at stake in the government of would-be refugees. 
Choucha is not a special place but, on the contrary, it allows us to highlight how a 
certain politics of (non)truth plays in the government of refugees’ conducts: thus, I 
take it as a “trans-local” space for looking at the functioning of certain regimes of 
veridiction. From this standpoint, Foucault's genealogy of the technique of 
confession and on its contemporary transformations– psychiatry and the juridical 
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 In this regard, the very geographical referent of Mediterranean should not be taken for granted, and 
in particular the boundaries which delimit that space work, I contend, as exclusive-exclusionary 
frontiers that separate those outside the Mediterranean area from the cultural and political proximity 
that Mediterranean countries are supposed to have. In other words, it’s in the name of proximity that 
European countries push for Politics of Neighbourhood with the southern shore and for politics of 
externalization. And at the same time, it implicates that “non-neighbourhood” are excluded from such 
a discursive and political frame. Obviously, the tracing of the border that posits where the 
Mediterranean space ends, has changed over time, and the Arab Spring was seen as a reason –or as a 




system – works here as a set of analytical coordinates through which to read both the 
regime of truth and the production of subjectivity at play in the domain the 
government of refugees. However, the scrutiny into the production of truth in the 
government of refugees raises issues far beyond the specific field of migrations, 
disturbing the supposed self-standing genealogy of the “western contemporary 
subject”.  
Therefore, the politics of (non)truth at stake in the government of would-be refugees 
operates here at the same time as a litmus paper of broader transformation of power, 
and as a laboratory of governmentality bringing into existence new or transformed 
political technologies.   
Good stories and the confession without truth:  
December 2011: “We are aware that we are not asked to tell the truth, to tell our 
truth story, rather we need to tell a good story”. People who fled from Libya in 2011, 
most of them third-country nationals working in Libya and forced to leave after the 
outbreak of the war, know this. It is not the truth, namely the effective events 
occurred in the lives of those would-be refugees, which really matters for Unhcr’s 
commissioners who decide whether to give them a space on the earth where they can 
legitimately stay. In some sense, there is an “excess of the real in their stories that 
cannot be symbolized” [Beneduce, 2008, p.507] – because it doesn't refer to any 
deferrable or “in place of” meaning to unfold, but rather it addresses lived 
experiences – is not required and cannot even be grasped by juridical categories. But 
what are the “good stories” that the refugees mention as stories to be told? In order to 
answer this question we have to delve into the kind of truth that is at stake in the 
partition between economic migrants and refugees [Good, 2004]: indeed, having in 
mind Foucault's description on the obligation for the subjects to tell the truth upon 
themselves, in the case of the government of the would-be refugees the speech of the 
migrant is postulated as untruthful in principle, or better as suspect of lying: “this 
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systematic suspicion regarding the asylum seekers transforms the inquiry on truth 
telling into a process of lie detecting”26 [Fassin, 2013, p.54].  
The reason why would-be refugees refer to a “good story” to tell as the only 
possibility to get  international protection is that the discourse required by the 
territorial commission which processes asylum claims essentially needs to comply 
with a set of normative categories and conditions [Zetter, 2007]. In other words, the 
discourse required to the would-be refugee is supposed to comply with a truth that in 
some way is already-there – the truth actualized in profiles of mobility – according to 
which people are spatially re-located; then, the primary partition economic 
migrants/refugees is multiplied into a differentiation of conducts corresponding to a 
downgrading continuum going from protection to unprotection [Bohmer, Shuman, 
2008; Squire, 2009]: vulnerable person, “ordinary” refugee suspect-fake refugee, 
denied refugee. Recalling Fanon’s considerations on the treatment of the “ill 
colonized”, what is important to notice is that the “conducts” of would-be refugees 
emerge only through the clash with “governmental truth”, namely with power 
[Fanon, 1994; Foucault, 1994a]: “the North African does not come with a substratum 
common to his race, but on a foundation built by the European” [Fanon, 1994, p.7]. 
In fact, Unhcr’s procedure for assessing asylum seekers is grounded both in the 1951 
Geneva Convention and a countries scheme, much more variable over time, listing 
safe and unsafe countries. However, this geopolitical map of unsafety is not the only 
condition upon which the decision is made: actually, the articulation of personal 
stories and nationality is what in principle forms the ground for examining the 
reasonableness of asylum applications. And the yardstick for assessing the reliability 
of asylum seekers’ stories depends fundamentally on two criteria: the contradictory 
dimension and the inconsistency of the would-be refugee’s discourse, with the latter 
ultimately prevailing over the former
27
. To sum up, there is no discourse of truth that 
migrants and would-be refugees are considered able or willing to utter. Their speech 
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 As Didier Fassin points out, the restrictiveness of asylum that has been in place since the late 
nineties has been accompanied “by a profound loss of credibility of asylum seekers within the 
institutions in charge of assessing their applications”; and “the generosity that prevailed in those years 
[the Sixties and the Seventies] was largely a consequence of economic needs for the reconstruction of 
Europe and the growth of North America” [D. Fassin, 2013].  
27
 Interviews conducted with a lawyer in the city of Catania who works with asylum seekers in the 
biggest Italian reception centre for asylum seekers –CARA of Mineo (07/05/2013).  
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is judged on the basis of what I call an asymptotic adherence to the moral 
cartography of the regime of asylum [Malkki, 1992]: the national origins and the 
“degree of vulnerability” of the asylum seekers define the two main coordinates 
through which the “mobility profile” of the would-be refugee is shaped – rejected 
refugees, resettled refugees, vulnerable subjects, bogus refugees, internal displaced 
persons. Moreover, this discourse situates into a “downward” rationale that keeps the 
rates of the international protection low. That is to say, the examination process 
hinges on a sort of “defensive proof”: would-be refugees need to demonstrate against 
the moral geography
28
 traced by Unhcr and designed to label them as non-eligible 
for protection [Bohmer, Shuman, 2008]. In this regard, no document is more 
explicative than this: when there are asylum-seekers coming from safe countries, 
“applicants are requested to rebut the presumption that the Country of origin is safe 
with regard to their particular circumstances […] And considering the difficulty of 
refugees to prove persecution, the applicant's mere assertions of the facts can lead to 
the grant of asylum provided that they are credible in the sense they lead to the full 
conviction of the truth, and not just probability, of circumstances causing the fear of 
persecution” [Unhcr, 1991; see also Council of Europe, (1471)2005]. This document 
makes clear that the would-be refugee, or better still I would say “the non-refugee 
until proven otherwise”, is required to provide evidence for questioning the objective 
geopolitical narrative: the asylum seeker has to demonstrate that his/her personal 
story is an exception to the safety of people's lives coming from his/her country of 
origin attested by Unhcr. Thus, a mark of non-credibility sustains the discourse of 
impossible truth demanded of the “not-refugee until proven otherwise”; and it's up to 
the would-be refugee to undo the probable denial, by proving to be an exception to 
the geopolitical normativity.  
Untruth conducts and the moral geography of asylum: 
Nevertheless, what should be remarked is that in the government of would-be 
refugees is not a question of “silences” about those lives: in fact, while on the one 
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 Through this expression I mean the “geography of the humanitarian” that Unhcr put into place, 
making a secret list of “safe countries”, whose citizens are considered not in need of protection. More 
broadly, the expression “moral geography” refers to the set of criteria according to which would-be 
refugees are “allocated” in spaces or resettled in third-countries. 
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hand the government of migration is characterized by a proliferation of discourses 
and of categorizing procedures; and this “high rate of discursivity” is the very 
mechanism through which would-be refugees are governed and encoded into an 
intelligible and standardized schema of conducts. Thus, despite the fundamental 
discredit which underpins the speech of would be refugees, it remains that an 
injunction to speak, to tell one's own story, percolates the technology of government 
of displaced people: the asylum seeker is demanded to tell not only the story of 
his/her journey but of his/her entire life. As Didier Fassin contends, “the paradox of 
the politics of asylum is that the person who has suffered a persecution in his/her 
country of origin, now is faced to a new proof, through which power wants to 
produce the truth” [Fassin, 2013, p.47]. However, what predominates is not the truth 
of the asylum seeker’s speech on his/her life but, rather, the truth of his/her 
geopolitical location and at the same time of his/her singular story as part of that 
moral geography. Therefore, the truth is produced irrespective of the discourse of the 
would-be refugee. But it doesn’t mean that the story told by the “suspect subject” is 
irrelevant: on the contrary, the story-telling works as a sort of normalizing 
technology demanding that the migrant comply with the geopolitical narrative 
provided by international agencies, humanitarian actors and states. Secondly, as I 
stated above, the subject could switch its impossibility of telling the truth into a 
process of self-victimization, narrating the “good” story to the Commission and 
arguing that its vulnerability definitively makes an exception to the rule. Therefore, it 
could be named a “confession without truth”; or better, a quite odd practice of 
confession that does not postulate any hidden thought to unfold but, rather, posits a 
reality that is already-there, envisaged by international criteria and treaties, and that 
the subject is demanded to embrace. More precisely, unlike the correspondence 
between discourse and subjectivity that the psychiatric confession requires of the 
individual [Foucault, 2012a, 2012b], in the government of would-be refugees it 
doesn’t matter that the subject authenticates itself and its subjectivity by attaching 
itself to the discourse it formulates upon itself
29
. Instead, what is at the core of this 
regime of veridiction is exactly the dissociation between the speech of untruth – the 
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 In this sense, the practice of the confession is not simply a statement of fact that the subject 
produces upon itself: rather, it involves a specific involvement (engagement) of the subject in relation 
to what it says, namely to its discourse of truth (see Foucault, 2012a, 2012b). 
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constitutive non-credibility – of the migrant and its juridical status fixed by 
normative international criteria: the very notion of truth is partially superseded by the 
idea of a statement of facts, namely an objectivity presented more as the result of an 
indisputable evidence graspable through standardized knowledges and practices of 
expertise than as an unintelligible reality to unfold. By scrutinizing the effects of 
subjectivation generated by this confession without truth, what emerges is a growing 
array of “profiles of mobility” that singular stories must fill in and that get troubled 
when juridical categories become unsuitable in keeping up with the heterogeneity of 
migrants’ practices. Unhcr acknowledges that in many cases both migrants' 
conditions and practices of migration do not fall into existing mobility profiles and 
migration categories. Profiles are created both for individual conducts and for 
countries, proving that humanitarian government lies at the junction between a moral 
geography of conducts and a governmentality of scattered populations where nation-
states still play an important role. Moreover, the overlap between the national and 
geopolitical scale on the one hand – safe/unsafe countries – and the spatialisation of 
singular conducts is enforced also by non-humanitarian actors like Iom delegated by 
the European Union to produce a constantly updated report on migration profiles, 
analysing the migratory situation country by country.  
Coming back to the injunction for the refugee to tell one's own story, I compare it 
with confession as a “technique of government through truth” [Foucault, 2012a] 
starting from the hypothesis that in the governmentality of would-be refugees their 
speech is disqualified from the very beginning, and that definitively no discourse of 
truth is supposed to be formulated by asylum seekers. In order to make this 
comparison, stressing affinities and discontinuities, Foucault's work on confession 
represents a crucial reference. The main function of confession, also in its “secular” 
forms, is to attach the subject to its own truth; and this truth is not coming from the 
outside but it coincides with the very discourse that the subject is forced to produce 
upon itself. Now, if we shift to the examination process of would-be refugees, we see 
that the goal is not to tie the subject to its untruthful speech. Rather, “assessment of 
credibility” is the buzzword extensively used by the agencies of the humanitarian for 
postulating the discourse of the migrant as an “in principle contradictory” one; at the 
same time, would-be refugees are entitled to the right to defend themselves against 
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the evidence of facts and statements formulated in reference to their life/story and to 
their geopolitical location. 
When categories do not work anymore: the subtraction from the diagnostic grasp 
“So, by whom have you been threatened?” the commissioner asks.  
“My cousin, as I said before.”  
“But you also mentioned that your cousin escaped with you. So, your sentence is not 
tenable. Let's start again.”  
This dialogue between the commissioner and a would-be refugee shows that the aim 
of the examination consists of making the subject contradict itself, playing with the 
incongruities that the examiner finds in the migrant’s speech. This leads us to recall 
Fanon's descriptions on the difficulty for psychiatrists to make a diagnosis of the 
illness of the colonized due to his resistance to accounting for himself: “The refusal 
of the Muslim to authenticate through the confession of his gesture the social 
contract that is offered to him, means that his effective subjugation cannot be 
confused at all with the acceptance of that power” [Fanon, 2011 p.126]. On the one 
hand, the colonized refuses to authenticate his/her act, disengaging from the 
subjectivity to which the diagnostic knowledge tries to bind the colonized; on the 
other hand, this refusal is staged through an “orchestration of a lie” [Fanon, 2011]. 
Therefore, in some cases diagnostic categories fail to tell the truth about the subject, 
since this latter at some point resists the possibility that a diagnosis could be made; 
and this resilience is displayed also at the level of body: “the doctor would have to 
conclude that medical thinking was at fault […] and he finds the patient at fault – an 
unruly, undisciplined patient, who doesn’t know the rules of the game” [Fanon, 
1994a, p. 8]. What Fanon enables us to see is the “regime of (non)truth”, that 
produces denied subjects – the rejected refugees – denying them also a space of 
belonging, is a regime that does not work in a smooth way. Rather, it is forced to 
constantly reassess its strategy in the face of elusive migrants’ speeches. And the 
anxiety of governmental agencies to update both juridical categories and moral 
cartographies of migrants’ practices shows their trouble in keeping up with the 
transformed causes of migration and with the changes of political context in their 
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countries of origin. But Fanon's reflections also remind us of the relevance of 
understanding the legacies between the present technology governing would-be 
refugees and the colonial governmentality. Perhaps, following Fanon's 
considerations, we could reverse the gaze on the government of would-be refugees 
from the standpoint of the governed subjects: in the place of the moral cartography 
enacted by the government of “untruth conducts”, the persistent elusiveness of 
would-be refugees to make their biographies “readable” by the regime of veridiction, 
traces out another map. And such a map not only shows the resistances to diagnostic 
categories but it also stages these latter as “machines of translation”, namely as the 
attempt to constantly keep up with the turbulence of migrations, traducing them into 
mobility profiles. There are biographies that cannot be fixed into profiles or narrated 
into stories. Or, stories that prove to be an exception to the unquestionable truth as 
evidence upon which the government of would-be refugees is grounded. Putting in 
conversation Fanon's analysis with Foucault’s considerations on the politics of truth, 
it could be suggested that when the would-be refugee refuses to sign the “social 
contract”30 offered by the moral geography of governmentality – making impossible 
to translate practices of mobility into “profiles” – he/she cracks the consistency of 
that regime of veridiction which seeks to make migrants’ journeys intelligible. 
Nevertheless, it doesn't mean that the subject thoroughly subtracts from that regime; 
in fact, migrants’ deportability [De Genova, 2010] and the stranded conditions of 
their existences living in a frozen-time dimension, tell us how power carves out their 
bodies and lives. Rather, despite the meshes of “diagnostic truth”, would-be refugees 
(sometimes) do not authenticate that regime of veridiction, strategically playing with 
their untruth conduct and producing a strategic inversion of the “confession without 
truth” that is requested of them. To be clearer on this point, I make a detour into the 
mechanisms of confession as a discourse of truth of the self upon itself. As Foucault 
explains, the ordinary technique of confession in all its secular and religious varieties 
aims at disciplining and governing the subject through individualization. In fact, 
unlike the techniques of the self at play in ancient Greece, based on an unceasing 
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 In fact, as Foucault stresses, the practice of confession “secularized” in the juridical context, 
implicates that the subject not only recognizes the crime  but also the validity of the punishment and, 
consequently, the social pact in which it, through the act of the confession itself, asks to be 
reintegrated [Foucault, 2012a]. 
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transformation of the subject – a subjectivation taking place via the relationship 
between the conduct and the production of truth – both Christian and contemporary 
relations to truth are basically hinged on the obedience to norms [Foucault, 1988, 
2012b, 2012c]. But in any case, individualization still works as the main mechanism 
through which the subject is shaped and addressed. In the context of the speeches of 
the would-be refugees, despite the fact that they are demanded to go into detail on 
the narration of their life and their journey’s experiences, the injunction to tell a good 
story is not grounded on individualization and, secondly, I suggest that it seems not 
involving a process of subjectivation in the sense illustrated by Foucault. Instead, 
biographical details and psychological examinations do not excavate the hidden truth 
of the “confessor subject” from itself but they are oriented to force biographies into a 
pre-existent moral cartography of migration categories and mobility profiles; b) and, 
simultaneously, they give rise to a new, updated “compound of unsettled existences”. 
According to Foucault, secularized techniques of confession basically function as 
“therapies of truth” that the subject is compelled to engage in; in this way it could be 
stated that the couple coercion-therapy is at the very core of the injunction to speak 
and to tell the truth upon oneself. The peculiarity of the modern therapies of truth 
consists in postulating the dependence of our salvation – secular safety - on the 
obligation to know who we are: subjects must hold a thorough knowledge of 
themselves, and such a truth has to be regularly verbalized. This entails that the 
disciplinary function of the techniques of confession lies in a (true) production of 
knowledge that takes place through the discursive engagement of the subject.
31
 But 
is this the case also for the good stories that would-be refugees have to craft? At 
close scrutiny it seems that any therapeutic function is excluded from the discourse 
of the refugees. In fact, the obligation to make one's own life intelligible and 
readable, doesn't aim to “care” or to “save” the suspect subject by integrating it into 
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 Indeed, as Foucault explains in the conferences he hold in Lovanio in 1981, the obligation for the 
subject does not only concern the act of telling the truth upon itself but also the relationship of 
knowledge that it must undertake with itself ( see Foucault, Mal faire, dire vrai. Fonction de l’aveu en 
justice, Presses Universitaires de Louvain, 2012, pp.5-7).  In fact, the goal is to make the subject 
accept the diagnosis or the status attributed to it, in a way that could transform the relation that the 
subject has with its illness/guilt. To the contrary, in the speech demanded of the would-be refugees 
there is no the purpose of bounding the subjectivity of the asylum seeker to the categories or the 
profiles that migration governmentality invents. Nor the issue is to make the subject transform the 
relationship it has in regards to itself. 
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the order of citizenship: indeed, also the politics of resettlement which relocates 
people in third-countries assigning them a space to stay, is not conceived on the basis 
of a logic of therapeutic “salvation”, but rather as a biopolitical relocation of bodies 
and existences in space. Moreover, the asserted impossibility of care depends also on 
the colonial legacies that still pervade the body and the geographical origins of the 
would-be refugee: the colonial subject was depicted not only as a suspect subject but 
also as an incurable body, which escapes from all diagnostic categories. The 
“unreality” that, as Fanon illustrates, is judged in the colonies as the hallmark of the 
pain of the colonized underlies also the truth-telling of the would-be refugees
32
 
[Fanon, 2011]. In other words, in the absence of any possible “therapy of truth”, two 
distinct but overlapping levels are at play: on the one hand the individual level of 
conducts – where would-be refugees are assumed as vulnerable subjects to take care 
of, but whose latent vulnerability ultimately remains incurable; and on the other, the 
impossibility of the therapy is translated on a global scale, concerning the 
governmentality of migrants and displaced persons. In fact, the international regime 
of would-be refugees does not provide for a “therapy of citizenship” but rather it is 
embedded in fundamental political dissymmetry between hosting and sending 
countries, presenting the European space as a privileged and desirable place. Thus, 
the “impossible therapy” referred both to the life of the refugee and to the 
postcolonial order of mobility is enforced through the moral economy of 
resettlement. 
The twofold non-savoir: 
The supposed impossibility for the refugee to produce a truthful knowledge should 
be related to the radical non-savoir concerning the place in which the subject will be 
stranded or will be moved to – in other words, its future relocation. Going into detail, 
the produced “ignorance” concerns at the same time the relation to the space where 
people live and the effectiveness of the knowledges that migrants have on their rights 
as workers or as asylum seekers or as economic migrants. As far as their mobility is 
concerned, as I will show in the third chapter, it is highly monitored and controlled. 
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 « The North African’s pain, for which we can find no lesional basis, is judged to have no 
consistency, no reality. Now, the North African is a man-who-doesn’t-like-work. So that whatever he 
does will be interpreted a priori on the basis of this » (Fanon, 1994a, p.6).  
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But more than that, the space in which would-be refugees are entitled to temporarily 
stay is ultimately “unusable” for them: in fact, both the rights they are entitled to and 
the possibility that in principle they have for getting  economic autonomy are de 
facto excluded from any effective access. For instance, many migrants who arrived 
in Italy in 2011 from Libya have now found “informal jobs” working in southern 
Italy as day labourers: also those who know both their rights as workers and the 
possibility to regularize their juridical status through the “sanatoria” law, then having 
no formal contract their eligibility actually remains a mere abstraction. Concerning 
the abstract rights that refugees have in the hosting country, this knowledge finally 
turns out to be quite useless to the extent that the real conditions of the camp make 
those rights ineffective and not enjoyable. Consequently, the impossible true 
knowledge of oneself is combined with the fundamental non-savoir about their lives 
and about the space where they are stranded. However, if would-be refugees are not 
produced as subjects of knowledge, a politics of knowledge is in any case at stake: in 
the case of refugees, I would say that knowledge is posited outside the subjects to 
govern, nurturing and articulating with a regime of veridiction that is grounded on 
“evidence”; and against which the subject has to prove its exception to the norm. To 
sum up, the supposed impossibility of truth in asylum seekers’ speech indicates that 
the regime of truth is fundamentally external to the space of the subject's formation. 
In this way, reflections of processes of subjectivation need to take into account this 
factor: indeed, if as Foucault remarks there is a direct implication between the 
regime of veridiction and the production of subjectivity – since the subject is 
required to attach itself to its discourse of truth upon itself – what about a confession 
without truth? That is to say, what are the effects of a regime of truth that is 
dislocated from the subject? Is it possible to talk about processes of subjectivation – 
starting from the idea that “all practices through which the subject is constituted 
come along with the formation of knowledges” and in turn that this knowledge is 
postulated to be produced by the subject? Nevertheless, the very partition between an 
inside and an outside of the regime of truth becomes unsettled by would-be refugees’ 
strategies: in fact, the production of “good” stories, that is the choice to craft and 
alter one’s own story and biography in order to meet the criteria for getting  refugee 
status, involves a truth-telling to which the subject ties itself. Or, to the contrary, by 
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resisting any “diagnosis of truth”, would-be refugees undermine the functioning and 
the tenability of migration categories and mobility profiles.  
 
Politics of presence and the strategic play of a dislocated truth: 
The complex dovetail between the government of untruthful conducts and the 
biopolitics of scattered populations brings to the fore the ductility of the notion of 
technologies of government for unpacking the mechanisms through which 
subjectivity is produced. But no conclusion can be drawn from this analysis for 
thinking about an effective resistance to that regime of truth. In fact, one should bear 
in mind that in the government of would-be refugees two levels coexist and relate to 
each other: the government of singular conducts and the government of populations. 
However, interruptions and short-circuits of the regime of truth could take place 
from the inside of the “humanitarian corridors” where would-be refugees are placed 
or finally excluded from. After all, if we focus on the fact that truth is somehow 
dislocated from the subject, the detachment between the subject and the truth that 
performs its “profile” at times is strategically reversed by refugees into a foothold for 
refusing and challenging the grip of power. For instance, as Fanon's analysis 
highlights, the colonized, by troubling the functioning of diagnostic categories and 
making the therapy impossible, refuses both to sign the “social contract” offered to 
him and to confirm that regime of truth coming from the outside, in that case 
colonial governmentality. By the same token, would-be refugees (sometimes) 
succeed in making impossible their capture into profiles, forcing power to keep up 
with the heterogeneity and the undecidability of migrants' practices; or, conversely, 
they tell “good stories” for matching the protection criteria. Temporary strategies of 
resistance that are however quite easily recaptured and normalized by the constant 
redefinition of technologies of governmentality. But if we shift the attention to the 
spatial upheavals produced by migrants, or to the places migrants arrive as 
unexpected presences invalidating statistical expectations, it is rather the 
governmental technology which is forced to tame those unexpected turbulences. And 
no proof of evidence or truth could disregard those presences in space: a politics of 
the presence against a politics of truth.  
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This inroad into the government of would-be refugees has highlighted the exclusive 
and exclusionary boundaries through which the subject of truth, namely the subject 
investigated by Foucault’s genealogy, is shaped and subjected – in the twofold 
meaning of “being subject to” and “being subjectivized”. At the same time, such a 
trajectory in the spaces of would-be refugees enables us to “complicate” the 
genealogies of the pronoun “our” (referring to “our societies”) focusing on spaces 
and lives “at the limits of the world's history” [Guha, 2003]: would-be refugees are 
not the mere reversal of the political subject or of the good citizen, rather they 
emerge from the primary partition between migrants and refugees and from the 
multiplication of different degrees of (un)protection, configuring an unstable moral 
cartography of legitimate or undesired presences. Thus, beyond the strugglefield 
over truth and subjectivity in the government of refugees, such an analysis could be 
turned into litmus paper and, at the same time, into a “troubling factor” in the light of 
which would be a rethinking of the genealogy of the modern Western subject. 
Ultimately, conceiving critical philosophy as investigation for “understanding how 
subjects are effectively tied into and through the forms of veridiction in which they 
are engaged” [Foucault, 2012a], a history of the present could not and should not be 
made “by writing in the comfort zone” [Stoler, 2002] or by positing a form of 
subjectivity yardstick of all the others.  
A critical focus on the regimes of truth at play in the government of would-be 
refugees makes it possible to bring out the differential mechanisms of “governing 
through truth”: a gaze on the “working differently” of the mechanisms of power and 
truth in the government of would-be refugees could be used to investigate, starting 
from a marginal and specific location, the “production of truth” required to the 
citizen-subject. This is not to say that rationale and mechanisms governing migrants 
extend all over; rather, it is a question of drawing the attention to the transformations 
at stake in producing and governing subjects. In fact, as I have shown also at the end 
of the first section, from a Foucaultian point of view we cannot really analyse the 
transformations of power without questioning the regime of truth at stake and 
without a preliminary exploration of the forms of subjectivities in question – namely, 
how the subject of power has been transformed. Obviously, it is important to stress 
that it is never a question of a radical shift from one regime of truth to another one 
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but to complicate any univocal analytical grid, shedding light on the (different) 
impacts that the government of mobility has in “reworking of subjects”.  
After having explained the angle through which I gaze at the “twofold spatial 
upheaval” that took place in the Mediterranean –suggesting taking the migration 
regime in reverse -, in the next chapter I will focus on the spatial and political 
turmoil that revolutionary uprisings and practices of migrations generated on the 



























 practices of freedom. Three snapshots on the bank-effects
34
 of the 
Arab Uprisings 
 
“Liberty is a practice. So the liberty of men is never assured 
  by the institutions and laws. This is why almost all of these laws 
  and institutions are quite capable of being turned  
  not because they are ambiguous, but simply because liberty 
  is what must be exercised” (M. Foucault, Space, Knowledge, Power, 1982) 
                                                                                                     
The Arab Uprisings and the others in connection. This could be a title for describing 
the general context in which the Arab revolutions have been read on the Northern 
shore of the Mediterranean and in the US, presenting the Arab turmoil as a 
forerunner of new political practices – for instance, the occupation of the Kasbah in 
Tunis and of Tahrir Square in Cairo that staged new ways of dealing with public 
space – and as the belated emergence of democracy. And the simultaneity of Occupy 
movements and the Indignados with the events of the Arab Uprisings has clearly 
fostered the easy connections posited by many critical analysts, activists and 
scholars: “From Tahrir Square to Oakland”, “From Cairo to Wall Street. Voices from 
the Global Spring”, “Egypt supports Wisconsin”, “Turn Wall Street into Tahrir 
Square”. An inverse and double contamination seemed to be envisaged in all these 
analyses: the “not yet” of democracy going South, and new fresh practices of 
political participation migrating from the Southern Mediterranean Countries 
northward. It is beyond the scope of this work to make a comparative analysis of the 
European and American Occupy protest movements and the revolutionary uprisings 
in the Arab region, as well as to investigate their mutual influences. Rather, without 
denying all of this recognized nexus, I will focus here on the spatial upheaval 
triggered by the Arab uprisings on the Northern shore of the Mediterranean and, in 
particular, on what could be named the “Tunisian upheaval in Europe”. And at the 
                                                          
33 Many thanks to Arnold Davidson for suggesting this expression to me. 
34
 The term “bank-effect” refers here to the reverberations and the repercussions that migrations and 
the Arab Uprisings generated on the Northern shore of the Mediterranean.  
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same, I draw the attention on the politics of/over life that migration governmentality 
put into place to tame and regulate migrants’ spatial upheavals that took place across 
the Mediterranean in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings [Hass, Sigona, 2012].  
This chapter takes three snapshots concerning the “Tunisian turmoil in Europe”. The 
first snapshot is about the spatial rearrangements produced by the “North Africa 
Emergency” (ENA) declared by the Italian government in 2011 as a response in the 
face of the massive arrival of “Libyan” and Tunisian migrants on the Italian coasts; 
the second snapshot focuses on the multiplication of struggles in detention centers in 
Italy during the Arab revolutions; and the last one concerns symbolic occupations of 
buildings made by migrants in Italy. All these three snapshots draw the attention to 
new border spatialities as a result of power over/of migrants’ lives35. I look at them 
not as the emergent outcomes of struggles, conflicts and negotiations between 
techniques of governmentality and migrants' movements, both relying not only on 
biological life but mostly, and in a broader way, on the wide materiality of existence, 
conceived as an historical construction [Foucault, 1996c] and as an hetero-normed 
condition [Butler, 1996]. Nevertheless, it doesn't follow that escapes, practices of 
migration and strategies of resistance are coextensive and isomorphic to power: 
rather, I would focus mainly on the unsettling unexpected nature of resistances that 
try at times to dodge and times to reverse the political technology aimed at capturing 
and capitalizing people's movements. In this account, if we certainly need to 
emphasize acts of refusal and flights from the mesh of power, at the same time I 
would make room for the asymmetrical dimension of resistances [Revel, 2011] 
conceiving that precisely as the capacity of transgressing and redefining meanings 




                                                          
35
 In this regard, I argue that the notion of “life” is conceived here not in biological terms but as the 
material and complete existence of individual as historical subjects. As Judith Revel contends: “We 
have to account for life as an historical construction. Biopowers should not be conceived only as 
biological powers but also as dispositives of subjection., exploitation, capture and regulation of 
existence. Historical and epistemological determinations which produce life. It's necessary to think at 
the same time the determinations that make us being what effectively we are and the possibility to 
detach from ourselves” (J. Revel, Identità, natura, vita. Tre decostruzioni biopolitiche, in M. 
Galzigna, eds, Foucault oggi,Feltrinelli, Milano, 2008, p. 149). 
36
 However, before starting, I have to define how I use here the notion of biopower and then, why I 
prefer to talk about the power over/of migrants' lives. At first, I would remind that Foucault makes 
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By mobilizing the technique of snapshots, turns the attention to the production of 
new spatialities as an outcome of these practices of migration [Massey, 2005]. 
Spatialities framed and enacted by political technologies through economic or 
juridical measures, to respond, to catch, to (re)frame, to neutralize and to profit from 
revolutionary events; but also spatialities subverted and produced by migrants 
crossing borders. The advantage of such a perspective is, as William Walters 
observes, that “the zonal allows us to map irregular spaces that are neither national 
nor global and it avoids the teleological assumption that developments in migration 
control have an inevitable direction or end point. A zone is an extended area of 
circulation, connection, mobility and flow that spans heterogeneous systems and 
contexts” [Walters, 2011b, pp. 53-54]. The interplay between these two movements 
of spatial production – and practices in space – is precisely what is at stake here, in 
order to account for the complex and conflicting regime of power over/of migrants' 
lives. Such a spatial gaze, I contend, could work as a litmus paper to scrutinize the 
subtle dynamics and the instabilities between power over migrants’ lives and power 
of migrants. In fact, if political technology continuously plays in space and by 
making spaces in order to govern people's movements – creating special emergency 
areas, devising advanced techniques of bordering or externalizing frontiers – at the 
same time migrants’ practices at times not only trouble those channelled spaces of 
mobility but they also put into place different modalities of enacting and persisting in 
space. The reorganization of the border regime in the face of migrants’ spatial 
upheavals basically takes place through two main strategies: the “strategies of 
detection – improving surveillance systems and monitoring techniques but also 
                                                                                                                                                                    
reference to biopower in three specific contexts of analysis – Society must be defended, The will to 
knowledge, and Security, territory, population - and that according to the Foucaultian meaning it can't 
be separated by the historical production of population as an object of government. In this way, the 
assumption of this analysis is that we can't stretch the concept of biopower as an overwhelming and 
encompassing notion designating all forms of power over lives. Secondly, as I'll suggest in the first 
snapshot, it's the very notion of population that should be rethought in the light of the global current 
transformations occurred in our societies, mainly due to the redefinition of world labor force's 
composition on the one hand, and to the increase – of people's movements on the other hand. Thus, 
my argument here is that the government of migrations is at the very core of a broader government of 
populations, conceived today not as an homogeneous and national group but as a highly differentiated 
one, and therefore we could question how biopower works today; but at the same time, if we decide to 
focus on migrants' struggles and the government of migrants' practices, my point is that we should 
rather account for that in terms of a more general power over/of migrants' lives, since neither is it a 
population as a whole that is at stake, nor does it go without saying that the mechanisms of capture 
and government of migrants' lives form a specific and different modality of biopower. 
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displacing the border before and beyond the geopolitical line – and the “strategies of 
b/ordering” – that is, techniques and knowledges through which migrants’ conducts 
are regulated in their spatial persistence and in their mobility.  
However, I do not bring attention to the political movements taking place on the 
southern shore to see how they resonated in the European space: rather, I take into 
account a kind of movement which is acted between the two shores, namely the 
practices of migration taking place in the aftermath of the Tunisian revolution. The 
goal is not to bring out possible connections with events, practices and movements 
currently at stake on the Northern shore but, on the contrary, to illuminate how 
migrants’ spatial upheavals have multiplied - triggering a sort of domino effect - and, 
most importantly, engendered political and spatial transformations unsettling the 
tempos and the conditions of the politics of mobility. Thus, it is not a matter here to 
trace similarities and influences but to follow the disruptive forces of those practices 
which troubled, more than connecting, the supposed stability of the Schengen space. 
The choice to not take into account the Tunisian revolutionary movements but 
migrants’ movements is because I see these latter both as specific and non-
conventional practices that at times trouble the spatial and the political order, forcing 
power to govern their “intractability”, and as practices that pushed forward the 
Tunisian revolution on the northern shore and as freedom of movement. But I tend to 
resist the denomination of “political movement” to designate migrants’ practices, 
also in the specific case of Tunisian migrations during the Arab Spring: indeed, the 
risk is of overshadowing the specificity of practices of migration and of struggling as 
a migrant, encapsulating all that under the overcharged category of political 
movement and reestablishing the model of a collective homogenous subject-form. 
Then, what comes out as a subtext of this chapter and that I will better develop in the 
fourth chapter, is that one of the peculiarities of migrants’ practices is their complex 
game within and against the regime of visibility. 
What is at issue in these three snapshots are the instabilities produced at different 
levels by migrants’ spatial upheavals discordant” practices of freedom that do not fit 
into the script of the insurgent democracy or of majority politics: they trouble the 
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“isomorphism of the surface” which makes different political experiences easily 
connect and influence each other.  
Rather than tracing a spatial continuity between these snapshots, the aim is to bring 
to the fore the coexistence of different spatialities with their nature of “emergent-
emergency spaces”, meaning by that the production of new political practices as 
correlative of, at the same time, a temporal and a temporary dimension. “Emergent” 
alludes to a temporal aspect, namely to spaces that arise suddenly, as the outcome of 
economic spatial constructions and juridical decrees, or of strategic struggles and 
spatial practices. Turning the gaze to these spatialities, this chapter highlights the 
production both of anomalous spaces of governmentality, and of spatial overturns 
which challenge representability and rights as the main axes of the political domain 
[Papadopoulos, Stephenson, Tsianos, 2008]. “Emergency” refers to the temporary 
dimension vested in these spaces as political responses to a disruptive and troubling 
array of events, subjects and transformations framed as threats to social and spatial 
order: “emergency”, in the context we consider here, is nothing but the name given 
to a space carved out by heterogeneous political technologies (administrative 
measures, knowledges, technical interventions, juridical statements). Power of 
bordering and migrants' strategies do not take place on a flat and smooth surface, but 
rather, all these heterogeneous and conflicting modalities of playing on and in space– 
to border and to manage people's movements or to burn spatial distances – often give 
rise to spatialities that, in their turn, form distinct (bounded) sites, partly working as 
a kind of “training-anomalous-terrains” of political experimentation, which then 
could spread to other domains or spaces. The second related point considers that we 
should bypass the form of the “camp” as the exceptional space par excellence 
[Agamben, 1998] to understand what is at stake in the power over/of migrants lives: 
rather, the spatialities I deal with are characterized at once by a specific economy of 
spatial practices, and by a movement which constantly encroaches on the outside.   
North-Africa emergency and “Libyan” migrants scattered in Italy: 
March 2013: One of the most visible and politically immediate bank-effects 
generated on the Northern shore of the Mediterranean was the mobilization of actors, 
structures and spaces related to the so-called “North Africa Emergency” declared by 
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the Italian government in February 2011 and that ended in March 2013. The North 
Africa Emergency was officially designed as a program of aid and hosting addressed 
to people coming from the Libyan conflict: the program established that all asylum 
seekers arriving in Italy would be hosted in the Centres of Hosting for Asylum 
Seekers (CARA) until their demand of asylum was processed. Due to the sizeable 
number of arrivals in the first half of 2011, asylum seekers were hosted in alternative 
structures managed by cooperatives that had never dealt with migration, each of 
them receiving 43 euros per day per refugee. However, before entering into details of 
the functioning of the North Africa Emergency (ENA), I have to clarify from what 
point of view I take examine it: in fact the aim here is to sidestep any approach 
grounded on the logic of exception, focusing rather on the spatialization of the 
power’s functioning and on the ways in which political technologies or 
administrative measures shape migrants’ lives. Or better, “exception” here is not 
necessarily associated with politics of exclusion, since in the name of exception 
selected practices of mobility can be included into “humanitarian channels” or in 
protection programs and new “precarious zones” are built. Of particular concern here 
is the dispersion on the territory that the mechanism of the “modular hosting”37 
meant for migrants. And despite the many inefficiencies and the arbitrariness of the 
function of the “hosting machine”, the issue here is not to criticize the infringement 
of law and argue a smoother functioning of the mechanism of asylum: it is not a 
question, for instance, of opposing the “anomaly” of the “Italian model” to a more 
transparent or efficient system, but rather of raising critical points both on the 
principle and on the effective functioning of the “asylum machine” 
Mineo/Bari, August 2011. First of all, what should be noticed is the patchy 
arrangement of the system of hosting put into place by ENA: a variegated geography 
of centres and structures was activated, giving rise to highly non-homogeneous 
procedures and conditions of hosting. But most of all it’s important to underscore the 
ambivalence of this mechanism of capture and strand of migrants, drawing the 
attention to the strategy of chasing away and leaving undetected migrants’ presence. 






“Parked” in improvised structures or instead in new durable centers, “Libyan” 
asylum seekers were kept substantially unaware of their future possible destinations. 
In fact, the supposed “facilitations to protection” – which should consist in informing 
asylum seekers of the whole procedure of asylum, and also in putting them in the 
best condition for obtaining international protection – actually materialized in a 
series of obstacles to asylum seekers, making them all appear as “economic 
migrants”. To the principal question asked in the C3 formulary38 “why did you leave 
your Country of origin?” I realized in my visits to the Cara that most of them 
answered “to find a job”, an answer that means almost automatic exclusion from the 
“selective mechanism” of protection. In fact, the majority of them were not 
adequately informed about the criteria upon which the allocation of political asylum 
is predicated. Migrants were de facto left to their own fate despite being at the same 
time controlled in their mobility, and on the other hand they have been stranded in 
remote zones of Italy (in the Alps or in the middle of the countryside, in 
overcrowded centers or in small houses) without their demands being processed. In 
this regard, one can see the manifolds riots that took place in detention centres as 
exasperated reactions to such a situation and this was obviously an important factor. 
However, riots and protests were also markers of the threshold of acceptability that 
people coming from Libya and Tunisia could tolerate.  
Bari, 1 august 2011: asylum seekers coming from Libya started a riot in the Cara of 
Bari Palese protesting about the delays in the processing of their demands, and then 
they exited from the centre blocking the motorway and the railway, paralyzing  
traffic in the city. After violence by the police against the migrants, 29 of them were 
arrested for the first time. But despite the “cost” they paid for the insurrection, they 
launched an “ultimatum” to the territorial commission of asylum, arguing that if their 
demands were not processed in few days, they would rise up again. Thus their strong 
reaction was at the same time a way to put the Italian authorities over a barrel, 
demanding to be really taken into account as asylum seekers and not as negligible 
presences on the territory. But, again, the “costs” of the protest in the long run could 
not be overlooked: as in the case of the riots triggered by the Tunisian migrants, 
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 It is the formulary that asylum sekers need to fill once they arrive in Italy before doing the 
interview with the Territorial Commission tha processes their demand of asylum 
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especially those in the detention center of Gradisca d’Isonzo (24 February) and 
Modena (27 June), the Italian press talked about an “external and orchestrated 
organization. And some months later, in December 2011, 45 asylum seekers 
involved in the struggle were processed and then deported.  
Mineo, Sicily
39
: the biggest Cara of Italy, detaining more than 2000 people, is 
situated in the middle of a desert of oranges, 10 kilometers from Mineo, the closest 
village on the top of a hill. Everyday asylum seekers receive an allowance of 3.5 
euros that ultimately they cannot spend outside but only in the internal shop of the 
centre, where they can only buy cigarettes. Thus, this has generated a circuit of 
informal economy in the village of Mineo, where asylum seekers go to resell the 
cigarettes in exchange for money to buy everything else other than cigarettes – for 
instance, for women it was their only possibility to buy tampons, since the managing 
institution of the camp did not provide them. 
However, the point here is not to show up the illegalities that institutional actors 
perpetrated within detention centres; since if one contests the very existence of 
migration detention institutions criticism of the opacity of administrative procedures 
doesn’t hit the right target, and at the same time risks shifting the battleground over 
detention centers to claims for more human conditions or for legality. The violence 
and the power exercised in detention centres cannot be reduced to a question of 
legality/illegality [Benjaimin, 1986]: if detention is illegitimate, there cannot be 
something like humane treatment in a condition of detention due to the “crime” of 
being an unwanted/irregular presence on the territory. Consequently, the focus here 
is not on the abuse and arbitrariness of power but on the resolution of migrants in 
carrying on their spatial presence and on the politics of stranding-and-discharging 
through spatial dispersion that characterized the North Africa emergency hosting 
machine.  
The protests in August were not the first at Mineo camp: on 10th May 2011 200 
asylum seekers living in the camp organized a huge blockage of traffic demanding, 
that their claims be processed; in that case, they obtained that the territorial 
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 About Mineo see the report http://www.storiemigranti.org/spip.php?article1024  and the interview 




commission started to work on that after a few days. And, after August, more unrest 
took place, since the starting of the processing of the demands by the territorial 
commission was finally only a partial victory. The work of the territorial commission 
was going ahead very slowly and most of the time people were examined only by 
one member instead of five, often without appropriate language translation; and 
secondly, in autumn 2011 the first rejections of protection started to come. “This is 
not an admissible decision, we all fled from the same war, the Libyan conflict, and 
we are here because of that war”, I have been told by all the rejected refugees I met 
out of the camp: as I will show in the next chapter, the same discourse was then 
strongly argued at Choucha camp in Tunisia by rejected refugees. In fact, through 
the statement “all of us come from Libya and escaped a war” which circulated in 
many borderzones and sites of the Mediterranean, “Libyan” migrants cracked the 
tenability of the Geneva Convention’s principles: in particular the confronted with 
the limits of its nation-based logic – namely, the primacy of the  Country of origin – 
and of the settled-normativity – overlooking for instance African internal migrations, 
that is people who move for years and so who could find themselves in dangerous 
situations or contexts of persecutions that are not their country of origin.  
All these protests unpacked and undermined the mechanism of “stranding-and-
discharging” which actually underpins the politics of asylum, affirming the duty of 
humanitarian and governmental forces to finish their job. At the same time, more 
than practices of resistance they strongly posited the unacceptability of such a 
treatment, challenging and trying to interrupt the meshes of governmentality which 
exercise a specific government over their lives. In this sense, their refusal to being 
governed in that way shows indeed that migrations are always crisscrossed by and 
enmeshed into struggles; that is to say it’s not just when migrants engage in an 
organized struggle or lay claims that the conflicting dimension of migrations come 
out. This doesn’t involve a romanticism which sees migrants as struggling subjects: 
to the contrary, the idea that punctual struggles and resistances against specific non-
functioning of the asylum system actually convey a broader disqualification and a 
refusal of the ways in which migrants’ lives are governed, enables us to downplay 
stress on visible and organized struggles. In fact, being called a migrant involves 
being captured and shaped by a complex set of policies, knowledges, techniques and 
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encounters that make migrants’ lives governable, or better governable as migrants. 
Thus, the analysis of punctual struggles and riots –that shows how the humanitarian 
machine is constantly defeated by migrants– should go along with a consideration of 
the strugglefield of governmentality in which migrants are enmeshed [see chapter 1].  
The big centres of Mineo and Bari should not be taken as spatial paradigms of the 
structures of the North Africa program: rather, what characterized that program is its 
uneven spatial distribution on Italian territory, which included alpine locations many 
hours away on foot from the closest village. The choice of these remote places was 
justified in the name of a more humane and sustainable arrangement for migrants, in 
place of living in overcrowded detention centres very similar to prisons. But, under 
close scrutiny, this spatial distance actually meant migrants experienced extreme 
difficulty in gaining access to the services and rights they were entitled to, so it 
resulted in a very scanty assistance
40
 and finally it worked also as an anti-clustering 
factor preventing the possibility of coordinated or mass struggles. Many of them 
decided to escape in Milan or in other cities of North Italy, despite the official right 
to go out from the CARA during the day as stated by Cara regulations. Therefore, 
the remote locations of the North Africa emergency were little by little depopulated 
due to the flight of migrants that choose to self-organize in the cities, to occupy 
buildings and, in some cases, to find a job as hired men in South Italy (Foggia, 
Rosarno) or in the North (Saluzzo).  
In May 2012 out of 54,000 people coming from Libya, the percentage of rejected 
refugees is around 70%, despite pressure by many groups of activists to provide all 
asylum seekers from Libya one year of humanitarian protection. December 2013: the 
end of the North Africa emergency was postponed to March 2013, due to the actual 
impossibility for the cooperatives that host refugees to discharge them and act as if 
they suddenly did not exist.  “What to do with them ?”: this was the main unresolved 
question for governmental actors, a question that migrants themselves reiterated 
through their persisting in those centres, demanding that a sustainable solution would 
be found for them. This political impasse related to the difficulty of making people 
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 Thousands of people (230 in Valcamonica, 118 in the village of Montecampione at 1800 metres 
above the sea level) were hosted in hotels and structures on the Alps, in locations that could not be 
reached even by the Red Cross 
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disappear into the void and not letting them circulate all over the Italian territory as 
irregular presences. It led the government give temporary humanitarian protection to 
almost all the asylum seekers from Libya and grant them 500 euros as a way of 
winding refugees up from the humanitarian regime. But, once they were supposed to 
have become autonomous subjects, entitled to the rights related to temporary 
protection and allowed to freely circulate in the Schengen space, “not-to-chase” 
migrants
41
 found themselves not in a juridical impasse but in an existential one: the 
growing impact of the economic crisis made it impossible for migrants both to get 
any social protection and welfare assistance and to find even an informal job. 
Therefore, Cara and Reception Centers continued to be their main dwelling, and 
finally the possibility to have food and shelter became inevitably preferable to the 
perspective of being at the mercy of economic uncertainties and anti-immigrant raids 
made to defend citizens against migrant “job thieves”. For their part, the corporations 
that manage the centres have an interest in keeping the Cara open, in order to 
continue to get the 43 euros per day per person. Thus, the Cara of Mineo is more 
overcrowded than at the time of the North Africa emergency, with 3000 people 
living in the centre compared to the 1800 asylum seekers there in December 2011: a 
full speed machine, that nevertheless shifted from a humanitarian rationale to a 
dispositive to “park” people in an indefinite wait, when also the channels of informal 
economy are clogged up. Asylum seekers still continue to arrive in Mineo, 
transferred there as soon as they arrive in Lampedusa, as the two Eritrean guys I met 
out of the centre confirmed to me and then argued: “so, finally this is Italy, right? I 
didn’t imagine it like this; but we know that also here there is the economic crisis. 
We don’t want to stay here, maybe Sweden or Switzerland… and what about 
London? If you could just tell us what train we should take to get there… where 
there are not too many controls onboard”. So, Italy is neither for them a desirable 
place nor do they want to demand asylum to stay there. Or better, they do but only in 
order to be able to then move away and, in the meanwhile, take a rest there “at least 
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be granted at discretion of the territorial commission, when the claim of asylum is rejected because of 




here [at Mineo camp] we can eat every day and going out of the centre, when you 
leave you don’t know what you could come across”42. Differently from one year 
before, migrants’ turmoil has been tamed through the normalization of the camp life: 
that is to say, on the one hand, the official end of the North Africa emergency has 
slackened the controls into and outside the camp, and at the same time the managing 
authorities have realized that a more indulgent regime will prevent new riots. And, 
migrants themselves now see collective struggles as wasteful and strenuous actions 
that could work to their detriment, and that do not actually correspond to the deeply 
different juridical conditions which every one of them is: for someone else has 
obtained international protection, someone has humanitarian protection but still 
needs to get the 500 euros as established by the Ministry of the Interior, someone is 
still waiting for the examination by the territorial commission, etc. Therefore, the 
working of the categories in the government of migrations and refugees basically 
generates a fragmentation effect, just due to the “mobility profiles” migrants are 
shaped by. Indeed, the juridical status, or better the juridical limbo, through which 
migrants are defined, materialize for migrants into forced temporal geographies: who 
waits for the result of the asylum process cannot but stay stranded in place; who is 
rejected moves as an irregular presence on the territory; who gets the temporary 
protection but doesn’t have the permit to circulate in Europe, yet has to wait for an 
indefinite time before going. More broadly, migration governmentality works 
according to a “dividing through categories” rationale producing a precarization of 
lives – tracing out precarious transit zones in which economic migrants and refugees 
are differently allocated [Hess, 2012]. Or to put it differently, a mechanism of 
“categorizing for partitioning”: the multiplication of juridical categories in which 
migrants’ lives are situated - very often stepping out with their biographies and 
stories of the boundaries of those mobility profiles – works as a dividing-mechanism 
among migrants themselves. Beyond the full spectrum of migration categories and 
mobility profiles, we should consider how in practice the complexity and 
singularities of migrants’ stories blur any clear distinction between the different 
juridical categories; and in this way, the multiple partitioning set becomes de facto 
an also more complex and blurred producer of different temporal geographies. In 
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fact, one of the keystones of migration governance lies in the production of juridical 
differences through the multiplication of status, that then results into a differentiated 
regime of living depending on the different mobility profile through which one is 
labeled: actually, it is precisely in this sense that the governmentality of migration is 
primarily a government over lives. These differences are further sharpened due to the 
migrant experiences which never fully fit the existing legal bordered identities. This 
consideration raises a questioning about the drive to pluralize migration that 
underlies many critical analyses: indeed, if on the one side a political epistemology 
of migrations needs to unpack the migration catchword, highlighting the 
heterogeneous conditions and practices of mobility that the name “migration” 
eclipses, on the other side we should confront with the simultaneous multiplication 
and pluralization of profiles created by governmental agencies. And if one could 
object that it is not the same kind of multiplicity that is at stake, nonetheless it’s not 
enough to push for the multiplication of migration and the recognition of 
singularities: in this regard, the important criticism against the monolithic 
understanding of migration by governmental agencies and its objectification into an 
overwhelming category should take into account at the same time the “partitioning 
through differentiation” upon which the asylum politics is predicated. Coming back 
to the camp of Mineo, in place of setting collective struggles, migrants have started 
to mobilize in small groups, on the basis of their specific conditions and the claims 
to make. Most of the time their way of grappling with their existential impasse has 
actualized into the choice to leave and take one’s own chance, or to stay in the camp 
only “in half”, that is officially keeping a place there, but living de facto much of the 
time in nearby cities. 
May 2013, Paris, Hamburg and Berlin. If the so called North Africa emergency was 
one of the most visible bank effects of the Arab Uprisings on the Northern shore of 
the Mediterranean, we should consider also how the North Africa Program has in 
turn resonated beyond Italy. In fact, as I argued above, by North Africa emergency I 
don’t mean here only the governmental strategy of intervention and the set of 
measures deployed on the Italian territory but, more widely, the spatial effects and 





. Despite the changed political situation and the decline of 
organized struggles by asylum seekers in Italy, the scattering of “Libyan” asylum 
seekers and refugees coming from Italy produced “knots of struggle” in many 
European towns, in which they protested against any possible deportation or return 
to Italy and fought to get accommodation. 350 migrants from Libya entitled to 
temporary protection named themselves the “Lampedusa in Hamburg” group44, 
arguing “we did not survive the Nato war in Libya to die in the streets of Hamburg”; 
in this way they staged preeminently, as the marker of their present migrant 
condition, the geographies they enacted and the border-site in which they were 
blocked, identified or detained. “We are here and we will stay. No European country 
can evade the responsibility. We will not be played with anymore by the European 
policy. We were told that the only thing we would get is a ticket back to Italy. We 
think that the social and economic situation in Italy and other southern European 
countries is well known and that there is no possibility of livelihood for us”.  
So we put the question again in the room, what should be achieved, if we get a 
document of humanitarian protection but at the same time every possibility to 
survive is denied?”. These sentences incisively describe the condition of being “not-
to-chase” migrants”, that is the condition of those who have not been recognized as 
refugees but have been given temporary humanitarian protection. Ultimately, the 
very formula of “measures to favor exit patterns” for the “Libyan” migrants is quite 
ambiguous: in fact, more than programs of integration or of labor training, these 
measures have resulted up to now in ways encouraging people moving away from 
the hosting centers. 
Organized collective escapes and extreme resistances: the struggle for “the oxygen 
of freedom”: 
April 2011, Lampedusa and beyond: The second snapshot I take could start in the 
island of Lampedusa, where 25, 000 Tunisian migrants arrived in 2011, just in the 
aftermath of the Tunisian revolution, most of them aiming at going to France. The 
reason why I take this specific snapshot is that Tunisian migrants, through their 
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 This is the official name given by the Italian government to the “hosting machine” deployed once 
that it declared the North Africa emergency 
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 http://lampedusa-in-hamburg.tk/  
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presence, produced turmoil at the level of both European politics and Italian law, and 
radicalized claims and forms of protest. More than that, the analytical lens that I 
would like to suggest, consists in seeing a specific articulation that needs to be 
grasped, between the political event of the Tunisian revolution, migrants' departures 
from Tunisia, and their unconditioned will to move once they arrived on the Italian 
territory. To put it differently, gazing at the unexpected arrival of Tunisian migrants 
all coming in the span of a few months makes us interrogate the juridical and 
political transformations and the spatial turbulence that their presence generated on 
the European territory. New temporary spatialities emerged as outcome of migrants' 
movements and, at the same time, as the effect of border enforcement at the level of 
European policies. In fact, as Federica Sossi persuasively argues, Tunisian migrants 
had immediately to confront techniques of bordering that were activated to respond 
to that “sudden and effective upheaval of the space” [Sossi, 2012a]. In this regard, 
instead of lingering on the island of Lampedusa, I move across the Italian territory, 
taking snapshots of the multiplicity of struggles that happened in Italian detention 
centers. The choice to focus here on detention centres ultimately depends on three 
reasons. Firstly, because looking at delimited spaces, it's easier than elsewhere to see 
all political transformations and issues at stake – considering the detention center as 
a kind of “thickener” and accelerator of political dynamics concerning controls over 
people's mobility. Power over migrants' lives acts in detention centers in such an 
invasive and encompassing way that people seem to be in a condition only to 
counter-act, that is to refuse the grip of power by subtraction. However, at the same 
time, the aim of this glance is to highlight how those practices of migration and 
strategies of resistance actually “knock down” the walls of detention centers, not 
only in a physical way but also politically. The third aspect to explore consists in 
understanding if the multiplication of Tunisian migrants’ struggles in 2011 and their 
radicalism had an influence over other migrants' struggles taking place in the Europe. 
Nevertheless, this question makes much more sense insofar as it is placed within the 
articulation we sketched out between the political uprisings that happened in Tunisia 
in January 2011 and the practices of migration that occurred in the same period of 
time towards Italy. Indeed, what is at issue here is precisely to understand what kind 
of interconnections subsist between these two phenomena, namely between the 
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Tunisian revolution and border crossings. The will and the struggle for freedom that 
triggered and made effective the Tunisian upheaval, I suggest, has been retained and 
pushed forward by Tunisian migrants as people who took part in the revolution and 
then enacted that freedom as freedom of movement, in part breaking with the norms 
of their Country [Mezzadra, 2006] and in part presenting themselves as the “sons of 
the revolution” [Sossi, 2012b].  
The first freeze frame of this snapshot refers to 27
th
 March 2011 – so, in the midst of 
the “Tunisian revolution in Italy”: it shows a group of Tunisian migrants clinging to 
the wire netting of a detention center in Sicily, protesting about being detained like 
criminals arrived from the other shore of the Mediterranean Sea. One of them 
screams “The world is not mine or yours, it neither belongs to Obama nor to 
Berlusconi, it belongs to everyone. So, if I want to breathe the oxygen of Italy, I can 
do it; if I want to breathe the oxygen of Canada, I can do it. No wire exists for me. 
I'm here not to steal or to rob; I'm here for the oxygen of freedom”45. What is 
stunning in these words, is on the one hand the insistence on an unconditioned 
freedom, and on the other hand, the inflection of freedom itself ultimately as 
freedom of movement, and at the same time as an unconditional right to stay 
everywhere, to trample the soil and to move on.  
Moreover, this discourse displaces the spread discourse which sees migrations as the 
result of economic individual needs or of global market dynamics. Indeed, the 
sentences of the oxygen of freedom quoted highlight a very different point: the 
economic factor is only one among others which induced people to leave Tunisia, 
and most of the time it's not primary; rather, what they strive for is the effective 
possibility of moving, of living elsewhere. The claim about “the oxygen of 
freedom”, apart from the unconditional yearning to freedom that it reveals, also 
makes glaringly clear the persistence of a partitioning line that, at present, works as 
one of the main political technologies for the production of social inequality: in fact, 
it points at the crosscutting geopolitical gap between those people on earth who can 
move freely with their passport, and those who are not allowed to move without a 
permit. Thus it shows how this massive divider is the source of tangible effects: the 
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oxygen of freedom to which the Tunisian migrant makes reference, is precisely what 
he has been denied, first in Tunisia under the regime of Ben Alì – where the crime of 
emigration still exists, on the basis of the 1975 law, then reformulated in the 2004 
law
46
 – and then by European governments, that bridled his mobility and his desire 
to move on. That claim, I would argue, allows us to dislocate the gaze looking at the 
migration strugglefiled “form below”, namely taking on practices of migration as the 
strategies around which the migration regime (re)structures itself, opening to the idea 
of migratory projects instead of complying with the paradigm of forced migration 
[Mezzadra, 2006]: I would reformulate this by saying that people migrate not only to 
get out of some social or economic condition, but also because of their will to do 
something different in a different country, of living their existences elsewhere. The 
fact that Tunisians' migrations occurred in 2011 did not fit in the traditional schema 
of economic push-pull factors, deeply undermines discourses and politics on poverty 
as the evil to relieve: “I don't want to be given any sandwich, I want to be left free to 
move away from Lampedusa,”47 a Tunisian migrant firmly stated during the protests 
that took place in Lampedusa at the end of March 2011, when migrants shouting 
“hurrya!” (“freedom” in Arabic) asserted, as neither negotiable nor deferrable, their 
will to move. Yet, both the Tunisian uprisings and migrations across the 
Mediterranean were narrated by the mainstream media as struggles for bread and for 
finding a job. These two issues were indeed at stake and it is important to 
acknowledge the existence and the legitimacy of these aspects, in order not to fall 
into the error of detaching practices of freedom from any concrete concern, 
reiterating the gesture of seeing in events and practices what we are accustomed or 
willing to see. Nonetheless, economic reductionism cannot unfold the complex 
strugglefields in which both migratory movements and revolutionary turmoils are 
situated, exceeding through their practices any demand that could be addressed to the 
existing border or power regime and even less answered by governmental actors. In 
this regards, Sandro Mezzadra draws the attention to the connection between 
revolutionary uprisings and practices of migration: “Why” Mezzadra asks “should 
that scream [hurrya] be bordered within institutionally defined spaces ? Rather, 
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practices and ways of bordering which gave rise to that scream bear the marks of 
continuous trespasses of existences taking place in other spaces” [Mezzadra, 2011a, 
p.116].  
The fact of keeping the two spatial upheavals disconnected – viewing the revolution 
as a conquest of democracy and, inversely, he arrival of Tunisian migrants in 
Lampedusa as the marker of the risks and the crisis of such ungoverned democracy – 
led us to conceive of practices of migration exclusively in terms of “power over 
migrants’ lives” exercised by migration policies. Moreover, the image of Tunisian 
migrants crammed in Lampedusa or in the detention centers, waiting for a response 
from European Union or from the Italian government, portrayed migrants as people 
lacking in life’s projects or “worthy” political demands.  
The redefinition of the Schengen space  and of its principle of internal free mobility 
demanded by some European governments, along with the enforced blurring 
between politics of asylum and border controls
48
, represent the two pillars upon 
which the European space of mobility has been reshaped to respond to migrants’ 
spatial upheavals. In particular, some Countries (Denmark and the Netherlands) 
decided to reactivate national borders.  In between the lines, it should be noticed how 
such spatial rearrangement signal less the enforcement of a European border regime 
than its uneven political geography and internal conflicts among member States. 
Thus, in order to grasp the complex entanglement between the spatial troubles and 
transformations generated by migrants and the new geographies traced by power, I 
take a stock of the riots, escapes and resistance and struggles that took place in the 
Italian detention centers in 2011. The long series of struggles I report was 
“inaugurated” at the beginning of February, when about 60 Tunisian migrants exited  
the courtyard of the detention center in Modena, went up onto the roofs and 
protested, screaming “Freedom, freedom!!”, while also showing signs with the same 
words. In the meantime, 32 Tunisian migrants succeeded in escaping from a 
detention center in Brindisi, making a hole in the wall. From then on, it has never 
been more than 7 days in between riots, and I just recall here in passing the escape of 
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hundreds of Tunisians that happened in Manduria on the 2
nd
 of April. It goes without 
saying that the high number of riots clearly depends also on the considerable number 
of migrants who arrived at once on the Italian coast that, in turn, produced a harsh 
response by governments. In particular, the Italian government put into place new 
sites of detention and renamed already existing detention centres, inventing an 
anomalous spread space of detention, in which people were not formally detained 
(“these are not detention centers”) but at the same time, the Italian vice-Minister to 
the Home Office Mantovano “they can't move away without becoming clandestine 
and losing the possibility to claim for asylum”49 ! 
That said, we should not overlook the impetuosity and at the same time the 
irreverence of those riots and escapes, towards the b/ordering of their movements. 
What is noticeable here is that the unintelligibility of those movements through the 
lens of traditional democratic processes of transformation – readable through the grid 
of revolutionary models – inevitably colludes with the eradication of political fear 
that Tunisians experienced – “we do not have fear anymore” – and that they 
translated into the unacceptability of obedience to their confinement. Recalling 
Foucault’s formulation of revolts: “The impulse through which a single individual, a 
group, a minority or an entire people says: I will no longer obey, and throws the risk 
of their life in the face of an authority they consider unjust, seems to me to be 
something irreducible” [Foucault, 1994d, p. 449]. Ultimately, the sentence that 
Tunisian migrants passed along sounded like “we, who actively took part to the 
revolution; now we are here and we continue it” stressing the hypocritical position of 
European governments, addressing especially to France – “you, who acclaimed our 
democratic uprising and promoted the human rights rhetoric; you are chasing us 
away, the sons of the revolution”. Ultimately, the question is not if they effectively 
took part in the upheavals of the 14
th
 of January or  in the occupation of the Kasbah; 
rather, what is significant in our perspective is that they asserted a relationship 
between the two movements, namely the political uprising in Tunisia and their 
movements across the Mediterranean. In addition to that, my hypothesis is that 
something has changed after their arrival, in regards to the space of movement they 





traced out: they didn't ask to be settled and to become integrated in the Italian 
society, and their claim never referred to citizenship. Instead, they want to exercise 
the freedom gained in Tunisia, which made it possible to materially burn the borders, 
crossing the Italian border and moving on to France and to other European countries. 
In the meantime, something has changed also in relation to the intolerable nature of 
power, namely to the threshold of tolerance as regards the confinement of people's 
movements into wired places and, more widely, against their hampered mobility 
[Balibar, Brossat, 2011]. Over one year of riots and escapes in the Italian detention 
centers, what should be remarked on is the increasing radicalization of forms of 
struggles, and an overall shift from symbolic protests and easy escapes to engaged 
striving and physical fights against police. At this stage of the analysis, the related 
point I would like to raise concerns coexistence between on the one hand extreme 
acts of refusal and deprivation – like hunger strikes and self-mutilations – that even 
when not isolated entail direct physical engagement and attempt to subtract from the 
grasp of power – and on the other hand, organized and collective strategies of escape 
and riots orchestrated to get out of the camp and carry on the practices of migration. 
The presence of both these forms of resistance undermines the idea of the detention 
center as a place where strategies of resistance and collective actions are nearly 
impossible. 
As the chronology of riots indicates, not only did migrant struggles take place also as 
organized escapes, but these latter proved to be the most successful strategies: the 
vast majority of flights succeeded because of the cunning strategies adopted, 
combined with promptness of action and coordination among people.  Along with 
escapes, during the first half of 2011 we witnessed the occurrence of symbolic 
protests – often followed by escapes –that succeeded in bringing the echo of the 
demonstrations beyond the wall of detention centers. In fact, despite their juridical 
status of “irregular”, in the first period Tunisian migrants put into action a strategy of 
visibility, aiming at stressing their not being criminals and their will to move on. 
From this perspective, the most remarkable gesture has been the protest that 
happened in Lampedusa the 31
st
 of March, when migrants took to the streets in a 
disorganized and peaceful way, crying: “we want to move elsewhere”. 
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On the same island, Lampedusa, a very different protest occurred in late September 
when, as I narrated in the first chapter, migrants burned the detention center, and the 
residents reacted, sparking off across the island a proper guerrilla campaign against 
migrants. These two starkly different snapshots bring to the fore a quite different 
context of struggles from that one of early 2011. Actually, the burning of the 
detention center in Lampedusa was in the last the most resounding event of a huge 
number of riots that stood in the background, remaining outside the spotlights of the 
media: we refer to very violent forms of protest, that confronted the containment of 
people's mobility, basically relying on two factors: sudden actions – taking police 
forces by surprise – a united-front of people who brave controls in the most 
overcoming way. How do we account for such a radicalization? In this regard, we 
should linger over two political steps that considerably changed the condition of 
migrants. The first one concerns the decree promulgated by the Italian government 
the 16
th
 June 2011, which extended the maximum time for detention from 6 up to 18 
months. The second stage is the repatriation decree (2
nd
 August) which stated the 
possibility of direct expulsion of undocumented migrants “who could be a danger for 
the public order”; then, that law was enhanced in September with the bilateral 
agreement signed between Italy and Tunisia on the “Extraordinary repatriation plan” 
– that provided for 100 daily returns, throughout three weeks. It's striking to see how, 
just days after the promulgation, many riots occurred, bursting in a sudden way. This 
is not at all to suggest that migrants' movements could be seen as mere reaction to 
power enforcement; the reverse is rather the case, since those juridical measures 
came out in an twofold attempt to stem the upheaval of ordinary space produced by 
migrants' movements, and at the same time to seize the opportunity of “political 
emergency” for introducing significant changes in the juridical regime of human 
mobility, and in the perception of migrations as a problem of public order to solve 
through administrative measures. Thus, the emergence of conflicting spaces should 
be considered in all its complexity: on the one hand migrants' crossings produced an 
upheaval of governed spaces, shaking the threshold of acceptability of power
50
; on 
the other hand, the “response” given both by the European Union and by the Italian 
government didn't simply enforce existing techniques of bordering but rather paved 
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the way for a deep reassessment of the European politics of mobility. In fact, at the 
European level the spatial rearrangement that followed the Tunisian turmoil 
consisted in a partial reconfiguration of the Schengen space
51
 [Garelli, 2013], while 
in Italy, through the invocation of the “humanitarian tsunami”, the Italian 
government enforced special and arbitrary measures of containment. Finally, in the 
name of “humanitarian crisis in North Africa” new actors and international agencies 
entered the machine of migration management and, broadly in the “economy of 
development”, producing new economic exceptional spaces of intervention. The 
spatial upheavals produced by Tunisian migrants through their practices of 
movement and struggle pushed governmental forces to set new emergent-emergency 
spaces. 
These riots and strategies of resistance highlight an overall inclination by migrants to 
continue their practices of movement, not backing down. They also convey a 
peculiar meaning to the idea of resistance to power over migrants' lives – and 
consequently to power over migrants lives, as well: this turmoil of escapes and 
protests does not only resisted the capture and the discipline of lives within the 
camp; rather, it also challenged the bridling of the freedom of movement, cracking 
the very distinction between “legitimate” and “ordered” migration and disordered 
mobility. In this sense, gazing closely at those struggles the unconditioned right that 
I mentioned above and that Tunisian migrants ultimately claimed – the right to 
trample on the soil and to cross all over – is actually an odd form of right, or better a 
sort of “non-juridical right” since as Nicholas De Genova points out it is not a 
question of migrants’ rights but rather of the expression of migrant mobilization, 
“that is to say they erupt from mobilities which cannot be fixed into place, 
categorized and regimented. They refer us to practices and processes of open-ended 
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 The first measure was taken by France, that in April 2011 closed the border with Italy, refusing 
Tunisian migrant who received the humanitarian temporary protection to enter the country, breaching 
the Schengen normative framework according to which migrants with a permit obtained in a member 
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(COM(2011) 560 final). 
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becoming, that actively produce and transform space” [De Genova, 2010a, p.115]. In 
fact, I would add, they do not claim rights in the strict sense, for two reasons. Firstly, 
because they don't demand anything: rather they directly enact movements that 
question and force traditional rights, while both critical scholars and political 
analysts frantically seek to absorb and to cage those practices in the language of 
rights. Secondly because their gestures and claims could neither find a place nor be 
narrowed within the perimeter of citizenship: they are unrestrained precisely because 
they are not in accordance with any given pattern or process of claim – and in this 
sense they are “discordant practices of freedom”. They “plunder” and make use of 
many political tools, reassembling them according to different and unknown 
strategies; but on the other hand, those struggles over life not only place themselves 
outside the register of rights, they are also excluded out of necessity, since it's the 
very status of “subject of right” that excludes undocumented migrants. What does it 
mean to struggle for rights insofar as it's not contemplated that you, as an 
undocumented migrant, would exercise rights? 
However, rather than dismissing right as a tool and as a terrain of struggles, it should 
be acknowledged that struggles for rights, are inevitably overwhelmed and driven by 
the narrative of the nation State. And this latter tends to neutralize both political 
inventiveness and the political force of “discordant practices of freedom” which 
short-circuit the established realm of the political. In fact, first of all, the majority of 
them did not aim at settling in Italy but at moving away – so that the temporary 
permit
52
 that some of them obtained, shifted away both from the narrative of 
integration and from the logic of a right kindly granted by the “hosting” society. 
Contrary to that, Tunisian migrants used also the special temporary permit as a way 
to move on.  
However, this stress on freedom needs to be specified, asking what kind of freedom 
is at stake here.  In fact, freedom in itself is nothing but an empty signifier which 
from time to time is filled with different contents and is addressed to different 
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subjects. Moreover, it is the very form of freedom and its conditions of possibility 
that are constantly resignified
53
. In regard to the context here at stake, the reason why 
I so constantly made reference to freedom as at once a main stake in migrants' 
struggle and as a practice exercised by migrants themselves, lies in the idea that it's a 
very peculiar kind of freedom that is named, asserted and played by migrants coming 
to Italy in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. Indeed, the freedom that they speak of 
– in protests – or enact – by crossing borders and escaping from detention centers – 
seems to designate an unconditional force/movement: not an external position to 
power relations, rather a radical questioning of the traditional political dialectic 
which establishes the conditions and the limits of freedoms. Beyond any “social 
contract” or representative model, Tunisian migrants simply act without regard to 
any condition/restriction to accept for making their claims legitimate. In a nutshell, 
they “place” their freedom without seeking to be in accordance with and recognized 
by powers and rules which fix both the contents and the borders of “legitimate” 
political practices: they don't look for any correspondence between their practices 
and the political order, they do not seek to fit into that. In this sense, I would suggest, 
freedom here is claimed as an “unfitting practice”. After all, it's important to 
remember that “the sheer autonomy of migrations, especially that of unauthorized 
migration, remains a permanent and incorrigible affront to state sovereignty” [De 
Genova, 2010b, p.39]. 
The church and the crane: migrants' unsettling spatial struggles 
Massa, May 2011/ Brescia, November 2010. Through this last snapshot I take a step 
aside from the unexpected turmoil produced by the events of the Arab Spring and 
from Tunisian migrants coming from the Tunisian revolution. However, such a 
distance is taken on purpose, in order to interrogate the political resonance that the 
Tunisian migrants’ upheavals eventually produced, supporting other struggles at a 
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 In fact, drawing on Foucault, this analysis grounds on the idea that freedom is nothing but a 
practice, and thus it is not something that can be granted through rights, even if it is the right to 
freedom of movement. Freedom is always enacted: “Liberty is a practice. So there may in fact be a 
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them, but none of these projects can, simply by its nature, assure the people will have the liberty 
automatically, that it will be established by the project itself. The liberty of men is never assured by 
the institutions and laws intended to guarantee them. This is why almost all of these laws and 
institutions are quite capable of being turned around- not because they are ambiguous, but simply 
because liberty is what must be exercised” [Foucault, 1994c, pp.354-355] 
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distance, through their revolutionary impetus. More exactly, migrants' strategies of 
resistance on the one hand, and political technologies on the other hand, gave rise to 
a spatial redefinition as well as a change in the ways of enacting movements and 
presence in spaces. In a certain way, such a resonance could be figured out as a kind 
of accelerator – producing a domino-effect – of existing social conflicts, leading to a 
radicalization of the ways of acting.
54
  Radicalization here designates not necessarily 
an increasing use of violence, but rather the bringing to the fore of contradictions and 
paradoxical elements in the government of migrations. The short-circuit of power 
mechanisms was fostered especially by the symbolic dimension of some migrant 
struggles. 
In this regard, the snapshot I take concerns two urban protests, whose force lay 
precisely in the way in which symbolic places are used, and are made to play, in the 
struggle. Moreover, both protests are characterized by a particular “spatial 
persistence” – by persisting in space I mean here not only the reference to space as a 
surface and a strugglefield, but also the unauthorized presence in a specific place and 
the claim to the possibility of staying there. However, this spatial persistence is not 
limited to the claim to stay in a certain space but it also entails a redefinition of that 
space itself. This persisting was put into practice also through the occupation of 
symbolic places: a church and a crane. In both cases, as I would show, it's noticeable 
how a juridical claim that ultimately accepts playing the game of power – demanding 
the residence permit for migrants workers
55
 – has turned into a protest which, 
although starting from a punctual claim, spilled over that perimeter, encroaching on a 
broader range of political issues. 
The occupation of the cathedral by migrants happened in the Italian town of Massa 
in May 2011. It started on the 1
st
 of May and it lasted for more than 20 days. What is 
very significant to our purpose are the considerations which led to the decision to 
                                                          
54 Radicalization does not necessarily designate here an increasing of the use of violence but rather it 
points on the one hand to the exposure and at the direct involvement of subjects and, on the other 
hand, to how political stakes/claims become more radical than before. 
55 In fact, the struggle for a residence permit does not challenge in itself the governmental logic 
which assumes as indisputable the idea that migrants need to ask for a permit to be recognized as 
subject of rights. To the contrary, it means to accept terms and conditions of that logic and to strive 
for obtaining what is due to you. Thus, more than forcing the borders of the political, it's a struggle 
which claims against State's violation of rights – in this case the right to be regularized as migrant 
workers as provided by the Italian law.  
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occupy the church, and the way in which migrants acted within the existing political 
conditions and framework, evaluating how to interrupt the functioning of the 
“governmental machine” – composed of different political agents, like local 
institutions, political parties, the catholic church, employers and trade unions – and 
making visible the absurdity which underlies the governance of migrants' lives. 
Every step of the occupation was adopted according to a strategic evaluation, 
grounded on the idea that the keystone of the struggle should be to make the 
different political actors –the Catholic Church, political parties, the trade unions and 
the local government - clash one each other. 
First, the choice of the church
56
. Instead of occupying a trade union office, migrants 
opted for the church for two reasons. The first one is that they considered that 
traditional forms of occupation are by now empty of any political meaning: 
according to them, the factory work  no longer represents the modalities and the 
extension of migrants work force exploitation. As a matter of fact, the blackmailing 
and the precariousness in which migrant workers live, is not reduced or bordered to 
the place of the factory; and besides, salaried work does not correspond any more to 
the forms of work they have to lend themselves to. The second point is that they 
were aware that the challenge was much broader than the question of legal permit, 
and thus they translated the juridical demand, ultimately based on a worker 
perspective, at a political level; or to put it bluntly, they claim the political dimension 
of that protest, refusing to be seen as struggling only to become regularized workers. 
Quite to the contrary, the place of the church would have enabled, at once, to put to 
the test the hypocrisy of the Catholic Church – which appeals to an unconditioned 
                                                          
56 The first and most well-known occupation of a church by migrants dates back to 1996, when a 
group of sans-papiers occupied the churches of Saint-Ambroise and Saint-Bernard. Now, if it's quite 
evident that the sans- papiers' struggle has played over times as an point of reference for migrants - as 
it has been the case in Massa - it seems to me that even hinging on that experience, migrants in Massa 
came at put into place a quite different strategy of action: what they claim is neither to be recognized 
as belonging to our society despite the lack of a juridical status and exceeding the formal frontiers of 
citizenship, nor to recognize their presence as socially legitimate and economically necessary: what 
they put into practice is rather close to what Virno calls “a politics of exodus” which ultimately means 
refusing the very terms of the governmental regime determining the threshold of the political. This 
political practice “is not a negative gesture, exempt from action and responsibility. On the contrary, 
because defection modifies the conditions within which conflict takes place, rather than submit to 
them, it demands a particularly high level of initiative” [P. Virno, 1996]. In other words, it's less an 
act of outing on the public sphere that a radical act -of force- that states: ”we don't accept it anymore, 
we take the matters in our hands and we do not obey until something changes”. 
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welcome for migrants, unfailingly disappointing that principle in practice – forcing it 
to make a stand on that issue. Hinging on the centrality played by the Catholic 
Church in Italy, migrants looked at the church as a place from which to address all 
political forces. Nevertheless, they didn't ask for hospitality within the church, rather 
they overturned the space of the church as a sanctuary space: “we don't want to be 
tolerated or hosted: we know that this space is not a property of the Italian State, but 
we argue that it does not belong to the catholic Church too, since it is named – by the 
Church itself- as a universal space. So, we simply decided to stay here, without 
asking anybody to be hosted”. In this way, they strategically played on the 
ambivalence of the discourse of the Church, producing a sort of short-circuit of the 
regime of tolerance. If we think about the Tunisian oxygen of freedom – the episode 
that I mentioned in the second snapshot – it seems to me that we find a quite similar 
logic at work: in both cases, migrants are clearly careless of terms and conditions 
fixed by the democratic regime of discursivity, as for instance the insistence on 
rights' claim. In other words, the occupation of the Church in Massa – or better, not 
so much the form of protest in itself as the way in which it has been replayed – 
resounds the “discordant freedom” I mentioned in relation to Tunisian migrants. To 
qualify this expression in a slightly different way, I would say that it addresses 
freedom as a practice – more than as a content – which does not seek any 
correspondence or alliance with the conditions of democratic society as claimed by 
“liberal States”: “migrants are not the lacking subjects of freedom; quite to the 
contrary, just because they are not subjects of right of any pre-established citizenship 
[…] they deeply put into question its structural limits”, and therefore, compared to 
democracy as the normative order of our societies “migrants represent a 
contradiction on the move” [Mometti, Ricciardi, 2011]. The notion of “discordant 
freedom” focuses less on the unconditional exercise or on the non-complying nature 
of that, than on the will to bring to the fore the absurdity and the irrationality of the 
government of human mobility, bringing political forces into conflict with each 
other. For instance, migrants living in Massa contradicted the president of Tuscany's 
speech about the injunction to build up “humane” detention centers, “which would 
transform clandestine migrants into workers”, by pushing to extremes that discourse 
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and saying “so, we need to also put inside Italian people, since most of them are 
nowadays unemployed”.  
Closely related to that, the occupation of the Church in Massa suggests to us also a 
creative dimension that is more and more at stake in migrants' struggles: in fact, as I 
argued before, what is really interesting is not the form of struggle they put into 
place – the occupation – but rather, the way in which they re-played and reworked it, 
asking people and institutions to come there in order to negotiate, and redefining the 
space of the church as a common space. As L.D pointed out, “we made visible, as in 
the back-light, the lack of inventiveness characterizing the Western political tradition 
and the weakness in producing practices which effectively short-circuit power 
regimes of discursivity”57, in order to open spaces for political agency refusing the 
well-known dance of political representation as the master ground for political 
action. In the same perspective we should read the gesture they performed in front of 
the main institutional buildings, showing at the same time a box of tomatoes and a 
residence permit: why, they asked, do we have fewer rights than a box of tomatoes? 
Far, if the certified box of vegetables could freely circulate all over Europe, this is 
not the case for migrants, who even though they get a permit for staying and working 
in Italy, cannot search for a job in France or live in Spain. That is to say, the freedom 
of movement, very rhetorically promoted by European Union and effectively 
asserted in international treaties, is allowed and enacted by governments through a 
deep asymmetry between people and goods. This is the reason why we should shift 
our political attention from the rallying call of “freedom of movement” to a 
questioning concerning the ways in which such a freedom is conceived, enacted and 
equally guaranteed. And this is also the reason why they refused to accept a 
temporary permit that the local government would have granted to them: indeed, 
what they want to sidestep is the logic of precarization underlying the concession of 
permit; and along with that, they refuse to narrow their struggle to a battle for getting 
a paper – the resident permit –and consequently to accept to play within the frame of 
claim of rights: indeed, “we use this targeted struggle for spilling over the very issue 
of permit, making clear that what we want to act is freedom of movement, and not 
juridical regularization. This last is nothing but the correlate of the violation of that 
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 Interview conducted in Massa in December 2011 
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freedom we constantly undergo. In this sense, it's clear that we have never claimed  
rights, we simply assert that the practices we enact are hampered and consequently, 
what you call 'rights' is eventually what we are stripped of”. It could be argued that 
the symbolic level of these struggles pushes to redefine the self-evident function of 
right, shifting it from a claiming question to a pick-lock or a tool-box to unhinge that 
regime of political epistemology traditionally legitimized by right. But despite the 
fact that a huge literature asserts the strength of outcast people to challenge and to 
reshape the borders of citizenship and political belonging [Balibar, 2002; Isin, 2002; 
Mc Nevin, 2011, Nyers 2010] it cannot be overlooked that what is at stake here is 
not a demand of belonging or “to be recognized as integral rights-bearing members 
of the polity despite lacking legal status” [Nevin, 2011, p. 131]. I suggest that it's 
rather the proposition “to belong to” which is actually challenged by the unexpected 
presence of Tunisian migrants in Europe – what I named the “Tunisian turmoil in 
Europe” -, thus effectively shaking the discursive framework of Western political 
thought [Arendt, 2001]. In fact, the idea of belonging necessarily entails a political 
space fixed in advance, towards which subject are supposed to address, sometimes 
stretching its borders: indeed, the space and the desirability of belonging are both 
taken for granted, while what is asserted is eventually the possibility to enlarge the 
range of subjects entitled to it. In this regard, I would say that the shift of focus from 
citizenship to belonging doesn't push the question on: in fact, the normative ideal-
type is in both cases – citizenship and belonging – the “ethical” construction of the 
good citizen or at least of the good civic subject: civilization and (urban) civility 
overlap as the underlying frame of reference.  
After considering the choice of the place – the church – we should dwell upon the 
day they decided to act: the 1
st
 May. Again, we see how symbolic element and 
strategic evaluation are intertwined. In fact, strategically speaking the 1
st
 May was a 
day in which a lot of people would have supported their struggles – as a non-working 
day, and as a bank holiday which conveys a specific political meaning, so that people 
are more inclined than usual to take part in workers' struggles. Then, on the other 
hand, hinging upon a very symbolic day, migrants ultimately aimed at unsettling and 
reversing the very meaning of 1
st
 May: they stress that far from being a holiday to 
celebrate, it should be understood as a moment for recalling the precariousness of 
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workers' lives as the absence of work is a constant that people have to confront. In 
other words, the 1
st
 of May sounded at once like a way of gathering as many people 
as possible, far beyond the communities of migrants – playing just on the political 
meaning of that day – and as a stage for rethinking its function.  
Now I take a step back, turning to the occupation of a crane which took place in the 
city of Brescia in November 2010, when nine migrants decided to go up the crane 
and stay there to protest against the 2009 Italian law on legalization, as in the case of 
migrants in Massa. At this point, it's relevant to see how certain strategies of 
resistance could produce a sedimentation of knowledges and practices – I would say 
of ways of acting – that then are re-mobilized and replayed by other people, 
resounding in other contexts. What the occupation of the crane clearly staged is 
above all the overcoming of the fear to openly question the regime of 
clandestinization set by the Italian government and, more broadly, by the politics of 
migration control. Secondly, migrants actually broke with the condition of “being-
spoken-by” – trade unions, political parties etc. – since they choose a highly 
symbolic work place, the crane – thus stressing the exploitation of migrants' labour 
force – but refusing to be represented by anybody. 
The hypothesis that I would put forward is that migrants struggling in Brescia put 
into place a way of facing political forces, and at the same time a way of exposing 
their own precariousness, leaving a sort of practical-political legacy that is then very 
soon reused by others. Such a legacy, I would argue, has been reshaped and mostly 
radicalized in the aftermath of the political uprisings that happened in North Africa. 
Paving the way to a series of migrants' struggles playing on buildings occupations 
and symbolic acts, something however happened between the occupation of the 
crane in Brescia and the other struggles. The snapshot on Massa shows at once how 
much migrants reactivated and re-mobilized the practical savoir-faire put into place 
in Brescia, and how they actually revised that way of struggling in the light of a by 
then acquired fearlessness to face power; secondly, the extreme and dangerous 
exposure of lives – which most of migrants' struggles entail – came to be 
problematized; then, a shift from the domain of labor to a wider political issue was 
reckoned as crucial. Finally, it's important to stress that in the aftermath of the Arab 
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Spring, and at one and  the same time that the struggle in Massa happened, the 




The methodological choice to talk about emergent spatialities taking specific 
snapshots comes out also from a radical questioning of the cartographic rationality 
which plays a fundamental role in migration governmentality –see for instance the 
codification of migration strugglefield in terms of governmental maps that I illustrate 
in the fifth chapter – and which represents spaces and events according to a flat 
overview and a timeless narrative. Through the technique of the snapshots I tried to 
take on the heterogeneity of border crossings, political technologies and struggles, 
running through space, that took place within a certain spatial framework [Pickles, 
2004] Nevertheless, such a methodological ruse doesn't aim at freezing those 
practices: on the contrary, snapshots have highlighted the spatial turbulences 
generated by practices of migration across the Mediterranean, and provided a 
different slant on the ambivalences of power over/of migrants' lives. At the same 
time, they enabled us to keep in mind that techniques of bordering and practices of 
migrations are always crisscrossed by a complex strugglefield.  
The resounding of the revolution brought by Tunisian migrants on the northern shore 
of the Mediterranean was triggered firstly by Tunisian migrants who burned all the 
frontiers of their own country, getting freedom there; and when they arrived in 
Europe not only did they self-nominate themselves as “the sons of the Revolution” 
but they also asserted the will to carry on that revolution far beyond Tunisia itself. In 
this regard I recall here the discourse of the “Collective of Tunisians from 
Lampedusa in Paris”, addressed to the French, that stated “you, the people flaunting 
universal human rights and democracy, now you refuse to let us live in this country”; 
and it could be continued saying “we, Tunisian migrants, we have just made the 
revolution in our country and we are now making a revolution here, intending to 
really burn the borders and to live here, to stay here”. Nevertheless, the bounce-
                                                          
58 After many sit-in in early May, the 22
nd
 of May migrants occupied the churchyard of the Dome in 
Brescia, while the 16
th
 of June a group of migrants went up a crane in the city of Padova, and in Milan 




effect is not merely a question of the legacy of the Tunisian revolution on the 
practices of freedom enacted by “revolutionary” Tunisian migrants: in a broader and 
maybe pretentious way, I would argue that the bank-effect has also impacted and 
resounded in other contexts or in regard to other forms of struggle – as for instance 
in the case of the occupation of the church in Massa or in the hired hands' strike in 
Nardò, or finally in asylum seekers' riots that happened in Bari in summer 2011 
[Perrotta, Sacchetto, 2012]. But far from seeing there a revolutionary season/cycle of 
struggles, or the production of new political subjects, I would rather draw attention 
to the intensity and to the multiplication of riots, resistances and escapes that took 
place in Italy and France in the aftermath of the Arab Spring More than a question of 
numbers, I would see the specificity of this bounce-effect in the motto “no fear 
anymore” that qualified and made possible the Tunisian revolution, and which 
seemed to be equally at stake in the strategies of resistance and in the practices of 
freedom we mentioned here. An ambivalent discourse, a constant tension, I would 
say, between the awareness that there is nothing to lose and a political force coming 
in a certain way from the borders burned during the revolution. Jointly with that, the 
bounce-resounding effect is visible also at the level of the ways of struggling, and 
more precisely of the inventiveness that is involved in most of them. By 
inventiveness I mean here both the experimentation of different modalities for 
making play one's own invisibility and the capacity to redefine also traditional forms 
of struggle according to the present political contexts/subjects, sometimes 
completely transfiguring their original meaning. Nevertheless, we should not fall into 
a romanticism of migrant struggles, or of envisaging practices of migration as forms 
of resistance in themselves: instead, the focus on the articulation between the 
revolutionary uprisings and migrations includes also shedding light on the 
strugglefield in which migrations are always situated, as also it’s the case of political 
turmoil that in fact takes place in the turmoil of power relations. 
An intermezzo on migrant struggles and freedom of movement: 
The formula “migrant struggles” encapsulates at least two different meanings and 
refers to an array of different empirical experiences of migration.  Firstly, “migrant 
struggles” is the name for saying the multiple concrete struggles in which migrants 
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are engaged: more or less organized struggles that defeat, escape or trouble the order 
of mobility, the regime of labor, the politics of detention and control or the space of 
citizenship. Struggles taking place at the border or before and beyond the borderline, 
struggles that gain the scene of the public space or that remain invisible. Assumed in 
this first empirical meaning, “migrant struggles” should unpack the catchword of 
“migration” highlighting the heterogeneity of migrant conditions and the different 
ways in which migrants are confronted with powers. Thus, “migrant struggles” 
makes as pluralize migration, suggesting that any possible common ground of 
struggles cannot be but built creating new alliances from time to time. However, 
taking migrant struggles in this first empirical meaning, we should resist seeing any 
practice of migration as deliberate agency or as challenges to the border regime. 
Rather, as it is well known, migration is strongly needed by capitalism and also if 
focusing on “illegal” migrations, it’s important to keep in mind the ambivalences 
that cross practices of migration: they could play as resistances against some 
mechanisms' containment or against the social norms of the Country of origin, but at 
the same time being the other side of the selected mobility that partitions  channels 
of allowed and fast mobility on the one hand, and unskilled migrant labour force that 
is supposed to move illegally. From this point of view, the stake becomes to bring 
out what also in these irregular-but-wanted practices of migration exceeds the 
economic frame in which their presence is required and expected. But along with this 
first empirical meaning, “migrant struggles” could be framed also in a more 
structural way, starting from the consideration that every migration is situated in and 
grapples with a certain strugglefield, and in this sense is always crisscrossed by and 
involved in multiple struggles. It basically depends on the fact that practices of 
mobility that are labeled as migrations are captured, filtered and managed by 
migration policies and techniques of bordering. It follows that migrations are 
eminently grasped into relations of power and conflicting fields of forces; and 
consequently, any migration as practice taking place within such a strugglefield is 
immediately also a struggle for modifying, challenging or interrupting that 
configuration of power. And at the same time, migrations force the border regime to 
constantly revise its strategies, working in a way as a constitutive “troubling factor”. 
After all, by naming these migrants' struggles as “discordant practices of freedom” 
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what is highlighted is also the specific freedom that migrants enact when they move 
or stay in space despite the techniques of bordering that set the pace of the terms and 
conditions of mobility: that is to say, the freedom of movement they enact is not the 
same of that claimed and promoted by the European Union. Additionally, if the 
freedom taken on the Southern shore was seen from the European side as a 
paramount conquest, it was depicted with disquieting traits when translated into the 
freedom of movement acted by Tunisian migrants: in some way, it could be 
suggested that the Northern shore praises a politics of “connections at a distance”, 
while becoming troubled when the bank-effects of the revolutionary and democratic 
uprisings involve a spatial presence on the European territory. But coming back to 
the common watchword of “freedom of movement” that today spans from European 
Union agencies to NoBorder activists, I contend that only a much more qualified 
argument about freedom of movement and about its content could safeguard from 
being absorbed into the very discourse of governmental actors: in this regard, the 
practices of freedom played by Tunisian migrants make visible that there are 
multiple and conflicting ways of conceiving and enacting freedom of movement: the 
adjective “discordant” stresses precisely the uneasiness both of governmental forces 
and of European citizens in grappling with practices of movement that do not fit into 
the established frame of regulated mobility. In this way, Tunisian migrants have 
troubled the presumed universality of the paradigm of freedom of movement 
presented by governmental discourses aiming at managing and selecting practices of 
mobility. “The free mobility of whom and at what costs?”  should be perhaps the 
question to pose at every time when one engages in a critical and a political analysis 
on the struggles over freedom of movement. An analytical posture that tries to 
redouble the same gesture of discordant freedoms enacted by migrants, resisting the 
assumption that the freedom of mobility proposed by European “liberal 
democracies” is the normative yardstick to judge the legitimacy of practices of 
migration. Moreover, it means to challenge the conflation of freedom of movement 
with free circulation, or better to reduce the former to a question of easily circulating 
in space [Bigo, 2011]: the freedom of movement I talk about and that Tunisian 
migrants glaringly staged does not concern the mere possibility of movement – 
which is actually one of the main present pillars of  European politics – but the 
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effective and equal possibility to move and stay without playing along with the pace 
of the politics of mobility and its selective partitioning. However, if we keep at 
distance the narrative of the European migration governmentality examining rather 
how circulation of people has been historically managed, we see that capitalist 
economy, far from effectively enabling the free circulation that it promotes, is 
grounded on a substantial differentiation of access to mobility: free circulation of 
goods and people is posited by liberal democracies as the desirable and unachievable 
goal that, is actually sustained by exclusionary and selective rights to mobility.  
The second point that I would raise in this regard concerns the relationship between 
“discordant” practices of freedom and the will of “not being governed at all or not be 
governed in such a way” that Foucault pointed out. This means to interrogate to what 
extent the practices of migration that I took into account here crack the going-
without-saying of governmental rationality, its indisputable reality and necessity. 
Obviously such a question opens a field of problematizations that goes beyond the 
scope of this research. So, I delimit here the debate arguing that in order to grapple 
with such a question we should firstly distinguish two different meanings of 
government – and government over lives. In fact, if by government we refer to 
governmental rationality – and in this specific case to the government of people’s 
movements, it could be stated that these struggles undo at its very root the 
assumption that mobility is something that should be governed or managed. And the 
ways in which they discredited the governmental rationale was less for their acts of 
border crossing in itself (the practice of the “harraga”) than on the basis of what I 
called “discordant” practices of freedom: namely, migrant struggles that, despite 
sometimes concerning specific demands, exceed any specific address towards 
governmental actors of “liberal democracies”. Indeed, if we look at Tunisian 
migrants arriving in Europe, they didn’t claim  any “reasonable” political solution – 
for instance the international protection or the will to become Italian 
residents/citizens – and, finally, it could be argued that they didn’t address power at 
all, since mostly during the first months of their presence on the Italian territory, they 
simply tried to move towards France or Northern Europe but were blocked by many 
State controversies.  However, another level of government is also at stake, I believe, 
when we refer to migrants' strategies of resistance. This second meaning draws on 
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the definition of power given by  Foucault  in The Subject and Power: “what defines 
a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does not act directly and 
immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, 
on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future 
[...].Basically power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or the linking of 
one to the other than a question of government. To govern is to structure the possible 
field of action of others” [Foucault, 1982, pp.789-790]. Now, from this point of 
view, it should be stressed that, as I previously showed, practices of migrations 
always take place within a strugglefield of governmentality and that migrants are 
continuously “captured” in the meshes of power. Moreover, drawing on Foucault's 
definition of government, by challenging the techniques of bordering that constitute 
the migration regime, migrants put into place and enact different ways of exercising 
their freedom. In other words, insofar as there is a strategy of resistance at stake, 
however “intentional but non-subjective” it could be, the goal is to slacken the grasp 
of power, to interrupt some mechanisms of capture or to not be governed by those 
laws of mobility, and in this sense it is always a relational practice confronting and 
situated within power relations. 
Ultimately, our main focus on emergent spatialities produced at once through 
practices of movements and time by politics, should be seen from just  this 
perspective: if migrants' practices enacted a “spatial takeover” [Sossi, 2012a] namely 
a redefinition of spaces – and of the way in which spatial distances are conceived 
and crossed – forcing power to reassess its strategies and targets, then refusals and 
movements practiced by migrants disseminated ways of acting the spaces that do not 
fit within any previous logic of “legitimate” practices of mobility. Therefore, the 
discordant freedom, which does not find any correspondence and alliance in the 
normative democratic order of freedom, contests that order through the very 
practices, or better still it acts that challenge. Not an overwhelming “revolutionary” 
movement, but rather a multiplicity of turmoil – some acting behind the scenes, 
some more visible and disruptive – coming from “the margin”– of the city, of the 
European borders, of the social – which filter and penetrate into the “accepted space 
of mobility” opening fold-spaces inside it. That said, as I also pointed out regarding 
the intransitive freedom that Tunisian migrants strove for and enacted, we should be 
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aware that a critical political posture can't split or untie the discourse on the freedom 
to move from a rethinking of the very contents of the freedom that we have in mind 
and that we constantly mention. To put it briefly, it's not enough to praise freedom of 
movement as such, regardless of its content, precisely because it is as much asserted 
and promoted by the regime of governmentality that here is in question: in fact, the 
European Union is enhancing more and more a discourse on a free mobility not only 
for goods but also for people. For this reason, I would contend, in order to be really 
“discordant” these practices of freedom should be coupled with praise to social 
equality, revolutionizing terms and conditions so that everyone could effectively 
exercise that freedom. 
However, all these struggles could be read also from a different vantage point, and 
instead of stressing the multiplication of riots across the Mediterranean linger on the 
elusiveness of migrants’ presence in visible spaces and the evanescent existence of 
organized collective struggles. Two and a half years after the outbreak of the 
Tunisian revolution no trace has remained of the Tunisians from Lampedusa in Paris, 
no trace left of the groups of migrant workers in Italy, no trace even of their 
occupations. In fact, the choice of spatial and temporal snapshot comes from the 
importance of dating all these spatial upheavals without the ambition and the task of 
talking about the (eventual) persistence of those collective movements after their 
dissolution. They did not leave any trace but, in some way, the snapshots show us 
that they made a groove, in that space and at that specific time, temporarily shaking 
the geographies and the spatial bordering.  
While Tunisian migrants were upsetting the spatial and political geometries of the 
European space of free mobility, the revolutionary uprisings and migrations from 
Libya troubled the politics of mobility in Tunisia and the narrative of “transition to 
democracy”. The next chapter engages with these spatial disorders and rescaling, 






CHAPTER 3:  
Democracy as containment and migration in crisis in revolutionized Tunisia 
 
“The events unfolding in our southern neighbourhood reflect a profound 
transformation process. The changes now underway carry the hope of a better life 
for the people of the region and for greater respect of human rights, pluralism, rule 
of law and social justice – universal values that we all share. Movement towards full 
democracy is never an easy path – there are risks and uncertainties associated with 
these transitions. The EU must not be a passive spectator. It needs to support the 
wish of the people in our neighbourhood to enjoy the same freedoms that we take as 
our right. European countries have their own experience of democratic transition” 
[EU, COM(2011) 200 final] 
In this chapter I bring the attention to the spatial upheavals produced in the 
Mediterranean at the time of the Arab Uprisings, focusing on the new spaces they 
produced and the spatial economies that they troubled. I situate the analysis at the 
intersection between practices of movement and spatial economies, interrogating 
how different regimes of government, truth and mobility have been created, 
transformed or resignified. In the first section I focus on the idea of democracy as a 
strategy of containment, analyzing how the politics of mobility and economic 
projects of development articulate in revolutionized space through the script of 
democracy. Then, I take into account the notion of “crisis” as a catchword used by 
migration agencies for coming to grips with the migration turmoil that took place in 
the Mediterranean. Finally, in the third section I turn to the project of a Maghreb 
transnational area of free mobility: what is at stake is to explore how these political 
upheavals produced new spatial configurations far beyond the national boundaries of 
the revolutionized Arab countries, tracing transnational spaces and challenging the 
“European referent” as a space of free circulation. Hinging on the fundamental 
openness that characterizes these political events, I talk about “revolutionized 
spaces” in the place of “post-revolutionary contexts” in order to mark the ongoing 
political turmoil taking place on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, stretching 
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the temporality of the revolution fixed by the European narrative of the Arab 
Uprisings and downplaying dates of migration policies.
59
  
The political upheavals which took place in 2011 in many Arab countries were 
immediately depicted as the awakening of the Arab region, through the trademark of 
“Spring” as a sign of the “delayed” race to democracy that Arab people undertook 
struggling against dictatorship [Badiou, 2012; Eyad, 2012]: the “Arab Spring” was 
situated into the historical prose of the Enlightenment – in this case, the “delayed 
Enlightenment of the Arab countries- and within the tale of economic development, 
and the Mediterranean was presented as a space for a fruitful political dialogue 
between the two shores: “as a result of the recent Arab mass uprisings, a new 
Mediterranean is emerging. In fact, until only recently the dynamic northern shore 
appeared to have played a meaningful role in the evolution of good governance. The 
southern shore, in this view, is seen as an obstacle to progress.” [Ammor, 2012, p. 
128]. At the same time, the “Arab” label encompasses different contexts of struggle 
through an indistinct signifier. The rallying cry of freedom and democracy resounded 
across the Mediterranean, with both liberal analysts and left-wing movements 
looking at those revolutions as a promising prospect for political change and as 
liberation from dictatorships.  
The wave of upheavals was framed from different angles as a new open struggle-
field for democracy. Nevertheless, this “pleasant smooth tale” was destabilized by 
the departure of thousands and thousands of Tunisian migrants towards Europe: the 
conquests of freedom and democracy became a more ambiguous concern, deeply 
challenged and troubled in the face of the “side-effect” of irregular migrations. Thus, 
while not yet put into place, the new democratic space was revealed as a very 
unstable region, subject to diverse possible continuations or future “crisis”: the 
migratory crisis, the crisis of just-born democracies, debt crisis, humanitarian crisis 
at the Libyan border, unexpected social remonstrations... The unexpectedness of 
migrants' departures was translated in the terms of a predictable failure of a still 
unstable political context to be headed towards an accomplished democratic system 
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 For a critical analysis of the “narrative of the revolutions” and European history presented as a 
blueprint for reading the present events, see F. Sossi, 2013. 
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of governance. Migrations were seen as the undesired outcome and, at the same time, 
as the index of the political crisis springing in new-born democracies. Very quickly, 
the tale of revolutionary democratic upheavals slipped into “discontent and turmoil” 
triggered by social and economic inequality, laying the ground for presenting it as a 
phenomenon to be governed and finally tamed. Migrants' movements were depicted 
as the index of the political turbulence triggered by Arab Uprisings, requiring a 
structured response by the EU: migrations became the “side effect” of the 
revolutions and the troubling but inevitable outcome of undisciplined democratic 
uprisings, enhancing “deviant” impure models of democracy and “disturbing” 
processes [Chatterjee, 1993, p.3]. In such a context, the nexus mobility-democracy 
was mobilized simultaneously in two opposite directions. On the one hand, it was 
built on the concept of “good governance”: democracy is posited as a guarantee and 
an indispensable condition for managing ordered mobility, while (selected) mobility 
is seen as a fundamental phenomenon to propel in order that Tunisia could achieve a 
proper transition to democracy
60
. On the other hand, (disordered) mobility and 
(undisciplined popular) democracy were designated precisely as the causes of 
political instability in the Mediterranean. 
The slowness of the discourse and the frayed texture of governmentality:  
In this chapter I work through the gaps between regimes of discursivity and the 
effective way in which power works and fails: it involves investigating the function 
of such a discrepancy and the relations between discursive and non-discursive 
practices. The gap that I take into account consists in the partial non-correspondence 
between the governmental narrative and the complex texture of struggles and 
techniques of government taking place on the ground. Such a discrepancy between 
texts and the strugglefield of governmentality is at times the result of practices and 
resistances that constantly make governmental programs “fail”, and sometimes is 
used to the advantage of the functioning of power – for instance, producing a (huge) 
“residual” of people excluded from international protection programs. If on the one 
hand, as Foucault stated, governmentality always adapts and operates tactically, on 
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 In fact, the logic of “learning best practices” which sustains most of the programs of selected 
mobility between North African countries and the European Union encapsulates the idea that a 
smooth transition to good governance requires an “apprenticeship” of practices of democracies. 
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the other hand something always escapes from and exceeds regulative mechanisms. 
It seems that this discrepancy reveals both the leeway and the interstitial spaces of 
practices that governmentality cannot wholly capture. 
In particular, what I would like to stress is the constitutive discrepancy between the 
“slowness of the discourses” and the “unrest of practices”. In fact, without denying 
the performative function of the discourses, they need to adapt and respond 
according to the strugglefield of power relations; thus, the temporality of discourses 
is forced to keep pace with the underway transformations in the social field. In this 
regard, this hiatus resembles the distinction made by Guha between the “time of the 
event” and the “time of discourses” [Guha, 1988]. Actually, Guha refers to the 
constitutive gap between on the one hand practices and events, and on the other the 
representative and discursive dimension which inevitably fails to keep historical 
events alive. Translating his analysis in the domain of governmentality, 
governmental programs frame present events and political practices according to an 
anticipatory narrative which stages their future steps. The discursive regime of 
policies works as a yardstick for codifying noisy and discordant events into a grid of 
intelligibility which makes those practices manageable. In the face of the 
ambivalence of these gaps, what emerges is the “frayed” dimension of the migration 
regime [see chapter 1], its “patchy texture”: this refers to the uneven interplay among 
these heterogeneous elements; but at the same time concerns the slippery positions 
that subjects enact within the meshes of governmentality, complicating and “fraying” 
the borders between inside and outside. It follows that the possibility to resist, to 
dodge or to counter-act some mechanisms of capture cannot be resolved into a sharp 
opposition between an inside (“the migrants”) and an outside (the citizens or the 
mobile persons).  
Democracy as a strategy of containment: Since the Nineties of the 20
th
 century , 
the migration-development
61
 nexus has been presented as the  cornerstone of  
Migration Studies and policies, conceiving migrations as a factor constitutive of 
developmental policies [Castells, 2009; Faist, Fauser 2010; Ghosh, 2000; Hess, 
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 The category of “development” is assumed here starting from the analysis of Arturo Escobar who 
shows that development discourse emerged in the Fifties as a political project to continue colonial 
domination in other forms and for taming social unrests in decolonized countries [Escobar, 1996]. 
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2008; Pastore, 2007; Piper, 2009; Truong, Gasper, 2011]: migrations are managed as 
a developmental solution, and the main challenge of intergovernmental agencies 
becomes to “fix” subjects in space, preventing people from migrating in the name of 
developmental goals. At the same time, migration has started to be the clue through 
which redefining developmental strategies and discourses. However, this is only a 
side of the story of the “Migration & Development” blueprint, whose characteristic 
ultimately relies on the ambivalence of the question “development for whom?”. In 
fact, two simultaneous political orientations are encapsulated in the formula of 
“migration and development”: on the one hand, migration policies aiming at 
enhancing a selected and managed mobility towards Europe in order to counter the 
European demographic crisis –thus, order mobility at the benefit of Europe –and 
migrants’ networks are seen as “developmental agents” [Faist, 2008]62; on the other 
hand, developmental projects in migrants’ countries of origin in order to tackle the 
“root causes of illegal immigration” [Chaloff, 2007; Pastore, 2007]. Therefore, if the 
former is commonly recognized a “development through migration” strategy, I 
would call the latter a “non-migration through development” rationale. And if both 
are largely promoted by the European Union, the “non-migration through 
development” is by far more implemented. However, as many authors have 
contented, the strategy of “development instead of migration” that consists in 
undermining the “root causes of emigration” –promoting development in the 
countries of origin – is not effective: sociological studies demonstrated that an 
increase of development tends to generates more human mobility [Castells, Delgado, 
2008; Tapinos, 1990]. In fact, the argument that I push forward in this chapter is that 
the proliferation of development programs for would-be migrants and returned 
migrants in revolutionized Tunisia, promoted under the banner of democracy, 
actually do not aim at improving economic autonomy and development: on the 
contrary, they “fix” would-be migrants in space through unskilled economic 
activities, making them fall into debt with international financial circuits. In this 
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 This argument has been strongly remarked in the European documents and communication 
delivered in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. In particular, a milestone of the 2011 Eu’s strategy on 
migration (Communication on Migration) stresses that point: one of the most pressing economic 
challenges faced by Europe is the need to address the demographic decline in its working age 
population coupled with significant projected skills shortages in certain sectors […] Europe must take 
concrete steps to meet its projected labour needs via targeted immigration of third country nationals” 
(COM(2011) 248 final). 
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section I will explore how democracy plays as the tenet through which the 
migration-development nexus was revised in the Tunisian revolutionized space. 
Following a current of literature that centered on developmental spaces [Brookfield, 
1975, Bonata, Protevi, 2004; Sidaway, 2007] I frame the issue by taking on a spatial 
gaze, looking at the spatial transformations that the nexus in question engendered. 
July 2012: I visited Tunisian villages of the inner regions of the Country (Kasserine, 
Sidi Bouzid, Tataouine and Sbeitla) in order to find the developmental projects in 
support of returned migrants that Iom, Eu and World Bank sponsored on their 
websites and in official documents: in fact, the overall picture of revolutionized 
Tunisia that emerges from those governmental strategies is the necessity to build the 
“new democratic Tunisia” by managing instabilities centering on two main pillars: 
good governance and rule of law. The transition to democracy is the main script 
through which the Tunisian uprisings have been framed from the northern shore of 
the Mediterranean [Amin, 2012; Bishara, 2012; Brynen and others, 2012]. However, 
in those villages only few people knew about Iom, and the reintegration projects for 
returned migrants I discovered consisted of quite unskilled economic activities, very 
reduced in numbers, promoted by local or international actors
63
. For instance, in the 
village of Zarzis the project for the reintegration of voluntary returned migrants 
promoted by a local association involved in the European Migration4Development 
network in cooperation with the French office for immigration and reintegration 
(Ofii), consists of supporting fifteen people of the southern regions of Tunisia
64
  in 
starting up economic activities – like hairdresser, driver or restaurateur – which “best 
accord to the profiles and skills of the people concerned”. Among the criteria for 
allocating funds is included a “true will to stay in Tunisia and not to leave any 
more”. The actions of actors like Iom ultimately result in getting people into debt, 
allocating the amount of required money to ask for a bank loan. While Iom plans to 
govern post-war Libya – managing migration flows, job locations and public sector 
reconstruction – actually, this is not precisely what is going on. For instance, no 
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 http://www.tn.iom.int/activites_details.php?id=18;  
http://www.tn.iom.int/activites_details.php?id=9  
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 15 returned migrants for the regions of Medenine, Tataouine and Gabes (2 people from the city of 
Medenine, 4 from Ben Guerdane and 9 from Zarzis). The maximum given to selected returned 
migrants is about 7000 euros, but it cannot exceed  35% of the total amount that a person is supposed 
to invest for starting the economic activity in question 
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, constant homeward journeys and no register 
of entries-exits makes the materiality of migration practices a multifarious 
phenomenon which cannot be fully readable and encoded by governmental 
programs. The complex texture of governmentality is constituted also by self-
organized migration patterns and labor economies deployed in-between the folds of 
the governmental machine. This brings to say that in order to explore how a space is 
governmentalized, we need to take into account together practices of self-
organization, political technologies and strategic embodiments of migration 
categories and identities. Practices of migration do not merely constitute the hidden 
foil or the sub-text of governmentality: rather, the notion of governmentality 
designates the overlap of decentralized sovereignty, battles of knowledges, market 
forces, people’s strategies of movement, and informal “invisible” economies. 
Despite the deployments of many European projects of development in 
revolutionized Tunisia, the script of a smooth “transition to democracy” is far from 
encompassing the heterogeneous and complex reality of that space. 
Fixing people in space: the migration development- nexus in revolutionized Tunisia: 
In response to destabilizing social unrest and to the thousands of young Tunisians 
who migrated towards Italy and France, Iom launched a campaign funded by the 
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 According to the Office de Tunisiens à l’etranger the number of Tunisians who fled Libya in 2011 
is around ninety thousand people. The data was taken at the Libyan borders of Ras Jadir and Dehiba 
by international agencies which monitored the crossing of all people fleeing from Libya. Instead, the 
number of Tunisians who have come back to Libya in 2012 cannot be determined, since many of 
them did not register at the office of foreign workers in Libya, and so their presence cannot be 
surveyed, but according to the Tunisian Foreign Ministry by October 2012 more than 50% of them 
have come back to Libya, with an estimation of 200, 000 jobs for Tunisians in Libya for the following 
year. 
66
 In summer 2012, the average cost to go from the Tunsian citiy of Sfax to Tripoi was of 50 dinars. 
More than ten vans per day leave to Tripoli bringing Tunisians who look for a job in Libya in the 
construction industry or in the hotels. The high rate of unemployment in Tunisia and the medium 
salary in Libya which is more or less twofold  the Tunisian one (around 800/1000 dinars against 500) 
mean that Libya is one of the main economic space of migration for Tunisians. Most Tunisian women 
who go to Libya to work have already signed a job contract, while men leave and look for a job once 
in place. The opportunities offered by the Libyan labour market are clearly marked also in 
governmental projects: 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Santi%20quaterly%20f%C3%A
9vrier%202012%20(bis)_Santi%20quaterly%20f%C3%A9vrier%202012%20(bis).pdf    After the 
outbreak of the Libyan war, the Tunisian government allocated 600 dinars for Tunisian citizens 
returning from Libya. 
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European Union addressed at “stabilizing at risk communities”67, namely the inner 
regions of Tunisia where the revolution started and which are at the same time zones 
with a high percentage of emigration. This campaign was put into action supporting 
local investments and facilitating would-be migrants who planned to start small 
businesses. But the project also targeted migrants recently returned from Europe, 
staging for them “reintegration paths”: the logic that underpins these projects 
basically consists in making migrants learn to be responsible citizens in the face of 
the “democratic challenge” and of the historical revolutionary moment. This 
complex and ambiguous entanglement between politics of mobility and politics of 
development shows clearly that migration governmentality largely oversteps the 
field of border policies, situating within broader developmental technologies 
governing populations and “would-be migrants”. In fact, all Tunisians coming from 
“at-risk communities” are considered would-be migrants, due to the possibility to 
migrate opened up by the revolution
68
. In the name of democracy as a stage to be 
fully achieved through transition, (some) would-be migrants are fixed in space: in 
response to the “risk” that most of the people could refuse to stay at their own place, 
the politics of selected mobility that the European Union promotes for specific 
migrants categories – students, high-skilled workers – is refracted into a 
complementary politics of “democratic containment” which playing with the 
migration-development nexus encourages the building of durable economic 
perspectives in the Country.
69
 “Lack of economic opportunity is a primary reason for 
migration and underscores the close relationship between migration and 
development. Improving the underlying economic and social conditions in areas of 
high migration pressure – addressing these root causes of migration – is an important 
element in any comprehensive approach to migration management” [Iom, 2011]. 
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 In fact, soon after the outbreak of the revolution, maritime border controls became softer due to the 
fall of the regime and the temporary interruption of the bilateral agreements with Italy. 
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 See Spring Program, EU response to the Arab Spring: new package of support for North Africa and 
Middle East, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1083_en.htm?locale=en and EU response to 
the Arab Spring: special measures for poorest areas in Tunisia. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-11-642_en.htm?locale=en . This latter aims to “contribute to the creation of 
employment and to measures of social integration […] focusing on short-term employment, for which 
the Tunisian Government has allocated 64 million Tunisian Dinar (TND) to the governorates of the 
poorest regions in order to finance 42,700 fixed-term jobs” and “to improve access to microfinance 




Since 2005 the International Organization for Migration put into place campaigns of 
sensibilization aimed at convincing people not to leave their own country in an 
irregular way, showing the risks of clandestine departures and the uncertainty 
surrounding their future in the country of destination [Andrijasevic, Walters, 2010; 
Georgi, 2010]. In a nutshell, Iom’s campaigns of sensibilization consist in a set of 
activities (showing documentaries, organizing meetings in local communities and 
staging shows) with the aim of “demonstrating” the risks involved in migrating 
“illegally”, convincing people not to leave the country and promoting local economic 
activities as incentives for staying. One of the most important campaigns was headed 
in Senegal, in 2006, against migrants' departures towards the Canary Islands. In 
Tunisia the main recent activities were led in the so called “at risk communities” of 
the inner regions of the country. It should be noticed that the expression “at risk” 
designates the geographical area where the revolution started: ultimately, the aim of 
these projects is at the same time to prevent people from leaving both the country 
towards Europe and the countryside toward the coastal regions of Tunisia, taming 
migrations and the social unrest at the same time. These mechanisms for managing 
migrations basically rely on a strategy aimed at “fixing people in places”, or better at 
partitioning between selected channels of mobility and people as clandestinized 
migrants. The EU-Iom project called Stabilizing At-Risk Communities shows quite 
clearly the ambivalent role that democracy plays in migration governmentality 
discourses concerning revolutionized spaces: “the project provides alternatives to 
communities at risk, by promoting stability in a transition period through 
intervention on quick-impact income-generating activities […] addressing youth un- 
and underemployment in at-risk communities, through activities to enhance their 
employability in local and foreign labour markets, and to promote local socio-
economic development” [Eu-Iom, 2011]. The script of democracy works on the one 
hand as a supposed universal value that, after being conquered also in Arab 
revolutionized countries, is the pre-condition for promoting local development and 
ordered mobility; on the other hand, it is presented as a destabilizing factor 
producing social turmoil that needs to be managed through the implementation of 
regulative measures and projects of development. In fact, the Arab Uprisings are 
depicted by European analysts as a source of economic and political instability and, 
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simultaneously, as an opportunity to put into place new economic agreements: 
“political events experienced by Tunisia caused an economic and social shock which 
has disrupted Tunisia's economic growth. Return to economic recovery is a must and 
requires the launch of immediate new economic and social policies and reforms 
which meet the needs of the citizens; in particular those in the most impoverished 
parts of the country” [EU, MEMO/11/642]. 
In revolutionized Tunisia and in Libya the migration-development agenda found a 
fertile ground, and at the same time it was destabilized by practices of migration that 
could not be fully regulated through the logic of “development instead of migration”. 
The script of the “transition to democracy” was introduced through the 
developmental grid for “taming” the turbulence of peoples’ mobility and social 
unrest according to the logic of the “not yet”: the gradual conquest of democracy, the 
quest for secular values as well as the learning of the “best practices” are the three 
main pillars of Europe’s discourse on the conquest of democracy by Arab people. 
Liberal analysts read the Arab uprising in terms of the political awakening of the 
Arab people, following at a time distance in the footsteps of the European modern 
democratic age. However, if at a first glance the discourse of the European Union on 
the transition to democracy could be seen in continuity with colonial politics, this is 
not the reading that I embrace in this work: what I foreground is the way in which 
the blueprint of democracy has been assumed and (strategically) resignified in 
Tunisia, and at the same time it is mobilized by Europe and migration agencies for 
persuading countries of origin –in this case North African countries – of the 
importance and the advantages of a strong cooperation on migration management 
[Hess, 2008]. 
Following the reading of the Arab uprisings coming from Europe, the distance 
between the two shores of the Mediterranean is erased in the name of a cultural and 
historical proximity: the Mediterranean emerges as a homogenizing spatial signifier, 
functioning at once as a reducer of distance and as a boundary-fixing mechanism, in 
the sense that it (re)traces at every time the edges of what needs to be considered – 
culturally, politically – “close”. Consequently, in the name of proximity new 
exclusionary borders are traced out, excluding some countries and geographic areas 
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from the logic of partnership as well as from the discourse of a common space to 
share and develop. In this regard, the stress on the Mediterranean as an area of 
political relations and economic exchanges, necessarily involves the exclusion of 
people and countries beyond the Mediterranean boundaries. Moreover, these borders 
are essentially blurred and always changing, since the Mediterranean space itself, as 
an economic and political landmark, is ultimately the provisional result of the 
combination of different agreements and networks – the Union for the 
Mediterranean, Mediterranean dialogue 5+5, Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights 
Networks
70… 
Nevertheless, as soon as the attention shifts to migrations, the distance between the 
two shores seems to increase: migrations are seen not as practices of freedom that are 
part of an effective democracy but rather as side-effects of ungoverned social unrest 
and deceitful practices which try to dodge the law.  
The production of teachable subjects 
Shifting the attention to the spatial transformations engendered by migrations’ 
upheavals and revolutionary uprisings in 2011, it should be noticed that migration 
governmentality has been rearranged taking the migration-development nexus as its 
main lynch-pin. This is not at all an original agenda in migration policies, but what is 
peculiar is the way in which the strategy of “making the poor work” and politics of 
migration are articulated to govern political instability, economic discontent and 
practices of mobility, surreptitiously positing mobility as a symptom of unrests and 
troubles. Political upheavals in Tunisia were sized as the opportunity to revise 
bilateral agreements
71
 and Mobility Partnerships; and conversely the migratory issue 
has become a constitutive part of the process of “transition to democracy”. In 
December 2012 a new Privileged Partnership was signed between Europe and 
Tunisia, in which the promotion of selected skilled migration – especially students – 
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is a crucial point
72
. And if in that agreement there is no obligation for Tunisia to 
accept the repatriation of third-countries nationals on its soil, the sharpening of the 
two-sided logic – support of skilled migration/criminalization of illegal movements – 
paves the way for future readmission agreements implicating that clause [Martin, 
Haon, 2013]. 
Thus, more than setting autonomous developmental policies, international migration 
agencies place their interventions within wider economic projects of a “struggle 
against poverty” and “millennium developmental goals”73. In this way, an in-depth 
analysis of migratory policies necessarily needs to take into account the economy of 
people's mobility at large, meaning by that both the economic projects of 
development in revolutionized spaces and the relationship between people's 
economic productivity – labor force – and the territory.  
In order to understand such an articulation, I focus on the way in which the 
migration-development nexus put into place strategies for fixing people in space, 
positing the migrant as a subject who must learn to come out from poverty remaining 
in her/his own space: in this sense, the economy of subjectivation in postcolonial 
revolutionized space cannot be straight and fully encapsulated into the logic of 
human capital, since many political technologies are simultaneously at play. After 
all, the model of  human capital frames capital as a social relation within the kernel 
of the “human”, failing to account for the overlapping, and sometimes conflicting, 
processes of subjectivation as well as of exploitation [Mezzadra, Neilson, 2013a]. I 
refer for instance to the dynamic of qualification and disqualification of people’s 
skills, that are subjected to the juridical and social position of subjects.
74
 Broadly 
speaking, the model of human capital is not fully adequate for casting light on the 
different mechanisms at stake in the “moral geography”75  of migration governance 






 http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/  
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 For instance, the value of a certain skill “embodied” by an individual changes if the person becomes 
a migrant, bringing with him/her such a qualification into another space. Thus, the processes of 
capitalization of the “human” depend on the social position of the subject. 
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 The moral geography refers in this case to the ways in which people changes in social, juridical and 
political status according to the space they are at some point, and conversely how people are 
differently allocated, moved or stranded into a certain space by migration policies. However, the 
123 
 
[Hyndman, 2000]. If the homo oeconomicus is a subject who responds only to its 
own interest, and for this reason he can be governed according to economic 
principles [Foucault, 2009], the would-be migrant in revolutionized Tunisia is 
shaped in a slightly different way: would-be migrants and returned migrants are 
addressed as teachable subjects – who need to learn practices of democracy and to 
engage into an entrepreneurial rationality - but only while remaining in their own 
economic and geographic context. Then, if the human capital is governed and self-
disciplined through his own desires, what characterizes the government of would-be 
migrants is rather a more multi-faceted rationale, in which the entrepreneurial 
principle, the logic of learning –the learning of “best practices” of democracy– and 
the injunction to remain in one’s own place coexist. Therefore, the suggestion to 
profitably manage one's own conduct is rephrased into a migration governmental 
rationale that aims at producing a conditioned-autonomy, respecting the boundaries 
and the conditions of an ordered democracy and of a managed mobility.  
However, it is important not to follow closely the governmental narrative, remaining 
at the level of texts. In fact, if we consider the kind of developmental projects and 
economic activities promoted by international and European agencies in Tunisia, we 
see that far from fostering individual autonomy: what is effectively sustained and 
funded is a set of unskilled economic activities. Thus, what should be acknowledged 
is the fundamentally unachievable character of the “learning autonomy” model, and 
the inevitable “failure” of would-be migrants in performing that model of 
subjectivity. Indeed, what Sanjay Seth argues in relation to the colonial context could 
to some extent be recalled within the present political frame of “democracy to learn”: 
“colonial governmentality functioned to posit the possibility of self-governance and 
incite the desire for it, while simultaneously declaring it unachievable” [Seth, 2007, 
p. 123].  
But it is not only on the southern shore that the migration-development conceives of 
migrants as “teachable subjects”. For instance, in France the Office for Immigrants 
(Ofii) offers Tunisian migrants “projects for economic reinsertion” encouraging 
people to devise an entrepreneurial project to develop in Tunisia under the guidance 
                                                                                                                                                                    
expression originally means the significance of the geographic context for ethical principles and 
practices [Proctor, 1998; Smith, 2000] 
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of experts. At the same time, as observed for reintegration programs in Tunisia and 
in Libya, the relevance of these economic measures is quite scant (16 projects in 
total) and they consist of funding traditional activities reframing them through the 
enhancement of the private sector. Moreover, Tunisian migrants that Ofii took-in-
charge were labelled as humanitarian assisted returns: all “illegal” Tunisian migrants 
not detained in a detention center could apply for the “humanitarian formula” that 
consists of 300 Euros plus an organized repatriation flight. What is striking is that 
904 persons benefited from the repatriation program, while almost nobody left 
France through the assisted voluntary return: those migrants did not meet Ofii's 
criteria to apply for assisted voluntary return, since they had not been in France for at 
least two years; secondly, the humanitarian label served to let pass in the name of 
humanitarian emergency a mechanism for getting rid of them, providing just 300 
Euros instead of 2000 as scheduled for the voluntary return. 
To sum up, revolutionary events in Tunisia were the occasion to situate migration 
policies into a wider economic rationality that address the stability and the 
reconstruction of a new democratic space and comprehensive obligations for third-
countries [Cassarino, Lavenex, 2012]. In addition to that, revolutionized spaces 
allow us to see how the right to move freely is reframed in the light of the discourse 
on civic responsibility: after the revolution, migration and development have been 
rearticulated on the basis of the logic of “not migrating in order to develop your 
space” or “migrating according to the established conditions of selected mobility”. In 
fact, in the Tunisian public debate the widespread discourse which circulates 
contends that “young people should not leave the country just now: following the 
revolution we have the opportunity to build a different society and we also have the 
responsibility to work for our country”.  
Democracy as a strategy of containment: 
The logic of the “best practices” of democracy to be learnt by Tunisian would-be 
migrants highlights the function of democracy as a strategy for governing “unruly 
political upheavals”. In particular, having in mind the development projects for 
would-be migrants that I illustrated above, what I explore is the way in which the 
script of democracy is played in the Tunisian revolutionized space. Recalling Ranajit 
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Guha's reflection on the nation state as a “strategy of containment” [Guha, 2003], I 
suggest looking at democracy as a kind of strategy of containment precisely in the 
light of the migration-development nexus. My intention is not to superimpose a grid 
of intelligibility on underway events but to bring out the mechanisms of government 
at play and the effects that they triggered. Therefore, it's not the injunction to 
democracy as such that will be considered here but the rationale of the “transition to 
democracy” in revolutionized contexts, and how it articulates with migration 
governmentality and with developmental politics. According to European analysts, 
development is the precondition for the settling of a “safe” democracy and, 
conversely, projects of development require a minimum degree of social security in 
order to be able to really foster processes of democratization. 
In order to tackle these issues I have focused on how Iom set its activities in Tunisia 
through two main strategies: democracy as containment and secured mobility 
through development. These two combining political technologies for governing 
revolutionized spaces center on would-be migrants and returned migrants to mobilize 
wider moral economies of development. Along with Icmpd (the International Center 
for Migration Policy Development) Iom functions as a “norms-making agency” and 
as a “governmentality storyteller”: actually, Iom contributes to implementing a 
specific regime of truth by making space for new discursive and non-discursive 
practices of intervention aimed at governing mobility. The government of would-be 
and returned migrants has today a paramount relevance in the construction of a “new 
democratic Tunisia”, in which migration policies that are less concerned with border 
management than with the migration-development nexus. 
  
By encouraging people to foster local economies, both the EU and Iom seem to push 
for a national autonomous development to prevent unskilled would-be migrants from 
leaving the country. But actually, projects of privatization
76
 and development show 
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 The European Union is promoting Public Private Partnerships regarding public services like water 
and gas pipelines, and which consists in a contract between the public sector and a private party that 
becomes in charge of governing the service. In March 2013, the OECD, the African Development 
Bank and the International Finance Corporation supported the Tunisian government to implement a 
law on Public Private Partnership, while Mena granted 3.85 million dollars to Tunisia in order to 
introduce the PPP in the infrastructure sector.  
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that, far from promoting a real economic autonomy, European actors try to scale up 
and align Tunisian economy with international standards through the support of 
small economic activities dependent on foreign loans. In this way, safe-secured 
mobility is drawn upon the conditions of development and economic growth: those 
who don't migrate avoid falling into the circuits of smuggling and illegal migration, 
while skilled migrants are encouraged to go to Europe to learn good practices of 
development. The first thing to remark on about development projects is that they 
enhance an economy of debt –in order to start the project, returned migrants need to 
ask for loans from microcredit institutes or also ordinary banks– based in turn on the 
logic of “making the poor work”: after the revolution in the name of a 
democratization of the access to productivity and investments, many circuits of 
micro-credit have been activated addressing “the root causes” of emigration, that is 
poverty and unemployment. Secondly, those projects actually enforce a low skilled 
economy: despite the injunction for a developed economy of growth, at a closer 
scrutiny enterprise activities supported by the European Union and the African 
Development Bank via Iom mostly pertain to the so called economy of subsistence. 
In other words, it is an informal economy of needs that is ultimately enhanced 
through development projects which put would-be migrants at the core of the 
“construction of a new democratic Tunisia”. In fact, despite the injunction to 
privatize public services and to empower entrepreneurial attitudes, the activities 
effectively supported are part of the traditional economic sector. The starting of local 
enterprises like small restaurants or rural activities is presented by Iom as an 
innovative way of fostering regional development. Moreover, as Cassarino points 
out, “the majority of these so-called “development” actions generally take place in 
the form of short-term projects corresponding to priorities aiming to channel 
migratory flows (both on their departure from Tunisia and on their return)” 
[Cassarino, 2012]. 
 
However, far from reading this in terms of an economic backwardness enhanced by 
international actors, I suggest to draw on Kalyal Sanyal's considerations, bringing 
attention to the constitutive heterogeneity of capitalist economy and the simultaneity 
127 
 
of processes creating, restoring and destroying traditional modes of productivity. 
Secondly, as Sanyal notices, the basic need-based approach to development is 
grounded on two main pillars: on the one hand “the purpose of developmental 
interventions is to create and extend entitlements outside the capitalist space for the 
excluded and the mariginals” and on the other hand “the employment strategy 
promoted by these organizations is highlighting the prospect of self-employment” 
[Sanyal, 2007]. In fact jobs promoted by agencies like Iom in revolutionized Tunisia 
consist in unskilled activities that returned migrants need to demonstrate to be able to 
build by themselves, following terms and conditions of financial circuits as well as 
the best practices to learn from the promoters of democracy. 
Such a perspective enables us to unpack the logic of transition to democracy: the 
politics of fixing (some) people in space and settling hybrid economies – private 
investments and unskilled activities – is also a strategy for taming revolutionary 
turmoil maintaining revolutionized spaces in a state of permanent transition. In 
reintegration programs sponsored by Iom and the European Union, migrants are 
depicted in counterpoint to the figure of the responsible citizen: returned migrants 
emerge, against the light, as subjects who irresponsibly fled the country in the 
aftermath of the revolution. In this sense, revolution is paradoxically reworked here 
as a counter-uprising force used to tame social disorders and political instabilities in 
the name of a smooth transition to democracy: the event of the revolution is posited 
as the main reason for engaging in the construction of the new democratic Tunisia. 
However, a further moral partition is made among returned migrants themselves, 
splitting them between the responsible citizens and the incorrigible ones: indeed, 
those who have been deported are excluded from any migratory or developmental 
program. In this sense, a sort of “corrective reintegration pattern” is envisaged for 
migrants who voluntarily returned to their country of origin, excluding instead those 
who came back as deported. But this doesn't mean that “irresponsible” migrants are 
out of the grip of governmentality: actually, if on the one hand they are left to their 
own destiny and no official institutional program is provided for them, on the other 
this mechanism works as a normative operative tool, a principle of distribution of 
moral and economic credits for taking part in democratic processes. In other words, 
the rallying-cry of democracy puts into place a normative matrix assessing which 
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conducts are suitable for the democratic standards. In a nutshell, European analyses 
and migration agencies envisage the process of transition as a laborious challenge 
and as a conquest that can be realized upon certain conditions. A great deal of effort 
is required, to paraphrase governmental documents, in order to get the democratic 
order stabilized. An effort in economic and in moral terms: the attitude (disposition) 
to work hard and to rationally plan economic strategies is part of the same organizing 
principle. Therefore, “moral development” and economic “unachievable” 
development are mutually entangled [Rose, O’Malley, Valverde, 2006; Watts, 2003]. 
The European Union has established the future directions of revolutionary uprisings 
according to the secularist political teleology: no room is left for the religious and 
political differential that is at stake in the Maghreb area. Do the rallying-calls of 
“freedom” and “democracy” have another connotation and meaning than in the 
European space? The secular and progressive narrative emerges in a quite 
outstanding way in the discourse pronounced by Cecilia Malstrom, the European 
Commissioner for Home Affairs: “I was impressed by the people’s determination to 
make their liberated country a success. Here, and throughout the region, we need to 
constantly assess whether our policies are providing an effective response to their 
historic challenges”.77 Thus, democracy works by taming political unrest and 
ungovernable movements playing on a strong ambiguity: it is seen at once as the 
unexpected and delayed conquest of the Arab people and as a source of social 
instability and political crisis.  
Working at the margins of power and migration as a “decompression chamber” 
As many scholars have argued, migrations could play as a litmus paper [Mezzadra, 
2006] to understand broader mechanisms of governmentality. In addition to this, a 
focus on the ways in which migration turmoil forces political technologies to 
redefine their strategies involves situating the analysis at the margins of power. By 
margins I mean the spaces and the subjects that function as elements of 
friction/resistance to power mechanisms. In this vein, Foucault's suggestion that to 
take the point of view of the reversal and of the limits of power, is essential to 
analyze its dispositive, is an important principle to grasp in detail the functioning of 
                                                          
77 http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_12133_en.htm  
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migration governmentality [Foucault, 1980a]. The limits of power also designate the 
edges where many dispositifs of government overlap and where they need to reinvent 
strategies in order to respond to migration turbulence. Taking the margins as an 
analytical vantage point means bringing to the surface mechanisms of 
governmentality that are particularly conspicuous at the borders, showing the uneven 
functioning of power –namely, how it works differently at the margins [Mohanty, 
2003].  
After this overview on the connection in revolutionized spaces between the 
democratic script and migration governance, I draw the attention to the discourse of 
the transition to democracy in its articulation with territory and the government of 
social disorder. Such an analysis requires a retracing of the colonial legacies of 
migration governance, avoiding perceiving this latter as a completely new diagram 
of power which mushroomed in the last decade. 
I would start by remarking that migration governmentality in the Mediterranean is 
focusing more and more on migrants’ countries of origin; indeed, if the political turn 
in migration management towards the southern shore of the Mediterranean started in 
2003 with the British proposal to externalize frontiers, what I indicate here does not 
concern detention centers or border patrols against illegal crossing, but the 
government of returned-and-possible migrants within “their own space”. In this 
regard, the colonial heritage cannot be overlooked for a history of the present about 
the transformations at stake in the government of mobility. In particular, it is through 
the entanglement of territory and the democratic script that social unrest is tamed and 
governed. In fact, in the 19th century the French occupation of Algeria and Tunisia 
responded to many political and social issues, and here in passing I recall the most 
preeminent: the rise and the primacy of the United Kingdom in imperial conquests, 
the importance of finding new markets and the necessity to resolve internal social, 
demographic and political problems [Le Cour Grandmaison, 2005]. The colonial 
conquest in North Africa was led by the idea that French social turmoil and the 
revolutionary threat could be tamed only by making citizens flow abroad. 
What took place in Tunisia with the outbreak of the revolution resounded in part that 
governmental script – with a reversal of the directionality of migration, colonial 
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migration in one case and contemporary “flight” in the other cases: just after the fall 
of Ben Ali, thousands of young Tunisians tried to leave the country “illegally”, by 
boat, making what Tunisian migrants call the harraga – the act of burning frontiers. 
That collective departure was seen by European and international agencies as a 
migratory impetus representing the side-effect of the democratic upset which shook 
political balances, giving rise to social disorder: in this regard, the European Union 
and Iom converge in saying that “turbulence and conflict have created vast new 
challenges which, unaddressed, threaten to derail transition processes”; and 
consequently migration-development programs rooted in strategy of “smooth and 
driven transition” to democracy  “address and establish the pre-conditions required 
to enable smooth transitions and comprehensive and sustainable recoveries in Libya, 
Egypt and Tunisia” [EU-Iom, 2011].  
In fact, revolts and turmoil produced slacker border controls, since many of the 
Garde Nationale deserted and a huge number were used to govern the riots in 
Tunisian cities; but at the same time the Tunisian government strategically seized the 
opportunity to stream out of the country many youths who participated in the 
revolution. Indeed, in the face of an ungovernable mob, the strategy of the 
“decompression chamber” appeared as a temporary solution, and the spontaneous 
practices of migrations that the revolutionary elan mobilized ultimately were 
facilitated by not obstructing departures by boat from the cities of Sfax and Zarzis. In 
this sense, paradoxically, the primary connection between revolutionary turmoil and 
practices of migration was established by the Tunisian government that depicted 
Tunisian migrants as the sons of the revolution: young people who could have 
provoked disturbances and the snowballing of social and political unrest should 
literally be encouraged to put out to sea. Thus, the “mob” shaped in the 19th century 
as an object both of techniques of containment and strategies of flight [Chamayou, 
2010], nowadays has been reactivated in postcolonial revolutionary Tunisia towards 
the most unruly among Tunisians who could carry on social unrest and so prove not 
to be “responsible citizens”.  In some sense, Tunisian migrants who left the country 
after the outbreak of the revolution resembled a “migratory mob”, namely an 
ungovernable social problem that it was best to let go away. Actually, it is in such a 
political context that the strategy of democracy as a mechanism of containment takes 
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shape, inflecting in a different manner the tactic which consisted in “throwing the 
mob out” practiced by colonial and postcolonial governments.  
The unceasing productivity of spaces: 
All these things considered, democracy as a strategy of containment has to be set as a 
complex response to practices of mobility which unsettled the normativity of 
previous spatial economies. At close scrutiny, what comes out is the reconfiguration 
of existing spatialities along with a conspicuous production of new bordered spaces 
and special zones that in turn multiply borders and frontiers: the differentiated access 
for people to borders and spaces is enacted precisely through the tracing out of 
temporary zones, special economic areas, regional cooperation and highly monitored 
spaces. For instance, in the case of Neighbourhood Policies, launched by the 
European Union in 2003, a shared political Mediterranean space is envisaged in the 
name of the proximity between the two shores of the Mediterranean. But such a 
commonality is actually based on an iterate asymmetry, as is clearly shown by the 
“principle of conditionality” which underpins the logic of neighbourhood [Cuttitta, 
2010; Gregor, 2005; Hailbronner, 1997; Lavenex, 2008]: the “migration clause” is at 
the core of broader economic bilateral agreements, compelling North African 
countries to adopt measures of reinforced border controls against migrants’ 
departures, and to accept the repatriation of third-country nationals on their soil. 
Another important reference to talk about the multiplication of special zones 
produced by migration policies is the Regional Protection Programs activated by the 
European Union in 2005
78
 based on principle of the redistribution of the “refugee 
burden”: these provide economic and political incentives to non-European countries 
for adopting a politics of asylum, in order to strand asylum seekers before arriving in 
Europe – by processing their demands in third countries. After all, the politics of 
asylum is also functioning in part as a politics of containment “by stages” and 
“through channels”. The leading logic is to predispose external spaces of protection, 
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 The Regional Protection Program with North African countries started in December 2011 –while it 
started in 2005 for other regions -, as one of the main political changes in the politics of asylum 
“triggered” as a response to the Arab turmoil. Among the significant “responses” of migration 
policies in the face of the Arab revolutions, there is the revision of the Global Approach to Migration 
and Mobility (GAMM) launched by the European Union in 2011 and that consists in a strong 
cooperation with third countries of managing migration. 
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encouraging partner states to activate systems of humanitarian protection with the 
supervision of European agencies [Afeef, 2006; Heddad, 2008]. The second pillar of 
this package is to create “safe environments” in countries of origin in order to make 
displaced people “voluntarily” returned there. Finally, the RPP include also the 
resettlement project aimed at resettling in Europe refugees stranded in third 
Countries lacking in a politics of asylum
79
: special zones and regional externalized 
spaces of protection overlap with humanitarian zones breached within the European 
space. However, if on the one hand it is important to critically stress the ongoing 
trend to externalize the mechanisms of asylum, on the other it is important to 
disengage from a Eurocentric vantage point, exploring whether and how, from their 
side, third countries could gain autonomy in setting a politics of asylum on their 
territory. In particular, the possibility of building an economy of asylum independent 
from Europe could challenge the dominant discourse on international protection 
which posits European democracies as the real model guaranteeing an efficient and 
abiding system of asylum. 
 
This last point leads us to problematize the limits of a critique of the border regime 
done from the northern shore. How is it possible to resist European migration 
policies and bilateral agreements without gaining a (relative) economic autonomy 
from the European labor market? What are the margins for a politics of 
externalization could be strategically used by North African countries, reversing the 
“migration clause” at their own advantage?80 In Tunisia the debate on a relatively 
autonomous development, independent from the European principle of 
conditionality, is considered as a pre-condition for thinking of democracy and 
improving participative politics. In some way, the Arab Uprisings troubled both the 
Eurocentric left-wing critique to development and the governmental discourse on 
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 The project started in 2009 and after the outbreak of the Libyan war has gained more and more 




 As Sabine Hess explains, “countries of transit and origin themselves more and more play the 
“migration card” in international and economical negotiations […] it is getting harder and harder to 
negotiate readmission agreements with African countries as they start to demand a real equivalent 
amount for the missing remittances” [Hess, 2008] 
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democratization through development, positing the necessity of reformulating it in 
the light of the specific Tunisian context. In meanwhile the high rate of 
unemployment continues to generate social protests throughout the country and 
movements demanding the cancellation of the national debt
81
. Thus, if migration is 
always encroached upon and encrusted in other domains, and must be situated in a 
broad government of conducts – as a government of the “mob” -, a critical analysis 
of migrations should rethink together mobility, economic and political struggles. For 
this reason, migration could hardly be assumed as an autonomous subject of 
analysis: as a catchword and as a site of struggles, it is the catalyst where a huge 
variety of economic and social issues converge and overlap. The migratory issue 
always gets a marginal position in political debates and it tends to emerge in an 
eminent way only if connected to and enmeshed in other thorny problems. This is 
also the reason why it is hard to distinguish and elucidate the specificity of 
migration’s troubling effects, since it is never a “pure” phenomenon.  
Revolutionized Tunisia constitutes such a privileged space of investigation to grasp 
in detail the reconfiguration of migration governmentality also because of the multi-
oriented migrations that cross its territory, constituting a sort of “migration hub”: 
Tunisians migrating to Europe, Sub-Saharan asylum seekers who fled Libya, 
Tunisians who came back from Libya and now are going back there or to the Gulf 
States. Besides, considering the length of time that almost one million Tunisians 
have been living abroad, the very construction of Tunisian citizenship cannot 
dispense with the presence of immigrants on Tunisian soil and the departure of many 
Tunisian citizens. For these reasons, a genealogy of the citizen-subject in Tunisia 
cannot disregard both the colonial legacies –Tunisian migrations towards France82 – 
and the current considerable presence of migrants in Tunisia. The marginality that 
the migratory issue has in the Tunisian official political debate is quite astonishing: 
in fact, after the huge wave of migrations towards Lampedusa in early 2011, the 
migration topic then faded again into the background, promptly reactivated in the 










light of shipwrecks of migrants’ boats or via the debate on the economic crisis, 
unemployment and projects of development. However, moving away from the 
institutional channels, in Tunisia migration is perceived instead as a socially rooted 
phenomenon: “at some point (many) young people decide to leave, to do the harrga, 
sometimes as a boastful act, sometimes with the desire of living abroad for a period 
of time, and sometimes looking for a job. There is nothing new in this, it’s for ages 
that it has been happening”.83  
In such a context, the apparently extraordinary strategies of smuggling and migration 
actually also need to be situated at the level of the ordinariness of the strategies of 
existence: the “smuggler” I met in Sidi Mansour84, a village close to the city of Sfax, 
one of the most important departure zones for migrants, was introduced to me by one 
of the residents, whose son left for Italy by boat in 2011 and to this day is still 
missing. If the image of an outlaw man operating behind the scenes was outstanding 
in my mind, the meeting that I had with him and with the families of the missing 
Tunisian migrants definitively upset this imaginary, de-mythicizing the scene of 
“clandestine” migration as an extraordinary, "dodgy" realm. In fact, I met the 
smuggler in the frame of a political campaign concerning Tunisian migrants who 
“disappeared” in the Mediterranean in 2011. And the goal of compiling a dossier 
concerning the exact times and places of the departure of those migrants caused me 
to meet the “smuggler” and the families of the village of Sidi Mansour to get these 
details. The relatives of the missing migrants and the smugglers had a discussion 
with us about all this as if it was a question of an “ordinary drama” – not the “illegal” 
departure itself, but the shipwrecks that can happen at sea. “Young people here in 
Sidi Mansour leave in this way, we construct fishing boats on purpose” they told me 
pointing at one of the wood boats anchored near the coast, “and this is the only 
possibility, if you want to reach the other shore of the Mediterranean”. That said, it 
should not be too striking that what links fishermen, migrants’ relatives and 
smugglers to each other is a kind of commercial relationship. 
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 July 2012. The encounter with the smuggler took place in the context of the 
inquiry coordinated by Federica Sossi (University of Bergamo) concerning the disappearances and the 
deaths at sea of hundreds of Tunisian migrants in 2011. I would greatly like to thank Federica Sossi 
for her special support in this work and for the strong collaboration we started. 
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This snapshot dismantles “exotic” analytical gazes on the informal network of 
migration strategies. The focus on Tunisia allows us to complicate the relationship 
between the outcasts and the production of citizens, as well as the stretching of the 
borders of the political community, precisely due to the disjunction between 
strangers and migrants: in the public Tunisian debate, the term “migrant” refers in a 
substantial way to the young Tunisians who take flight. Nevertheless, the presence in 
Tunisia of hundreds thousands of sub-Saharan immigrants cannot be overlooked, if 
nothing else for the social conflicts that this presence engenders and for the non-
existence of a politics of asylum in Tunisia
85. The story of “Tunisia and its others” 
cannot be bounded to these historically rooted racist attitudes: the opening of the 
Tunisian national frontiers after the outbreak of the Libyan war has to be stressed, as 
well as the practices of popular aid deployed by Tunisian people in 2011, definitively 
before the arrival of the humanitarian international agencies. At the same time, 
asylum seekers stranded in Choucha refugee camp have been harshly attacked by the 
habitants of the close village of Ben Guerdane and then exploited into unskilled and 
hard jobs, but at least in part finally integrated into the informal economy of the 
village. 
  
Thus far I’ve analysed the developmental politics of the European Union and looked 
at how discourses on the democratic transition work as a strategy of containment for 
would-be migrants. However, the analytical gesture of criticizing the European 
narrative could fall into the trap of paradoxically fostering the grid of 
governmentality, taking for granting its consistency and assuming it as an all-
encompassing grasp. The other related limit of centring the analysis within and 
against the European debate is to reproduce an internal reading of those movements, 
“taming” and encoding them through existing political grids and taking for granting 
Europe as the only actor involved in producing knowledge on migrations and 
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 In the first place, it should be noted that in Tunisia both practices of emigration and immigration 
pertain to a quite ordinary dimension, but this does not mean that it is an idyllic context, especially for 
“Africans”, as Tunisians name migrants coming from outside of the Maghreb region. Sub-Saharan 
migrants become the figure of racialized economic migrants pushed at the borders: during the regime 
of Ben Ali, forced deportations of migrants made towards the Libyan border, making migrants cross 
the desert on foot and then be detained in Libyan prisons, were ordinary practices. 
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governmental policies. As far as democracy is concerned, if we focus exclusively on 
the discourse of the transition to democracy, we definitively remain entrapped in a 
critique which is internal to the regime of knowledge and truth we aim to challenge. 
Therefore, after the examination of European Union’s programs and discourses, I 
undertake a gesture of disengagement from the cartography of the Arab revolutions 
traced by European actors, turning the gaze to the way in which democracy is 
signified from within the Tunisian revolutionized context. First, it should be 
considered that a debate on democracy has long existed in the Arab revolutionized 
countries and did not suddenly mushroom in 2011, as a follow-up to the “Arab 
awakening”. Instead, if we follow the European narrative, the practice and the debate 
on democracy in the Arab states came out of nowhere and in some way against the 
“natural disposition” of the Arab people, historically prone to resist social 
transformations [Pollack 2011, Bishara 2012].
86
 Nevertheless, the point is not to 
quest for the original meaning of democracy in the Arab context, retaining a 
supposed authenticity of the signifier, but rather to highlight the complex affiliations 
and inflections of that political referent: the way in which it is moulded by colonial 
heritage, the resistance to the “importation” of the values of the colonizer, and a 
reworked-but-own meaning of democracy itself [Filali-Ansary, 2012; Ramadan, 
2012]. 
Firstly, we should distinguish between what we commonly define as democratic 
values at large (freedom, human rights…) [Marzouki, 2011] – and democracy as a 
political regime. The political forces which resisted and opposed colonial domination 
in the early 20th century mobilized a series of values against the cultural invasion 
conducted by the French protectorate, turning over some of the same rallying-cries 
that French colonialists also used and promoted to legitimize the invasion. A 
possible reading of this is to think about freedom, equality and fraternity as 
strategically appropriated by Tunisian movements; but such an analysis would still 
configure Arab countries as spaces where the very ideas and practices of freedom 
and human rights came only as a consequence of the westernization of the area. 
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 “Considering that the Arabic word for regime is order, any attempt to bring down the regime is 
equated with chaos. Over history this fallacy has been internalized by many, even by opposition 
parties that allowed themselves to be domesticated through blackmail and bribery. The result was 
stagnant regimes, subservient oppositions that acted as mere puppets” [Bishara, 2012, p.3]. 
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Actually, one could interrogate in which ways those political referents were already 
in use in the Tunisian space well before the French protectorate, and how they were 
influenced by the colonial presence and finally revitalized against it. Instead, if 
democracy is narrowed to a regime of government, it is historically related on a 
major scale to the colonial project and venue. In fact, democracy as a regime 
basically refers to a new way of administering both the territory and the population, 
conflicting with existing political forms of rule. Even though Tunisia was a 
protectorate and not a colony, the transformations that occurred both at the juridical 
and at the social level were considerable: despite the formal sovereignty maintained 
by French protectorates and the status of “strangers” in the place of “subjects” 
recognized to the people, many obligations and restrictions - limitation on free 
mobility - were imposed on the population.
87
 Moreover, a conditioned economy was 
put into place: Tunisia could not sign economic agreements before consulting the 
French protectorate. It should be noticed that the “indirect presence” of the French 
was justified on the basis of the narrative of “undesired autonomy”. In fact, on the 
one hand the main reason advocated by French for their intervention was the absence 
of modern institutions and of an autonomous government; while on the other hand 
the protectorate was presented as the viable solution for bolstering a “protected” 
autonomy, since Muslims were depicted as not able to desire and to strive to govern 
by themselves. Thus, the goal of autonomy, it was contended, could not be reached 
following the same patterns as the Europeans, and the supposed unconditioned and 
universal rights, claimed by the French revolution, are not actually enjoyable to the 
same degree by every nation. Or at least, according to French theorists and 
politicians of the colonial age, those rights could be granted under forms of 
domination which would instantiate the conditions for making up political subjects 
[Ganiage, 1959; Estournelles de Constant, 1891; La Nef, 1953]. This order of 
considerations led to a legitimization of the colonial presence: “colonisation has not 
violated the rights of the nations, since it didn’t run into true governments and what 
it found in those countries was a state of pure anarchy”; the disorganisation of those 
people, the lack of a national sentiment and the infantile stage in which the 
indigenous persist, indicate the absence of any national formation, and consequently 
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the rights of the nations, French colonialists argued, is deprived of all meaning 
[Lavergne, 1948, p.151]. This last point deals with the place of migration in the 
colonial (discursive) economy: if since the second half of the 20th century the main 
orientation of migration was Tunisians migrating to France, before then the massive 
flow was the emigration of French people to Tunisia; and French migration was 
presented by the French state as a strategy for guaranteeing demographic superiority 
on the territory of North Africa. More interestingly, colonization itself was presented 
as the “modern form of emigration”, in which domination and migration overlap into 
a “softening regime”. To put it differently and following the French trajectory, 
colonization involves particular practices of migration instantiating and revealing 
asymmetric political relationships [Lavergne, 1948]. 
Later in the 20th century, and after the end of the French protectorate, democracy 
stood for a set of ostensibly liberal reforms that Ben Ali put into place and that on 
the contrary were seen by a huge part of the population as “liberal-impositions”, as 
for instance is the case for the prohibition on women wearing the veil in the name of 
a modern liberal society. During the colonial period, democracy as a governmental 
system was related also to the advancement of “modernity” as a political colonial 
project aimed at dismantling rooted practices of life in the name of a governable 
space. For instance, as Pierre Vermeren illustrates the Salafi movement in the thirties 
paved the ground for an Arab-Muslim nationalism forged in opposition to the 
colonial machine” challenging the Western field of political alliances - nationalism 
vs internationalism, secularism and anti-colonialism [Vermeren, 2011]. If we take 
the other moral pillar and political category promoted a thte time of the Arab 
revolutions – modernity - it should be considered that Salafism defined itself in 
terms of “Muslim reformism” aiming at modernizing Islam within a process of 
reinvigoration of the Islamic principles. Therefore, it did not “import” the issues and 
the forms of modernization from the outside but rather this latter was envisaged as a 
pattern to undertake against the colonial presence: Islamic movements tended to 
remark on the betrayal and the failure of the Western project of modernity, which 
generated an unprecedented break-up of social bonds and was unsuccessful in 
creating a harmonious social development. The normative ideal of modernity was 
deeply contested for the damaging effects it triggered within the social fabric; and 
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modernity promoted by colonialism was considered as a failed project that instead of 
making scientific and technical advancements working for a real development, paved 
the way for moral and religious disintegration. Then, from the sixties onwards, with 
the beginning of the “development era”, the slippage of democracy into modernity 
became more evident: economic foreign investments allowed the regime to 
strengthen relationships with European States and to disqualify Islamic forces as 
main causes of Tunisia's backwardness, thus linking democracy and development as 
two mutual enforcing processes to embark on
88
. Nevertheless, despite Tunisia having 
lengthily been considered as an “example” for the entire Arab world for its economic 
growth rate, this latter does not correspond to the wealth of the population especially 
in the inland regions of the country, and the debt of the Tunisian state made it subject 
to the economic authority of the FMI. 
Going back to the colonial age has enabled us to see that democracy was played 
there in multiple ways and that the “battle over democracy”, both as a resistance 
against the colonial power and as a debate about the construction of a new society, 
has a long historical trajectory. In other words, firstly it makes it possible to trace 
back the tale of the “Arab Spring” to its colonial legacies, without assuming the 
revolutionary uprisings of 2011 as a sudden awakening of the region. Secondly, such 
a move suggests undertaking a spatial dislocation from Europe as a unique 
standpoint of analysis and main epistemic referent for analysing the signification of 
political languages and categories than sometimes have the same name –for instance, 
how democracy is signified differently there than in the European political thought. 
The script of the democratic transition is almost entirely a vocabulary deployed by 
European discourses for describing what I call the “struggles of the others”, even 
though in the aftermath of the revolution, it has also been adopted by Tunisian 
institutions for dialoguing with international actors. In a similar way, if we take for 
granted nexus between democracy and secularism, struggles for democracy are 
immediately translated within Western political and epistemological coordinates, 
The ambivalence of the “democratic conquest” as mapped in the European gaze is 
translated by migration and governmental agencies into the idea of a “complex 
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crisis”. This expression conveys the difficulty of “reading” those upheavals and to 
make them intelligible to the ordinary political narratives, and at the same time it 
postulates the necessity to frame a global political approach to that turmoil, 
encapsulating migrations and social conflicts within the label of a “socio-political 
crisis”. Consequently, migrations turn out to be a part of a broader “spatial re-
arrangement” which is presented by governmental actors and migration agencies as a 
“coherent approach in the area of migration, mobility and security”89. The reference 
to the complexity of the Mediterranean “crisis” and the claim for a comprehensive 
approach to it should be read as a way for coming to grips with political space in 
motion – the space of the Arab uprisings- that is slipping out of the hands of 
governmental narratives. In the following section I bring attention to the 
Mediterranean “crisis”, focusing in particular on the way in which the catchword of 
the crisis has been mobilized by migration agencies and by governments for packing 
the “twofold spatial upheaval”, making of it a new space/object of government.  
Migration (in) crisis and “people not of our concern” 
The slippages of the migration crisis: 
July 2012: The two-year period 2011-2012 could be seen as the age of a 
“Mediterranean crisis” spanning from the edges of Africa – the Libyan war – to the 
countries of Southern Europe. This analysis centres on the Mediterranean, reckoned 
in many political analyses as the space in which two “crises” overlap: the “migration 
crisis” and the resulting economic backlash. As I explained in the beginning of the 
chapter, the migration crisis is figured as a flood coming from the southern shore of 
the Mediterranean: the spatial and political upheavals produced by the so called 
“Arab Spring” and brandished as the democratic awakening of the Arab Countries 
were very soon stigmatized as a social turmoil and as a migratory disorder, mostly 
when the so long-awaited bank-effect on the northern shore actualized into the 
presence of thousands of migrants on European soil.  It is following the instabilities 
produced by the economic and migration “crisis” that I orient the reflection. 
Focusing on the politics of mobility, migration agencies have disconnected the 
relationship between the European governmental crisis and the crisis of the asylum 
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system – positing this latter as a humanitarian and securitarian problem. And at the 
same time they have seized the crisis as a floating signifier for setting up “migration 
in crisis” as an odd compound where different kinds and meanings of crisis collapse 
into one another and become conflated: the crisis in Libya, the humanitarian crisis at 
the Tunisian border, the crisis of the European states receiving thousands of 
migrants, and finally the crisis of the migrants arriving in Europe and now struggling 
with the economic recession. 
The script of a “migration in crisis” has been recently promoted by the International 
Organization for Migration (Iom) in order to address the Libyan political turmoil and 
its “disseminations”, namely its impacts in other spaces – Tunisia and Europe – and 
in different domains such as the humanitarian regime, security and economics. 
However, it is certainly not the first time that the paradigm of the crisis has been 
introduced by states or international agencies as a keyword encapsulating an array of 
political technologies of migration governance – and the Iom was itself put into 
place in the Fifties precisely to respond to the crisis produced by the two-blocks 
politics in the aftermath of the second World War [Georgi, 2010]. That said, in the 
aftermath of the Libyan war, the catch-word of the crisis has been re-introduced as a 
multifunctional prism for framing a heterogeneous array of “mobility disorders” – 
namely, practices of migration that through their “spatial takeover” [Sossi, 2012] 
trouble the “b-ordering spaces”90. But what does “migration crisis” stand for? It is 
not a question of quibbling with words if we take into account the nuances of that 
formula, especially the swing between “migration crisis” and “migration IN crisis”. 
In fact, the use of the two expressions reveals a slippage in the meaning of the crisis 
when referring to migration: “a large scale, complex migration flow resulting from 
crisis and typically involving significant vulnerabilities for the individuals and 
communities affected […] migration caught in crisis involves different categories” 
[Iom, 2012b; see also Iom, 2012d]. It’s noticeable that the crisis refers to the state of 
precariousness, vulnerability and restricted mobility which affects migrants crossing 
the borders of a third country due to a military conflict and people who became 
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“migrants” because of the crisis; and at the same time, it addresses the economic 
backlash and the security issue affecting receiving countries. Migration as a 
“disordered practice of mobility” is staged as a turbulent and troubling factor in 
itself, triggering a state of crisis or fostering an ongoing crisis already there, 
irrespective of the nature of the crisis – humanitarian, economic, security … What 
the regenerated formula of “migration crisis” made visible is that migration works 
precisely as a magic-tenet through which the conquests of democracy and freedom 
have suddenly translated into an unfulfilled democratic revolution with unpredictable 
fallouts for European democracies as well: “migration” plays as a transformative 
catalyst for re-codifying political struggles and spatial upheavals into a source of an 
undetermined crisis. Migration as the space-troubling factor, migration as the 
degenerative force of a favourable mobility, migration as the deviation from the road 
to democracy, migration as a plight for social cohesion and as a disobedient practice 
of movement. 
 A parenthesis on the blurred catchword of “crisis”: 
In his genealogy of the variegated occurrences in which the term “crisis” has 
historically been used, Reinhart Koselleck shows the catch-word function of the 
notion of crisis and its blurred meaning, which covers a wide semantic range 
drawing on multiple domains – medicine, law, theology, philosophy of history: 
retracing the emergence and the uses of the term “crisis”, the political-economic 
signification emerges only in the late 18th century and still continues to encroach 
upon other domains [Koselleck, 2012]. Nevertheless, the political force of this notion 
is historically grounded on its plurivocal nature, evoking different and overlapping 
levels of meaning. From the second half of the 19th century, “crisis” has become one 
of the main key-words of the political vocabulary for legitimizing structural reforms 
as well as for marking points of no-return or critical moments of transition which 
impose a quick response or mutually exclusive choices. Ultimately, what relates the 
migratory issue to the notion of crisis from a theoretical and political standpoint is 
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the hybrid nature, namely “the qualities of creating connections and at the same time 
the necessity to connect itself to other terms” [Koselleck, 2012: 92].91 
The Tunisian migration cluster: 
Despite the term migration crisis being coined to address the Libyan political turmoil 
and its  multiplicative effects, revolutionized Tunisia is an interesting space for 
interrogating the formation of what I would call a “migration cluster”: after the 
outbreak of the Tunisian revolution and of the Libyan conflict, Tunisia has become a 
space of “complex” migrations, which is a factory and at the same time a recipient of 
migrants and would-be migrants, sub-Saharan refugees and asylum seekers, young 
“Tunisian beggars” crossing the Mediterranean and Libyan nationals. But Tunisian 
citizens who left the country for Europe and the migrants who fled Libya were seen 
in Tunisia as two completely different phenomena: this consideration is in part true if 
we consider the different conditions and reasons for migrating, but at the same time 
it overshadows the commonalities that depend on the very mechanism of “selected 
mobility” from which both these practices of migrations are excluded. In this regard, 
the existence of refugee camp of Choucha and the crossing of the Libyan border by 
almost 1 million of people in 2011 after the outbreak of the war, have remained in 
the shadow in comparison to other political issues taking place in revolutionized 
Tunisia. Or better to say, the problem of migrants and refugees fleeing Libya was 
primarily tackled by the “popular chain” of hospitality set in place by the Tunisian 
people [Tazzioli, 2012]. 
“Give us our lives back”: stranded migrants out-of-place in the space-frontier of 
Choucha 
 Choucha is a tent camp in the middle of the Tunisian desert, nine kilometres from 
the Libyan frontier of Ras-Jadir and more than 10 kilometres from the closest 
Tunisian village – Ben Guerdane. And since the problem of the rejected refugees and 
of the not-resettled refugees arose– summer 2012 – the stranded people, waiting for 
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months like in a lottery, have remained in the shade of the Tunisian political debate 
centred on the construction of a “new democratic Tunisia”. The camp opened on the 
26th February 2011, hosting people displaced by the Libyan war, those hundreds of 
thousands Libyan residents – almost all of them “third country nationals” – who fled 
the conflict towards Tunisia. The maximum number of people trapped in that spaced 
peaked at 22,000 between in March and April 2011; then, since late summer 2011 
for one year the average number of asylum seekers stranded there was around 4000. 
At the time of writing this article (March 2013) an estimated 980 people are still 
there, despite the exact number, as I will explain later, being very difficult to 
establish.  
January 2013: From the outset the main sorting at Choucha among war-displaced 
people was between those who decided to return to their country of origin and those 
who applied for asylum; then when Unhcr started to communicate the results of the 
demands for asylum the camp was soon split into two areas, the “official” camp and 
the areas of the rejected refugees: these latter were “kindly” invited to leave Choucha 
as presences “out of place”, since Unhcr takes into account refugees and asylum 
seekers but not those who “failed the trial” of the asylum process; those, I would say, 
incapable of proving their exception in the face of a mechanism that sees them as 
non-eligible for protection. In this regard, this document encapsulates well the 
meaning of my argument: “when asylum-seekers come from safe countries 
“applicants are requested to rebut the presumption that the country of origin is safe 
with regard to their particular circumstances […] And considering the difficulty of 
refugees to prove persecution, the applicant's mere assertions of the facts can lead to 
the granting of asylum provided that they are credible in the sense they lead to the 
full conviction of the truth, and not just probability, of circumstances causing the 
fear of persecution” (EC, 2012). The document makes clear that, as I explained in 
the first chapter, would-be refugees are “not-refugees until proven otherwise”. If 
such a procedure represents the general standard adopted by Unhcr, the Libyan crisis 
and the claims of the would-be refugees brought into question the tenability of the 
very principles of the international protection determined by the Geneva Convention 
and the disregard for the reality of the international labour regime which causes 
people to move all over the world: due to the presence of more than 1 and a half 
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million migrant workers in Libya, the outburst of the war produced an 
unprecedentedly huge outflow of “third-countries nationals” in Egypt and in Tunisia. 
The criteria for recognising the status of asylum materialized in the interview with 
the Unhcr Commission, in which people were asked “why did you leave your 
country of origin?”,  instead of being asked for the reasons why they escaped Libya, 
which is their country of residence or in any case the country where they had worked 
for years. “All of us fled from Libya, from a war” rejected refugees stated during 
their sit-in of protest in Tunis “and so no distinction should be made among us, 
between those deserving of protection and those who do not”. If in the first period 
rejected refugees were sheltered and assisted by Unhcr, despite the spatial seclusion, 
since October 2012 no food and medical assistance has been provided to them
92
. 
Moreover, those who were employed by NGOs in the camp were dismissed from 
work so the only possiblity of getting food comes from finding an informal job in the 
village of Ben Guerdane, where the rate of unemployment exceeds 30% along with 
the rest of Tunisia which is now experiencing economic crisis. Confronted by the 
protests of the rejected refugees and the political denunciation of some local and 
international groups of activists, the Unhcr replicated that “rejected refugees are not 
people of our concern, so we are by no means obliged to take care of them” adding 
that “in a time of crisis, we have to cut the costs for managing the camp and the 
assistance provided to denied refugees until October was not owed”. In other words, 
rejected refugees don’t meet Unhcr’s criteria of “eligibility” for getting the 
privileged status of refugee, as an exception to the rule within the humanitarian 
mechanism which produces rejected refugees; indeed, it is a mechanism which 
works leaving stranded the majority of would-be refugees, fixing them to a space and 
to a certain mobility profile – economic migrant/refugee/vulnerable subject, and 
person to be resettled or not – which however could be “revoked” at any point by 
Unhcr’s commissioners. “They are people not of our concern” stands for “those 
existences are not visible for us, and even less they are of our pertinence; to someone 
else must go the task of governing them”. In fact, rejected refugees exist precisely 
because the government of the humanitarian generates a “marginal” production: by 
labelling some  as “rejected refugees”, the mechanism of asylum de facto makes up 
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“illegal” migrants: “we do not say that denied refugees are illegal migrants. This is a 
question out of our domain of concern: we simply say that they cannot be protected 
under the criteria of the asylum system. Thus, we can say who they are NOT, while 
it’s up to the competence of nation-states to decide upon their juridical status”. In 
part, this is a strategy designed to chase away those “unplaceable” subjects, and 
thatat the same time encourages them to do so. Nevertheless, the production of 
people “out of concern” goes along with the control over their mobility: in the case 
of Choucha, the passports of the rejected refugees are still in the hands of Unhcr, 
which releases the documents only provided the person returns to their country of 
origin. The logic of a layered protection combines with a substantial limitation of 
mobility: a unilateral pact is that set in place by the humanitarian regime, which 
locates an exchange of security-mobility at its core. Would-be refugees are allowed 
to become undetected presences in the Tunisian space, and Unhcr encourages them 
“to find a job here, to value one’s own skills as economic migrant”. Therefore, on the 
one hand the so called migration regime is actually composed of and fragmented into 
different and sometimes conflicting governmental agencies, research centres and 
states, each one with very specific tasks and domains of concern; on the other hand, 
despite Unhcr’s formulation that “they are not people of our concern” –which from a 
juridical standpoint is correct – the subjectivities they produce largely exceed their 
domain of pertinence: to put it simply, the figure of the denied refugee is the result of 
the partitioning mechanism of the asylum, and not of migration governance at large. 
The crisis of what? The spinning freely of the sorting mechanism of migration 
governmentality 
This snapshot on Choucha has unfolded the slippages and ambivalences at stake in 
the use of the formula “migration (in) crisis”: the crisis refers to the potential turmoil 
and the demand for resettlement in Europe in the face of the presence of would-be 
refugees on Tunisian soil, but at the same time it addresses the condition of being 
caught in crisis that migrants, denied refugees, asylum seekers, un-resettled refugees 
and a plethora of “troubling forms of mobility”. Nevertheless, I’m not suggesting 
that these impasses have been generated by the Libyan crisis: in the end, what I have 
mentioned here are not exceptions to the functioning of the government of the 
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humanitarian; and it’s not in terms of violations of the rules of asylum that one could 
tackle both the sorting out of a “migration population” – the partition between 
refugees, denied refugees, economic migrants etc. – and the exclusion of some of 
them from the regime of protection/assistance. In fact, if we take into account the 
“moral geographies” traced by the regime of asylum, the way in which refugees and 
migrants have been classified into migration profiles is not too dissimilar from other 
contexts. In fact, Unhcr produced in Choucha an array of degrees of unprotection 
among which the denied are obviously those with no place at all, “a nowhere as their 
condition of existence” [Sossi, 2007]. Rather, the “Libyan crisis” has finally 
exploded the untenable-ness of the Country of origin-based logic of asylum; and it 
was made visible by the rejected refugees who carried on protests in the name of 
their common (forced) escape from Libya. They put into place a “politics of the 
governed” [Chatterjee, 2004;], stressing the fact of being all subject to the 
mechanisms of migration governance and, at the same time, withstanding the Libyan 
conflict. At a first glance, the claim of the rejected refugees, “we are not migrants, 
we are all refugees and victims”, could be read as a reinforcement of the 
longstanding distinction made between the “beggar” migrants, who move in order to 
get a better life, and the displaced persons fleeing a country for political reasons. 
And in this way, such a discourse could ultimately strengthen logic of a “legitimate” 
mobility. However, in this case the claim-protest reversed and counter-acted the 
exclusive logic of partitioning which underpins the politics of protection, imposing 
their own meaning on that: in contrast to the mechanism of partage and to the 
country-based criteria (people coming from “safe” or “unsafe” countries) they 
demanded resettlement away from Tunisia. To the primacy of the safe/unsafe list and 
of the national origins [Noriel, 1991], rejected refugees impose the law of their 
spatial presence and of their condition of being governed by the “migration game of 
bouncing”93 which strands people by fixing them in spaces or making them wander 
without a place. Moreover, they reversed the very logic of (un)safety, demanding “to 
be resettled into a safe country”, thus excluding the possibility to remain in Tunisia 
also with a temporary protection status, as Unhcr is pushing for. 
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The “Libyan crisis” and revolutionized Tunisia make it visible also that the 
economic crisis, the political upheavals in the Arab countries, and the epistemic 
crisis of migration categories, sharpened and transformed mechanisms of migration 
government. The multiple crises exploded the unquestioned functioning of the 
partitioning machine of the asylum system and, at some points, some of those 
mechanisms spun freely. But while in the case of the Tunisian migrants arriving in 
Italy in 2011 the temporary short-circuit of the partitioning system went also to the 
advantage of some of them – through the concession of a temporary permit – the 
“epistemic crisis” of governmental migration agencies and the juridical confusion 
produced by “complex migrations” [Iom, 2012d] went to the detriment of the would-
be refugees in Tunisia, literally stuck in juridical impasses. In fact, the migration 
crisis is recognized by international agencies like Iom, Uncpd and Unhcr as at the 
same time a crisis in “migration governmentality”, or better an epistemic crisis 
within the mechanism that sorts people, makes up juridical subjectivities and 
spatializes their conducts: “the difficulty to respond to complex crisis is that a 
complexity of mobility practices is also at play: mixed migration flows formed of 
people moving for diverse reasons and with different aims, generate challenge to 
migration management” [Iom, 2012c]. Thus, the economic crisis which dramatically 
impacts on migrants’ lives and further tightens the already restrictive European 
politics of asylum and resettlement is coupled with the crisis of the “migration 
sorting mechanism”. But at closer glance the “partitioning log jam” of the migration 
regime in classifying people in mobility profiles is at least in part, as governmental 
agencies recognize, the outcome of migration upheavals: practices of mobility which 
to some degrees exceed existing partitioning criteria, and cannot fit into those 
migration profiles. What the governmental lexicon calls “complex migration” 
resonating the designation of “mixed migration flows”, corresponds to the juridical 
confusion generated by migration practices that were not “expected” and whose 
combination of status, citizenship and country of residence makes it difficult to trace 
uncontested juridical profiles. 
The moral economy of resettlement and the secrecy of  humanitarian knowledge  
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The complex mechanism of resettlement, as a technology for governing the 
migration population, needs to be situated within a broader moral economy of states 
in a time of crisis: a system of economic incentives has been activated by the 
European Union which grants up to 6000 Euros per refugee to states accepting to 
resettle refugees; and countries like Brazil enter the program in order to promote 
themselves as democratic States on the world scene. Instead, the criteria that every 
country adopts for selecting and excluding people remain “secret”. Actually, if we 
could guess that skilled migrants are the most desired refugees, taking that logic for 
granted would mean to corroborate the governmental discourse which in principle 
promotes skilled mobility
94
. Conversely, going in-depth into the mechanism of 
resettlement, it becomes evident that this selection criterion is not really the main 
one. As the refugees in Choucha have understood while waiting for their turn, 
Canada accepts only francophone people, Portugal tends to take those refused by 
other Countries, Denmark the vulnerable cases, and Sweden and Norway prefer 
women… Among the recognized refugees around 150 people have been labelled as 
not eligible for the resettlement program: people with legal precedents, people taking 
part in social disturbances and people charged with terrorism. Following pre-
selective screening carried out by Unhcr, nation-States interested in resettling people 
select the most suitable profiles among the refugees and refuse many of them on the 
grounds of “security reasons”. In this way, in Choucha some of the “official” 
refugees won’t be resettled, despite their juridical status. At the moment of writing, 
the “unselected” refugees come from Arabic countries, Palestine and Iraq. 
The knowledge possessed by would-be refugees at Choucha camp involves a kind of 
lateral thinking here: perfectly aware of being stranded on the international 
chessboard of the politics of mobility, they are nevertheless able to work out their 
future location via a process of deduction, observing how despite the formal criteria 
the partitioning divvying up of people is really made. What is supposed to constitute 
a shared and standardized process, then under close scrutiny turns out to be a 
mechanism of “exclusionary knowledge”. And the fact of being wise to the rights 
and the formal procedures of the asylum system cannot be of help in this case: 
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despite their deep knowledge of the international law on protection and of the 
geopolitical context, would-be refugees realized that a huge discrepancy persists 
between the order of norms and the effective government of their lives. Who holds 
their passports, into what migration profile they have been fit by states, where their 
dossiers have been placed, and what is the list of safe/unsafe countries: all these 
information are unknown to the refugees. The list of safe and unsafe countries was 
established by Unhcr in the late eighties with the purpose of pushing through the 
procedure of asylum [Hailbronner, 1993; Achermann, Gattiker, 1995].  
Would-be refugees fleeing Libya have to some degrees and for some moments 
poured the crisis into the logic of protection. The unexpected arrival of hundred 
thousands of third country nationals in Tunisia, and the rejected refugees’ demand to 
give the international protection to everybody fleeing Libya, de facto undermined the 
tenability of the very logic of the asylum, which relies just on a partitioning  
rationale – economic migrants/refugees, bogus refugee/vulnerable subjects, denied 
asylum seeker/resettled person. Faced with the incorrigibility of their demand [De 
Genova, 2010a], Unhcr has adopted a “tactic of discharge”, producing rejected 
refugees which actually could neither move nor stay in any place except going back 
to their country of origin with the 700 Euros “offered” by Iom in exchange for their 
spatial fixation; in this way, rejected refugees have become imperceptible and 
undetectable presences in the Tunisian space. In this regard, the elusiveness of 
numbers concerning the denied refugees in the camp (312 according to Unhcr 
estimations, but only 200 have been officially “counted” since November 2012, and 
also this number actually oscillates) depends on the tactic of “chasing away” 
deployed by humanitarian actors that pushes some people to abandon the camp to get 
informal jobs or move to some Tunisian towns or finally go back to Libya. “To 
discharge the many in order to care of a few”: this is not a novelty coming out of the 
“migration (in) crisis” script but rather the underlying logics of the international 
politics of asylum. However, as I stressed above, this rationale became more tangible 
in a space of “crisis”. Meanwhile, the “twofold spatial upheaval” made the 
mechanisms of partitioning spin freely: in the Libyan case the “migration (in) crisis”, 
unlike other historical forms and times of crisis, has not worked as a moment for 
radically reassembling power relations or for transit to another regime of 
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government. Rather, the spatial and political disorder, along with the multiplication 
of “precarious” spaces– like zone of humanitarian crisis – have been played as 
means and object of government [Sidaway, 2007]. 
The politics of presence: the refusal to stay in one’s own place by taking one's own 
space 
What this snapshot on Choucha highlights are the limits of a hyper-governmentality 
grid for analysing the politics of mobility and the mechanism of protection. In fact, 
the tactic of “discharge” largely prevails over the logic of managing the lives of all 
would-be refugees; but at the same time, their mobility is highly monitored – as the 
custody of their passports by Unhcr confirms. In particular, one episode which 
happened to refugees on the route to Tunis highlights very clearly their conditioned 
and monitored (im)mobility. Ben Guerdane, 26 March 2013: on their way to the 
World Social Forum that takes place in Tunis, a group of 96 refugees from Choucha 
camp traveling on three buses were blocked at Ben Guerdane by the Tunisian 
national police. “You are not allowed to circulate in Tunisian territory” the 
policemen argued, disregarding the special permit that the refugees obtained from 
the Defense Ministry to go to the Forum. They had seized the opportunity of the 
Social Forum to make their voices heard, as the name of their blog also suggests 
‘Voice of Choucha’ , and to demand that Unhcr “finish its work”, acknowledging 
their status as Libyan war refugees and resettling them in safe countries. After their 
confrontation with the police, eight of them succeeded in reaching the Tunisian 
capital by a collective taxi sneaking away from the police blockade. The next day, 
only half of the people who had been stopped by the Tunisian police would manage 
to arrive at the Forum. There, non-resettled refugees and rejected refugees split into 
two groups choosing to set up two different protests: the former would start a hunger 
strike lasting for twenty days in front of Unhcr headquarters, while the latter decided 
to stage demonstrations at the entrance of the World Social Forum. 
The decision by rejected refugees and non-resettled refugees to stage two different 
protests because of their different juridical status draws our attention to the 
ambivalences surrounding the issue of pluralizing and differentiating migrations. In 
fact, if one the one hand the splitting of the Choucha refugee group was the result of 
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their strategic consideration that two different demands should be addressed to 
Unhcr, on the other hand such a decision highlights the appropriation by refugees of 
the partitioning categories of the asylum, limiting any possible broad alliance or 
common ground of struggle among migrants. In a nutshell, the epistemology of the 
humanitarian regime is predicated on the multiplication of mobility profiles that 
ultimately fragments migrant struggles. The important task to pluralize the migration 
catchword, stressing the heterogeneity of migrants’ conditions and of their stories, 
should however take into consideration the strategies of fragmenting-by-
differentiation that migration agencies and put into place. In the face of that, the 
stake is how to keep together the necessity to unpack the catchword “migration” 
staging the multiplicity of migrants’ conditions, and envisaging a pluralisation that 
does not work in the direction of dividing and weakening possible common struggles 
by migrants stranded in the same space
95
.  
December 2012- July2013: “They are not people of our concern, any more” repeated 
the Unhcr officer in Zarzis “so it’s not our problem what they do with their lives. 
They are not vulnerable or at risk, it’s their life, we are not responsible for them and 
it’s not our fault if they die going to Italy by boat”. This is was the clear-cut 
explication that the responsible of Unhcr Tunisia gave me in the Unhcr’s office in 
Zarzis, in December 2012, and through which she excluded any institutional solution 
for the rejected refugees. And a quite detailed knowledge of the “rules of the game” 
of the politics of asylum led me and other researchers involved in the Choucha case, 
to deduce that, effectively, there was no room for further developments and 
reopening the dossiers of the rejected refugees, since according to Unhcr they did not 
meet the criteria of the international protection. Therefore, it seemed that only a non-
institutional solution could be envisaged, out of the formal recognition of protection, 
or that some European state could accept to resettle them in an exceptional way. 
Instead, the argument of the rejected refugees was very clear: “Since they govern us, 
they must take care of us. And they need to comply with the principles and the work 
they are expected to do: they should take decisions based upon the rights they talk 
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 In fact, the production of “innovative” concepts and categories to analyse migrations is also at the 
core of governmental approaches, see for instance M.Jandl, eds (2007) Innovative Concepts for 




about; human rights”, while “humanitarian forces that in principle should defend our 
rights mock us and strip us of those rights”. Therefore, following this discourse the 
governors become the truly “bogus” to be opposed and unmasked: “we know our 
condition is an international affair, we are part of an international problem which 
concerns also Palestine and Iraq. So we don’t leave the camp, we do not accept their 
game and we stay here as long as the work of Unhcr remains unfinished”. And the 
“occupation” of the camp continued until the 30th of June, when the camp was 
expected to close, but the rejected refugees resisted to be evicted, demanding that a 
solution would be founded for them. Most of the rejected refugees have chosen to 
stay at Choucha imposing on the law of their presence: “they cannot but see us, they 
want to make us invisible but we are here”. 
17
th
 July 2013: the Tunisian government has declared to give them a temporary 
permit for staying and circulating in Tunisia
96
, providing also some accommodations 
in the city of Medenine and Ben Guerdane
97
. Such a decision has not fully satisfied 
the request of the rejected refugees, who demanded to be recognized as refugees by 
Unhcr, but for the first time the “rule of the game” of the asylum system have been 
eluded by a State. And it is not irrelevant, I contend, that Tunisia, which officially 
has not a politics of asylum, has taken such a measure, in a time of political and 
economic crisis, showing in some way that the supposed “good model of asylum” of 




The insistence of the rejected refugees in obtaining a form of protection, despite they 
were declared by Unhcr out of the “rules of the game”, indicates a quite peculiar way 
of endorsing the condition of “being governed: on the one hand they could not but 






 Actually, according to what officially stated by the Tunisian government, both the rejected refugees 
and the non-resettled refugees will be granted of the temporary permit to stay and circulate in Tunisia. 
However, only the non-resettled refugees will have access to the established 700 job offers, while the 
document is unclear about the possibility for rejected refugees to get an accommodation. However, it 
is important to notice that Tunisia’s decision to give the temporary protection is not in contrast with 
Unhcr, since this latter made pressure on the Tunisian government to take in charge the refugees that 
have not been resettled abroad. 
98
 In this regard, it should be reminded that in 2011 Tunisia left open its Southern border with Libya, 
allowing people fleeing from the war to enter the Country. 
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playing within an institutional horizon, claiming to be recognized as refugees, 
appropriating  and make use of the same vocabulary and the same partitioning 
categories of migration governmentality; but on the other hand, they “expropriated” 
and “hijacked” the rules of the game of the asylum, pushing for an “impossible 
demand” –“protection for all”. As a matter of fact, that demand was “impossible” 
and also paradoxical if the follow rules of the game of the asylum, that, in the end, 
both activists and critical researchers take for granted in thinking about political 
strategies.  
Coming back to the question “what does the crisis stand for?” in the Tunisian 
revolutionized context and in the European space “disturbed” by migrants’ 
upheavals, I showed how different orders of crisis overlap and get confused: 
migration crisis, migration in crisis, the crisis of the international regime of asylum, 
the economic crisis impacting on migrants’ lives, the epistemic crisis of migration 
profiles…In the face of all that, the “crisis” of the rejected refugees in Choucha and 
the way in which they misfired the governmental mechanisms of partition which for 
two years encapsulate well the slippages of the crisis and its multiple sides. By 
“occupying the camp”, despite their condition of subjects “out of place”, and 
instating with their “impossible” demand out of the “rules of the game”, the rejected 
refugees in Choucha refused to stay in their own place [Fanon, 2007], the 
paradoxical place of being without a “legitimate” space.  
The transnational Maghreb area of mobility in the making: 
As I posited at the beginning of the chapter, the main concerns of this analysis are 
spatial effects triggered by the Arab uprisings and migration turmoil: how spatial 
economies and economic spatialities have been produced or transformed in 
“revolutionized” spaces. In this regard, it should be interrogated if those “spatial 
upheavals” have unsettled the national frame. Did those spatial upheavals challenge 
the “methodological nationalism” which commonly underpins political analyses? 
Starting from this point, the shift that I propose to undertake here consists in turning 
the attention to the spatial outcomes that the “twofold upheaval” – migrations and 
the Arab uprisings – reinforced, stretched or generated at a transnational level. The 
Maghreb space of free circulation that I talk about is neither properly a “new zone” 
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nor to this day a “real” space; however, the Arab uprisings have pushed for the 
enactment of an area of free mobility despite running into very conflicting positions. 
In fact, the Maghreb area of free circulation was proposed as a space to be realized in 
1989 and it was then actually put into action as a space of free circulation of goods, 
but not of people.
99
 Or to put it better, the facilitations for internal migrations within 
the geographical area including Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Libya 
has mostly depended on bilateral agreements [Perrin, 2008]. The reason why this 
space in the making is of particular interest for this analysis on migration is that it 
intersects migrations across the Maghreb region and human mobility on the one 
hand, and economic spaces and political economy on the other: the free mobility of 
people and the making up of an economic space relatively independent from the 
partnerships with the European Union need to be analysed together. Secondly, the 
transnational space in the making that I address does not correspond to the area in 
which the Arab revolutions took place, tracing instead a potential new cartography of 
the entire Maghreb region as a bank-effect of the uprisings: indeed, neither in 
Morocco nor in Mauritania did people take to the streets in 2011, and in Algeria 
despite protests in January and in February 2011 against the regime for the rising of 
the price of bread, the political regime was not overturned. The project of a Maghreb 
area of free mobility needs to be situated into the broader African debate about 
politics of mobility: what is criticized by many African scholars and analysts is the 
lack of a common African regime of asylum and mobility, as well as the incapacity 
and the incompliance of the States to cope with inter-African migrations setting for 
instance a labor politics of free mobility between those States [Likibi, 2010]. In 
particular, they raise the need to establish concrete conditions for a politics of 
mobility independent from bilateral agreements with the European Union. In fact, as 
Romoulad Likibi questions, “according to the present conditions, is it possible to talk 
of political partnership in the full sense of the term?” arguing that in order to 
negotiate with the European interlocutors “no important decision about the future of 
the African continent should be left to others” [Likibi, 2010].  
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 Actually, the first negotiations for establishing the Union du Maghreb Arab started in 1964, with 
the main economic aim of coordinating the development plans of Algeria, Libya, Morocco and 
Tunisia and the relations with the European Union. However, this plan never came into force until 
1989, with the signature of the Treaty that officially established the existence of the UMA.  
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Meanwhile, it is precisely at the crossroads of these two aspects that some pressing 
stakes arise around the so called migration-development nexus: to what extent 
should a quest for no borders and free mobility take into account radical changes in 
political economy, in order not to be merely a liberal rallying cry? And conversely, 
how could a new economic space not run the risk of reproducing the same script of 
the European economy – privatizations, neoliberal investments, and financial power 
– and build at the same time a space of people mobility not based on the logic of 
market? In this way, the focus on this contested space in the making allows us to 
problematize a discourse on free mobility that does not complicate the political 
analysis on borders and mobility with the economic issue: in particular, those 
perspectives reveal their limits in the light of political uprisings which made it 
visible that “the centre cannot hold” [Dabashi, 2012], namely that Europe and the 
West as epistemic and political referents are no longer tenable. Neither the 
vocabulary of the uprisings nor the patterns of current migrations from North Africa 
address the European space as a dreamland, especially after the outbreak of the 
economic crisis which contributed to dismiss the desirability of Europe. Secondly, 
migration policies in the Maghreb region need also to be analysed in connection with 
the political project of an area of free mobility, depicting a spatial economy of 
revolutionized spaces that goes largely beyond migratory patterns going to Europe. 
Thus, one of the main outcomes and impacts of the multiple uprisings taking place in 
2011 is just the necessity of revising the relationships between a radical critique of 
borders and a reflection on alternative economy. But before unfolding this point, I 
refocus on the Maghreb contested space of free mobility. In January 2012 the 
Tunisian President Marzouki proposed to the other countries of the Maghreb area to 
build a common space of free circulation not only for goods but also for the citizens 
of those countries. The political debate around this project wavered between two 
ambivalent orientations: the possibility of setting a productive economy, in order to 
gain some independence from the agreements with the European Union, and the goal 
of fostering the circuits of free circulation of people and capital to entice also 
investors from abroad are posited at the same time. The leading opponent of this 
proposal was Algeria, which cautioned against the possible illegal traffic of weapons 
that such a measure could have facilitated, and warned of the risk of losing national 
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identities. Nevertheless, what has to be highlighted is that the space of free mobility 
in part already exists, due to bilateral agreements. For instance, this is the case of the 
agreement between Libya and Tunisia, signed for the first time in 1974, allowing 
both Tunisians and Libyans to freely move, work and stay in the two Countries. It is 
noticeable that the agreement was signed just in the aftermath of the oil crisis of 
1973, which marked a considerable turn of Tunisian migration routes from France to 
Libya, since this latter experienced a period of economic growth and consequently of 
labour force demand due to the increase in oil prices. And if the Arab revolutions 
have been an opportunity for some states to revise these treaties,
100
 more or less 
informal flows of people, most of all between Tunisia and Libya, have never ceased. 
However, we should not overstating the smoothness of this space or the porosity of 
the borders: quite to the contrary, ongoing conflicts and harsh obstacles characterize 
the political relationships between those Countries and their migration politics; 
above all, the Moroccan-Algerian dispute which started in 1994 after terrorist attacks 
in Marrakech led Morocco to close the frontiers with Algeria and to introduce visa 
obligations for all Algerian citizens. Despite the period of formal restrictions ending 
in 2004, today the two countries are far from coming to terms about a liberal politics 
of mobility: the burning political issue of the annexation of the Western Sahara 
region to Morocco and the independence of the Sahraouian people that has been 
going on since 1975 are still at the core of the present quarrels. Moreover, the 
frontiers are de facto still closed for Moroccan citizens. But the reverberations of the 
Arab uprisings is for many aspects resonating also in those Countries, where no 
revolution took place: the current processes of reassessment of the political balances 
between Algeria and Morocco hinge considerably on mobility issues, with the 
proposal of a Maghreb area of free mobility at its core. The first step of the Tunisian 
government was to revise the conditions for the Visa and the residence permit for the 
                                                          
100
 Tunisia and Libya are revising the agreements on military and economic cooperation; Tunisia and 
Algeria signed in December 2012 an agreement on border controls and anti-terrorism collaboration. 
Then, in 2012 Tunisia signed many programs of selected mobility with France and an agreement with 
Italy about tourism (July 2012), while Morocco revised the bilateral agreements with France 
concerning economic development. As I explained above in the chapter, since December 2012 
Tunisia has become a “Privileged partner of the EU”, while in June 2013, after months of 
negotiations, Morocco and the EU signed a Mobility Partnership which includes readmission 
agreements according to which sub-Saharan migrants who transit from Morocco before arriving in 
Italy will be deported to Morocco. The agreements signed by Maghreb Countries are not only with 
Europe but for a considerable part also with the Gulf States – Qatar and Arab Emirates – concerning 
most of all labour migration (see for instance the Tunisia-Qatar agreement signed on January 2012). 
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citizens of Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania (but not for Libyan citizens, since Libya 
is now considered a politically unstable country).
101
  
However, the attempts to construct the Maghreb as a free space should not be 
regarded automatically as a positive resistance to the Schengen area as an economic 
space and a space of mobility. In fact, despite the relevant political gesture of 
(partial) detournement from Europe that some North African countries are making, 
the economic and the political agenda of those countries is essentially based on many 
neoliberal measures and that more than envisaging an economic system which 
completely revises the mechanisms of production is turning to the Gulf States.  
Besides, it would be misleading to think that countries like Tunisia renounce the 
funds of the European Union: on the contrary, it must be stressed that while 
negotiations about the Maghreb space of free circulation were going on, important 
summits between European Countries and the Countries of the southern shore took 
place – such as the Euromediterranean summit, which was held in Malta in October 
2012
102
 – as well as many bilateral agreements between European and Maghreb 
Countries, or the European Neighbourhood Policies which were strengthened just in 
the aftermath of the uprisings.
103
 Moreover, other transnational spaces of free 
mobility – for trade, and not for people – are supported by the European Union: the 
“Arab Mediterranean Free Trade Agreement” signed in Agadir 2004 between 
Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt with the approval of Europe is now promoted 
by the European Union as an example of the “experience transfer” – the European 
economic integration model “is now transferred to the Arab Mediterranean 
Countries”104. 
Nevertheless, the ambivalent political issues underpinning the Maghreb space of free 
mobility compel us to largely rethink both the discourse on free movement and the 
migration-development nexus in the light of an alternative economy, interrogating 
what a critique of the developmental paradigm could mean in revolutionized spaces. 





 http://www.5plus5.gov.mt/malta-summit  
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In fact, as I previously stated, what stems from the context of the Arab uprisings is 
the inadequacy of a “liberal” critique that merely advocates for no borders and free 
mobility, without taking into account the economic factor. All these questions are 
not the result of the Arab Spring, and actually most critical approaches to migration 
governmentality have taken them seriously. Rather, what I would like to highlight is 
that the Arab revolutions have brought to the fore and sharpened the necessity to 
think and act together a critique of borders and a critique of the productive system. In 
fact, unlike other practices of migration, migrants’ practices taking place in 2011 in 
the Mediterranean space need to be situated within the “revolutionized spaces”: that 
is to say, from the standpoint of a long-run analysis, the temporary interruption and 
short-circuit of the migration governmentality mechanisms that Tunisian migrants 
enacted has to be articulated with the debate about the construction of a “new 
Tunisia”. To sum up, the gaze on migrants’ practices occurring in the context of the 
Arab uprisings makes us see the limits of a “liberal” critique of the border regime. Or 
in broader terms, migrations at the time of spatial and political upheavals – and 
considering migration itself as part of the turmoil – force us to relocate critical 
discourses on migrations and borders within a radical and wider economic analysis 
that tries to think together the removal of borders and an economic perspective 
which neither posits Europe as the most esteemed space, nor considers every 
“variation of tune” to that economy as a real and good alternative in itself. In this 
sense, the Arab uprisings and migrants’ practices suggest that a reformulation of 
critical discourses on migrations
105
 from the southern shore of the Mediterranean 
involves dismantling the colonial and the post-colonial imagery which underpins the 
narratives on democracy. 
Ultimately, if on the one hand the issue is to bring into relief the “bank effects” that 
the Arab revolutions produced on the mechanisms of migration governmentality, on 
the other the political economy of mobility represents an important angle to take for 
an in-depth analysis of the Arab uprisings. In fact, as some scholars suggest 
[Dabashi, 2012; Kanna, 2011] migrants’ movements and migration politics are 
crucial elements of the cartography of the Arab revolutions. And at the same time, 
they have played an important role in workers’ struggles that historically have 




marked the forms of dissidence towards the dictatorships in Arab countries in recent 
years. In turn, as Hamid Dabashi points out, “the Arab Spring is very much 
implicated in this tracing of the patterns of labour migrations”. This is the reason 
why, as I introduced earlier in the chapter, the opening of a space of free circulation 
of people that the Arab revolutions could generate in the near future must be read 
carefully in the light of “the proliferation of borders that cut across and exceed 
existing political spaces” and the related multiplication, see differentiation, of labour 
regimes as new mechanisms of hierarchization through the “multiplication of control 
devices” [Mezzadra, Neilson, 2013b]. In particular, focusing on the “migration 
roots” of the Arab revolutions, a huge number of migrant workers’ struggles took 
place in the Gulf States in the last ten years, in the form of protest against the 
exploitative conditions of the labour system. In some sense, migrant workers’ 
protests have been the “sidelong force” of the revolutions. This does not mean that 
they have played a marginal role in the unfolding of the events; on the contrary, as it 
is well known, migrant labour force represents seventy per cent of the whole 
population in the Gulf States; rather, by that expression I want to stage the different 
position and claims of migrant workers in comparison to the more narrated protests 
and political unrest of citizens (in Tunisia, Egypt, Barhein, Syria, Yemen) 
demanding the end of the dictatorships and a real democracy. In fact, as Ahmed 
Kanna suggests, while migrants did not ask for social or political integration within 
the perimeter of the polis, citizens made claims and gained their freedom from  
inside the borders of the space of citizenship. However, both these vectors of the 
revolutions have shaped the ground for social protests, but the struggles of the 
migrant workers bring to the light some limits of citizens’ political demands and 
more broadly of uprisings that still centre on a national framework as ultimately is 
the case of the Arab Spring. 
The Mediterranean space, which has been shaken by the “twofold spatial upheaval”, 
does not include only national or land boundaries but also the Mediterranean Sea as a 
contested space of mobility and as a sea of deaths. The next chapter mobilizes a 
countermapping approach to unpack the politics of control in the Mediterranean, 
looking at the ways in which practices of migration upset the humanitarian and the 





Mediterranean patchy (in)visibilities: undetected movements, “noisy” practices  
 
“At stake in every politics of border controls 
is control over the borders of the political”. 
(A.Mitropoulos, 2007) 
 
6th September 2012: Twelve miles off the coast of Lampedusa, and very close to the 
little island of Lampione, at around 4 pm a boat with 135 Tunisians on board sends 
out an SOS to the Italian Coast Guard; after more than nine hours 56 of them are 
saved while the others “disappeared” in the Mediterranean, despite the tiny 
dimension of the island of Lampione. The Italian authorities do not believe the 
version of the story told by the surviving migrants, suspecting that they have been 
dumped in the sea by the smuggler, since no sunken ship was found. This shipwreck 
of a migrants’ boat was not an extraordinary event in the Mediterranean sea: 
according to Unhcr, in 2011 more than 1500 migrants drowned or “disappeared” in 
the Mediterranean, although the real number could not be exactly estimated, since 
when shipwrecks are not attested by national or international authorities it is almost 
impossible to count the losses at sea from the Northern shore of the Mediterranean. 
On the Southern shore these uncounted “disappearances” are much more tangible, 
since people know who left by boats and never arrived. 
However, the tragedies of migrants dead at sea is not a phenomenon that started in 
2011: since 1988 more than 18,500 people have died in the Mediterranean
106
 - an 
unreliable number that comes out from the assemblages of many data sources; and 
Unhcr started to count deaths at sea only in 2007. Nor is the Mediterranean the only 
area where migrants drown, as mortal shipwrecks in the Australian waters attest. 
Thus, the anomalous shipwreck of 6th September 2012 is only one among many 
cases in the last decade. Nevertheless, it must be noticed that, for the first time, in 





Tunisia in 2011 and in 2012 the families of the disappeared self-organized in groups, 
setting up protests and political campaigns to know what happened at sea, and 
demanding that both the Tunisian and the Italian government respond. In some way, 
the “mood” of the Tunisian revolution spurred multiple struggles positing the 
unacceptability of power. These were struggles characterized by what I would call a 
“fundamental intractability”: namely “noisy” practices that could not be easily 
recaptured by institutional or humanitarian discourses and that staged an 
unprecedented radicalness, refusing to be represented by any human rights 
association, political party and international organization. Two days after the 
shipwreck of September in the village of El-Fahs, the families of the twelve migrants 
who disappeared in the shipwreck of Lampione proposed to the other resident of El-
Fahs to declare a general strike: all economic activities were blocked, as well as the 
arterial road out of the city. Neither the main trade union (Ugtt) nor a political party 
organized the strike, but rather it was the result of a self-organized network set up by 
the parents and the relatives of the disappeared migrants: the day after the shipwreck 
they summoned up all citizens for a collective response  to the silence of the 
Tunisian authorities, since both the national and the local government did not 
communicate any news to the families about the incident, and they drew up a wrong 
list of the missing people. The general strike represented a gesture of radical distrust 
towards the governors and it was a way to clear them off: “we blocked the 
production in order that the government was obliged to see us; and at the same time 
through that protest we discredited it of any authority”107. The words of the parents 
of the missing migrants addressed the unresponsiveness of the Tunisian government, 
which did not investigate the circumstance of the shipwreck and which still 
criminalized “illegal” emigration. The general strike was the culmination of one and 
a half years of protests made by the families of the Tunisian disappeared migrants, 
that pointing the responsibilities of migration policies in letting migrants die at sea, 
upset the largely spread humanitarian discourse which denounces the deaths at sea
108
 
as “tragedies” that require a more efficient system of rescue.  
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 Interview with the one of the parents of the missing migrants, El Fahs, December 2012 
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 It is important to stress that in parallel to these analyses focused on the Mediterranean “border 
zones”, Critical studies of migrants’ deaths at the borders are growing also concerning other areas. In 
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The reality of the deaths at sea in the Mediterranean is today acknowledged by 
European agencies and governments, which prompt for a better and more 
coordinated system of security and rescuing in the Mediterranean. If on the one hand 
the denunciation of the deaths “at the borders” of Europe is certainly an important 
step in order to bring out the effects of the “border spectacle” [De Genova, 2011c], 
on the other its capture and translation into the humanitarian discursive frame, has 
“tamed” somehow the troubling impact of that “disobedient gaze”. In fact, counter-
narratives, critical reports, video and maps which showed the “dark side” of border 
controls have been, at least in part, incorporated into the human rights discourse 
promoted by European agencies [Dembour, Kelly, 2011]: this latter has tended to 
shift those “counter-maps” of the border regime from a critique of the very 
mechanisms and rationales of migration governance to denunciations and legal 
claims against the incompliance of European States in rescuing people or for pushing 
them back. However, this political mobilization which started in the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, was then turned by humanitarian actors into a claim against the 
violations of human rights. The appeals to International Law, which obliges to rescue 
people distressed at sea, campaigns that claim more secure journey conditions for 
migrants and discourses on the risk to migrate unsafely, see “illegally”: these have 
become the main pillars that define the codification of the strugglefield on migrants’ 
deaths at sea by humanitarian agencies and governmental discourses. On the 
contrary, the protests in El-Fahs and the many demonstrations of the families of the 
disappeared migrants that took place over 2011 and 2012 both in Tunisia and in 
Italy, could not be easily captured by the humanitarian script claiming for a “safer 
Mediterranean”. In fact, through their “impossible demand” – which asked the 
Italian and the Tunisian authorities through digital and biometric traces if those 
migrants arrived to Italy
109– they touched the kernel of the two-sided mechanism 
formed of illegalized movements and selected mobility, which instead is commonly 
                                                                                                                                                                    
particular, the US-Mexico frontier and deaths at sea in Australia [see for instance, Cornelius 2001 and 
Stephen 2008] 
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 In fact, when undocumented migrants arrive on the Italian coasts they are fingerprinted, and then 
the digital data are put in a national database (Afis). And in Tunisia digital fingerprints are taken for 
the ID cards. Therefore, it is possible to check if among the fingerprints archived by Italy there are 
those of the disappeared migrants. However, it is important to say that in the first half of 2011 the law 
which establishes the duty for the Italian police to take fingerprints to migrants has been “disobeyed”, 
due to the sudden arrivals of thousands of Tunisian within few weeks. 
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taken as disjointed. Moreover, in the specific context of the Mediterranean crossings 
the human rights “equipment” which sustains most of the claims against border 
controls, has put migrants, I suggest, in the condition of making themselves 
vulnerable, as the only (non)choice they have in order not to disappear and not be 
stripped of any right to stay. In fact, the claim of asylum seems to be their only 
concrete manner for not being pushed back
110
; and similarly, the fact of being in 
danger and becoming detectable by sending an Sos and made one’s own position 
localizable, paradoxically increases the possibility for migrants to reach European 
shores (being rescued and not pushed back). 
This chapter focuses on the Mediterranean Sea as one of the Earth’s most monitored 
spaces, and on the ongoing improvement of technologies of control by European 
States. Against this background, the chapter aims at fraying and flaking the 
Mediterranean space of mobility, refusing to assume if as a surface where politics’ 
implementations and border enforcements take place: on the contrary, the 
Mediterranean is seen here as one of the main reference points and constructed 
object of the politics of mobility of the European Union. Secondly, this chapter 
gestures towards a de-articulation of the safety-and-control paradigm, pushing not 
for a more effective functioning of the mechanisms of control, but on the contrary 
seeking to undermine the assumptions upon which it is built –the overlap between 
humanitarian and security concerns – and to disentangle/unpack the all-monitoring 
logic that underpins the European politics of mobility [Pugh, 2001, 2004]. Finally, 
the chapter stresses that migration controls are neither based on a specific rationality 
nor implemented through specific techniques realized on purpose for monitoring and 
capturing migrants; it suggests that, in order to grasp the functioning and the 
specificity of migration government one needs to shift from a focus on controls and 
securitization, situating all these techniques within a broader rationale of governing 
movements, in which economic, political and administrative issues overlap. The 
narrative of migration governmentality as an encompassing and well-coordinated 
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regime needs to be deflated and then scrutinized into its specific orientations and 
mechanisms, as well as in the conflicting instances and interests that cross the 
supposed horizontal coherence of the international border regime. The first counter-
mapping move that I undertake in this chapter interrogates to what extent a politics 
that counter-acts the rationale of migration controls could effectively interrupt and 
disrupt the mechanisms and principles of migration government – both at the level of 
its discursive narrative and in its functioning “on the ground” [Feldman, 2011]. In 
order to take a distance from the image of a self-standing and coherent migration 
management, I will focus on the effective fragmentation of the European border 
regime, and will linger on what I would call the “frantic management” of the 
European borders, that is to say the  tactic of “running after migrants” that, 
ultimately, the agencies of border management are forced to enact, in order to 
monitor their routes or in order to produce then statistical reports and to shape “risky 
mobility profiles”. The supposed coherent and prefigured set of strategies forming 
the so called “migratory regime”, I will show, actually turns out into a patchy 
governmentality of “overlapping technologies”. Nevertheless, I don’t want to 
suggest that something like a government of migration does not exist. Nor do I wish 
to point at the “failures” of such a governmental regime, simply stressing the 
discrepancies between the discursive regime and the effective functioning of those 
techniques. Rather, what is at stake is to understand what these “failures” indicate 
and stand for: on the one hand, the conflicting interests between different actors – 
states, private companies, European institutions – and on the other hand the way in 
which, despite  “failures”, a government of migrations is in place. The same point is 
made about the singular actors involved, like states that in part oppose the decline of 
their sovereign prerogatives, but at the same time try to take advantage from time to 
time of some specific measures and standards established by the European Union. 
The plurality of political and economic actors leads to increasing difficulty in 
understanding, case by case, what specific powers or actors need to be addressed to 
stake a claim, insomuch it seems that the migration regime is a self-standing smooth 
machine and that no nameable subject could be identified as actively involved (and 
interested) in governing migrations. In other words, the multiplicity of interests and 
actors involved in governing migration results in a substantial blurring of political 
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responsibilities. Nevertheless, beyond this crucial point, the argument that I would 
like to raise concerns the inadequacy of studying the government of migrations by 
focusing exclusively on migration policies or techniques of control: the “migration 
strugglefield” – meaning by that the struggles around governing migrations – cannot 
be fully grasped if we do not overstep the boundaries of migration as a political and 
disciplinary field, locating it at the crossroads of multiple economies of power, 
including the international labour market, the politics of citizenship, biopolitical 
powers and the government of conducts [Foucault, 2009]. To put it differently, the 
migratory regime is neither formed solely by the articulation of national and 
international migration policies, nor does it act according to the same logic on every 
subject and in every space: to the contrary, what characterizes bordering 
technologies is precisely the differentiation of status and conditions of mobility of 
migrants, as well as the ways in which the violence of and at the borders differently 
impacts on subjects. Drawing on Foucault, it could be argued that there is no unitary 
dispositive, or better, that what a critical analysis has to do is just to make visible the 
non-unity of such a regime, the multiple levels at which it exercises and the 
impossibility of assuming a single logic through which to read the functioning of the 
government of migration [Foucault, 1998]
111
. It also cannot be overlooked that if all 
mechanisms of identification and control run in a perfectly smooth way, the result 
would paradoxically be quite counter-productive for states and, especially, for 
economic actors: the guarantee of a degree of illegality production [De Genova, 
2002; Haas, 2008] would be paralyzed. From this standpoint, an engaged analysis on 
migration governmentality should be wary of pointing out or denouncing the 
“failures” of governmental mechanisms, in order not to fall into the trap of 
unintentionally fostering the improvement of monitoring systems.  
The Mediterranean as a border: the production of an “insecure” Sea  
Following Foucault’s genealogical approach and the idea of a history of the present 
that is not flattened on “present-ism” [see chapter 1], it is important to trace back the 
moment and the ways in which the Mediterranean Sea started to be moulded as a 
space of monitored mobility and, at the same time, as an (in)secure space. In fact, the 
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production of the “Mediterranean (in)security assemblage” dates back more than two 
decades: the shift from the perception of maritime space as a space of rescue and free 
movement to a zone of interceptions, monitoring and refoulements clearly depends 
on the flourishing of the visa system in the Nineties that strongly limited access to a 
free and unsanctioned mobility [Cuttitta, 2007, De Haas, 2007b; de Wenden, 
2010]
112
. Thus, the spatial redefinition of the Mediterranean Sea as a border zone, or 
better as an assemblage of borders, went along with the redefinition of its legal 
geography [IMO, 1980]: Mediterranean controls intensified in parallel with 
migrants’ journeys, setting new legal borders and geographies. In this sense, the 
Mediterranean Sea is one of the zones in which the dislocation of borders from 
territorial sovereignty and the current spatial restructuring and multiplication of 
borders is particularly salient. High sea was historically considered a space of free 
mobility, exempt of any form of sovereignty, and this hampered states to intervene 
for intercepting boats in that area. In the last decade, the Mediterranean has become a 
highly governmentalized space and a contested zone of states’ interventions. In fact, 
the quarrels among States over the areas and the vessels of competence in rescuing 
people or intercepting boats on the high seas determine a reconfiguration of 
sovereignty. As Karakayali and Rigo put it, “borders become normative devices that 
can continuously be reproduced. They do not trace the limits of any given space but 
reproduce a territorial authority […] every time that migrants’ rights remain 
anchored to their authorized or unauthorized movements” [Karakayali, Rigo, 2010, 
p. 138]. In fact, both the operative competences and duties of intervention and 
vessels themselves become “mobile” borders113, activating even the possibility for a 
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State to apprehend “suspect” migrants’ vessels and then dislodging its sovereignty: 
according to the most recent regulation of the European Parliament on the 
surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational cooperation, 
intercepted boats could be diverted by the ships of a member state towards the 
territorial sea of a third country, and rescued people should be disembarked to a 
“place of safety”, namely “discharging” them to another state [2013/0106(COD)] 114.  
The Mediterranean as a border zone stems from specific techniques of bordering, 
namely technical, and juridical measures that trace out discontinuities in space and 
produce interrupted migrant geographies. From this perspective, borders are not the 
demarcating line of political strategies and of spaces of exception, but result from 
technologies that select, monitor and capture mobility. And at the same time, borders 
do not work only by containing and blocking movements but also as regulative 
technologies [Mezzadra, Neilson, 2013; Soguk, 2007; Sparke, 2006; Walters, 2006]. 
The Mediterranean maritime area is at once an anomalous space– because of the 
indistinct and overlapping border regimes giving rise to controversies between 
national and international actors– and a spatial lens for enlightening political 
technologies in which borders and (national) territorial sovereignty are disjoint. In 
fact, the territorial division between national and international waters overlaps and 
partially clashes with the operating of mobile or punctual borders –like for instance 
nation states’ patrolling in international waters or in the national waters of another 
state, as established by many bilateral agreements; or through the functioning of 
electronic monitoring systems dislocating the border out of sight –radar and satellites 
– or finally tracing zones of blurred sovereignty – for instance, making it hard to 
understand who is in charge of controlling and rescuing migrants at sea in certain 
areas (Frontex, nation states, Nato boats). Non-territorial borders and spatialities 
have been produced through two main border displacements: firstly, bilateral 
agreements and the externalization of frontiers and controls; secondly, technological 
monitoring and identification systems. 
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May 2007: A quite renowned longstanding controversy concerns the Maltese and the 
Italian zones of competence in rescuing people at sea in Searching and Rescue areas 
(SAR). The most famous case took place on the 29th May 2007, involving also the 
Libyan authorities, when 27 migrants were found by a Maltese tug boat and rescued 
“at distance”. The migrants were not allowed to get on the boat but only to hang on 
to the tuna cages, where they remained for more than 24 hours; after that time the 
Italian Navy “Marina Militare” brought them into the detention camp of Lampedusa. 
Malta had refused to embark the migrants since the national authorities claimed to 
have found them in Libyan national waters. A “politics of deferral”115is put into 
place by European States when it is a matter of spending on rescue operations or 
taking political responsibility for people left dying at sea. However, the “costs of the 
borders” and of border enforcements spent by states in operations of sea patrols and 
in the “fight against illegal immigration” is quite indicative of the “economy of 
borders” activated around the migratory issue: between 2005 and 2012 Italy spent 
1.3 billion Euros on border controls, deportations and detentions, of which 283 
million came from European funds. However, this number does not include the 
money paid by Italy to fund Frontex operations at sea, since that cost is kept secret 
by national authorities. Border conflicts are reanimated among States when they 
come to dispute the boundaries of their sovereignty at sea: for instance, in May 2011 
Malta refused to rescue migrants drowning in its Search and Rescue area and Italy 
complained about saving them; and in August 2011, the Italian Minster of foreign 
affairs Franco Frattini, quibbled with Malta over a wider Maltese sovereign Search 
and Rescue zone. It seems that the political game of national authorities consists in 
not being encroached upon by other sovereign States and not acting in their area of 
competence: they tend to informally dis-charge tasks and responsibilities to other 
national and international actors, turning a blind eye to costly operations at sea. 
Questioning the war paradigm and highlighting the “patchy visibility “regime: 
June 2011.It is important to remark that the advanced systems of surveillance were 
not set into place with the specific purpose of leading a “war at low intensity” on 
migrants [Mazzeo, 2011]: most of the technologies for controlling coasts and high 
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seas were originally devised for other goals such as fishery and illicit trafficking of 
drugs. That said, many of these systems have been “hijacked”, enforced and used 
also for migration monitoring, or at least, combined with more targeted instruments 
specifically created for detecting small vessels like migrants’ boats. European 
research studies like Bortec (2008) investigated the feasibility of integrating already 
existing technologies of surveillance with new systems of detections [Kasparek, 
Wagner 2012; Wolff, 2008]: migration controls often depend upon other 
governmental mechanisms and strategies. In this regard, while it is of great salience 
to shed light on specific forms and contexts of a war on migrants, the paradigm of 
war is not a true grid to catch and explain the effective functioning of migration 
governmentality [Peraldi, 2008]. This doesn’t mean at all to deny the violence that 
takes place at the borders, or to point to deaths at sea as mere “side effects” of the 
politics of mobility. Nor does it entail embracing an idea of governmentality as a set 
of frameworks grounded on non-coercive forms of power and operating through 
freedom and subjects’ agency [Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2010]: on the contrary, and as 
explained in the first chapter, this work conceives of governmentality as a 
strugglefield. The issue here is to question the adequacy of the model of the war as 
the characterising style and functioning of a governmental rationality that is 
eminently grounded on controlling and managing flows and routes and their 
temporality –the “pace of mobility”. And the blurring of the functions of many 
governmentality technologies encapsulated under the generic label of “fight against 
illegal trafficking” heterogeneous political objects, among which is immigration. In 
this work the point is not to unfold migrants’ cunning strategies for dodging controls 
and patrolling at sea, since it would mean to unfold their strategies of resistance: 
rather, in the place of making migrants’ journeys and routes visible, I bring to the 
fore the array of technical means and knowledges deployed for detecting and 
counter-acting migrants’ practices. Nevertheless, it is important not to follow 
through and through the descriptions of the Mediterranean sea as an all-monitored 
and “transparent” space: indeed, between the supposed overall technological eyes 
over the Mediterranean and the effective coverage of the Mediterranean area there is 
a huge discrepancy that does not depend simply on failures in the mechanisms of 
visibility – especially if we consider the “disturbances” produced by weather 
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conditions and the so called “shadow zones” where radars and satellites cannot see. 
In fact, this uneven visibility in the Mediterranean depends in part on the 
impossibility to “map and see”, all movement and presences in space, thus bringing 
to the fore the limits of representation and mapping [Cobarrubias, Pickles, 2011]. 
Indeed, “Undesired” migrants’ movements are part of the selected politics of 
migration that contemplates that many arrive out of the established channels: thus, 
the “disappearance” of some migrants’ traces and their undetectable presence is 
outside of what is of interest to see and monitor. 
The limits of the monitoring systems are revealed also by those who devise radars 
and satellites at high visibility: “the time for achieving the global coverage is 
approximately 3 months” for the four satellites of the Cosmo-SkyMed constellation 
that are installed in the Mediterranean, while “they take 5.7 days to cover 90% of the 
area” [Topputo, 2009]. The other element to notice, proving that migration 
governmentality tends to lean on other governmental domains and regimes of 
visibility, is that the possibility to get a satellite or a radar image of a migrants’ boat 
is higher if the boat moves close to a war zone –for instance, Libyan waters in 2011 
– since in that case the whole array of technologies of monitoring is being deployed 
by states. Then, if a suspicious boat is detected, it might take more than 35 hours to 
obtain a new useful SAR image of the same boat; or in any case the resolution 
capacity largely depends on the weather conditions, so that the range for a second 
possible snapshot could span from 12 to 70 hours; and given that the average time 
for a fishery boat to get to the island of Lampedusa from the Tunisian coasts is about 
twelve hours, it is very likely that the boat would arrive in Italy without being 
detected again. But the Italian Coast Guard admits that also during the best 
conditions of visibility the possibility at detecting an “irregular” small vessel is no 
more than 80%, also when Frontex missions are in place as in the case of “Hermes” 
operation in Lampedusa in 2011. Something always escapes the technological eyes 
deployed by concurrent actors that, in any case, fight each other to get the best of the 
control over a given Sea area. For instance, if in principle real time information on 
“suspect” vessels and on the position of the patrol boats should be shared by all the 
Italian forces – Marina Militare, Guardia di Finanza, Guardia Costiera and 
Carabinieri –in reality they frequently quarrel over who needs to undertake the 
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rescue. Taking on the vocabulary of military authorities, once migrants’ vessels are 
detected at sea, in principle they are “tracked” at a distance along their path – 
“tracked by shading” is the technical term used by Italian authorities – but actually 
this would require a huge deployment of costs and forces, especially as in the 
“trafficked” first half of 2011, when the number of migrants’ boats per day was 
considerable. 
The scene becomes more complicated if we consider the “secrecy” under which 
some patrols are expected to act: with regard to Italian forces, Marina Militare has 
the right to maintain secrecy regarding the location of its patrols from the other 
Italian corps, while the details of Frontex patrols are known only to the states taking 
part in the mission: Nato boats do not reveal their position to national forces. On the 
other shore of the Mediterranean, Tunisian patrol boats are in part provided by 
European States – according to the do ut des logic of bilateral agreements, in which 
the fight against “clandestine immigration” plays a pivotal role – but they are very 
scanty in comparison to the advanced technological means in possession of 
European actors. Thus, the “fight over visibility” – that is, the striving of migrants to 
remain undetected, and the attempts of multiple actors like Frontex and national 
corps to detect them – is enacted by governmental forces on the basis of an essential 
asymmetry between the States involved: North African countries are required to 
patrol their coasts and to prevent people from migrating, but de facto they act in a 
condition of enduring dependence on the European forces, since the means provided 
from the Northern shore are not adequate for detecting and then registering into a 
database all “suspect” movements. Indeed, fishermen are often questioned to 
understand if a shipwreck has occurred, since their constant presence at sea makes 
them sometimes more abreast of what happens. In this way, the support of the 
European actors remains unavoidable and, at the same time, the property of 
(technological) knowledges is played by European states as a political weapon that is 
mobilized every time for reiterating the “conditionality” of the economic and 
political partnerships (Neighbourhood Policies)  and confirming the non-autonomy 
of the politics of mobility of African states.  
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The European Surveillance Border System (EUROSUR) promoted in 2008 by the 
European Commission, and that will officially start in October 2013, is the most 
prominent attempt to establish a plan of visibility and "visibilization" of migrants’ 
vessels. This project is presented by the European Union as a sort of “coordinator” 
tool that will put to an end the lack of coordination and information sharing among 
member States, private actors and international agencies in providing a live map of 
the movements in the Mediterranean [Jeandesbodz, 2011]. This project is based on a 
logic of spying and hijacking migrants’ routes, in order to trace out a “refractive” 
and “reactive” cartography of people’s movements, in order to block and filter them. 
Therefore, the alleged “pre-emptive actions” and anticipative risk analysis promoted 
by agencies like Frontex are actually the result of frantic practices that run after 
migrations trying to hijack, deviate and when possible anticipate their moves. It 
suffices to cast a glance on how expertise and research centres try to set new 
strategies for overcoming the limits and the failures of the “systems of capture” and 
detection at sea: “beyond piracy, also for a wider maritime safety: illegal fishing, 
immigration, pollution etc.” the Joint European Research Centre declares, and in this 
way the migratory issue is conflated within a range of other “criminal activities” 
which disturb good maritime governance. In other words, it seems that, more than 
the direct control on specific “illegal” movements, what is at stake is the enactment 
of a complex regime of (in)visibility, articulating zones of shadow and subjects at 
high visibility. At a cursory glance, it could be argued that a “fight against opacity” 
underlines all the researches and operations aiming at “enhancing the Maritime 
picture”. Thus, what is envisaged by research centres, national authorities and 
international agencies is an unveiling map catching migrants’ “tricky” movements 
and spatial strategies, not simply for detecting but, rather, for detecting in order to 
predict vessel positions and to trace a risk map. However, things are more complex 
than this, and the image that I suggest of an uneven regime of (in)visibility is useful 
to unfold the ambivalences and the nuances of the “battle over visibility” that 
characterizes migration governmentality: in fact, the real time cartography of the 
movements in the Mediterranean envisaged by international agencies and States 
ultimately results into an impossible transparent map, namely a map with opaque 
patches and spaces “out of sight”. In fact, as the “watchers” of the Mediterranean 
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confess, a considerable quotient of invisibility is always at play due to the external 
interferences. At the same time, the governmental real time map of the 
Mediterranean, far from aiming at a full-spectrum visibility is built on the secrecy of 
border dis-location. To explain this last point I draw attention to the exclusionary 
knowledge of the mapping gaze and to the ongoing transformations of the border 
regime. Firstly, the integrated systems of sea monitoring are based on restricted 
access, and only the Automatic Identification System is based on an open platform 
mechanism. Concerning transformations of the border regime, we should look at the 
dislocation of borders produced by monitoring technologies, as well as by techniques 
of remote control, biometric data storage (Eurodac, Sis I) and mechanisms of 
government at distance like the Visa system: as many scholars have long contended  
[Bigo, 2005; Bigo, Guild, 2010; Cuttitta, 2007,] borders are more and more less 
reducible to linear edges and tend to get point-shaped and mobile, frontiers attached 
to the body [Sossi, 2007] and multiply far beyond the geopolitical line [Mezzadra, 
Neilson, 2013]. To sum up, what emerges from an in-depth analysis of migration 
controls, monitoring systems and spaces of (in)visibility in the Mediterranean, is that 
it’s not through the dichotomy visible/invisible that the “migration strugglfield” 
could be fully grasped. Rather, what is at stake is on the one hand the strategic ways 
in which visibility and invisibility are arranged and played, both by governmental 
actors and by migrants; and on the other, the limits of power and technologies in 
effectively providing a full-spectrum of monitoring.  
 Starting from the multiplication of borders, it should be asked, as Cuttitta does, if 
one could take on the new borders as vantage points from which to observe and 
interpret the dynamics of power [Cuttitta, 2007]. In this regard, the ongoing 
dislocation of borders from the national territory should not make us overlook the 
still considerable impact of state sovereignty in violently blocking people at the 
borders. But all these analyses are useful in highlighting the way in which the 
exercise of state sovereignty and territorial authority has been increasingly detached 
from each other. For instance, the patrolling of the Tunisian frontiers is made in 
conjunction between Italian and Tunisian forces. Secondly, techniques of 
surveillance at distance and biometric controls have considerably contributed to 
displacing the border before and beyond the geopolitical and the territorial frontier. 
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Against this background, the map of the Mediterranean migrations traced by 
monitoring systems and governmental agencies makes difficult to understand the 
dis-location of borders: in fact, what is in place a technology of tracing and 
traceability– the traces of migrants’ passages, the traces of their bodies – which 
keeps the secret on the location of the border; and in this way one could speak of a 
“sneaking” power working underneath the threshold of visibility, which does not 
indicate in advance where mobile borders are. The fight over knowledge is well 
illustrated in the secret location of radar stations and the positioning of marine 
patrols: the map of Guardia di Finanza representing the Italian radar stations is not 
in the public domain, only researchers and lawyers can demand the permission to see 
it. And this is just one layer of invisibility, since other integrated systems of 
patrolling and monitoring remain at the moment untraceable, as with the new drones 
against-immigrants and Frontex operations. Nevertheless, as I stated before, the 
migration strugglefield over (in)visibility should not be posed along binary or clear-
cutting partitions: it is neither a question of making visible all silent struggles and 
movements that remain beneath the threshold of visibility traced by power nor of 
overemphasizing hidden practices or invisibility as such. It is likewise important to 
underscore the variable geometry of visibility at which power works, alternating 
politics of detection and non-traceability: the impossibility of attesting to many 
shipwrecks of migrants’ boats, of reconstructing what exactly happened at sea or 
accounting for the “disappearance” of thousands of migrants cautions against 
assuming migration governmentality as a politics of overall visibility enacted by 
power. 
Soft borders?  The deceptive hype of transparency and accountability: 
March 2013. Since 2011, both human rights organizations and European Union’s 
agencies have produced a huge amount of critical analyses and documents about 
migrants’ deaths in the Mediterranean. Denunciations by activists and human rights 
advocates of the refoulements of migrants’ boats in international waters have 
considerably increased over the last decade: the images of Fortress Europe and of the 
Mediterranean as a sea of deaths have circulated in the European public debate, at 
least in its most politicized milieu. However, the impact of all that is not clear. Let’s 
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bring the attention to the warnings of the European Council about migrants’ vessels 
and the “tragedies at sea”: “Europe's leading human rights watchdog has called for 
an overhaul of policy on migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean following 
an incident […] In an effort to prevent a similar tragedy from happening again, the 
Council of Europe has now endorsed a thorough review of existing protocols 
regarding migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean. The Council's 
recommendations include better clarification on the demarcation of search and 
rescue obligations between states, improved communication between national 
coastguards and military vessels, and an end to any ambiguity over what constitutes 
a distress”. This quote refers to the document, “Lives lost in the Mediterranean Sea: 
who is responsible?”, released by the European Parliamentary Assembly after 
investigation into the shipwreck of a migrant boat leaving from Libya and the 
accusation that a Nato boat did not rescue those people in distress: “there were 
failures at different levels and many opportunities to save the lives of the people on 
board the boat were lost. In the light of the information available, it has become 
apparent that NATO was not very accessible with regard to requests for SAR 
operations. Although it was known that many refugees were leaving Libya by the 
Mediterranean Sea route in order to reach Europe, there seemed to be no working 
agreement between the SAR authorities and NATO headquarters in Naples. This 
non-communication contributed to the situation in which help was not given to those 
on board”. This admonition highlights some frictions at stake among European 
institutions – mainly between the European Commission and the member states on 
the one hand and the European Council on the other hand – but at the same time it 
also reveals to what extent critiques and denunciations of migrant “disappearances” 
at sea are reabsorbed into a governmentality discourse. Nevertheless, “pillage” or 
“appropriation” are not useful terms to read the translation of the critical discourse 
on migrants’ deaths into the institutional domain: the discursive field set by human 
rights advocates is fundamentally grounded on a firm critique of states and European 
agencies like Frontex which are responsible for not complying with international 
standards and for the violations of human rights. Their discourse claims for the 
accountability of the governors’ conduct and for a better transparency on operations 
at sea. This sounds like a kind of “watching the watchdogs” strategy, which points to 
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the “failures” of the governmental machine in providing a coordinated system of 
rescue. To better explain the political stakes of the discourse on deaths, I try to 
articulate the three main overlapping points. Firstly, both institutional documents and 
human rights advocates claim for “filling the void of responsibility”: this implicates 
to set up a more effective coordination system among the different actors, aiming, in 
some way, at a smoother functioning of border controls. In other words, it brings out 
the “double-side of visibility”: the claim for a more efficient and legislated system of 
rescue could easily slip and reverse into the strengthening of the mechanisms of 
capture. 
In this regard, also the discourse made by human rights groups tends to reproduce 
and foster the logic of “by the rule and against opacity”. Actually, disappearances 
and deaths at sea are neither natural tragedies that governments must prevent nor the 
dark side or the side effects of migration governmentality [Grant, 2011a, 2011b; 
Spijkerboer, 2007]: envisaging them merely as the consequences of the harshest 
European watchdogs –like Frontex – one overlooks that the fight against “illegal 
immigration” is one of the main tenet of the European border regime. Pushing this 
argument forward, it follows that a critique of the border regime which aims at 
producing some effective interruptions or disturbances, should move from a focus on 
migration controls – that many scholars charge with the “human costs” they 
implicate – towards a challenge of the partitioning mechanism which sorts out 
between migrants and non-migrants, as well as between migrants and asylum 
seekers. If we certainly cannot equate political campaigns against deaths at sea made 
by No Borders groups or by networks like Boat4People, with the humanitarian or 
governmental discourse on the “tragedies at sea” –nevertheless two points need to be 
considered. Firstly, governmental analyses pushing for a “humanitarian border” and 
for softening the “side-effects” of migration controls [Lutterbeck, 2006, 2007], easily 
override, retrieve and absorb activists’ political claims into a “watching the 
watchdogs” logic or into a humanitarian discourse that points to the states’ 
obligations at sea established by  international maritime law [Gammeltoft-Hansen, 
2008; Lisson, Wienzierl, 2007; Tondini, 2010]. In Tunisia the critical discourse 
about deaths at sea and the border regime after the revolution has been centred 
around a more radical instance: the existence of the visa regime  is precisely what 
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needs to be dismantled, since migrants’ risky journeys depend on the exclusionary 
and exclusive conditions established by the European politics of mobility. 
 At the same time, governmental agencies have replayed the script of security and 
rescue at sea along two lines: by enforcing technologies of monitoring, as a part of 
the ongoing militarization of the Mediterranean, made in the name of a “secure” and 
“safe” sea; and by partitioning between people taking the risk of leaving in 
dangerous conditions (economic migrants), and people in need of protection (asylum 
seekers). These ways of sorting people out, charging  some migrants with the 
responsibility for risking their own lives and presenting others as people to save as 
asylum seekers, emerged quite blatantly in the Italian context in 2011 with the 
arrivals of migrants from Tunisia and Libya: during the first months of 2011, when 
only Tunisians arrived on the Italian coasts,  the debate swayed between a 
humanitarian discourse on people fleeing political turmoil, to worry over  an 
unexpected “wave” of migrants and their unjustified escape. But with the increase of 
Tunisian migrants on the island and the first arrivals of people from Libya the 
“moral” partition became more clear-cut: on the one side there were the “beggars” 
Tunisians seizing the opportunity of the revolution to escape their country and on the 
other side the “Libyans” claiming for asylum. More broadly, the “twofold spatial 
upheavals” upset and force to rearrange both the order of discourse and 
governmental technologies of monitoring and capture. In June 2011 the European 
Council stated that “the surveillance of Europe’s southern borders has become a 
regional priority. The European continent has to cope with the relatively large-scale 
arrival of migratory flows by sea from Africa. Migrants, refugees, asylum seekers 
and others risk their lives […] These journeys, always undertaken illicitly, mostly on 
board flagless vessels, putting them at risk of falling into the hands of migrant 
smuggling and trafficking rings, reflect the desperation of the passengers”. In this 
way, the crisis of migrants reaching Europe is framed from the outset as the crisis of 
the European democracies in the face of migrants’ upheavals. People leaving North 
Africa are portrayed as desperate migrants risking their lives in unsafe vessels or 
through smuggling circuits. And the starting point of these analyses is always that 
irregular movements take place: the incorrigible irregularity of migrants is assumed 
as the condition on which any politics of mobility should hinge, so that “deaths are 
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nothing but the outcome of irregular movements and unsafe routes” [Grant, 2011a]. 
In other words, the absorption of the strong criticisms against deaths at sea by 
governmental and humanitarian discourses, makes that the condition of being a 
migrant – or better, an undocumented migrant –  posited as a primary given; then, it 
is recognized that, despite everything,  migrants are human beings that have rights as 
such [Betts, 2010]. However, by saying that techniques of migration governance 
“respond to” practices of migration [Walters, 2012] it does not mean that there is a 
mere reactive strategy at play. In fact, “responding to” and drawing on the 
turbulences of historical events – in this case the Arab uprisings – techniques of 
border controls and migration governance actually seize the opportunity for 
reassessing or stretching both the rationale of government, and the techniques for 
partitioning and capturing migrants. Let’s take for instance the so-called regime of 
humanitarian protection: the “migration mess” which took place in the 
Mediterranean fostered and accelerated transformations in governmental 
technologies that were partly already in place, like the blurring of the international 
protection framework and the depoliticization of the logic of asylum. The stress on 
the category of “survival migrants” and the recognition of the necessity to “stretch” 
the borders of protection also to non-refugees emerged with a particular vigour just 
after the Mediterranean migration turmoil, pushing forward a trend that was already 
underway. However, it is important to stress that this already-underway process, 
which consists of broadening the “space of protection”, actually leads to a substantial 
weakening of international protection, making harder to get refugee status. Often this 
is replaced with “surrogates” like the humanitarian temporary protection, which lasts 
for one year and can be given once the asylum seeker has been rejected as a refugee 
but when there are “serious reasons, in particular of humanitarian concern”.  
Counter-acting the monitoring systems: the primacy of disobedient gaze in migration 
activism  
Starting from the patchy spaces of visibility in the Mediterranean, political 
campaigns and actions against migration controls and deaths at sea tried to come to 
grips with the visibility regime set up by the mechanisms of migration 
governmentality. Political or juridical actions and critical analyses of migrations are 
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largely predicated on a dissident gaze at and on the borders: a dissident gaze on the 
borders which assesses the impacts and the tangible effects of borders and shows the 
“side-effects” of migration management, looking at the border from a different 
standpoint; a dissident gaze at the borders that assumes the border as a privileged 
vantage point for reversing the discourse on migrations and unsettling the order and 
the thresholds of visibility/invisibility set by migration policies. Thus, this political 
approach is basically grounded on a demand for more visibility and transparency, 
about the ways in which power operates. From a theoretical point of view, the 
production of a different and dissident cartography of the visible is the main gesture 
that political campaigns undertake. 
In order to unfold this argument, I take into account the political campaign Frontexit 
against Frontex, the European border agency, and then the so called Left-to-die case, 
a political and juridical action concerning the shipwreck of a migrant boat coming 
from Libya in March 2011. The campaign against Frontex started in March 2013 and 
demands accountability from the European agency in the respect of human rights 
standards in Frontex operations. “Disproportionate, opaque, dangerous” are the 
watchwords of the video entitled “Europe is at war against an imaginary enemy” 
which launched the campaign. The lack of transparency in the operation of Frontex, 
and the critique of the “border spectacle” seem here to overlap, finally reinforcing 
the image and the discourse of the migrant as the external enemy that national and 
European institutions try to chase out. What the platform of the associations involved 
in the campaign demands is that Frontex needs to be transparent regarding its 
operations and that more political and juridical boundaries have to be set limiting the 
autonomy of the agency. Advocacy, litigation awareness and investigation are the 
four areas of intervention covered by Frontexit, aiming basically at monitoring 
Frontex activities. Through these political claims they demand the agency to reject 
its present guidelines, while the juridical action consists in appealing to the European 
Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights “using the legal avenues 
to bring to light Frontex’s responsibilities as regards the violation of migrants’ 
fundamental rights”. In this regard, it is to be stressed that while the first campaigns 
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against Frontex, like Frontex explode
116
, strikingly targeted the existence of Frontex 
as such, promoting and undertaking actions to sabotage its activities, Frontexit 
centres rather on the necessity to limit and oppose the autonomy of Frontex’s 
actions, demanding transparency from the agency: assessing the (human and  
economic) costs of Frontex operations, advocating an external monitoring of its 
operations and the imposition some limits to the excesses of its actions, mirroring the 
European Union principle of proportionality – “with Frontex, Europe is therefore 
deploying disproportionate measures to fight an enemy who is not a real enemy: the 
migrant”. The second axis of intervention –the demand for transparency and 
visibility – aims at tracing out a clear cartography of Frontex operations, contesting 
at the same time the map of migrant invasion that the European agency updates 
every year. To phrase it differently, the principle of the “democratization of the 
borders” [Balibar, 2004] seems to qualify the campaign, translating the protests 
against the very existence of the agency into a redefinition of its boundaries of 
visibility, pushing for what I would call a “democracy of the visible”. In the end, the 
logic of “controlling the controllers” animates this mobilization, overshadowing the 
untenable principle upon which the agency is predicated. The violation of human 
rights perpetuated by Frontex is obviously to denounce, but what remains in the 
shadow is the very mandate of the agency and its tasks. If on the one hand the 
multiplicity of European institutions allows campaigning against an agency created 
by the European Union itself – appealing to the European Court of Justice – on the 
other hand, it remains the fact that Frontex is not an exceptional entity generated by 
Europe but an agency conceived for realizing the lacking cooperation on border 
controls among member states. Or better, what characterizes Frontex is precisely the 
blurred line between the relative autonomy of its conduct and the independence of its 
legal personality, and its status as a European cooperation agency. And as I will 
show in the next chapter, this political and juridical ambiguity leads to a factual 
impossibility of determining the legal responsibility between member states and 
Frontex about human rights violations and “deficit” in the implementation of the 
duties of rescue people at sea [Lisson, Weinzierl, 2007]. Now, if one opposes the 
tasks and the mission of Frontex as such, as well as the broader border regime in 





which it is situated, it could not be a question of proportionate or fair use of the 
measures deployed by the agency.  
“Illiberal practices” within the liberal law and the banality of out-of-law 
procedures:  
The call for transparency needs to be framed into a broader political and juridical 
rationale: the politics of visibility for fighting human rights violations at sea hinges 
on a supposed sharp division between the domain of the rule of law on the one hand, 
and “illiberal practices” or arbitrary powers on the other. In this way, the “watching 
the watchdogs” gaze is basically grounded on a liberal political horizon that assumes 
the boundaries of the law as the guarantor of power’s legitimacy; and consequently it 
presupposes that liberal law can re-instantiate a space of fair governmentality 
[Basaran, 2011]. Indeed, if analyses of exceptional zones and states of emergency 
have been useful in providing insights into spaces of detention, they tend to obscure 
recognition of the fact that the functioning of migration controls responds to uneven 
legal and administrative regimes, in which illiberal practices sustain the existence of 
ordinary laws. Border and temporary zones are seen as compensatory mechanisms of 
the liberal regime and conditions of its possibility – securitization working for 
freedom, as Foucault poignantly noticed [Foucault, 2009]. A gaze focusing on 
exceptional measures, and attentive to the abuses of sovereign power, tends to 
overlook the “banality” of border controls and the ordinary low-tune measures 
through which migrants are identified, classified and subjected to “illiberal” 
techniques of detention and deportation. The “inequality of treatment” firmly 
condemned by humanitarian actors and NoBorders activists, is actually the 
unconditional premise in order that a government of migrations could exist: in fact, 
in order to set a moral partition of practices of movement (non-migrants/regular 
migrants/refugees/illegal migrants) borders must substantially work by producing 
differences and spaces of differential exclusion. 
Countermapping governmental “eyes” and knowledge:  
July 2012: The “Left-to-die boat” case is considered here as one of the most effective 
practices of political countermapping of the shipwrecks of migrant boats in the 
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Mediterranean. On 27th March 2011, a boat with 72 people fleeing the Libyan war 
ran out of fuel and remained for 14 days at sea without being rescued. Eventually the 
migrants landed back on the Libyan coast, but only nine of them survived. An 
investigation made by a group of researchers and activists related to the Migreurop 
network led to the conclusion detailing “an aircraft that flew over them, the distress 
call they sent out via satellite telephone and their visual sightings of a military 
helicopter which provided a few packets of biscuits and bottles of water and a 
military ship which failed to provide any assistance whatsoever” [Heller, Pezzani 
and Situ Studio, 2012; Heller, Pezzani, 2013]. Starting from the testimony of the 
surviving migrants, researchers mobilized a forensic (oceanography) approach to 
retrace what exactly happened at sea. The forensic approach entails that when a 
politics of witnessing and testimony is lacking, facts are reconstructed resorting to 
the material traces produced by those events: in this case, the weather conditions of 
the days of the incidents, the SOS calls sent out by the migrants and the images of 
the radar located in that area were used as elements to combine to provide a quite 
detailed picture of the event. From a countermapping standpoint, what is of 
particular interest here is that the forensic method consists in a counter-use of the 
watching technologies conceived for monitoring, controlling and blocking migrants: 
radar and satellite images, and the location of the distress calls were turned into 
source of information for reconstructing a map “on the move” usable for appealing 
to the European Court of Human Rights, demanding the legal and  political 
responsibility of national, international and European authorities – in this case, Italy, 
Malta, Nato and Frontex. The countermapping strategy here, lies at the junction 
between a practice of visibilization and a strategy of “mapping otherwise” –that is, 
the production of a different map compared to the governmental cartography–
actualizing in this case in the reconstruction of the events. In the wake of the left-to-
die boat case, a web platform called Watchthemed has been created in order to 
provide a) an alternative map of the Mediterranean, highlighting the “dark effects” of 
migration controls and the consequences of the visa regime , b) and a constantly 
updated cartography of the Mediterranean Sea, a sort of real time map – based on the 
principle of  crowd maps  – reporting all distresses at sea, in order to alert the 
national coast guards and thus obliging them to intervene. The claim for political 
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responsibility –who is responsible for those deaths? –and the logic of a “disobedient” 
watching gaze orient all these practices.  
“Mapping otherwise” and making “another map”: 
Against this background I would like to address these forms of disobedient gaze, 
questioning the possibility of producing interruptions in the mechanisms of power 
[Pickles, 2004].To what extent do they effectively disrupt the cartography of 
calculated bodies/practices? Or, rather, do they claim for a “stretch of the border”, 
reassessing the limits of power and “mapping otherwise” migration 
governmentality? Drawing on the idea of politics as the breaking of the ordinary and 
expected location of bodies in space, the question is whether or not a practice of 
“mapping otherwise” finally plays within the borders and the game of visibility set 
by migration governance. In fact, even the logic of “countering”, namely a practice 
which envisages a counter-narrative or a counter-map of the migration regime, 
situates within the space of the accepted codes and languages in order to subvert 
them. More concretely, on the one hand the strategy of demanding states and 
international organizations account for their political responsibilities is crucial for 
reversing the position of “being governed” [Chatterjee, 2004, Foucault, 1997]: 
demanding that advanced technologies that monitor mobility make their images 
available to us, means trying to reverse the logic of securitization that is commonly 
presented as a guarantee for securing our lives. But on the other hand, this gesture 
tends to take for granted and reinforces pre-established political frames, addressing 
the European institutions as guarantors of the respect of human rights standards, 
shifting the focus from the politics of insecuritization [Huysmans, 2006] and 
invisibilization produced by migration policies to violations of international norms 
and standards to sanction. In fact, a “counter” approach coupled with a battle over 
visibility implies that: a) these political entities are recognized as the interlocutors for 
stretching the borders and thresholds of tolerability of power, and b) that national or 
international authorities are to be denounced for their “failure” to fairly govern 
migrants. Meanwhile, European agencies stress the need for a real time “situational 
picture” of the Mediterranean area – with the aim of more efficient border 
surveillance and to intervene in rescue operations [COM(2011) 873 final; FRA, 
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2013]. This focus on the visibility strugglefield at sea, raises a broader question: 
what could it mean to trace a counter-map, once governmental actors also promote 
real time updated maps in order to get a thorough plan of visibility? Secondly, the 
idea to build an informal network of assistance proposed by some platforms of 
activists – like Boat4People –should take account of the ambivalent strategy 
promoted by some European agencies. According to what I called a “politics of 
discharge”, which avoiding spending money or taking responsibility for rescuing 
lives at sea [see chapter 1], European expertise recommended that fishermen and 
private shipmasters should not be sanctioned for providing assistance to migrants 
[FRA, 2013]. In this way, a “politics of deferral” along with a discourse of civic 
responsibility are played at the same time: on the one hand, institutions, most of all 
in a time of economic crisis, try to minimize the costs of border controls, while on 
the other hand they reverse the social and moral responsibility of the “tragedies” at 
sea on “humanitarian” civil society. A clarification is however needed on this point: 
the struggle against opacity that governmental agencies seem to promote in the name 
of security and safety at sea, does not mean that everything is made visible by power. 
On the contrary, the most illegal measures, like refoulements on the high sea, remain 
imperceptible to the “civic eye”. As Foucault incisively remarks, the opacity, namely 
the “secrecy” of power, and I would add also the non-savoir about its effective 
functioning is one of the main levers of power’s mechanisms and conditions of its 
acceptability. Interrogating the reason why analyses on power tend to remain within 
the juridical paradigm of the interdiction, erasing the productive dimension of power 
and its multiplicity of subtle and capillary mechanisms, Foucault concludes that the 
success of power is proportionate to its capacity to partially conceal its effective 
functioning [Foucault, 1998]
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.A critique of the border regime which plays at the 
level of law risks downplaying the constitutive sabotage and bridle of mobility, 
namely the function of capture and disturbance that borders enact
118
; and it overlooks 
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 In The Will to Knowledge Foucault explicitly points out that “power is tolerable only on condition 
that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own 
mechanisms […] For it, secrecy is not in the nature of an abuse, it is indispensable to its operation. 
Not only because power imposes secrecy on those whom it dominates but, perhaps, because it is as 
indispensable to these latter” (Foucault, 1998, p. 86). 
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 Reframed from a slightly different angle, it could be argued that the legal gaze downplays the 
“violence of the borders”, narrowing it to the moment and the dimension of the infringement of the 
law on the one hand, and to the exercise of a direct fight against immigration.  
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mechanisms through which bordering technologies work and impact on migrants, in 
a less blatant manner than the exercise of arbitrary power. 
Therefore, the argument that I advance here is that humanitarian and governmental 
discourse put on the stage the reality of the deaths at sea, establishing a conceptual 
enchainment between the losses of lives, the danger run by migrants, and the risky 
choice to migrate clandestinely. Techniques of surveillance are postulated in the 
humanitarian-governmental narrative as deterrents against the circuit of “illegal” 
migration: in this way, the humanitarian domain spans rescue operations to the fight 
against the smuggling economy, since the act of saving migrants’ lives is posited as a 
way to subtract would-be migrants from dangerous circuits.  
The violence of/at the borders: 
The denunciations of the violence of/at the borders are part also of the “counter” 
approach that I examined above. Both the production of counter-maps marking the 
“dark side” of border controls, and the discourses which counter-act the narratives 
that depict migration as a threat for nation states, centre around the twofold paradigm 
of violent borders and a violence at the borders. This entails that the border – which 
could be also a “border zone” - is assumed as an exceptional site of blurred 
sovereignty, where the political responsibilities of governmental agents become 
confused and the standards of human rights and international laws are very often 
infringed. Secondly, the respect of norms and international standards is played as the 
yardstick to evaluate the tenability of migration management technologies, 
introducing the possibility to think of migration governmentality as a set of 
mechanisms which need to be acted fairly and by the rules. In other words, focusing 
on the “supplement” of violence exercised at the borders, and denouncing the 
violation of the laws that governmental institutions are expected to abide by, the 
constitutive sabotage exercised against undocumented migration eclipses at the 
advantage of a “convertible violence” [Balibar, 2010a]: namely, an exclusive focus 
on the “excessive” violence, consisting in human rights violations, overshadows the 
violence that is constitutive of the very act of tracing borders and instantiating 
differential rights to mobility. That kind of violence, which does not necessarily 
requires the use of force, can be easily “converted” into accepted technologies of 
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bordering, political statements and humanitarian-securitarian measures. In this 
regard, Balibar’s reflections in Violence et civilité can be addressed for disentangling 
the question here at stake, bringing attention to what Balibar calls the 
transformations of violence. According to Balibar what characterizes present 
societies is a form of violence that cannot be translated into political codes and that, 
by its nature, exceeds all antagonisms and conflicts, working rather as a permanent 
horizon and a condition of their deployments. In this sense, political philosophy 
shadows what exceeds the boundaries of the convertible violence, revealing its 
irreducible character. This unconvertible kind of violence, Balibar contends, assumes 
today two complementary forms: on the one hand, ultra-objective violence consists 
in mechanisms of de-individualization, reducing human beings to “things”; and on 
the other hand, ultra-subjective violence, which “represents some individuals and 
groups as the personification of the evil” [Balibar, 2010a, p. 86]. Coming back to 
migration governmentality in the Mediterranean it could be argued that the violence 
of and at the borders is to some degrees comparable to the unconvertible dimension 
posited by Balibar: far from being only a transgression of norms and laws to be re-
codified, the constitutive sabotage of migrants’ practices represents the frame and the 
horizon of migration management. In other words, in the government of migration 
there is something which resists any codification in terms of violations of norms and 
rights, since the turbulence of migration reveals precisely the untenability and the 
illegitimacy of the cartography of temporal and spatial borders against which 
migrants are supposed to move. It is not in terms of “failures” that migration policies 
should be challenged: the failures in keeping up with migrants' rights, the failures in 
rescuing people in distress at sea, the failures in setting up fair mechanisms of 
government… All these “failures” are not voids to fill up, rather they need to be read 
in the light of the “patchy visibility” of the migration regime, in part because of the 
technical limits of monitoring technology, and in part because the fact of “not-
seeing” is definitively one of the ways for “selecting” migrants. 
However, the constitutive sabotage and violence acted by governmental forces 
doesn’t work solely through exceptional, disproportionate and illegal exercises of 
power. Or better, these aspects are certainly at play, both “on the scene” of the 
border spectacle –as in Lampedusa– and “offstage”, letting migrants “disappear” in 
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the Mediterranean [Sciurba, 2011; Sossi, 2007, 2012]. The unconvertible dimension 
of sabotage and violence of migration governmentality consists rather in the very 
principle of a differentiated and selected politics of mobility, which partitions 
people’s movements into degrees of (un)legitimate mobility and profiles of 
(un)accepted subjectivities. It follows that a critique of violence or a political 
struggle against the violence of and at the borders, should be situated less within the 
broad paradigm of a war on migrants than in the ambivalent and exclusionary 
mechanisms of the politics of selected migration. At the same time, the challenge 
could not be simply to produce a detailed map, in which the failures and the 
violences of power are made visible. To put it differently, a counter-mapping 
approach should not fall into a circular critique of violence, assessing the legality or 
the illegality of power’s techniques or the proportionate correspondence means-ends 
[Benjamin, 1986]. As Judith Revel rightly stresses, the real issue in talking about 
violence “is to tease out how violence plays within a specular configuration of 
power”. That is, to tease out how the paradigm of violence forces powers and 
resistances into a dialectical schema – “the mutual inducement of powers and 
resistances […] doesn’t mean that they are of the same nature”. The challenge 
consists in breaking the circular movement between powers and counter-powers that 
the matrix of violence instantiates [Revel, 2013b]. 
The challenge to realize “another map” thus cannot be reduced to the practice of 
“mapping otherwise”, that is, to the goal of illuminating what power let in the 
shadow or to shift the gaze to the dark side-effects of the border regime. To trace 
another map involves what Revel calls the production of an asymmetry between the 
violence of tracing borders and the practices of resistance. Thus, “another map” does 
not mean only to shift the gaze to unheard or invisible practices, or to the violent 
effects of borders: instead, it also means refusing to assume in advance the meaning 
of struggle itself, instead of testing it in migrants’ strategies [Mezzadra, 2013]. 
Therefore, critical analyses on the violence of and at the borders need to be coupled 
with a challenge of the partitioning logic upon which, I contend, migration 
governmentality is predicated. Coming back to the point I raised in the first chapter, 
tracing another map entails making surface and locating movements which produce 
interruptions in the functioning of the mechanisms of capture and in the thresholds of 
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the acceptability of power. To sum up, if the practice of “mapping otherwise” makes 
us see the “other side” of border management, the production of “another map” 
refuses to be in step with the configuration of borders as such. Secondly, a rupture in 
“the general law that defines the forms of part-taking by first defining the modes of 
perceptions in which they are inscribed” [Rancière, 2001] – is framed here as the 
possibility to envisage another map refusing to work through the established borders 
and fixed cartographic coordinates. To put it in figurative terms, the possibility to 
enact “another map” depends on the discrepancy between countermapping practices 
and the cartographic space of address. That is to say, another map could be produced 
only when there is no space of address fixed in advance, since both the legitimacy of 
the configuration of borders and the borders of the political are dismissed from the 
very outset. From this perspective, no void-position or “discordant” practice is 
allowed into the space of address postulated by critical reflections on citizenship and 
democracy; everyone is supposed to fill a certain subject-position in order to appear 
on the public and visible scene of the political; and the scene is made of a balances 
and counter-balances. Instead, some practices of migrations – and in our case, the 
migrants’ upheavals that took place in the Mediterranean –cannot be located into the 
existing political diagram, such that their noisy is translated into the frame of claim. 
Coming back to the violence of and at the borders, one could say that it consists of 
tracing maps, namely disposing bodies and movements in space, establishing their 
degree of “legitimacy”. The deterritorialization of borders and the increasing 
differentiation of their functions and topology should not be considered in itself in 
terms of a smoother circulation and less constraints to freedom of movement 
[Karakayali, Rigo, 2010]. To the contrary, the stake here is precisely to disconnect 
the question of the violence of and at the borders from the geopolitical matrix as well 
as from the exercise of a sovereign arbitrary power based on exceptionalism or on 
the violation of law. In fact, far beyond the acting of power at the borders, what I 
mean by violence of and at the borders is also the temporal management of 
migrations–the production of an anticipatory cartography of movements, and the 
efforts to spatially trace, register or disturb some specific forms of circulation and 
presence in space, like “irregular” migration. In fact, the border regime is an 
assemblage of knowledges and techniques for tracing and disturbing some people’s 
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movements and the persistence of subjects in certain spaces. From this standpoint, 
the technological systems of monitoring at a distance and the mechanisms of digital 
traceability do not involve fewer bordering effects: rather, they contribute to the 
twofold operation of multiplication (differentiation) and invisibilization of borders.  
Nevertheless, coming back to Balibar’s argument on the coexistence of hyper-
objective and hyper-subjective mechanisms of violence, an analysis of the 
transformations of the b-ordering practices should not disregard violences 
perpetuated in certain spaces or upon specific “mobility profiles”. A violence that 
could take the form of de-individualization processes, as Balibar suggests, producing 
a surplus of unproductive monitored (im)mobility that is exercised by leaving some 
subjects “off the map” [Neocleous, 2003]– for instance, letting them die at sea. 
The contested “right to life” and the broadening of the notion of surveillance: 
The humanitarian-security script blurs the constitutive violence of the mechanism of 
selected mobility, which makes people “disappear” in the Mediterranean while 
allowing some others to leave safely, stressing instead more evident forms of 
violence. It also focuses attention on the violation of international norms and human 
rights that the “good face” of migration governance is prompt to condemn. The 
current debate on deaths at sea constantly refers to the “right to life” enshrined in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The right to life of migrants 
as human beings (before  becoming migrants) is commonly presented as a universal 
right, while the condition of “migrant” is implicitly envisioned as a “fault”(defect) 
that doubles and reconfigures the human condition. In this regard, the first thing to 
notice is that the floating meaning of “right to life” embraces and blurs at the same 
time the multiple occurrences, forms and meanings of “life” shaped and governed by 
migration policies. To put it differently, the general notion of “life”, constantly 
mobilized for invoking humanitarian obligations, tends to cover an array of 
meanings and forms of life that every subject is expected to embody [Douzinas, 
2007]. In particular, the floating meaning of “life” as used in the specific context of 
migration policies, plays as a sort of “redux factor”, assuming life as a “life on the 
edges”: migrants arriving by boats are narrated as risky subjects, meaning by “risky” 
both the hazard through which they “choose” to jeopardize their own life, and their 
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condition of life in the country of origin that facilitates their being trapped into the 
circuits of smuggling [Parliamentary Assembly, 2011]. As Ruben Andersson 
convincingly points out, “sea surveillance depends upon a framing of boat migration 
as dangerous by definition, a ‘risk to life” [Andersson, 2012]. But more than that, 
migration policies shape forms of subjectivity and involve specific meanings of life: 
migration policies instantiate selective and filtering borders by enacting sorting 
mechanisms – partitioning between profiles of mobility –that produce forms of 
differentiated subjectivity, corresponding to different meanings of life that subjects 
are “entitled” to live. Ultimately, as Judith Butler argues, “the frames that work to 
differentiate the lives that we can apprehend from those we cannot not only organize 
visual experience but also generate specific ontology of the subject” [Butler, 2009, 
p.3]. We can similarly suggest that migration policies differentiate among forms of 
lives that different migrant subjects are expected to live. However, under close 
scrutiny what seems to characterize the discourse and the measures of the 
humanitarian-securitized politics of mobility [Balibar, 2013] is not so much the lack 
of recognition of the precocity of migrants’ lives, than a use of precariousness as a 
tenet for turning down the conditions of life that certain subjects are considered as 
deserving to have guaranteed. The production of differential borders and rights to 
mobility implicates by design a differentiation among conditions, levels and forms of 
life that migrants, non-migrants, refugees etc. are said to have right to. After all, the 
politics of “humanitarian securitization” of the Mediterranean Sea – based on the 
right to watch-and-control – stresses that the only indisputable right that migrants are 
entitled to, irrespective of their juridical status, is the right not to be killed by the 
same politics that designates their “migrant condition". In other words, the empty 
signifier of “life” shadows the different regimes of life in which migrants are 
situated. And it is not a question of philosophical conceptions of life. Rather, this 
question brings us to a broader concern which I unfolded in the first and in the third 
chapter: the migration regime is characterized by “working through partitioning”, 
tracing and multiplying profiles of mobility, defining the spaces of allowed mobility 
fixing the thresholds of what is a liveable life. Beyond the violence of and at the 
most visible borders, a notable example consists in borders through which would-be 
migrants are fixed in space, in the country of origin, both by the visa regime, by 
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unemployment or by “legal geographies as powerful instruments in locating people 
in space”  [Basaran, 2011]. Thus, migration politics contribute to sort among 
different forms of liveable life that are then translated into different degrees of 
“legitimate mobility” – e.g., the so called bona fide travellers are entitled to 
favourable conditions of mobility and are also supposed to have the right of moving 
by choice: they are not required to demonstrate humanitarian or economic reasons 
for their movement. The general invocation of a right to life for migrants in distress 
at sea, orients the gaze to see migrants as subjects saved from natural accidents and 
from their own risky choice, overshadowing the fact that the danger they are in is 
actually the effect and the marker of their migratory status, and of their temporary 
position on the chessboard of the migration regime [Balibar, 2013; Pugh, 2004]. As 
William Walters has nicely captured it, the life that becomes an object of the 
humanitarian-securitarian government of migrations cannot be addressed in terms of 
pastoral power as described by Foucault [Walters, 2011]
119
: indeed, pushing forward 
Walters’ analysis, it could be suggested that the humanitarian discourse can be truly 
understood only by taking into consideration at the same time the securitization of 
lives –namely, the spreading of bordering techniques in the name of more security 
and safety – and on the other the a politics of “dis-charge” that intervenes selectively 
and discontinuously. In some way, the floating signifier of the “right to life” is 
mobilized neither according to a rationale of “care” nor on the basis of a logic of 
individualization. 
April 2013.The strengthening of the nexus between humanitarian and securitarian 
operations at sea has redefined and broadened the notion of “border surveillance”; 
displacing the border-line before and beyond the site of border crossing, and 
reframing surveillance in terms of prevention and dissuasion. The last proposal of 
the European Parliament and the European Council on the surveillance of the 
external sea borders, underlines this point very clearly: “surveillance not only 
encompasses the notion of detection but extend to steps such as intercepting vessels, 
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 “The ways in which NGOs and humanitarians engage in the governance of migrants and refugees 
today have changed quite significantly from the kinds of networks of care, self-examination and 
salvation which Foucault identified with pastoralism […] the pastoral care of migrants, whether in 
situations of sanctuary or detention, is not organized as a life-encompassing, permanent activity. 
Instead, it is a temporary and ad hoc intervention [Walters, 2011, pp.158-159]. 
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as well as arrangements intended to address situations such as search and rescue […] 
border surveillance should be effective in preventing and discouraging people from 
circumventing the checks at border crossing points” [COM(2013) 197 final]. In such 
a context, the humanitarian issue is mobilized for legitimizing and at the same time 
broadening politics of control at sea, playing on the double sided of surveillance: in 
fact, surveillance is posited simultaneously as an encompassing function which goes 
far beyond the monitoring of/at the borders, and as an unpleasant enforcement of 
detection and control measures for saving lives at sea. 
The “noise” of the Tunisian families120: 
June 2011… and still ongoing. The struggle of the Tunisian families of the missing 
Tunisian migrants, who left Tunisia after the fall of Ben Ali and “disappeared” in the 
Mediterranean, has cracked the principle of a “proper space” for the critique [Assad, 
Brown, Butler, Mahmood, 2009]. Moreover, this struggle showed what I would call 
the “intractability” of its demands and of its “noisy” practices: both political 
institutions and humanitarian organizations failed in translating that struggle into 
their epistemic codes and the movement resisted being represented by any political 
instance. In other words, the struggle could not be delegated to any other subject. 
Indeed, the way in which these families have obsessed the Tunisian and the Italian 
authorities with their impossible demand to account for the disappearance of the 
Tunisian migrants– “tell us where our sons are” – is not a political campaign in the 
traditional sense, since families neither fight against the migration regime, nor 
deliberately challenge the politics of control in the Mediterranean. Rather, they have 
struggled to know what happened to their sons. The radicalness of their discredit 
towards any political institution relies in the asymmetry of their demand, in the 
“other map” that they enacted through their reiterated refrain: “our sons cannot have 
disappeared. Where are they? Are they in Italy or somewhere else? And if they are 
dead we want to know, to see their bodies”. But let’s take a step back in order to 
situate this struggle. If on the one hand, as I stated at the beginning of this chapter, 
migrants’ “disappearances” and deaths in the Mediterranean Sea are not at all recent 
phenomena, it is likewise important to stress that during the two-year period 2011-
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 For a detailed account of this struggle, see F. Sossi, 2013a. 
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2012 the number of deaths was dramatically high because of the huge number of 
departures from the coasts of North Africa. This picture emerges very clearly in 
Tunisia, where awareness of the “Mediterranean’s trap” –namely, the risk of leaving 
by boat - for migrants who cannot obtain a visa to go to Europe is widespread among 
Tunisians. However, only the direct involvement of the families of the missing 
migrants has raised such a phenomenon at a national issue, putting it on the political 
agenda of revolutionized Tunisia. The political movement started in summer 2011, 
and it gathered the families of four “disappeared” migrant boats – March 14th, 29th, 
30th and May 5th 2011.At the end of 2012 also the families of three other 
“disappearances” joined the campaign – April 28th, September 6th and 21st 2012. I 
talk about “disappeared boats” in the place of “shipwrecks”, since the strangeness of 
all these events is that no shipwreck has actually been attested, and because parents 
and relatives have never accepted the version of the facts presented by the Tunisian 
and the Italian institutions – “we don’t know where they are, probably they died at 
sea but in any case there is no trace of their presence”. Or better, the families refuse 
the substantial non-answer given by governmental authorities, and their tactic of 
dodging the inquiry in the face of the insistent pressure of the parents: they recognize 
some of the missing migrants in the videos of Italian newscasts of Lampedusa and 
consequently they demand to know where their sons are. But this is not the context 
for describing in detail the steps and the difficulties of this struggle. Instead, 
following the conceptual coordinates along which this work orients, what is of 
relevance for us is to highlight how this struggle actually mobilized “another map” 
which refuses the established borders that the “mapping otherwise” practices try 
instead to stretch, limit or make visible; and at the same time they showed the radical 
“intractability” of those forms of protests and of their demands, are not grounded in a 
militant approach against migration policies. So, in what sense did they enact 
“another map”? The answer can be situated at two levels. Firstly, the specific request 
of the campaign that started from a basic assumption: since the Mediterranean is 
highly monitored by advanced techniques and governmental agencies, these latter 
must have seen the missing persons. Moreover, since Italian authorities take the 
fingerprints of migrants in the detention centres, and these fingerprints are then sent 
into the European central database (Eurodac) they should know if migrants arrived in 
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Italy. In this way, the families fully staged a counteracting practice, demanding 
power’s technologies to account for those disappearances. Secondly, besides the 
stakes of the campaign and beyond the strategic counter-acting struggle, they have 
exceeded the very order of the “counter” – the logic of “mapping otherwise” – by 
imposing their “other map”. In fact, pressured by their demands, national authorities 
replied by stressing the technical impossibility of counting and identifying all people 
crossing the Mediterranean. In the face of the governmental cartography of borders, 
families have staged a different order of visibility and knowledges: “the Italian 
coasts are quite close to Tunisia and people cannot cross undetected”, they argue. 
“We know that the police in Italy are racist against migrants, so they must be 
detained in some exceptional prison”; “the result of the fingerprint check is negative, 
but we do not trust Tunisian institutions, they mock us by not sending the right 
fingerprint data to Italy”.  
If one considers the “proper space” that the governmental script establishes and 
traces out– the proper space of the political, the proper space of the country of origin, 
the proper space of a regulated mobility, the proper space of political subjectivity –
the struggle of the families of the missing migrants was somehow reduced by 
activists to a humanitarian concern, – parents and mothers as vulnerable subjects – or 
as a protest that finally lacked political awareness. The troubling effect they 
generated on the official map of borders resulted also from their persistence in 
disturbing the political scene, imposing to be heard without being translated into a 
more codified political language but rather through their visual vocabulary and their 
“noisy” presence. At the same time, their battle revealed also that a political gaze on 
migrations cannot overlook the “class question”: all the missing migrants and their 
families come from poor and populous neighbourhoods and this element became 
visible both in the attitude of the Tunisian government, which tried to mock  the 
families by trying to formally satisfy their demands, and in the subordinate position 
that Tunisian activists earmarked for that struggle in the aftermath of the revolution 
in comparison to other more traditional political issues. This episode seems to 
suggest that another map could be envisaged when subjects in question disregard the 
boundaries of the place they are expected to stay in [Fanon, 2007]: thus, it is the 
illegitimacy of power as such and a transformation not in terms of knowledge but of 
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the position of the bodies [Rancière, 2004a, 2004b] that could produce interruptions 
and disruptions, more than a critique, in the taken for granted cartography of 
selective borders. 
Eu-Lisa: the shrinking of the European borders in the IT database: 
12 December 2012: The turbulence of migration that upset the Mediterranean region 
in the year of the Arab revolutions has transformed the already variable geometry of 
mobility and controls, forcing the European Union to reinvent new mechanisms of 
capture and to redefine the conditions of an internal European space of free mobility 
[Garelli, 2012; Hein de Haas, Sigona, 2012; Mezzadra, 2011; Sossi, 2012]. See for 
instance the newly-born EU agency “Eu-Lisa”, charged with the central management 
of the European IT systems and databases (Eurodac and SIS II) which was created as 
a response to “the political instability in certain North African Countries and the 
Middle East, the mass influxes of persons from these Countries to the EU”. In the 
face of such turbulence, the European Commission concludes  the necessity of 
having an “effective IT system in place to manage the external border and enhance 
cooperation of relevant authorities”. The response of the European migration 
apparatus [Feldman, 2011] followed a twofold trajectory: on the one hand it has 
resulted in the redefinition of the rationale and the tasks of existing agencies, like 
Frontex (see for instance the cooperation agreement with Easo, the European agency 
of the Common Asylum System); and on the other hand, new agencies in charge of 
governing mobility or of setting new mechanisms of migration governance have 
been established, pushing forward the dislocation of monitoring and controls of the 
Mediterranean outside its perimeter, through the implementation of the coordinate 
mechanism of digital data gathering. This cursory gaze on Eu-Lisa, the new 
European agency “for the operational management of large-scale IT system in the 
space of freedom, security and justice”, does not aim at an ethnographic research of 
the nth European actor. Rather, drawing on Foucault’s triple methodological 
displacement (see chapter 1), in place of positing the institution at the outset of the 
analysis for understanding the functioning of migration governmentality, I turn the 
attention to the spatial and political redefinitions that migrants’ upheaval engender, 
forcing power to reshape its rationale and its techniques [Foucault, 2009]. However, 
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this approach should not be translated into the idea that migration turmoil 
automatically triggers political or juridical responses and that migration policies are 
set according to a “doubling process” of migrants’ movements, namely as a direct 
reactive response running after migrants. As the case of Eu-Lisa shows,  most of the 
new European directives and  new policy orientations do not suddenly mushroom 
from nowhere; to the contrary, in order to fully understand their rationale and their 
operative function they need to be situated in a broader political spectrum –e.g. the 
freedom-security mobility paradigm promoted by the European Union. Looking at 
the consistence of the migratory regime as a (temporary) configuration stemming 
from migration strugglefields means to stress the “propelling effect” of migration in 
speeding up, diverting or exacerbating processes underway and political 
transformations. In fact, if we take on the Stockholm Program, the creation of EU-
Lisa was not explicitly recommended in the final text; but the stress on the necessity 
to develop new watching technologies for monitoring the external borders of Europe 
and to foster cooperation among states, connecting the national systems, was the 
prelude to the creation of the new European agency, along with the note on the 
importance to skimp on European economic resources on border controls.  
“Faulty” data and the production of “trans-individual” subjectivity profiles: 
As I illustrated above in this chapter, migrants are detected through different systems 
of control at distance and, once captured, they are identified more and more through 
biometric mechanisms. However, as I will show in the fifth chapter, in order to 
critically and deeply scrutinizing mechanisms of migration governmentality, 
unfolding their real effects of capture on migrants’ lives, we need to undertake what 
I call a non-cartographic countermapping gesture. As I explain in the fifth chapter, it 
consists in taking mechanisms of governmentality backward, that is looking at them 
turning the gaze on spaces, subjects and aspects that usually are not focused by 
critical analyses, with the purpose to grasp their effective functioning, limits and 
“failures” beyond the governmental narrative. 
Digital fingerprints are by far the most used devices for identifying migrants in order 
to deport them and for recording and “marking” their entry in the European space, 
then archiving the information in Eurodac, the European database. A huge literature 
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has extensively dealt with the “becoming-border” of the body with the advent of 
biometric technologies [Amoore, 2006; Muller, 2011; van der Ploeg, 1999]; at the 
same time, these analyses have thoroughly explored how the shift of the border 
towards bodily-borders de facto corresponds to a substantial desubjectivation, due to 
the “becoming digital trace” of migrants’ physical presence. In other words, to be 
stored is the digital information about the time and location of the presence of 
migrants in space (when and where fingerprints are taken). Against this background, 
and engaging into a Foucaultian perspective on production of subjectivity, I suggest 
that in order to grasp how forms of subjectivity are accounted for by power, we 
should shift from a direct relation between the subject and the biometric technologies 
of identification. In fact, instead of looking at the processes through which subjects 
are translated into digital traces, we could try to scrutinize the forms of “trans-
individual” subjectivity produced beyond the capture of migrants at the borders, and 
that are functional not so much to the identification of singularities as to assemblage 
of risky “mobility profiles” [Aradau, Van Munster, 2007; Van Munster, 2005]. 
Through this argument I don’t deny the individual capture that biometric 
mechanisms perform; rather, the issue is to bring out the multi-functional aims and 
techniques that migration controls enact. Moreover, the shift towards trans-
individual subjectivities comes out also from the necessity to play down the myth of 
a smooth and pervading functioning of advanced technologies of control: in fact, 
quite similarly to remote monitoring systems (radar and satellites) also the 
mechanisms for fixing and taking migrants’ identities are far from being flawless. 
For instance, the many variables that come into play to give a proper image of the 
fingerprint on the screen of the policemen at the border-post make it difficult for the 
quality of the fingerprint to be good and usable for being transferred from the 
national database to the European one. “It really depends on the will of the 
policemen that day to do the job, then on the collaboration of the migrant (for 
instance if he/she “boycotts” the test by pushing in a bad way on the screen), but also 
on the similarities that exist between different fingerprints and finally on the capacity 
of the person who is in charge to “read” the fingerprints and compare them with 
those included in the European or in the national databases. In other words, when we 
try to check a digital fingerprint with the data of a specific database it is much easier 
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to exclude any matching than to prove that there is a correspondence. As I will 
explain in the next chapter, the compatibility between the national and European 
databases is not so evident as it could seem. Therefore, while it’s true that 
deportations are made on the basis of biometric identification at the borders –
checking the fingerprints taken with the database of Third Countries –it remains that 
the probability that the fingerprint could be read again in the future or used to 
compare with other information stored in the European database is not high. So, 
instead of focusing on the functioning in making the migrant’ body readable, I 
suggest that the uses of all these data beyond the time of the data storage and beyond 
the capacity to track migrants down should be explored. As I have said, what should 
be the object of concern is the huge the production not only of statistics upon which 
the “anticipatory move” of the migration regime is predicated, but also of migration 
profiles: the assemblage of millions of individual data multiplying and transforming 
the still existing migration categories. However, the possibilities the productivity of 
power in generating subjectivity-profiles starting from traces results less in a 
generalized ban-opticon [Bigo, 2008] division between bona-fide travellers and 
migrants than in more articulated multiplication and partition within the domain of 
migration profiles: in other words, the very figure of the “migrant” is fragmented and 
multiplied far beyond the quite binary division of economic migrants/asylum 
seekers. Moreover, as the “migration crisis” that I illustrated in the third chapter 
shows, migration profiles are not posited as discrete entities. Rather, they are played 
as “blurred subjectivities” that sometimes in part overlap, making difficult for the 
subject itself to fit properly into one category or another one, in this way limiting for 
instance the possibilities to benefit from a specific protection. What happens once 
fingerprints are stored in Eurodac for five years? Ultimately, if migrants could 
always try to “cheat” the digital reader of the body and to misfire the “truth” of their 
bodily information, the “governmental phantasy” [Feldman, 2011] in creating 
governable subjectivity profiles is not bounded to the truth and falsity or to the 







Unspeakable maps and migration strugglefield. A (non-cartographic) 
countermapping  gaze 
 
“Tunisian migrants caused the crisis also of each figure or word that,  
despite its “counter”, still aims at re-state and re-present them”  
(F. Sossi, 2013a) 
 
November 2011: “There was a kind of big wave which started to organize the way 
of leaving, it's [known as] the harga (to burn). This wave comes from Zarzis: the 
Quatre Chemins metrò station in Paris has been well known for twenty years for 
being the meeting point of people coming from Zarzis […] At the beginning it was 
like wandering, they didn't know anything, they came across many difficulties but 
they have a savoir-faire and by that they started to occupy the zone of La 
Villette”121. Through the voice of M., a Tunisian in Paris, the odd geographies 
imagined and acted by Tunisian migrants bring out a complex intertwining between 
invented new cartographies and historical colonial legacies, tracing out unspeakable 
maps that at least in part unsettle the migration governance mapping narrative. 
Taking into account some mechanisms of migration governmentality – like 
deportations, border controls and temporal politics of migration – this chapter puts 
into practice a counter-mapping approach, looking at the effects, impacts and 
resistances engendered both in the spaces where they act and on migrants 
themselves, with a specific focus on the southern shore of the Mediterranean and on 
the Mediterranean Sea at the time of the Arab revolutions. In the first section there is 
an overview of the different practices of “dissent cartographies” concerning 
migration maps, teasing out the main theoretical and political stakes of counter-
mapping. After addressing the limits of counter-cartography in the domain of 
                                                          
121 “Vieni qui al Metro Quatre Chemin”, Interview conducted by Federica Sossi and Martina 
Tazzioli with a group of Tunisians living in Paris (November 2011) in F. Sossi eds, (2012), Spazi in 
migrazione. Cartoline di una rivoluzione, Ombre Corte, Verona. 
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migration, I turn to a non-cartographic practice of counter-mapping, taking on 
counter-mapping as an analytical posture through which to gaze on and engage with 
migration and border issues. The non-cartographic practice is staged here through a 
counter-mapping analysis of the mechanisms of migration management. The goal is 
not to trace a counter-map of the migration routes across the Mediterranean, but to 
undo the regime of the visible at play in migration govnermentality –forcing a 
remaking of it [Mirzoeff, 2011] - and to problematize the possibility to represent 
migrations’ turbulences through different languages– narrative, cartography, images. 
Resisting and opposing the goal of making visible “another map” of the 
Mediterranean as a space of movements (in some way opposing the Mediterranean 
of the politics/the Mediterranean of movements) I would rather insist on the 
constitutive opacity and elusiveness which characterizes practices of 
(undocumented) migration. 
The unspeakable maps that I talk about here are sorts of prismatic devices reflecting 
and at the same time amplifying the spatial-political outcomes of migrants' practices 
in the Mediterranean space that took place in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings. 
Maps that seek to bring to the fore, follow up and foster the “spatial persistences” 
[see chapter 2] and the “spatial upheavals” enacted by migrants. Unspeakable maps 
because they don't aim at unfolding migrants' strategies at length, producing an 
overall grid of intelligibility: to the contrary, the counter-mapping approach that I 
mobilize here, brings to the fore the impossibility of making the “turbulence of 
migration” [Papastiergiadis, 2000] fully readable and visible, both to the 
governmental mechanisms of capture and to the ordinary codes of political 
perceptibility [Papadopoulos, Stephenson, Tsianos, 2008]. To put it in cartographic 
terms, this counter-mapping approach posits a fundamental margin of “not-
representable” that characterizes migrants’ practices and that, at the same time, 
characterizes their “discordant” practices of freedom [see chapter 2] and their 
troubling the boundaries of the political space. Thus, there is a margin of “not-
representable” and a constitutive opacity that a counter-mapping perspective should 
respect. In this regard, we immediately reach the limits of cartography itself: there is 
something that necessarily remains out of any representation and plan of visibility 
[Deleuze, Guattari, 1975]. And, consequently, it could be argued that migration 
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counter-maps figure as quite paradoxical forms of mapping, at the limits of 
representation: among the many practices of dissident cartography, migration is an 
issue that involves and raises problematic stakes and limits that concern mapping at 
large. In some way, the choice to start from “impossible and fuzzy maps”, namely 
migration counter-maps, means to gesture towards the Foucaultian gaze to power 
from its limits [Foucault, 1980a, 1982]. Such counter-mapping resists translating into 
the ordinary codes of visibility, movements acted out of the spotlight of the 
“allowed” mobility channels. “Unspeakable” is the term I use here for naming such a 
remnant, all that remains outside of the map and outside of the existing codes of the 
political language. Unspeakable migration counter-maps emerge just at the 
intersection of the concrete practices of migration – as movements in space or as 
spatial persistence – on the one hand, and in-between the folds of what cannot be 
said or seen about them on the other. At the same time, a counter-narrative on 
migrations is also possible only by keeping the “intractability” of some migrants’ 
practices in being grasped or translated into the usual regime of visibility. Migration 
counter-maps should highlight how the “noisy” or the “silent” practices of migration 
that enact a “discordant” freedom, unsettle the given codes of political perceptibility 
forcing a reinvention of the boundaries and thresholds of the political. Secondly, 
instead of reproducing the “cartographic anxiety” [Gregory, 1994; Painter, 2008] or 
unfolding all the “silences”  and the “blind spots” of maps,  or their “blank spaces”, 
as Conrad puts it [Conrad, 2007] this counter-mapping gaze makes a claim for the 
constitutive incompleteness and partiality of migration counter-maps. In this sense, 
they act as a counterpoint to the very cartographic rationality that postulates an 
overall readability of phenomena and works as their grid of intelligibility. If by their 
nature maps locate in space all spatial movements and presences, unspeakable maps 
on migrations do not really provide a counter-narrative of the migration 
governmentality discourse: indeed, they don't envisage offering a comprehensive 
narrative but crack the governmentality map along its instabilities, without 
replicating its vocabulary. The meaning of “counter” is tackled by displacing the 
terms of the question in favor of the refusal to comply with the taming rules of 
visibility/readability. Therefore, if on the one hand radical cartography could unsettle 
the regime of what can be said and what can be seen (see the distinction made by 
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Foucault between régime de l'enonciable, régime du visible), on the other hand 
migrations make untenable the cartographic presumption of fixing-and-catching not-
allowed presences in space. Related to that, the analytical gesture of counter-
mapping strives to foster and push forward the unpredictability and instabilities of 
migrants' spatial turmoil, ultimately playing the part of an amplifier of struggles; a 
kind of magnifying glass apt to shed light on located and specific movements which 
dislodge the supposed stability of political concepts and spaces. 
Unspeakable maps do not follow the footsteps of the “order of borders”: 
The stress on the limits of representations, the vanishing character of migrants’ 
enacted geographies [see chapter 2], and their resistance to being translated into the 
existing political codes, need not and should not lead to a romanticism of the 
elusiveness and the imperceptibility of migrants’ practices. Rather, what this work 
brings to the table is precisely the subtle and complex games of visibility and 
invisibility, always at stake in migration strugglefields. If, by design, maps are 
devices for organizing the priorities of the visible, migrants’ “unspeakable maps”  
raise the issue of power, embodied in all maps, displacing the cartographic focus on 
transparency and whole visibility to the field of rapports of force: in other words, 
migrants’ geographies undermine the supposed binary relation between map and 
territory – or image and reality – highlighting that maps do not (merely) represent 
but produce spaces and territories, trace or challenge boundaries and they are the 
temporary result of strugglefields of power relations [Harley, 2001; Jacobs, 2006]. 
And the reference to the spatial upheavals triggered by Tunisian migrants underlines 
precisely that, in this case, migrants did not simply move along pre-established 
borders and paces of mobility, reproducing the existing cartography of the 
Mediterranean: on the contrary, they performed other geographies of that space. 
They did not produce other maps, since they did not map space, but they enacted 
space differently from the cartography of movements traced out by migration 
policies. Even if vanishing or hardly readable, nevertheless at the same time 
migrants’ unspeakable maps have carved out and left long-lasting effects or “traces”: 
indeed, enacting the Mediterranean space in a different way from the map fixed by 
migration policies and upsetting for some time that cartography, they forced us to 
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change both the point of view and the vantage point for looking at the border regime. 
They make us change the point of view insofar as they highlight how some practices 
of migration do not only challenge existing configurations of borders, in some way 
counter-acting and mirroring the existing map of borders, but rather they also 
definitively displace that cartography, forcing power to reinvent strategies of 
bordering. But power’s reconfiguration does not mean that after migrants’ turmoil 
everything falls back into place: those displacements and upheavals produced by 
migrants have marked and transformed the European cartography. And, as I said, 
they make us change the vantage point for gazing at the border regime: they suggest 
to us to take on the standpoint of migrations, that is to say looking at migrants’ 
practices not in terms of responses to the maps put into place by bordering 
techniques – opposing migration regimes following in its footstep – but instead as 
movements that the politics of mobility is up against, forced to trace out other maps 
of capture and bordering. To sum up in a formula, migrants’ unspeakable maps do 
not simply play “by counterpoint” to the cartography of power, and their disturbing 
effect cannot be fully recuperated by the cartographic reason of migration 
governmentality.  
Working within this frame my question is “what kind of gaze should we exercise? 
Where should we turn attention to, taking on a counter-mapping perspective?” In this 
chapter I engage in a twofold move, looking simultaneously at the spatial and 
political upheavals produced by migrants' practices and at the effects that migration 
governmentality engenders a) on migrants, b) in their Countries of origin, and c) in 
the Mediterranean space as a space of high-monitored mobility. The space that is the 
object of this analysis is neither restricted to a nation state nor does it correspond to 
areas of controls and selected mobility charted by bilateral agreements: rather it is a 
space that corresponds not to the Mediterranean area as designed by European 
politics but to the space coming out from the spatial upheavals generated by the Arab 
uprisings and the practices of migration taking place in the aftermath of the Tunisian 
revolution. Counter-mapping the mechanisms of migration governmentality means at 
first to shift the gaze from the Northern shore of the Mediterranean to the other one, 
getting rid of the European vantage point by drawing the attention to the ways in 
which migration policies impact upon and are seen from the Southern shore. But it's 
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not only a question of decolonizing the gaze and the migration narrative [Le Cour 
Grandmaison, 2005, Mignolo 2009]. Rather, the issue should be to unpack some 
mechanisms of governmentality, highlighting and challenging the orientation that is 
implicated in them. For instance, deportations and departures tend to be accounted 
for and analyzed from the European standpoint – no attention is paid to the impact of 
the deportation regime in the country of origin, while migrants’ departures are 
always considered by deduction, that is to say by focusing on the arrivals on the 
European coasts; and the impact of border controls could not really be assessed if we 
remain on the northern shore, since for instance, as shown in the fourth chapter, 
“disappearances” at sea become fully perceivable in the Countries where lost people 
come from. 
The cross-cutting routes of migration government: mobilizing (counter) mapping 
tools: 
Before coming to grips with the topic of migration and border controls I dwell upon 
the forms of visualization and the cartographic representations of migrations made 
by international agencies, arguing that they perform and reveal important 
transformations in the rationale of migration governmentality. In fact, while 
migration maps have been largely criticized for staging the invasion of the European 
space by migration flows, representing arrows directed from Africa and Asia towards 
Europe and reproducing a state-based gaze on migrations [Walters, 2009], nowadays 
the most “advanced” maps ground on a quite different blueprint and rationale. In this 
regard, I take into account the I-Map, the interactive map created through the 
cooperation of European countries, some third-national countries
122
 and agencies like 
Frontex, Europol, Unhcr and Iom: if on the one hand Europe is still envisioned as the 
space towards which most migrants’ routes converge, on the other hand it is quite 
noticeable that at the very core of the map there are migrants’ routes and not 
geopolitical national borders. This cartographic shift is a marker of a quite 
significant shift in the logic of migration management: indeed, the “map-text” is at 
the same time productive and revealing of a sub-text, formed by mechanisms of 
migration governmentality, knowledges which have gained the status of “sciences”, 
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and the strugglefield between migrants’ practices and techniques of b-ordering. Or 
better, more than a text, the cartographic tool resembles an inter-text, in which 
different layers of meaning and intelligibility overlap, and different epistemic orders 
of truth combine [Deleuze and Guattari, 2004]
123
: the order of representation and the 
order of an envisaged spatiality to-come; geopolitical boundaries and social spaces; 
migrants revolutionizing spaces and borders producing spatial differences.  
Moreover, the map as an inter-text refers also to its constitutive heteronomy: far 
from being a self-standing language, maps intersect and are the result of multiple 
texts and languages – juridical texts, governmental narratives, and geopolitical 
imaginations and so on. Therefore, in order to be fully readable, maps have to be 
unpacked through a cross and in-depth gaze, attentively scrutinizing their manifold 
layers of truths and languages. However, this does not mean to unfold the “secrecy 
of maps” – as if a hidden layer of meaning was at stake – or to make audible the 
“silences of the maps”. This second move is certainly one of the possible and most 
common counter-mapping approaches, but the point here is rather to account for the 
composition of different orders of truth and languages which are not concealed 
elements to disclose but already there. This is, after all, the gesture and the task that 
Foucault suggests we pursue: “the aim is not to unfold what is hidden, but rather to 
make visible precisely what is visible; that is to say, to make appear what is close 
and immediate, what is so much related to ourselves that, because of that, we cannot 
perceive" [Foucault, 1978b, pp. 540-541]. Finally, the inter-textual dimension of 
maps gains an additional meaning if referred to recent migration maps, where the 
mechanisms of knowledge production deeply influence the very nature of maps: 
migration maps reflect the knowledge-based governance upon which migration 
controls are predicated. That is to say, these maps show in-between the folds that 
migration governmentality is basically grounded on a socialized knowledge – it 
necessarily needs the combination of a variety of actors, approaches and specific 
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knowledges. This aspect gets a visible application in the so called “crowd-maps”124 
or in the I-map itself, which is definitively a collective product, constantly updated 
by different expertise. But most importantly, the peculiarity of the knowledge-based 
character of migration governance emerges in the hijacked nature of migration maps: 
as I argued in the first chapter, migration governmentality hinges on and produces 
knowledge on migrations which requires and hinges on a knowledge of migrations. 
In fact, the knowledge mobilized in the mechanisms of migration governance is 
primarily a knowledge which needs to spy, observe, hijack and capture migrants’ 
strategies and routes, in order then to produce its own map. In this way, migration 
maps follow the footstep of migrants’ practices, to get a plan of visibility and then to 
realize an outguessing cartography, which spies for playing ahead of time, tracing 
present and future expected migrants’ routes in order to manage them. Therefore, the 
spatial snapshots on migrants’ movements that the knowledge on migrations 
captures for producing its own cartography, is then translated into a temporal map; a 
map statistically forecasting evolutions and directions of migration routes with the 
twofold purpose of anticipating/managing movements and providing a specific 
“economy of gazes” [Azoulay, 2008].  
In fact, the “cartographic reason” [Olsson, 2007; Pickles, 2004; Turnbull, 2000] 
establishes the thresholds of visibility/invisibility of phenomena and subjects. Maps 
carve out and inscribe borders, thus telling us as much about spaces as about the 
tracing of boundaries. In the domain of migration this is translated in the tracing of 
spaces of governability – that is, migration maps posit how and to what extent 
people’s movements can be managed. And in the entanglement of different regimes 
of truth and languages and the overlapping of many layers of knowledges, unlike 
other kinds of maps, migration maps  not only stage the narrative through which 
power situates subjects in space [Crampton, Krigyer, 2006]: they complicate such a 
narrative, intersecting and including different epistemic codes and political sources. 
Obviously, we should not disregard the “power of maps” [J.Black, 2002] in shaping 
the real, as well as their double function of legitimation and enforcement of power’s 
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strategies [Gregory, 2007; Harley, 1992, 2001; Wood, 1992]. But what it is relevant 
to stress at this stage of the analysis, is the difference between maps and other texts 
with respect to the narrative made by governmental actors: the gesture of teasing out 
the “text-map” allows us to see conflicting or overlapping knowledges at play in 
producing the “migration regime", unpacking the apparent compact and solid notion 
of governmentality. To put it differently, a critical reading of the “text-map” is not 
equivalent to reading and sustaining the narrative on migrations produced by 
governmental agencies: could the map be a useful text –not as a neutral tool but as a 
strugglefield of visibility - to understand the effective functioning of power, both in 
its actual mechanisms and in its imagined developments? This question would 
require further investigation that goes beyond the scope of this work; however what 
can be suggested here is that the map as an inter-text is situated at the juncture 
between the effective functioning of power and the way in which the “governemental 
imagination” envisages working in the future. In fact, the political dimension of 
maps does not concern only their direct application into political strategies; it 
depends also on the regime of visibility that it structures, supporting pre-existing 
geographies of power and framing specific relationships between subjects and space. 
Maps, differently from other governmental texts on migrations, are operational tools 
of power which do not only narrate a “governmental phantasy” [Feldman, 2011] but 
also refract the transformations at stake in political technology. The edge between 
what a map is an expression of, and what it contributes to enact, cannot be fixed in 
advance, since the mutual reinforcements between the two factors are always at play.  
The government is not at/of the border: the I-Map and the real time updating of 
migrants’ routes 
Starting from this theoretical background, it becomes easier to assess what 
transformations in migration governmentality are marked and fostered in the I-Map, 
as well as in some other recent cartographic productions on migration flows. As  
mentioned, the first aspect to underline is that what matters in the I-Map is less 
borders as such, than migration routes and their orientations: “migration routes 
management is reoriented from a focus on a moving front-line to a series of points 
along an itinerary” redefining “ a new architecture of migration management” 
209 
 
[Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias, Pickles, 2013]. Conversely, the traditional mindset of 
border thinking vacillates: borders come to coincide with migration routes on the one 
hand, and with the spatialities of economic and political intervention on the other 
hand – for instance, through the implementation of regional and Neighbourhood 
Policies and economic agreements which involve “migration clauses” that contribute 
to creating an “EU at a distance”. In this regard, it could be questioned whether or 
not the persisting imaginary of Europe has in part been displaced, not getting lost but 
diffracted, expanding through regional areas outside conventional Europe and 
scattering into multiple sites. What appears in-between the folds of governmental 
maps is a  “scattered Europe” and a diffracted European space, which resemble in 
part the pace of migrants’ movements based on a “patchy” geography – 
characterized by space at high and low density of control. At the same time, such a 
scattered Europe is deeply redefined by migrants’ spatial upheavals in a twofold 
manner. On the one side, through their uneven geographies, Tunisian migrants 
demonstrated that no democratic revolution for freedom could exist without freedom 
of movement. On the other, once in Europe they have moved back and forth across 
the European space, with regional and Eurostar trains becoming the most concrete 
scattered and moving borders of Europe – migrants were blocked on the trains and 
let off – and at the same time spaces for sneaking off and places for staying – “This 
is Europe, this is my Europe”125 it’s the comment made by a Tunisian “harraga” 
who arrived in Italy in 2011 and who narrated their fragmentary backward and 
forward journey across Europe by rail. This is not to fall into a romanticism of 
practices of migration, but instead to stress their capacity to move across Europe 
enacting another pace of mobility than that established by migration policies. 
Meanwhile, they envisaged their own European geography, corresponding to the 
experiences they had of/at the borders: “Lampedusa is not Europe, and neither Sicily. 
Here we are treated as animals, Europe starts northward”. Nevertheless, stressing the 
spatial redefinition acted by migrants’ geographies does not mean to state the 
primacy of their European border displacements over the transformations produced 
by politics of externalization and migration routes management: rather, in order get 
to grip with the reality of a European diffracted space, we need to investigate 
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processes of “border scattering” and border displacements crisscrossing these two 
mutually responsive spatial practices  – migration turmoils and politics of regional 
re-bordering. On the basis of this “migration-based” counter-mapping approach, one 
of the main issues to raise consists in interrogating to what extent Europe remains 
the “sovereign, theoretical subject of all histories” [Chakrabarty, 2000], or whether 
migrants’ reinvented geographies have, at in least in part, shaken the tenability of 
that narrative.  
What seems to be of relevance is less the directionality of flows than the patterns 
themselves, namely the (transnational) spaces that migrants cross, irrespective of the 
orientation of the arrows: to put it differently, the governmental gaze is turned to 
migration spaces on the move, instead of focusing on the states “affected” by 
migrants’ flows; moreover, it’s the regionalization of the area to govern which 
prevails on the state spatiality or on the continental dimension – West-African 
routes, East-Mediterranean routes, Central-Mediterranean routes and so on. At the 
same time the distinction between Countries of emigration and Countries of 
immigration is definitively blurred since what becomes paramount are the spaces of 
transit and movement, and the space of “spatial insistence” [Sossi, 2012] of 
migrants. (Indeed, the towns marked on the maps correspond to the places of transit, 
departure and arrival, so that the small island of Lampedusa and the city of Oujda are 
visibly signalled).  
Let’s try now to take on a map that does not exist, yet: a map charting the impacts of 
developmental politics on non-European countries, and mainly on the 
Neighbourhood countries, which targets the so called “would-be migrants” stopping 
them migrating abroad. In some sense, it could be named as a map of would-be 
migrations that includes the spaces addressed by techniques of bordering. Following 
this undrawn map, and combining it with the uneven geography of the European 
space enacted by migrants that I illustrated above, the result is that, finally, no map 
of the European space could be properly traced from the standpoint of the migration 
issue. In fact, on the one hand migrants’ movements (sometimes) succeed in 
misfiring the capture of borders and in acting irrespective of the pace of mobility 
established by migration policies; on the other hand, Neighbourhood policies show 
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in a quite glaring way that Europe starts where migrants’ journeys are hampered by 
bordering technologies, breaking up the possibility of maintaining Europe as a 
spatially well-bounded referent. 
However, although the border cannot be the exclusive site of analysis for grasping 
migration issues in their complexity and despite a map of the European borders 
being hard to trace for the reasons that I sketched above, it nonetheless remains that 
the (fragmented) government of the borders  is one of the main mechanisms through 
which the image of a coherent European space of free circulation is effectively 
shaped according to the “very particular way the actual levels of cross-national 
cooperation in border legislation and policing are producing the material effects of a 
‘united Europe’. These include instruments such as cross EU cooperation on border 
patrolling and the standardization of many visa norms and customs controls” 
[Cobarrubias, 2009, p.70]. The problem is to understand what and where the 
(European) borders are at this time, challenging the traditional cartographic gesture 
of tracing a European well-bordered space. Perhaps it could be stated that a map of 
Europe cannot be traced any more, or that at the very least it would result in a patchy 
space, made up of special channels – economic and mobility channels. The spread of 
borders is the most direct outcome of migration controls, blocking some routes 
diverts migrants elsewhere, instantiating another border to cross, and displacing 
other frontiers: “Stronger controls at the EU external borders far from solving the 
problem they seek to solve, actually result in a movement of the border instead” 
[Rodier, 2006 p.4]. Besides making borders, the border management regime, both as 
political technology and a coherent image, produces tangible effects; and one of 
these consists in materially positing where the border is located in a certain space. 
But what is important to remember is that the multiplication of borders generates 
more than borders, it generates a multiplication, (see differentiation of spaces) and 
essentially it produces distances [De Genova, 2013b]. Indeed, the tracing of regions 
and zones where certain politics are implemented – see for instance the Economic 
Trade Areas – and the creation of Regional Protection Programs for refugees (in 
non-European countries) overlaps with national sovereignties. And in the case of 
migration governmental strategies, both cartographic representations and discourses 
envisage a migratory regime grounded on migration patterns and, jointly, on 
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regional/zonal spaces of interventions and monitoring – sub-Saharan migrations, 
West-Mediterranean routes, east-African Countries. 
Maps of migration (in) crisis: 
Another map playing as a prism of migration governance transformations is the map 
of “Migration crisis from Libya”126. This map is of particular relevance in the frame 
of this work if we consider that it was launched just at the time of the Libyan conflict 
and the Arab uprisings. The “live” map provides updated snapshots on the 
“migration crisis” triggered by the Libyan war, showing a multi-layered surface of 
visibility on “migration factors”: border movements, repatriations, humanitarian 
assistance and people locations are the entries forming the reality of “migration 
crisis” as a composite phenomenon to govern. If the I-Map illustrates the 
government of migration centering on the management of migrants’ routes, the 
“Migration crisis” map plays through situational risk analysis, creating what I would 
call “migratory compounds” that become objects of government. By migratory 
compounds I mean the outlining of a migration crisis situation, whose critical aspect 
relies on the difficulty of governing “mixed migration” flows, partitioning them in 
different mobility profiles. The multiple “crisis”, following the text-map and 
articulating it with IOM’s texts, requires as much complexity in the governmental 
approach to the migrations-situation, including all dimensions of migratory crisis – 
border management, humanitarian interventions, and identity checks. Therefore, 
instead of lighting up and following migrants’ movements, the “Migration crisis” 
spotlights critical border-zones: it locates and marks complex-migration phenomena; 
and migrants’ movements come to be included in a much broader object of 
government, namely the border-zone of a migration crisis as a complex 
phenomenon. The production of critical border-zones and the tracking of migration 
routes are two coexisting mapping rationales, revealing two governmental gazes and 
operational measures in which the border as a pre-established (geopolitical) line 
loses its eminence in framing the cartography of migration governability.  
In the face of maps like the I-Map and the Migration in crisis map, counter-maps of 
migrations need to take stock and closely scrutinize the cartographic rationality that 
                                                          
126
 http://www.migration-crisis.com/libya/  
213 
 
they try to “counter”. However, at this stage it is worth briefly taking a step back and 
casting a glance on the first migration counter-maps produced in the early years of 
the last decade. These maps are traced against the backdrop of the Fortress Europe 
imaginary that in the late Nineties and in the early 2000s was dominant both in 
critical academic analysis and in the activist debate. Starting from the assumption 
that mainstream migration maps “silence” the dramatic consequences of border 
controls and the regime of detention of migrants, the first migration counter-maps 
made visible the “dark side” of migration governmentality, showing a “Europe of 
camps” or marking migrants’ deaths at the borders127. At the same time, other 
migration-counter maps started to bring attention to the multiplicity of actors and 
layers of government involved in managing migration and in the chaotic migration 
regime they generate. In this case, the focus is on the functioning of power itself 
more than in its violent effects
128
. A third group of counter-cartographies of 
migrations is formed by those maps that shed light on migrants’ practices and on 
border struggles – namely the ordinary battle at the borders between migrants and b-
ordering techniques – showing the complex of practices, conflicts and technical tools 
through which borderzones, like for instance the Straits of Gibraltar, are produced
129
. 
Then, a huge variety of more artistic counter-mapping practices try to make migrants 
trace out their own counter-map, hinging on their journey and singular experience of 
migration
130
. Leaving aside this last group of counter-maps, which does not respond 
to a traditional cartographic rationale, the common mark of all the other maps that I 
briefly mention here is their inside position in relation to the cartographic 
epistemology itself, gesturing towards a strategic counter-use of that epistemic 
regime. The question to raise thus concerns the effective leeway for engaging in such 
a “counter”-use of the cartographic tools. In fact, if we take into account migration 
maps, two different critical issues overlap. The first one, that critical geographers 
and NoBorders activists are concerned with, relates to the regime of (in)visibility 
that official migration maps impose – shadowing the impacts of border controls and 
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portraying migrations as flows threatening the European territory – as well as to the 
political effects that those maps generate. Thus, taking on this criticism, dissident 
cartographic practices [Cortes & others, 2008] can effectively use the same language 
and technical tools for showing “another map”. But as I suggested earlier in this 
chapter, there is another substantial aspect of maps to sift: the problem of mapping 
migrations does not concern only the “battle” on and at the borders, but the 
cartographic rationality itself, which fixes and freezes a space of visibility. Indeed, 
dealing with migration through a cartographic approach implicates more pitfalls and 
political stakes than with other topics. Secondly, the knowledge produced by maps is 
inevitably coded through the language of representation and signification [King, 
1996; Papadopoulous, Stephenson, Tsianos, 2008] resembling actually what Deleuze 
and Guattari define as an act of tracing more than mapping: “the tracing has 
organized, stabilized, neutralized the multiplicities according to the axes of 
significance and subjectification belonging to it” [Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, p.15]. 
For these reasons, the visibility paradigm of cartography and migrants strategically 
playing with (in)visibility clash with each other, with the former encroaching upon 
the “silent” mode of the latter. Thus, related to this problematic issue, do we need to 
envisage a counter-narrative of migrations or should we let this “map” be produced 
by migrants’ spatial practices? (In fact, the act of mapping is at the least a way of 
narrating the lives and the practices of others, making them speak). What is the 
usefulness of realizing “another map” and to what extent could it be detrimental for 
migrants themselves, by revealing their strategies of movement
131
? And finally, to 
what degree is a strategic use of mapping tools possible, given that the cartographic 
technique is a normative tool which spatializes subjects and practices?  
“Spaces in migration” map: traveling with migrants’ uneven geographies 
Taking all these critical questions together, the map “Spazi in migrazione”132 
undertakes a triple displacement of the mapping gaze, troubling the order of the 
cartographic (in)visibility. First of all, the map tries to account for the spatial 
upheavals generated in the Mediterranean space by Tunisian migrants who left 
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Tunisia in 2011, and the responses of governmental actors for re-stabilizing 
migration governability. In this way, the focus shifts from the functioning of power 
in tracing borders to the spatial effects and the spatial upheavals engendered by 
migrants, thus subverting the order of space production and suggesting a different 
gaze on the migration regime: spatial upheavals are triggered by migrants and then 
national and international actors are forced to respond and reassess their strategy. 
Secondly, as I sketched, what is made visible are not migrants’ routes but rather 
these latter are fragmented and translated into a patchy map of the spatial impacts 
and effects of migrants’ practices: the Southern European space is troubled and 
recomposed through the discontinuous presence of migrants and their intermittent 
(in)visibility, and consequently uneven “mappability”. Thus, far from providing a 
full-spectrum of visibility or accounting for all the subjects at stake in that space, the 
Spazi in migrazione map attentively selects what to highlight and what strategically 
to leave as “unmappable”. The third displacement concerns the movement and the 
location of the mapping gaze: the map is not static but on the move, since it follows 
the movements of Tunisian migrants, not charting their routes but travelling through 
the same spatial circuits as migrants to grasp the upheavals they produce. In this 
way, borders are no longer the landmark through which movements are gauged: by 
making the gaze travel with migrants’ movements, borders are rather what is shaken 
and transformed by practices of migration. Tunisian migrants, the map tells us, have 
unified the space between Tunisia and Europe and, through their practices of 
movement, have wiped out national boundaries. This counter-mapping gesture is 
notably strengthened by the location of the gaze: turning traditional maps 45 degrees 
left, the reader is forced to follow the same direction of migrants’ movements, 
through a south-north orientation –from Tunisia and Libya towards Europe.  
Towards a non-cartographic countermapping approach: 
In the second part of the chapter I engage in a non-cartographic counter-mapping 
practice assuming counter-mapping as an analytical approach and a critical gaze on 
migration governmentality. In fact, bearing in mind all the limits of tracing dissident 
cartographies on migrations, I broaden the concept of “counter-mapping” to an 
analytical posture that unpacks and cracks self-standing categories of migration 
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governmentality. Translated in more concrete terms, this means to effect a triple 
displacement of the gaze: a) turning to the impacts and the effects on spaces and 
subjects of border controls and migration management; b) highlighting how some of 
these governmental mechanisms and many migration issues cannot be fully grasped 
if we remain located on the northern shore of the Mediterranean; c) peering into the 
ways in which migrants’ turmoil constantly force national and transnational actors to 
reinvent a map of migration governability, and more broadly how migrants’ practices 
make us see the friability of the migration regime. 
Departures: 
The term “departure” does not actually pertain to the discursive regime of migration 
governance, since the “count” of migrants is done looking at the arrivals of people in 
the “hosting” Countries. And also when official European statements mention how 
many people left Tunisia or Morocco, they index departures through the arrivals, 
without considering those migrants who never arrived. If “departures” can be 
deduced only via the arrivals this is not only because of the clandestine condition of 
those migrants’ departures but, I would argue, it is precisely due to the irrelevance of 
that data both for migration policies and for the narrative which replicates the 
argument of migrant "invasion". That said, the vagueness about departures seems to 
exclude the very possibility of reframing that notion “from the bottom”, or to put it 
better reversing the gaze and placing it on the other shore. For instance, during my 
fieldwork in Tunisia, when asking national institutions about the number of Tunisian 
migrants who left in 2011 by boat towards Italy, I realized that, definitively, such a 
number could never be reconstructed nor tracked down, due to the “clandestine” and 
therefore hidden nature of the departures. No archive of “illegal” emigration could 
exist, by definition. In order to find the numbers we necessarily need to move to the 
northern shore, where the Italian government counted 27 000 Tunisian migrants as 
having arrived on the Italian coasts after the Tunisian revolution. This entails that 
migrants become visible subjects – to be taken into account – as and to the extent 
that they are identifiable. However, this consideration obviously doesn’t mean to 
denounce the failures of Tunisian government in counting for migrants who left their 
countries. Instead, the crucial point to bring out is that visa requirements along with 
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the 1975 Tunisian law stating the “crime of illegal emigration” make people de facto 
forced to devise strategies of invisibility and consequently to disappear – or because 
of shipwrecks or in the sense that they can “reappear” as subjects only to the extent 
that they are identified and captured by biometric techniques and identity checks. 
Nevertheless, they “reappear” once in the European space as governable and 
countable migrants, in the form of electronic data which trace their presence on the 
soil. Thus, the impossibility of reversing the gaze on migrants' departures finally 
comes to reframe the terms of the problem, highlighting that a counter-mapping 
approach should insist on emigration as a practice that, in the case of Tunisian 
migrants, was not claimed as a right but forcibly taken by them through the 
revolutionary uprising. Thus, the practices of migration acted by Tunisian migrants 
after the outbreak of the revolution could be seen in some way as an extraordinary 
practice of migration, strongly linked to the political uprising in which they had been 
involved. But these practices of migration were at the same time also non-
extraordinary if we consider the attitude of Tunisian migrants in leaving the country 
and the collective dimension of those practices: “I left just because many friends of 
mine took that decision, all together; indeed, after the fall of Ben Ali it had become 
so obvious to take one's own chance and make the harraga – the act of burning 
frontiers – Europe is so close and I had always desired to go and wander there, also 
only for a while”. To focus on departures, not at all in terms of numbers but as 
practices that for many migrants is a “flight from” [Mezzadra, 2006] or an act of 
refusal, while for others is related to the desire to change or improve one's own 
social condition, enables us to recall Fanon's observation that “the first thing the 
colonial learns is to remain in his place and not overstep its limits” [Fanon, 2007, p. 
15]. It's just when people refuse the injunction to respect the assigned geographical, 
economic or social place that colonial governmentality could be effectively 
disrupted. And in fact, it could be explored how the refusal to comply with the 
criteria of selected mobility is played through migration.  
Border crossing: 
Both in critical Migration Studies and in the field of governmental politics, border 
crossing has a paramount relevance to the extent that all issues concerning people's 
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movements finally coalesce around the nexus migration-borders. From a 
genealogical point of view, such a nexus is to be questioned, dismantling the idea of 
its trans-historical and evident nature [McKeown, 2008; Sassen, 2006] since it has 
become the tenet of both mobility politics only in the last three decades. But most of 
all borders work as vectors of meaning and resignification for migrations: indeed, 
practices of migration are framed and approached through the grid of borders, with 
the latter conceived as sites of control, conflict or negotiation. In this way, border 
crossing functions as a sort of redux factor packing and narrowing migrations into 
the very moment and act of crossing frontiers. In this regard, Tunisian migrations 
displaced the emphasis on borders, by putting into place what I call a “politics of 
presence”. By that I mean their unexpected persistence in some public spaces and 
their peripatetic moving (using transport, devising strategies of survival and leaving 
material traces of one's own presence, but no trace to be counted or caught in 
statistics and research studies). In other words, it refers to the concreteness of their 
“staying there” (“being there”) and at once the ephemeral and opaque character of 
their presence, since they constantly need to move away, to change place or to live in 
public spaces in a concealed way, causes us to think about migrations far beyond the 
act of border crossing. Paris, Rome, Milan, Padova, Bruxelles, Marsiglia and many 
other European towns are the places where Tunisian migrants trampled and stayed, 
sometimes moving from one place to the other, or moving by train; however, what is 
focused on here is not so much the places where Tunisian migrants have lived for 
months as their modalities of staying in those spaces, playing on the edges of 
invisibility. Thus, also mobile sites like trains have become places where Tunisian 
migrants insisted, as hidden passengers, to go across Europe over a time-span of a 
few months. Therefore, the very act of harraga (the burning of frontiers) that 
Tunisians themselves mention as a brave challenge, represents only a delimited 
moment of migration: in fact, practices of migration do not consist only in spatial 
displacement but, in addition to that, movement itself is acted in multifarious ways, 
way beyond the act of border crossing. – And for instance, the borders “to be 




December 2012: The second counter-mapping gesture to trace basically mirrors the 
displacement of frontiers acted by Tunisian migrants who, by moving in large 
numbers towards Libya and Qatar, cracked the map traced by European governments 
which depicted post-revolution migrations as an exodus towards Europe, completely 
overlooking the multi-directionality of migrants' movements. According to the 
Tunisian government estimations, 100,000 Tunisians workers have come back to 
Libya after the end of the conflict
133
, but since a lot of people do not register at the 
Tunisian Consulate the real number is around 200,000. Meanwhile, the new 
economic agreement signed between Tunisia and Qatar made out that more than 
25,000 Tunisians are moving to Qatar to find a job, both in the non-qualified sector – 
such as construction and hotels – and in technological ones. While European 
Countries are still tied to a strict politics of quota, since the end of the Libyan 
conflict Tunisian migrants have started to migrate there again, aware of the 
economic crisis which is lashing Europe. Looking in the opposite direction, that is 
migrants' movements from the South to Tunisia, we should consider the Southern 
Tunisian border: 1 million people arrived last year fleeing from Libya, and Tunisia 
decided to leave the border open in order to let people enter. Today very close to the 
border almost 2600 refugees and asylum seekers are still there, in Choucha refugee 
camp, waiting for resettlement or stranded in the camp as undesired presences 
because they have been rejected as asylum seekers. 
The Eurodac database, created in 2003 for fighting against so called “asylum 
shopping” –meaning when a person demands asylum in different European 
Countries
134
 – is actually used as a system for also monitoring illegal crossing of 
European borders: everybody who enters Europe “illegally” should be fingerprinted 
and biometric information is sent to the European central database. In this way, all 
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 Instead, according to a research realized by Iom and the African Development Bank, in 2011 and 
in 2012, 40.000 Tunisians have left to Libya, corresponding to the 39% of the Tunisians who worked 
in Libya before the outbreak of the Libyan war, due to the high rate of unemployment in Tunisia 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-
Operations/Migrations%20des%20Tunisiens%20en%20Libye%20Dynamiques%20d%C3%A9fis%2
0et%20perspectives.pdf    
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 “A system known as ‘Eurodac’ is hereby established, the purpose of which shall be to assist in 
determining which Member State is to be responsible pursuant to the Dublin Convention for 
examining an application for asylum lodged in a Member State, and otherwise to facilitate the 
application of the Dublin Convention under the conditions set out in this Regulation” Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000 concerning the establishment of 'Eurodac'. 
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border crossings are in principle detected and stored, and the European perimeter and 
its borders are thus re-underlined by refraction through the detected presences of the 
migrants. Or better, digital borders allow the tracing of a map of Europe built on 
migrants’ digital traces. Nevertheless, if we depart from the descriptive narrative of 
power, focusing instead on the effective functioning of that data-capture and data-
store [Kunster, Tsianos, 2012; Schuster, 2011] we realize that a highly fragmented 
map of Europe comes out. The data stored in Eurodac does not so much trace 
migrants’ spatial routes than the pace of their movements. In order to explain this 
point, I take the Eurodac annual report: Southern European states such as Greece and 
Italy, the report states, constantly try to boycott the mechanism by not sending the 
fingerprint data to the European central unit or sending flawed or fake information. 
In this way, they boycott the Dublin II logic at its core: in fact, according to the 
Dublin II regulation, a person who wants to demand asylum needs to do that in the 
first European country he/she arrives in, and countries that are at the external borders 
of Europe, like Greece and Italy, are obviously more subject than others to the arrival 
of third-country nationals. Instead, in the case of people stored in Category 2 – 
illegal border crossing – the strategy of Southern Countries is more ambivalent: by 
reporting all illegal border crossings they can put pressure on the other member 
states, claiming the principle of  “burden sharing”; but the number of annual illegal 
border crossings officially sent by Greece to Eurodac in 2011 corresponds to the 
average of the weekly illegal crossing at the Greek borders – 550 “successful 
transactions”135 in the Eurodac database against 57,000 illegal crossing checked by 
Frontex at the Greek border. In this way, Greece and Italy can dodge standards and 
rules about deportations, instead signing bilateral agreements with Third Countries 
that include “exceptional” procedures136. In this sense the desirability of “Europe” 
and of a European government is constantly challenged by the move of the Southern 
European countries towards East-East or South-South agreements. However, the jam 
of Eurodac depends also on the technical failures and incompatibilities between 
                                                          
135
 The Eurodac regulation uses this expression to indicate “a transaction which has been correctly 
processed by the Central Unit, without rejection due to a data validation issue, fingerprint errors or 
insufficient quality” (Eurodac, Annual Report, COM (2012) 533. 
136
 Like for instance the bilateral agreement signed between Tunisia and Italy on the 5
th
 April 2011 or 
the one signed the 19
th
 September 2011, in which it is established that Italy deports 100 Tunisian 
citizens per day, five days a week. 
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different identification systems that make the “translation” of the national data into 
the standardized language of Eurodac database an arduous task
137
. 
The other “log jam” that frequently happens in Eurodac is the “appearing” of a 
migrant’s digital trace in a country which does not correspond to the migrant’s first 
point of entry in Europe; and in this way the country in charge of deporting the 
unwanted migrant or of processing the demand of asylum is the country that first 
registered the migrant’s border crossing, namely the entry of the migrant in the 
European space. In fact, the European Annual Report on Eurodac labels these 
“mismatches” and delays on the part of some countries in sending the fingerprints to 
the European central unit as wrong hits and missed hits
138
. The delay results in part 
from technical failures and from the lack of interoperability between different 
national systems but it is also the visible outcome of the refusals by States to comply 
with the standards established by the European system of asylum. In this regard, a 
question intersecting the politics of number and the politics of discourses should be 
raised: indeed, the consideration that  log jams very frequently occur and that some 
states delay in sending the fingerprints is largely recognized by the European 
institutions themselves [Samers, 2004]. Thus, how should we conceive a counter-
mapping approach to that issue? If concerning other points it could mean to situate 
the analysis within the discrepancies between the discursive regime and the 
effectiveness of the functioning of power, in this case such a posture is not profitable 
for taking backward and by surprise [see chapter 1] the mechanisms of migration 
governmentality. Perhaps we could try rather to understand what those “failures” 
                                                          
137
 The “failures” of Eurodac in receiving and processing data depend both on lack of compatibility 
between the national and the European system (discrepancy between digital and electronic systems, 
which involves a difficulty to translate the data from the national to the European database) and on the 
errors and hitches that take place at the borders, where police do not always take fingerprints 
accurately [Kuster, Tsianos and others, 2012]. 
138
 Wrong hits: when a third-country national lodges an asylum application in a Member State, whose 
authorities take his/her fingerprints. While those fingerprints are still waiting to be transmitted to the 
Central Unit, the same person could already present him/herself in another Member State and ask 
again for asylum. Missed hits: third-country national is apprehended in connection with an irregular 
border crossing and his/her fingerprints are taken by the authorities of the Member State he/she 
entered. While those fingerprints are still waiting to be transmitted to the Central Unit the same 




really stand for. The refusal of the European states
139
 to send data not only 
concerning asylum seekers but also illegal border crossings could be seen as a 
generalized resistance to playing the game of a coordinated government of migration 
and standardized process of asylum envisaged by the EU. 
Which subjects are inside or outside European databases is a question intersecting 
the temporality of the identification mechanisms on the one hand and the singular 
histories of migrations on the other. In fact, according to the Eurodac regulations, 
fingerprint data stored from migrants arrested whilst attempting to cross a European 
border illegally (Category 2) must be deleted after two years, so that their presence 
on the European soil vanishes [Kuster, Tsianos, 2013]
140
. At the same time, the data 
of those who have been returned back should not be stored at all in the system. In 
that case, deported migrants are not definitively “counted” and if they come back to 
Europe demanding asylum (category 1) or arrested during border crossing (category 
2) they are categorized as “new entrances”. More broadly the “mapping” mechanism 
of the European systems of identification results in a scattered map localizing 
“illegal” presences at the borders (Category 2), irregular migrants living in Europe 
(Category 3) or demands of asylum (Category 1). However, a map formed by fixed 
“dots” – the punctual presence of migrants – which does not account for the 
peripatetic times and patterns of migrations focusing rather on the moment of the 
presence of the migrants on the European soil and the juridical-political position to 
assign to them. At the same time, it is not the actual bodily presence that is of 
interest to migration governance agencies: rather, what becomes relevant is the 
attestation of the passage/crossing or presence of that body at some points and in 
some specific place of the European space [Van der Ploeg, Sprenkels, 2011]. 
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 Thus, at a close glance it’s quite noticeable that it is actually not only the Southern European 
countries that tend to bring down the number of the demands of asylum as well as of the illegal border 
crossing they send to the European central database unit.  
140
 Talking about “digital deportability”, Kuster and Tsianos convincingly argue that “it is the result of 
the permeability of Europe’s borders, making deportation at any given moment a constant threat 
within the slick space of the data flow. It is not the migrants themselves who circulate here, but rather 
the “embodied identity of migration,” as the sum of their data doubles” [Kuster, Tsianos, 2013, p.1] 
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December 2011: With the arrival of 53 000 Tunisian and “Libyan” migrants in Italy 
in 2011
141
, the number of  fingerprints stored in Eurodac increased significantly, due 
to EU’s pressure of the on Italy to register all the migrants arriving on the island of 
Lampedusa. Nevertheless, the mismatch between the numbers of fingerprints sent to 
the Eurodac database by Italy and the “successful transactions” is about 2500 (53 
000 fingerprints sent against 50 555 correctly processed by the Eurodac unity): 2500 
fingerprints, that is 2500 people whose passage and presence in the European space 
was “lost” during the transmission from the national system to the European one. 
But besides all this, the total number of Tunisian and Libyan migrants' fingerprint 
data taken at the Italian borders appears to be mistaken if we shift the attention to the 
effective functioning of the “fingerprinting machine”. “Nobody took my fingerprints 
in Lampedusa” is the answer that many Tunisians who have now returned to Tunisia 
gave me, especially those who arrived in Lampedusa in the most “crowded” period – 
February, to end of March 2011– when the technical difficulty in identifying people 
went along with what I previously called a “tactic of discharge”:  by letting some of 
the migrants go “undetected” on the Italian territory, Italy de facto made it possible 
to chase them away to France, where indeed the majority were headed. 
As Dennis Broeders points out, referring to European identification systems, 
“exclusion could take two different contradictory forms: exclusion from registration 
and documentation and exclusion through documentation and registration” 
[Broeders, 2009, p.42]. The script of an overall control on people’s movements 
breaks up if we take a distance from the texts and the narrative of power, turning 
instead to what effectively happened in Lampedusa, since as Tunisian migrants 
attested, many of them were not fingerprinted at all. And the reasons for such a 
“failure” are in part technical – due to the huge number of migrants on the islands – 
and in part reflect resistance to complying with European norms. Something escapes 
and something is let escape. Reframing a little bit the abovementioned quote on the 
twofold mechanism of exclusion, it could be argued that both the monitoring systems 
(radar, satellites) and the techniques of identification work to produce “gaps of 
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 Actually, in addition to the gap between the number of fingerprints sent to Eurodac by Italy (53 
000) and the “successful transactions” (50 555) there is another one which upsets and complicates the 
“politics of numbers”: in fact, according to the most updated statistics of the Italian Home Office, the 
number of Tunisians and “Libyans” arriving in 2011 was 56 000. 
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visibility” and a “spectrum of (in)visibilization”. And this latter could take two 
different forms: visibilization through registration and invisibilization because of 
non-registration or non-monitoring of migrants’ passages/presences.  
July 2013: A counter-mapping gaze on Eurodac has to bring attention to migrant 
struggles that oppose the circulation of their “data double”, as autonomous 
information “travelling” across Europe independently of the bodily presence of 
migrants. In fact, once that fingerprints are taken, these remain in Europe 
irrespective of the location of the person. And it is precisely through this 
disconnection that the “illegality” of the migrant apprehended is “carved out” in the 
European legal and political space. The ongoing struggle that Eritrean migrants are 
conducting in Lampedusa
142
, refusing to give their fingerprints to Italian authorities, 
crumbles the Eurodac logic and the Dublin II system at its core: during the 
demonstrations with the main slogan “no fingerprints by force”, they assert that, 
moving to Northern European countries as they want to do, their physical presence 
should not be disjoint from their digital data. In fact, according to Eurodac 
regulation, in the European database the person is registered –through fingerprints – 
on the basis of his/her first point of entry in the European space, irrespective of 
his/her present location. Migrants’ demand,  “away from Lampedusa and from Italy 
without being fingerprinted”, oppose the dislocation and the disjunction of migration 
biometric profiles from their actual bodily presence; at the same time, it circumvents 
the function of the politics of protection as a technology for governing and allocating 





February 2012: According to official Italian data, 3600 Tunisian migrants were 
deported in 2011 from Italy to Tunisia while almost 5000 were deported from 
France. 700 Tunisians in France came back through the so called “voluntary return 







 Because they consider Italy a country which does not effectively grants full rights to refugees, and 
so they want to claim for asylum in other European countries. 
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programs” sponsored by Iom and Ofii (Office Francais de l’Immigration et de 
l’Integration), while only around 30 persons have effectively been involved with 
Iom in Italy. In 2011 Tunisians who returned from France through the Ofii program 
received 300 euros, but in 2012 and in 2013 the “wage for returning” decreased at 30 
euros per person. It is harder to find the number of Tunisian migrants who returned 
by themselves, independently of any governmental program. In principle Tunisian 
consulates have these data – because most of the Tunisian migrants came without 
passports and so they need to demand a document to return – but they do not publish 
this information. Moreover, it is not even completely true that all Tunisians arrived 
without documents: although this is the case for the majority, some of them brought 
their passport with them, as Tunisian migrants living in Paris confirmed to me, and 
consequently their return wouldn’t be “checked” at all. According to Tunisians I met 
in Tunisia, many migrants who left in 2011 have now come back because of the 
economic crisis in Europe or due to the difficulties they came across in finding a 
place to live. A huge number, it can be supposed listening to some Tunisian voices, 
that neither the Tunisian government nor migration agencies “counted” the Tunisian 
migrants who came back, because they are outside both procedures of deportations 
and channels of “voluntary” returns. But meanwhile, this opacity of informal and 
ungoverned practices reveals the existence of infraliminar and concrete spaces of 
migrations that in part dodge and exceed the conditioned mobility figured out by 
governmental policies. Nevertheless, far from being out of any relation of power, 
these migrants constantly come to grips with finding leeway for moving and living; 
but sometimes enact discordant practices and strategies of movement which are not 
immediately graspable by programs like “migrations for the benefit of all”. For 
instance, at times they clustered as collectives to better find out strategies of 
existence and survival, or decided at what point to come back or go elsewhere, both 
trying to escape deportations and moving in a way that does not respond to criteria 
for “voluntary return”. Beyond this, we should consider the effects of the deportation 
regime [De Genova; Peutz, 2010] in the Countries of origin. What is noticeable is the 
tendency to study and to criticize politics of deportation locating mainly in the 
European or in the Western space, that is to say, challenging the deportation machine 
in destination countries, even though there is now a growing literature focusing on 
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deportees [Lecadet, 2013; Peutz, 2006, 2010; Majidi, Schuster, 2013]. Beyond 
bodily, psychological and economic consequences of deportation– families damaged 
by lack of income and migrants who experience the harsh treatment of police – 
“programs for the assisted return” promoted by Iom exclude all migrants who came 
back as deported, as I explained in the third chapter. In a way, deportation could be 
seen as a political technology to manage and re-distribute undesired moving people 
[Walters, 2002], and starting from that it should be investigated how it functions on 
the southern shore, that is, in those countries that experience the other side of the 
same mechanism. For instance, in Tunisia at a governmental level the theme of 
deportation is somehow eclipsed or neglected: no official discourse has emerged on 
migrants and their future time in Tunisia in the public debate, even though it is fairly 
easy to find returned migrants willing to talk about their deportation. Bilateral 
agreements with Italy and France concerning deportations are negotiated but then the 
phenomenon that is presented as something to be governed and fostered is the 
“voluntary return”, both at a discursive and a practical level, playing on and situating 
within economic projects for development that reinforce the migration-development 
nexus. 
After migrants are deported to their Country of origin, we tend to lose their traces: an 
analytical scrutiny of governmental mechanisms at a distance necessarily entails a 
counter-map gesture, which looks at those technologies of government displacing the 
gaze on the other shore. How are the expulsions of Tunisian citizens seen in the 
Tunisian political debate? Are they presented as “clandestine” migrants, caught “red-
handed”, or as Tunisian citizens subjected to European migration policies? The first 
aspect to be noticed is that a debate does not really exist in Tunisia, even after the 
fall of Ben Ali, concerning the Tunisians who were pushed back from European 
Countries. In other words, despite 5000 Tunisians being expelled from France and 
3380 Tunisian citizens from Italy, neither an organized protest nor a political 
questioning of migration policies has occurred. And the official data of the number 
of Tunisians deported are taken by the Tunisian government from the European 
states. At the time that expulsions take place, sometimes– due to the huge number of 
people returned or because of the inhuman treatment suffered by the migrants – the 
public focus shifts, for a moment, onto that topic. However, the bilateral agreement 
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with Italy signed in April 2011 that stated that all Tunisians who arrived in Italy 
illegally would be deported directly, on the basis of a simplified procedure, was 
finally accepted without too many complaints, since the agreement also established 
the delivering of a temporary permit of six months for all the Tunisians arriving in 
Italy between January 2011 and the 5
th
 of April.  
But what are the consequences for Tunisian migrants deported to Tunisia? This is a 
question that can hardly be addressed, since the “traces” and the “traceability” of the 
Tunisian citizens expelled from Europe dissolves quite quickly, at least since after 
the fall of Ben Ali, because they have no longer been put in jail. However, unlike the 
sub-Saharan migrants whose journey usually lasts for years before they finally arrive 
in Europe, in the case of the Tunisians, especially those who left after the revolution, 
the practice of migration is an attempt that requires neither much time nor high 
economic costs – and that some have done many times, or have tried more than once 
before succeeding. In this sense, expulsion is seen as a kind of false step in the 
practice of harraga. If they are not pushed back just after being captured by the 
European authorities and instead are put into detention centers and then deported, the 
trace of their presence remains in the European space, both in the Eurodac system – 
for two years – and in the national databases, for a undetermined time span. Now, if 
we focus on the criticisms of humanitarian agencies and of critical migration 
scholarship about the politics of deportation, the main target seems to be the non-
compliance of North African states with human rights protocols [Cassarino, 2010; 
Ceriani and others, 2009]: in this way, the political stakes are narrowed to the 
question of meeting humanitarian or democratic standards, while the mechanism of 
deportation is not really contested in itself. The problem is posited in terms of the 
inhuman treatment that migrants pushed back risk being subjected to in their country 
of origin or in the countries of transit, where most of them are deported: from such a 
perspective, North African states are under the demand to keep up with the 
international law on human rights, while European states are blamed for not 
considering how migrants are treated once they go back in their country of origin. 
Focusing on sea patrols in the Mediterranean, the infinite debate around the 
interpretation of Article 33 of the Geneva Convention on the non-refoulement 
[Allain, 2001, Fischer-Lescano, Lohr, Tohidipur, 2009; Lauterpacht, Bethlehem, 
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2001; Liguori, 2008; Mitsilegas, Ryan, 2010] in which Unhcr obviously plays a 
pivotal role, finally reinforces the partition between asylum seekers having a right to 
demand protection, and economic migrants. In fact, according to Unhcr, the 
refoulement of migrants at sea is illegal because among them there could be asylum 
seekers, since it implicates that no rejection at frontiers without access to fair and 
effective procedures for determining status and protection needs, and so states are 
obliged to screen intercepted migrants with a view to identifying persons in need of 
protection, assessing those needs and taking appropriate action [Unhcr, 2007, 2011]. 
Indeed, while giving prominence in the analysis to bilateral agreements (signed, for 
instance, between Libya and Italy
144
) allows us to discredit the Italian involvement 
with a dictatorship – at the time when Gheddafi was in power – and the technical 
support to the local authorities, even so the risk is to shift too much from the 
rationale of the mechanism itself to the “naughty” state partners chosen by some 
European countries [Cuttitta, 2008]. Thus, the floating notion of “safe country” 
becomes the tenet through which the politics of deportation is assessed in its 
legitimacy and “fairness”, since the deported migrant is considered not risking 
his/her life [Tondini, 2010]. 
In critical Migration Studies “deportation” refers mostly to the practices and politics 
of expulsions of migrants who have crossed the borders of a nation State, while the 
terms “interceptions” and “pushing back” are used for the refoulements of migrants 
at sea [Walters, 2002]. And notably, there are controversies around the term 
“deportation”, debating whether or not it could be applied to migrants pushed back in 
high sea, since they have not entered the territory of a nation state. For these reasons 
I talk about technologies of expulsion encompassing an array of ways, conditions 
and techniques through which migrants are chased away from the territory of a state 
or from the place where they are (as in the case of interceptions at sea). It is not 
properly an action of pushing them back, since for instance bilateral agreements that 
Italy signed with some North African countries like Tunisia and Egypt include a 
clause which requires those states to accept third-country nationals who transited 
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 The bilateral agreement was signed in 2007 but then implemented in 2009. The 6
th
 May 2009 Italy 
carried out the first interception operation. In total, in 2009 Italy intercepted and returned nine 
migrants’ boats coming from Libya and two from Algeria 
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there before arriving in Italy. In this sense, the formula “readmission agreements” 
encapsulates this ambiguity, positing expulsions as a return or as a measure adopted 
by the country of origin or by the country of transit. Despite the fact that the 
securitization of borders and the management of selected mobility are constantly 
mobilized in the dialogue between European and African countries, partnerships on 
mobility are usually enshrined into broader economic agreements on development 
and free exchange – as in the case of Morocco145 – or development and  transition to 
democracy – as in the case of revolutionized Tunisia. After all, in the face of the 
reticence of Maghreb Countries to sign “readmission agreements” of third-country 
nationals on their soil, the integration of mobility partnerships within the 
developmental agenda helps in shifting the focus from  securitarian concerns to a 
global approach on human resources – as demanded by Morocco and Tunisia 
[Rodier, 2012].  
According to a countermapping approach, we have ultimately to take stock of the 
prominence given to deportations and expulsions as mechanisms to look at for 
assessing the violence of border controls. In fact, when the number of deportations 
decreases it does not necessarily correspond to a softer regime of migration 
governance: for instance, in the two-year period 2006-2008, when Italy decreased 
considerably the number of deportations to Libya, in the meantime a series of 
measures were adopted for preventing and blocking migrants’ departures from 
Libya
146
. Nor should we link too quickly deportations and the politics of border 
spectacle: the first deportations to Libya were acted in the shadows, on the sly, only 
few videos made by activists bear witness to what happened on the island of 
Lampedusa. Thus, at that time deportations were functional to guarantee that no 
political or public debate would have arisen on migration: to keep the island “empty” 
instead of producing the spectacle of an invasion.  
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 The last agreement between Morocco and the European Union was signed on the 7th June 2013, 
after many negotiations taking place in the month of March. The partnership on mobility is included 
in a broader project on free economic exchange, and it established that, for the first time, Morocco 
will accept the repatriations from Europe of third-country nationals on its territory. 
146
 The first deportations from Italy to Libya were made in 2004 and in the period 2004-2006 more 




Europeanization of migration politics: 
The overwhelming notion of “Europeanization” does not refer specifically to the 
domain of migration and it addresses rather a much broader spectrum of policies and 
processes of European integration aimed at building and institutionalizing shared 
common standards or practices [Delanty, Rumford, 2005; Featherstone, 2003; 
Radaelli, 2004]. However, issues of migration management are included in the 
European-ness “mindset package” that structures the rationale of a common political 
and economic Europe in-the-making: the creation of a common European asylum 
system and the implementation of a European border regime are two of the main 
goals constantly circulating in policy discourses and EU statements. The so called 
Europeanization approach posits and reiterates Europe as a normative frame and a 
political yardstick against which to assess the tenability of national and non-
European policies. Moreover, Europe is assumed as a stable entity rescaling new 
political and economic architectures. The counter-mapping move that I suggest 
undertaking in order to destabilize the methodological and political Europeanism 
underpinning migration analysis [Garelli, Tazzioli, 2013] consists in a) highlighting 
the relationship between Neighbourhood policies and the Europeanization process 
and b) turning to the turbulence that migrations and the Arab uprisings triggered in 
the construction of a Europe-at-a-distance. In fact, as some scholars have noticed, 
“foreign policies and external relations have been neglected in the debate on 
Europeanization” [Jones, 2010], overlooking the politics of migration management 
and economic agreements that do not properly fall under the logics of European 
integration processes, but rather shape the image of  a “scattered Europe”. 
Neighbourhood policies, Euro-Mediterranean partnerships and bilateral agreements 
form the spectrum of the “EU-at-a-distance” in the Maghreb region. B-ordering 
processes at a distance make it hard to locate Europe on the map: where Europe and 
European borders start cannot be gathered from geopolitical maps, and more than 
ever, especially at its southern borders, “Europe is not where it is supposed to be” 
[Walker, 2000]. In addition to that, I would suggest that it becomes just as difficult 
to understand what exactly “Europe-at-a-distance” is. In fact, it is widely recognized 
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that Neighbourhoods policies and bilateral agreements in the Mediterranean area do 
not aim at integrating the Maghreb countries in the European space and it is not even 
according to a logic of “outsourcing European borders” that these politics can be 
fully evaluated. For even if the externalization of the European frontiers and of the 
mechanisms of migration governance has been playing a central role since the early 
years of the last decade, more complex dynamics are today at stake, especially in the 
Mediterranean region: the promotion of “best practices” of government in the 
Maghreb area, Regional Protection Programs of asylum in third countries
147
 and 
protocols on the technical assistance provided to North African states for improving 
frontier guards, shape a map which illustrates mechanisms for tracing the “borders of 
the others” as spaces of competence to take in charge. “Apprenticeships of 
democracy”, less for exporting the European democratic model than for making the 
southern Mediterranean area self-governing, in order not to burden European 
finances. And in the logic of Europeanization, borders refer less to lines of control 
than to spotted (border) zones of governmentality to promote asylum politics in 
critical regions, human rights standards, and reintegration programs for returned 
migrants. 
March 2013: At this stage, I draw the attention to the effects of the “twofold 
Mediterranean spatial upheaval” – Arab uprisings and practices of migration – to see 
how they have partially troubled and resisted the logic of “Neighbourhood.” This 
could seem a paradoxical claim, since the aftermath of the Arab revolution is 
characterized by the mushrooming of Euro-Mediterranean partnerships, selected 
mobility programs and bilateral agreements. But what a counter-mapping gaze 
should try to do is precisely to scrutinize in-between the folds of official 
cartographies, shifting from the layer of institutional treaties and political discourses 
to unnoticed practices, struggles and impacts, that are already there, in the map-text, 
but that do not emerge on the surface. The first line of instability consists in the 
resistances of Morocco and Tunisia to signing Mobility Partnerships, and it is just 
around the “migratory clause” that bilateral agreements with the European Union on 
economic free exchange have reached deadlock. Morocco refuses to implement its 
“watchdog function” of the European borders, and in particular to accept 
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readmissions of all irregular migrants arriving in Europe via Morocco. In Tunisia, 
the government is finally endorsing the logic of Europe as gatekeeper, with the 
argument that only a regulated emigration, channeled into a labor migration 
partnership, could be advantageous for the newly-born democratic Tunisia. But trade 
unions and Left movements strongly oppose the migration-development exchange 
with Europe
148. Above all, in the wake of the many shipwrecks and migrants’ 
“disappearances” at sea in 2011 and in 2012, the opposition to the visa system is 
widely percolating. Nevertheless, it cannot pass unnoticed that the only practice of 
struggle effectively in place which tries to dodge the mechanism of selective 
departure is the silent-invisible flight – that is, “clandestine emigration”. In fact, one 
of the most troubling factors messing up the “more for more” approach promoted by 
the EU
149
 is presented by the “disordered and silent mobility” enacted by Tunisian 
migrants.  Some of those who migrated to Italy and France in 2011, once they 
returned to Tunisia, demanded the Iom reinstallation program benefit (from 700 to 
3000 euros) and then left again to Europe with money. The last point of “friction” 
concerns the resistances of Tunisia against the pressure of the European Union to 
establish a politics of asylum and sign a Regional Protection Program: the dramatic 
situation of the rejected refugees in Choucha camp produced by Unhcr itself – 
asylum seekers which Unhcr has denied international protection – has been the 
occasion seized by the European Union to push the Tunisian government to adopt a 
politics of asylum. Both Unhcr and EU proposals need to be situated in a broader 
strategy that tries to delegate the “asylum burden” onto Third Countries and to 
discharge responsibility over the future of the refugees in Choucha. 
 





 The “more for more” approach can be considered one of the main pillars of the European Union’s 
strategy and it basically consists in an “exchange” between economic funding-realization of 
democracy: in other words, third-countries are pressured to adopt the international standards on 
democratic reforms in excahnge of financial support. And it is particuarly claimed in the Neigborhood 
policies, especially in the programs started after the outbreak of the Arab Uprisings: “Partnership for 
Democracy and Shared Prosperity” should react to the changing political landscape in the Southern 
region building on three elements: democratic transformation and institution-building, a stronger 
partnership with the people, and sustainable and inclusive growth and economic development. The 
EU offers “more for more” by linking democratic reforms and aid: More economic benefits & 
increased financial aid for more democratic reforms. The Partnership should be “an incentive-based 
approach based on more differentiation”. http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/com2011_200_en.pdf  
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The time of politics: 
Migration policies frame a complex spatiality of the Mediterranean, creating 
different channels of access to mobility – visa requirements, free movements, 
mobility partnership, and politics of quota– and consequently producing a forced 
clandestinity for those who remain out of the selected channels and want to migrate. 
But along with that spatial governmentality, the migratory regime also sets the 
“temporal pace” of migrations: on the one hand, fixing periods of time in which 
migrants could be legalized as migrants and then “translated” into statistics of future 
expected migrants' flows; and on the other hand imposing times of voids and 
suspension: when undocumented migrants live as invisible presences or when they 
wait for an indefinite time to get a permit to stay in a certain space. April 2011: 
Migrants' practices which took place just after the revolutionary uprisings in some 
way short-circuited, at least for some months, the temporal pace of the migration 
regime, arriving as non-calculated presences and proving to be in a hurry to move 
on, refusing to be entrapped in Lampedusa. However, this is only one side of the 
map, since it cannot be overlooked that in April the Italian government fixed a date-
limit to give Tunisian migrants a temporary permit, and in May 2011 the European 
Union proposed a deep revision of the Schengen Treaty concerning the possibility 
for European Countries to reintroduce border controls. That said, it holds true that 
migrants have succeeded in temporarily disrupting the temporal map figured out by 
governmental politics, while this latter was forced to rearrange itself in the face of 
the spatial turmoil of migrants' practices. Another way to frame this topic consists in 
drawing the attention to the temporal narrative that underlies maps and discourses on 
democracy and migrations in revolutionized spaces. The discourse on the transition 
of revolutionized Tunisia to democracy and the rule of law is grounded in a temporal 
logic of “stages” as well as on the logic that democratic practices have to be 
gradually “learnt”. This logic, I contend, is replicated from a different angle through 
the stigmatization of “disordered” practices of mobility. The regulated pace of 
migration politics and the progressive democratic narrative have come along together 
in the context of the Arab Spring, stressing that the very welcome “Spring” should 
be able to translate disordered political turmoil into a “by degrees” and ordered 
learning of democracy. Within such a frame, “out of place” and unexpected 
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migrations are seen as infringing the “right” pace to get freedom and freedom of 
movement. Through their practices of movement and spatial insistence, Tunisian 
migrants misfired for some time both the mechanisms of the selective-and-selected 
mobility and the logic of a democracy that needed to be progressively learnt: 
“everything (and) now” was in the end their migration translated in words; 
everything (and) now because democracy is not a set of economic norms, juridical 
standards and political values to be apprehended but, instead, for those migrants it 
was at one with the revolutionary uprisings: in this sense, the shout  “dégage” 
against Ben Ali was at the same time a disavowal of the legitimacy of any form of 
government over lives [Sossi, 2012]. 
Border controls:  
The European agency Frontex is commonly presented, both in critical analyses and 
in political campaigns, as an exceptional and “secret” agency playing very often at 
the limits of the European law itself. And the operative autonomy gained by Frontex 
in the last five years towards the European Union has raised objections from human 
rights associations and member states, warning the agency of its obligation to respect 
international and European norms. Nevertheless, it is important to notice is that 
Frontex was created as an operative unit for putting into place – albeit in a political 
climate of internal quarrels among member Sates – an integrated border management 
(IBM). Therefore, the image of Frontex as the official watchdog of the European 
Union needs to be complicated in order to not reduce Frontex’s activity to the 
securitarian bulwark of Europe. The rubric “border controls” does not entirely 
encapsulate the functions and the actions of Frontex, which has rather been working 
towards and through a logic of “border stretching”. Focusing on the Frontex Hermes 
operation
150
 deployed between Tunisia and the island of Lampedusa in 2011, I 
investigate whether the paradigm of the border spectacle is apt for understanding the 
rationale and the functioning of Frontex. Following Foucault’s methodological 
suggestions of a “triple displacement” of the institutions [Foucault, 2009] I suggest 
shifting the attention from an ethnographic analysis of Frontex as an agency with its 
specific prerogatives to the broader integrated border regime, of which it is a 
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component part and that includes not only border patrols and the fight against illegal 
immigration but also the politics of asylum. 
May 2011: The Hermes joint Frontex operation started on the 20th February 2011, 
as an immediate response to the sudden arrival on the Italian coasts of thousands of 
Tunisian migrants. The capacity to quickly set up a response was indeed tested by 
Frontex in 2007, with the start of Rabit, the Rapid Border Intervention Team 
deployed in the Aegean Sea to face the Greek “immigration crisis”. If Hermes, like 
all Frontex operations, was officially supported by many Member States –14 
countries – from the interviews I conducted with the Italian military corps of 
Guardia di Finanza it is clear that apart from the two airplanes provided in rotation 
by the member countries involved in the operation, all the other means were given 
by Italy which definitively took over the management of the entire operation. In 
particular, Guardia di Finanza patrolled both the territorial waters close to 
Lampedusa; but the patrolling of Guardia di Finanza was conducted not only along 
the Italian coasts – the national waters going up to 24 miles from the coast – as 
envisaged by the international maritime law, but also operated in the high sea, 
reaching the limits of  Tunisian territorial waters. According to the Italian authorities 
the encroachment in Tunisian waters was due to a clause included in the bilateral 
agreement signed on the 5th April 2011, in which the Tunisian government 
demanded the technical support of the Italian forces to block migrants leaving from 
the southern zones of Tunisia – mainly from the cities of Sfax and Zarzis, less 
monitored than the Northern coasts. Thus, more than a coordinated action resulting 
in a transnational network, the Hermes operation actually enforced and stretched the 
Italian spatial domain of competence. Nevertheless, at the same time, the location of 
Frontex patrols and airplanes, as well as the results of the interviews conducted by 
Frontex agents with migrants in Lampedusa remained almost secret to national 
authorities. The reference to this specific episode sheds light on the relative 
autonomy of Frontex towards the European Union and its member states on the one 
hand, and on the quarrels among member states, undermining the tenability of a 
European border regime.  
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September 2012: what it is important to stress, is that the border regime in question 
is characterized by the overlap of “humanitarian” borders, security borders and 
techniques of monitoring and control. In fact, the cooperation agreement recently 
signed by Frontex and Easo (the European Asylum Support Office) could be seen at 
the same time as a long term strategy through which the border regime is re-
composed – with a combination of humanitarian and police functions – and a re-
codification of that regime responding to “complex migration flows coming from 
North Africa” [Iom, 2012b]. The cooperation between the two European agencies 
has produced a substantial blurring of the competences between the two apparently 
conflicting domains, humanitarian government and border controls, signaling that 
the former is not the counterpoint or the counterpart of the border regime: rather, the 
latter continually traces and negotiates  its frontiers: in the end, the exclusionary 
politics of asylum could exist precisely because a regime of illegal mobility (to 
govern) is posited as the horizon against which all forms of humanitarian protections 
are dispensed. As the two agencies explicitly argue, “it is essential that the activities 
of Frontex and EASO are coordinated when it comes to the reception of migrants at 
the EU’s external borders and to the identification of those in need of international 
protection” [Easo, Frontex, 2012]. Translated into a non-policy oriented language, 
what is at stake here is precisely the sorting between migrants to be governed 
through the politics of asylum and migrants to be governed through illegalization.  
The other issue to raise about Frontex concerns what I called above the “stretching of 
the border”. By that expression I mean two operations that are related each other. 
Firstly, it consists in the displacement of the border from the geopolitical line, 
multiplying and disseminating it across different sites – “before” and “after” that line 
– and through an array of technologies – monitoring systems, pre-emptive 
identification mechanisms and biometric techniques. Secondly, along with this 
spatial displacement at stake there is also a temporal and conceptual stretching of the 
border that radically transforms the meaning and the function of the securitarian 
approach. Frontex is always presented as one of the main actors that fostered the 
securitization of migrations and asylum [Leonard, 2011; Neal, 2009] and as the 
European watchdog, with its team of border guards providing a quite emblematic 
image of that role. Nevertheless, I suggest that more attention should be paid to the 
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preemptive risk analysis that Frontex as a research unit produces : the annual risk 
analysis concerning the “migration threats” at the external borders of the European 
Union do not implicate that less importance is given to the security issue, rather this 
indicates its reformulation along different lines: the focus is not simply on operations 
at the borders and  the capacity to respond directly to migrants’ crossing, but also on 
the production of a real time picture which takes snapshots of what happens at the 
borders, and simultaneously a map that anticipates future migration flows, providing 
a spectrum of full-visibility
151
. Therefore, the idea is to produce a real time map for 
realizing an anticipative risk-based picture of border crossing that, however, is aware 
of the impossibility of achieving an overall visibility on frontiers. 
Ultimately, the statistics of illegal border crossing detected by Frontex reveal the 
peculiar way in which Frontex mixes up border controls and border crossing: indeed, 
every year the European agency stresses the annual progress in detecting illegal 
border crossing at the external frontiers of Europe, in order to emphasize the 
increased capacity in “capturing” the clandestine presences that enter the European 
space. But what gets lost in this politics of numbers is the non-necessary 
correspondence between the number of people who crossed the borders and those 
actually detected by monitoring systems. Secondly, it seems that what comes first is 
the ability to exercise an efficient monitor-and-capture activity at the borders against 
irregular migrants, more than succeeding in reducing the total number  crossing; in 
fact, what remains implicit in the analysis is the non-coincidence between detections 
at the borders and the number  crossing. It goes without saying that, in the end, such 
a discrepancy cannot be measured, since those migrants’ border crossings that are 
not detected are necessarily also invisible to any “count”. 
The new geographies that Tunisian migrants traced out in wandering across the 
European space are also part of the unspeakable maps that I tried to figure out. Maps 
of spaces not only crossed by the heterogeneous rationale of governments and 
political technologies, but also reshaped and unsettled by migrants’ spatial 
upheavals. These unspeakable maps definitively undo the idea of a coherent and 
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 “the Frontex Situation Centre (FSC) was created. FSC has the task of providing a constantly 
updated picture, as near to real time as possible, of Europe’s external borders and migration situation” 
(see http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/General/Frontex_Brochure.pdf ) 
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stable migration regime, since, as these counter-map gestures have shown, the 
existence of a political technology governing migrations is constantly undone by 
migrants’ presence in space. Or better, migrants’ practices do not play only as 
resistances against governmental mechanisms: rather, as their names indicate, 
mechanisms of capture and border controls try to discipline, filter and bridle 
practices of movement. In a nutshell, a counter-mapping approach on migration 
governmentality allows us to take on “resistances as a chemical catalyzer, enabling 
us to underline power relations” [Foucault, 1982]. To put it in cartographic terms, 
instead of taking for granted the codes and the epistemic frameworks through we 
usually look at movements and practices, the counter-mapping gesture consists in 
showing how migrations (sometimes) play as “discordant” practices of freedom in 
relation to the existing cartographic regimes of borders (political, social and 
geographic borders): in other words, they unsettle the tenability and the usefulness of 
such a map, forcing us to rewrite the coordinates of meanings. In fact, drawing on 
the distinction made in the fourth chapter between “mapping otherwise” and tracing 
“another map”, it should be noticed that migrants’ enacted countermaps do not 
(fully) situate on the same field of migration governmental maps, trying to subvert 
them or to shed light on the blind spots. Rather, they are struggles within that given 
“order of things” but, at the same time, struggles which undo the legitimacy and the 
existence of the borders of that regime of visibility. “Lived” maps which neither 
retrace nor recognize the existent cartographic blueprints. In other word, struggles 
for other maps, which bring into existence movements and practices that in 
governmental maps are not silenced or invisible but, more radically, are not expected 
to be there. In some way, through their uneven geographies, Tunisian migrants broke 
up the spread narrative on the Mediterranean as a space of free circulation –showing 
the deep asymmetry between the two shores -, and at the same time  they enacted a 
not-calculated freedom, crippling for some moments the mechanisms of selected 
mobility. And it is just as “unspeakable”, namely not easily translatable and hearable 
through the ordinary political and cartographic codes, that these counter-maps could 
put into place new geographies. “Unspeakable” as there is something which always 








 July 2013: this work was being written while the “twofold spatial upheaval”– 
migrations and the Arab Uprisings – was underway in the Mediterranean. The date 
of these conclusions also marks two years and half since the outbreak of the Tunisian 
revolution. Writing in the turmoil of these events imposes the limit of not being able 
to envisage the possible future developments of events underway, and of not being at 
sufficient distance to take stock of these spatial reshaping. Nevertheless, this work 
has tried to come to grips with the contingency of the present context and its 
changing conditions, resisting the temptation to judge on the failures or successes of 
those revolutionary movements. The choice to date the snapshots corresponds to 
relevant issues/transformations or to moments of rupture that took place at the times 
of the Tunisian twofold upheaval, both on the southern shore of the Mediterranean 
and on the northern shore as its “bank-effects” [chapter 2]. In a similar manner, 
dating the conclusions of this work on 30
th
 July 2013, I do not intend to provide a 
general overview or retrospective gaze tracing the trajectory of the different events 
that I took into account in this work. Rather, I choose a moment to situate the gaze 
into the present, since the conclusion of this work does not correspond to the 
completion of that turmoil– and also because I refuse to embrace the discourse of a 
postrevolutionary stage [chapter 3], since the Tunisian uprisings neither started nor 
ended with the fall of Ben Ali. Instead, what can be noticed at this point is the 
considerable difficulty in finding the traces of those spatial upheavals two and a half 
years later. Most of the “Libyan”152and Tunisian migrants are scattered across the 
European territory or have come back, while in Tunisia the ongoing political 
instability has transformed the nature of the conflict into more diffused local fights 
that bring to the fore the deep distrust against any form of representative politics, as 
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 I quote the term Libyan because actually migrants coming to Italy from Libya after the outbreak of 
the war were not Libyans but sub-saharan migrant workers. However, they were labelled as Libyans 
by Italian authorities as “non-Tunisians”: in fact, people coming from Libya followed a different 
institutional path, since all of them claimed asylum. Moreover, in the public debate the distinction 
between Tunisians and non-Tunisians also corresponded to a moral partition between “illegal” 
migrants and “vulnerable” subjects.  
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the general strikes and “exiles” confirm.153In the wake of this, rather than drawing 
general conclusions about these multiple and different spatial upheavals, I pinpoint 
some of the most relevant issues raised in the previous chapters that require being 
developed or that open the ground for further interrogations. What comes out is a 
texture, and not a narrative, that attempts to retrace and follow up the main stakes 
that those spatial upheavals generated, highlighted or exploded. 
Politics of perceptibility: 
In this work I have mobilized a countermapping gaze on migration governmentality 
also as a non-cartographic practice, positing it as an analytical posture that unpacks 
and unsettles governmental mechanisms and the regime of truth of migration 
governance [chapter 5]. The shift to a non-cartographic gaze allows us to see the 
limits both of the politics of representation and of the “cartographic anxiety” that 
underlies the activity of mapping. Beyond this point, a salient issue coming out of 
this countermapping gaze [chapters 4 and 5] concerns the differences between a 
politics of visibility and a politics of perceptibility. In order to explain this point I 
start from the following consideration: all counter-mapping practices relate to a 
visual culture approach that hinges on the power of images in producing political 
spaces and boundaries, trying to strategically overturn the directions of power over 
knowledge and image production [Mirzoeff, 2011]. Many of these approaches 
explicitly draw on Jacques Rancière’s thesis on the disruption of the thresholds of 
visibility in order to make visible phenomena, practices and subjects that remain “out 
of the spotlight” and “off the map”. In this way, the primacy of the visible, and 
furthermore the struggle over (in)visibility, are posited as the main axes through 
which political subjectivities could be reconfigured [chapter 1].In this regard, the 
question of how to disrupt thresholds of what is tolerated and what is visible remains 
narrowed to a politics of visibility: to put it differently, that visual gesture results in 
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 For instance, in 2012 many general strikes took place in Tunisian towns. One of the most 
important was in the city of Siliana, the 20
th
 November 2012, when the residents decided to start a 
strike to protest against the high percentage of unemployed and the unequal distribution of economic 
investment between the inner regions of Tunisia and the regions of the coast. The residents also left 
the city, as a kind of symbolic exodus, against the lack of attention and investment on the part of the 
government. Another significant protest happened in the village of El-Redeyef, in December 2012: 
also in that case the residents opted for a symbolic exodus toward Algeria against their exclusion from 
the governmental programs of employment. A similar movement took place in the city of 
Ghardimaou in January 2013. 
241 
 
the flattening of the politics of perceptibility within the frame of the visible. The 
problem that this move entails consists in taking for granted that the disruption of the 
codes and of thresholds of visibility would also engender a transformation of the 
thresholds of perceptibility at large, as well as a political transformation of the 
regime of truth. In fact, if it is indisputable that the growing production of images 
and mapping on migrations has brought to the surface new fields of visibility, at the 
same time the effects of making visible need to be deeply interrogated. In other 
words, what are the consequences and the outcomes of a struggle over visibility 
aimed at disturbing the thresholds of what is accepted and perceived? The regime of 
perceptibility encompasses all the ways through which “noisy” or silent practices –in 
our case, migrants’ movements and migrant struggles– become part of our political 
horizon, without necessarily being visible, that is appearing on the public scene. 
More than bringing out into the existing political space these noisy or silent 
movements, we should pay attention to the way in which they upset such a space. 
The second reason is that the battle over visibility and the production of new margins 
of visibility concerning migration has in part reiterated the posture of the spectator or 
of the claimant subject. Shedding light on the “silences” or on the “shadow zones” of 
the maps of power is politically oriented to activities of litigation against the 
violation of human rights and international law, thus defining in advance the borders 
and the terms of political action. In this way, the thresholds of acceptability of power 
are not really disturbed, since the stake becomes to provide a plan of visibility that 
accounts for practices and subjects off the map or to highlight elements and facts 
necessary to prove the violations of power [chapters 1 and 4]. The practice of 
“mapping otherwise” is neither a condition nor a guarantee for shaking the 
thresholds of what is acceptable or not; instead, a politics of perceptibility gestures 
towards a transformation in the practical and critical attitude in the face of power. 
Thirdly, this work has questioned the quite immediate nexus mobilized between 
politics of visibility and the vocabulary of political recognition: the appearance of 
uncounted subjects on the scene [Athanasaou, Butler, 2013; Isin, 2002, 2006, 2012; 
Rancière, 2001, 2004a] is envisaged as a demand for recognition staged by claimant 
subjects - although it’s not seen in terms of integration but as an action that 
“stretches” and challenges the borders of the political space. Maybe a further 
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comparison should be made between two angles from which to look at the effects of 
power on subjectivities, or two forms of being affected by power: anesthetization 
and acceptability. Both these effects are critical objects of a politics which aims to 
disrupt the thresholds of perceptibility and that cannot be initiated by simply 
unfolding a plan of visibility about the functioning of power. Thus, migration is a 
strugglefield in which the issue of the regimes of visibility emerges in a prominent 
way, since undocumented migrants very often situate off the map –out of the borders 
of citizenship, out of the spotlight of civil society [chapter 1].At the same time, as far 
as “unauthorized” migrations are concerned, the battle over visibility and 
perceptibility partially overlap: the disruption of the thresholds of acceptability of 
mechanisms of capture and detention tends to articulate with the task of “making 
visible” –making visible the violations of human rights, making visible migrants’ 
presence, making visible the arbitrariness of detention and migrants’ conditions etc. 
To put it bluntly, it is not a question of pushing for “imperceptible” struggles or 
visible claims [Papadopoulos, Stephenson, Tsianos, 2008].What a counter-mapping 
gaze suggests is to complicate the issues around the regime of visibility, refusing to 
tackle it through a binary approach – visibility/invisibility or 
perceptibility/imperceptibility –instead investigating in detail, from time to time, the 
stakes over (in)visibility and mapping, the complex game between strategies of 
invisibility and visibility. 
Migrant geographies: vanishing maps?   
This work has taken into account different practices –cartographic practices, political 
campaigns, analytical postures – for tracing “another map” of the Mediterranean 
space as the result of the spatial upheavals produced by migrants and the Arab 
Uprisings. However, all these heterogeneous countermapping approaches correspond 
to strategic uses of the same knowledges and techniques at play in the governmental 
“mapping” on migrations. Recalling Foucault’s reflection on the insurrection of 
subjugated knowledges, it could be stated that all those counter-mapping practices 
consist of political or analytical devices internal to the same regime of visibility they 
try to challenge through counter-acts. Nevertheless, in order to really unsettle the 
internal coherence of the governmental regime of truth and to break the mainstream 
narrative on migrations, we should take the side of another kind of “subjugated 
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knowledges": “a series of knowledges that have been disqualified as non-conceptual 
knowledges, as insufficiently elaborated knowledges: naive knowledges, 
hierarchically inferior knowledges, knowledges that are below the required level of 
scientificity” [Foucault, 2003, p.7]. This means shifting from the representative order 
of maps to migrants’ enacted geographies, namely to the “invented geographies” that 
migrants perform, both as spatial imaginary and spatial practices [chapters 2 and 
5].Tunisian migrants have imagined and practiced their erratic and uneven mobility, 
displacing the spatial order of the Mediterranean and its implicit directionalities –the 
northern/southern shore “opposite relation”, that sees migrants going northward and 
democracy exported southward. Moreover, through their practices of movement, 
they also envisaged the European space as if it were at hand, in contrast with the 
distance and the asymmetric mobility between the two shores of the Mediterranean 
that migration policies put into place: the fact of choosing where to go once they 
arrived in Europe, refusing to stay in Italy and showing a considerable ability to 
move around despite their unauthorised condition, is the most tangible mark of how 
they enacted a different map from the governmental cartographies. The imaginary of 
Europe that Tunisian migrants who left during the revolutionary uprisings traced out, 
is framed by “times of journeys” and strategies of migration.154Some of them were 
blocked in rail stations or moved by local trains, others squatted buildings and then 
were evicted; some Tunisians arrived in Belgium or in the Netherlands from 
Lampedusa and then were pushed back to Italy; sometimes they moved very quickly, 
while other times they were forced into indefinite rests; for those who had contacts in 
France, Paris was close, as was Sicily, while on the contrary the distance between 
Rome and Bologna could be significant for those who were arrested on the train. 
What comes out is a European geography reconfigured by the effective ways and 
possibilities of acting in space: migrants’ erratic presence in the European space and 
the stories of the others who migrated before them, contribute to shape a fragmented 
“Europe in migration” whose borders and distances reflect the effective time of 
migrants’ moving and staying [chapter 2]. The “democratic spatial orientation” of 
the Mediterranean has been definitively shaken by Tunisian migrants who arrived in 
Europe not to discover democracy but as the “sons of the Tunisian revolutions”; 




moreover, they did not demand protection, but claimed the right to practice freedom 
of movement as an essential component of the same democracy they had won and 
that Europeans looked on as the “awakening” of the Arab world [chapter 3]. 
However, Mediterranean spatiality was further remapped by migrants in the wake of 
the European economic crisis, with many Tunisian citizens moving to the Gulf States 
or to Libya to find a job. “Europe is no longer a dreamland; you are getting poorer 
than us” is a common refrain that you can hear in Tunisia, two and a half years after 
the outbreak of the revolution. The erratic migrations of Tunisians enacted “other 
maps” of the European space, stretching distances and borders through their “pace” 
made of movements and rests. And the relevance of cities and places was redefined 
by their knowledge and imaginary of those spaces, as well as by the possibility to 
“make use” of them. In other words, European geographic landmarks were 
positioned by migrants according to the contact they had or the life projects they 
were able to realize there: Parc de la Villette in Paris as a place very well-known by 
Tunisians for ages, Norway as a country where to go unnoticed, Switzerland as a 
State to apply to for asylum, the occupations in Padua, Paris and Marseille as places 
to find shelter. 
However, two and a half years after the starting of the “twofold spatial upheaval” 
[see Introduction] what needs to be questioned is the supposed vanishing character of 
migrants’ maps, which basically depends on the elusiveness and the “irregularity” of 
Tunisian migrants’ presence in the European space. In some way, the multiple 
cartographies of Europe performed by migrants resemble the elusive pace of 
migrants [chapter 2 and 5]: putting them into resonance with migration governmental 
maps, they show the hindrances and the impacts produced by borders on migrants’ 
movements. But at the same time, migration’s uneven maps emerge from the 
cunning strategies through which migrants dodge the “pace of mobility” set by 
migration policies. Migrants’ maps break up the consistency of Europe as a space 
with one single temporality of movements and one conception of space, cracking it 
as “an object constituted discursively” [Chakrabarty, 2000] and through cartographic 
imagination [Sakai, 1998].Following this point, it could be argued that migrations 
bring out the fundamentally fragmented and composite dimension of Europe, in 





: in other words, the enacted uneven geographies of 
migrants in Europe show that the “imagined Europe” is a protean and many-sided 
cartography, formed of heterogeneous –and conflicting – narratives.  
That said, let’s now go back to the vanishing character that I mentioned above: in 
fact, more than two years after Tunisian migrants’ spatial upheavals, we should 
investigate what “traces” still remain and how those maps inscribed some new 
languages of struggle that have not been (fully) recuperated by governmental 
cartographies. Recalling the question that I raised in the Introduction: beyond 
temporarily breaking some mechanisms of capture, did migrants’ enacted maps put 
into place “discordant” political practices that do not reproduce what is already 
there? This is a crucial question, since as far as migrants’ spatial upheavals are 
concerned, what seems to emerge two years after is precisely the difficulty of finding 
some “traces” of the collective struggles they organized and of the disorder they 
generated in the political geometries of the European space of free circulation. 
Related to this point, I would say that the importance to rethink the politics of 
(in)visibility [see chapters 4 and 5] that sustains migration governmentality, depends 
also on the elusiveness of migrants’ presence in space and on the “political scene” 
[see chapter 1]. Going to the most conflicting sites of the “Tunisian revolution in 
Europe” two and a half years later, what I realized is the “disappearing” of the most 
important political markers of their presence, such as political collectives
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occupations of buildings in European towns. In Paris, Milan, Rome, Brussels and 
Marseille, places where Tunisian migrants stayed for months, few traces remain of 
their spatial upheavals. In fact many have gone back to Tunisia, while those who 
remained on the northern shore are scattered all over the European space. However, 
the point here is not to romanticize the elusive and vanishing dimension of the 
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 On this point, see ParthaChatterjee and his criticism of Bendict Anderson’s theory of nationalism 
as an imagined community: in fact, according to Chatterjee, if on the one hand Anderson “refuses to 
define a nation by a set of external and abstract criteria”, on the other he conceives of imagined 
communities in terms of “modular character” of culture [Chattejee, 1986, pp. 19-22]. Also TalalAsad, 
in Formations of the Secular, questions Anderson’sidea of nation as “imagined community” that is 
grounded in homogeneous time [Asad, 2003, p.2]. 
156
 In this regard, a significant case is the Collective of the Tunisian migrants from Lampedusa in 
Paris,  as they called  themselves. In Paris two years later, it was not possible to find some of the 
people involved in the collective, since most of them came back to Tunisia, and others now live in the 
peripheral neighbourhood of Paris –many in squats in the area of Porte de la Chapelle– but they do 
not identify themselves anymore with that collective. 
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migrants' movements that I took into account in this work. Rather, this issue should 
be posed in a problematic way, at least from the standpoint of a militant research [see 
Introduction], which focuses on the interruptions of power mechanisms produced by 
migrants and on the possibility of envisaging “other maps” and alternative common 
vocabularies of struggles that do not ground on nation-based scripts. All these things 
considered, I suggest shifting the attention from the persistence in space of traces left 
by migrants’ upheavals to the circulation of languages and practices across different 
spaces, and to what I call the deferred bounce-effects of struggles. Despite the short 
duration of many migrant struggles and the uneven strategies of (in)visibility they 
perform, if we turn to the resonances of those practices as deferred in space and in 
time, a quite different landscape emerges. This could be formulated in two questions: 
how did some claims and modalities of struggle circulate? And how did some 
languages disseminate in other sites? These interrogations would require further 
development of this research. However, just to make a concrete example of what I 
mean when speaking of the resonance of migrant struggles despite their local 
elusiveness, I mention the multiple sites of struggles of refugees in Paris and in 
Germany. Those refugees fled Libya in 2011 and all of them arrived in Italy where 
they were “managed” through the “North Africa Emergency” system [chapter 2]. In 
Italy, we actually find that two years later there is not an organized movement of 
“Libyan” refugees in Italy, and that most of them were scattered across Europe. 
Instead, focusing on Germany and France we realize that many decided to leave Italy 
despite the temporary permit they got, claiming the right to move freely across 
Europe. Moreover, some political episodes have been recalled to organize other 
struggles: the Collective “Lampedusa in Hamburg” formed by refugees coming from 
Libya, deliberately assumed that name recalling the experience of the “Collective of 
Tunisians from Lampedusa in Paris” that now does not exist anymore, pushing 
forward a common denominator (Lampedusa) that for both the collectives was a 
significant border-post of their journey. Or, as in the case of the rejected refugees in 
Choucha, their demand that “all of us fled from Libya, and so the international 
protection must be granted to every one of us”, in some way has posited, once and 
for all, the present untenability of the principles of the Geneva Convention, opening 




A gaze on migrations that does not flatten “noisy practices” and “discordant 
practices of freedom” [chapters 2 and 4] into pre-existing political categories or 
radical democracy’s framework could see the exclusionary gesture of tracing the 
boundaries of the “political”: the partition between political and non-political 
languages results in a huge array of practices remaining unheard under the thresholds 
of perceptibility. Paying attention to the “noise” of migrant struggles, and to the 
ways in which they played as a troubling factor for “ordered mobility”, it becomes 
possible to see how “discordant” practices of freedom crack the representative 
dimension of the political. To put it differently, (some) migrant struggles, such as 
those that I have described [chapters 3 and 4]destabilize the neutralizing signifier of 
“political subjectivity”, forcing it to account for practices that cannot be 
“accommodated” into the tempo and the exclusionary boundaries of what is 
established as “political”. However, this does not mean to oppose a “politics of 
translation” of heterogeneous movements and struggles for crafting a shared 
language. Rather, the point is to resist that the codes and the coordinates of 
translation are fixed in advance, and that they belong to the normative script of 
“citizenship-and-representation” which “makes the law” to discordant practices of 
freedom. 
From this standpoint, as Papadopouolos and Tsianos nicely capture, “one cannot 
build liberal democracies with migration […] It’s impossible to adapt migration to 
our own political target be it right, left, liberal or radical left” [Papadopoulos, 
Tsianos, 2013, p. 187]. Therefore, disengaging from a governmental point of view 
on migrations [chapter 1] involves, first if all, to resist attributing in advance goals 
and meaning to the struggles: assuming migration as a vantage point means not 
taking for granted the political space of address in which migrant struggles are 
situated. But the above considerations also lead to challenging an abstract model of 
political subjectivity that one could postulate as a yardstick of (migration) practices: 
drawing on Foucault, we should not take any given subject as a starting point of the 
analysis, and should investigate rather its transformations and how it comes out of 
conflicting strugglefields of governmentality. Indeed, one of the recurring themes of 
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this work is that a critical gaze on the government of migration should challenge the 
supposed solidity of the migration regime, analysing its instabilities and 
transformations, and at the same time questioning the forms of subjectivity shaped 
and captured by that regime. Recalling the quote above, it could be argued that it is 
not from the standpoint of liberal democracies or from a space of citizenship already-
there that one could grasp the stakes of migrants’ practices and their opening of new 
political possibilities. Therefore, following this argument, migrants cannot be framed 
as the new figures of citizenship in crisis, the subjects “at the borders” who can 
reinvigorate the democratic pact [chapters 1 and 3]. Instead of asking what subject-
position migrants fit into, by reversing the angle we could explore which 
subjectivities are shaped and produced by certain political technologies, and how in 
turn they muddle, upset and crack its functioning. 
Focusing on migrations to see how governmentality and sovereignty work and 
combine makes it possible to see that it is not in the terms of  binary relations that 
the strugglefield of powers/resistances can be framed: the considerations on the 
uneven regime of (in)visibility [chapters 4 and 5] and on the multiplication of 
migration profiles [chapters 1 and 3] reveal that the stake is not to endorse one of the 
two poles of the battle – visibility vs. invisibility and imperceptible movements, 
identity established by power vs. autonomous subjectivity. Rather, the issue is to 
play within and along the subtle ambivalences of processes of subjectivation through 
which practices of mobility are translated into migrations. The ambivalent ways in 
which migrants grapple with mobility profiles and identities, show that a critical 
analysis should retrace the emergence of a certain political and conceptual field of 
government, and how local tactical elements are situated in broader strategies. A 
concrete example comes from the multiplication of “mobility profiles” through 
which migration governance partitions migrants, hampering in this way any possible 
unity of struggle. The importance of pluralizing the catchword of migration [chapter 
1] is not in itself a political defeat to the migration regime; instead, it depends on the 
very logic upon which migration governmentality is predicated, since the “migration 
crisis” has triggered a multiplication of migration profiles. At the same time, 
migrants and asylum seekers who got muddled in the mechanism of partitioning 
[chapter 3] shed light on the inadequacy of migration categories in encompassing all 
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forms of mobility, in response to which migration policies invented the blurred label 
of “mixed migration”. However, in relation to this point, it is important to recognize 
that the different “migrant conditions” do not actually resolve into the juridical status 
and the mobility profiles through which migrants are fixed to an identity. In fact, 
juridical categories, even though characterized by a multiplicity of status, are 
ultimately grounded on binary divisions (for instance, between asylum seekers and 
migrants) which are the condition for all the others. Instead, the juridical and 
epistemic regime of categorization needs to be confronted and articulated within the 
regime of labour. What emerges is firstly a more complex picture, in which the 
supposed binary distinctions and well defined subjectivities are superseded by a 
more blurred cleavage of inclusion through exploitation of (some) migrants in the 
labour economy. Secondly, there is a discrepancy between migrants’ identities 
shaped by juridical categories and migrants grappling with power relations in the 
domain of labour. Therefore, an exclusive focus on the epistemic and juridical 
proliferation of migration profiles does not make it clear how mechanisms of 
inclusion and exclusion–and most of all, of “exclusion through inclusion” [De 
Genova, 2013a] –which are at stake beyond the smooth space of subject-positions 
depicted by governmental agencies and juridical knowledge work. Talking about 
“migration strugglefield” for designating the complex articulation between different 
layers and mechanisms of power-resistance [see chapter 1], could be seen as a 
reformulation of Marx’s notion of capital as a social relation: the migrant condition 
is always “slippery”, since it is involved in a field of changing relations of power.  
The refusal to stay in one’s own place: migrants’ upheavals in postcolonial 
spaces 
Resistances played by refugees and their strategic “good stories” [chapter 1]; 
Tunisian migrants who refused to play along with the stages of the democratic 
transition and with the pace of migration policies and enacted their freedom of 
movement, pushing on the northern shore of the Mediterranean the impact of the 
Arab Uprisings [chapter 2]; rejected refugees at Choucha camp that undermined the 
principles of the politics of asylum, demanding protection as all having escaped from 
Libya and from a war started by Western countries [chapter 3]. These three episodes 
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confront us with migrants’ refusal to stay in their expected place, namely the place 
established by the articulation of migration policies and economic factors. However, 
“place” does not stand here simply for being “fixed in space”: rather, it indicates the 
times and the conditions at which migrants are supposed to move and stay. In 
particular, in the case of the Tunisian migrants, such a refusal was actualized through 
their unexpected presence on the European soil, troubling the narrative of freedom 
and democracy conquered through progressive steps. As Fanon remarked, the refusal 
to stay in one’s own place, conceived both in a spatial and in a social sense, is one of 
the main forms of resistance through which the colonized unsettled the colonial order 
[Fanon, 2007]. And this issue is a recurring motif in Fanon’s work, through which is 
possible to read his analyses into a postcolonial context of transnational mobility, 
and multiplication of borders [see chapter 1]. In a nutshell, it provides us with a lens 
to grasp the “intractability” of the migrant struggles that I examined in this work if 
confronted with the codes of representation and citizenship. In fact, what 
characterizes these movements is, I suggest, the way in which they interrupted or 
misfired for some time the pace of the politics of mobility; not so much by making 
claims but enacting practices of freedom that exceeded the “tractability” and 
governability of their conducts by migration policies. 
Multiple modernities and the history of the present:  
The “travelled” and uneven maps of Europe enacted by Tunisian migrants, and the 
political uprisings on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, unsettled the 
“methodological Europeanism” which underpins both Migration Studies and the 
analyses of the Arab Spring [see Introduction]. In fact, Migration Studies tend to 
posit Europe as the master signifier and the spatial referent of migrations, postulating 
a strong desirability of that space from the migrants’ standpoint. Similarly, political 
analyses on the Arab revolutions read those events in the light of the Western “road 
to democracy”, that is to say by iterating the script of secularization and 
democratization in the Arab countries according to the logic of the “not yet”, 
overlooking the différend of political practices taking place on the southern shore. 
By “methodological Europeanism” I mean the assumption of Europe as a 
politicallystable counterfoil through which to readboth the direction of migrations 
and political claims [see Introduction]. From this perspective, the growing centrality 
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gained in the political debate by the “Euro-Mediterranean” signifier – as a space of 
free exchange and free mobility – contributed to “tame" those upheavals, encoding 
them into a Euro-led narrative: indeed, through the cultural and geographical 
medium of the Mediterranean, the spatial upheavals and the “disorders” triggered by 
migrants’ movements and political uprisings, were rebalanced into that supposed 
shared space with a prevalent European matrix, as the designation of “Euro-
Mediterranean” suggests. In this way the “silent referent” of Europe, or better of 
“methodological Europeanism” is surreptitiously reintroduced through the Euro-
Mediterranean frame.  
In this regard, the Foucaultian perspective of a history of “our” present comes to be 
strongly complicated in the face of “twofold spatial upheaval” [chapter 1]. In fact, 
addressing both migrants’ practices and the political turmoil that burst on the 
southern shore, it becomes necessary to pluralize the present in question, paying 
attention to the different ways of practicing the space and the asymmetries (of 
subject positions and mobility conditions ) that carve out the space of free 
circulation. Migrants’ geographies, by tracing “another map” of Europe, bring out 
the encrusting of multiple tempos within the same space; or better, they unsettle the 
very idea of a unique space in which people move or stay in different ways. 
Therefore, a history of the present requires at the same time a pluralisation of its 
terms – “histories” and “present(s)” – and in turn, such a gesture cracks the 
consistency of a given homogeneous space to investigate. The second displacement 
concerns the spatial coordinates we take for granted: the pronoun “our” presupposed 
in many analyses that interrogate the bank-effects of the Arab revolutions (what 
impact did they produce on “our space”?) comes to be deeply questioned [chapter 1 
and 3].Does it refer to a contemporaneity that encompasses many spaces but keeps 
alive the blueprint of European political modernity? Or rather does it result from the 
“complication” of such a spatial/temporal baseline – through the resonance of 
multiple events? I suggest that it concerns the refusal to immediately operate the 
translation of political practices and subjects’ claims into the blurred counterfoil of 
Europe, that is to say the categories of “political modernity”. A countermapping gaze 
on the “Tunisian upheaval in Europe” [see chapter 2], unsettles the possibility of 
writing a history of the present without rethinking the terms and the coordinates 
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through which the spaces of the present are investigated. This doesn’t mean only 
changing our own location – moving from one shore to the other –but “complicating 
the grid” and getting rid of the baseline of political modernity for assessing the 
impacts of spatial and political turbulences. 
Migration crisis, crisis as bordering:  
The conquest of democracy in the Arab countries is the main motif of the narrative 
through which the Arab Uprisings were narrated from the northern shore of the 
Mediterranean. Nevertheless, the paradigm of the road to democracy has been 
quickly reversed into the framework of the “crisis” [chapter 3]. In particular, 
migrations worked as a kind of magic tenet through which democracy was soon 
translated into political instability across the Mediterranean: migration threatening 
the order and the temporality of the politics of mobility, migration disturbing the 
progressive building of democracy, migration as an economic burden for Europe. 
Migration as a “troubling factor” was associated with the overwhelming catchword 
of the “crisis” that the Libyan conflict generated, spreading far beyond Libyan 
borders and designating multiple sites of “crises”: the humanitarian crisis of refugees 
who fled Libya, the crisis of migration governmentality in partitioning migrants, the 
crisis of democracy… What I would like to add to this picture, is the functioning of 
“crisis” –conceived both as a discourse and as set of governmental strategies – as a 
re-bordering technology, that is as a political technology retracing the lines and the 
functions of borders. The production of new spatial economies and economic spaces 
in revolutionized Tunisia, but also on the northern shore of the Mediterranean (see 
for instance the spatial and economic transformations produced by the North Africa 
Emergency Program in Italy) is intertwined with the management of “multiple-
crises”. It is not simply that in the name of the crisis the security-humanitarian 
assemblage is reworked and fostered; rather, the question is how the government of 
migrations and the script of the crisis are imbricated and the government of the 
multiple-crisis works as a re-bordering mechanism. Conceiving the crisis as a 
bordering technique refers to a twofold meaning. On the one hand, the politics of 
“migration (in) crisis” mobilized in the aftermath of the Libyan conflict has in part 
retraced the borders and the terms of migration governmentality, and especially of 
the politics of asylum. On the other hand, the governmentality of “migration (in) 
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crisis” is characterized by the persistence of the horizon of the crisis: the issue does 
not seem to be how to step out of the crisis, but rather how to revise the politics of 
mobility, taking the crisis as its baseline. Therefore, the “crisis” could be seen as one 
of the main linchpins through which governmental strategies are reassembled and 
reframed. “Migration crisis” appears as a longstanding and complex phenomenon to 
govern that, unlike the logic of emergency, does not centre primarily on exceptional 
measures but tends to accelerate processes of power’s reconfiguration already 
underway [chapters 1 and 3]: Regional Protection Programs, the implementation of 
digital techniques of identification, the security-humanitarian nexus, the politics of 
rescue at sea... 
However, if one stops here the analysis it could appear a sort of circular dynamic 
between power-resistances at play, according to which migration policies reassess 
their strategies in the light of political transformations and migration turbulence. 
Instead, it is precisely that supposed circular mechanism that, as I tried to show in 
this work, needs to be challenged, highlighting the disconnections and the breaking 
points that migration produces inside. In this regard, in the third chapter I analysed 
how practices of migration do not only resist the script of the crisis but also produce 
it, making governmental partitioning spin freely and forcing power to rearrange its 
strategy as a strategy of crisis. 
Reoriented migrations:  
This final focus more points to further developments of this analysis of the “twofold 
spatial upheaval”, undertaking a counter-mapping move. It grounds on the critique of 
the “methodological Europeanism” that characterizes both Migration Studies and our 
political imaginary. The other source of this focus draws from “crisis as a re-
bordering mechanism” from the idea that in order to grasp the political effects of the 
heterogeneous spatial upheavals, it is necessary to intersect the impact of the 
economic crisis with revolutionary uprisings. Migrations are situated within this 
framework in a two related ways. Their reorientation in the aftermath of the Arab 
Uprisings and due to the economic backlash is a useful lens to scrutinize the ways in 
which revolutionary uprisings and the crisis combine. And, simultaneously, such a 
reorientation is a visible marker of the effects of that articulation and it shows us the 
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increasing provincialization of Europe as a space of immigration and as the 
“sovereign subject of all histories” [Chakrabarty, 2000; see also Chen, 2010]. In this 
regard, I bring the attention to the Tunisian revolutionized space conceived here as a 
“migration cluster” [see Chapter 3]: far from being exclusively a country of 
emigration towards Europe, migration patterns that increased after the outbreak of 
the revolution tell us another story. Firstly, Tunisia is historically a crossroads of 
different forms of migrations - migrant workers, asylum seekers and transit 
migration- coming from other Maghreb Countries, from Libya or from the sub-
Sahara region. Secondly, Tunisians themselves historically migrated to France (the 
big waves started in the Sixties) to Italy, but also to Libya (especially during the 
Seventies at the time of the oil economic crisis) and to the Gulf States. With the 
outbreak of the revolution and with the growing economic crisis that is affecting 
Europe, this scenario of multi-directional migration has gained more consistency: the 
Libyan war caused the arrival of hundreds of thousands of third-country nationals 
like never before and the temporary return of many Tunisians working in Libya. But 
the end of the conflict and the intensification of the rate of unemployment in Tunisia 
and in Europe made more than 40% of the Tunisian workers coming back to Libya 
unemployed, while 70% of the active Tunisian population is ready to leave to Libya 
to find a job. In the meantime, the choice of the Tunisian government to turn to a 
closer economic and political cooperation with the Gulf States, and especially with 
Qatar, favoured the signing of bilateral agreements for official quotas of Tunisian 
labour migrations. Indeed, in the interviews I conducted in summer 2012 in the cities 
of Sfax, Gabes and Tunis with unskilled Tunisian workers, what clearly emerged is 
the double salary that Tunisians are expected to get in Libya or in Qatar in 
comparison to the Tunisian average. This doesn’t mean that the “desirability” of the 
European space is over: Tunisian citizens and migrants working in Libya are still 
arriving on the Italian coasts, despite the critical economic situation; and Europe has 
multiplied in number the programs of selected mobility, promoting in particular 
student mobility, although the negotiations with Tunisia encountered many 
resistances on the Tunisian part. The reorientation of migrations does not concern 
only Tunisians or people from other African countries. In fact, the divide between 
the northern and the southern shore of the Mediterranean has been downsized due to 
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Tunisian migrants who “burned every kind of cultural, spatial and political distance 
between the two continents” [Sossi, 2013c]; but also for the escalation of the 
economic crisis that cracked the European space between the southern countries of 
Europe and the others. This is not to say that Tunisia has become a prosperous 
economy: on the contrary, the economic backlash is at once one of the primary 
reasons for the outbreak of the revolution and one of the main problems that Tunisia 
is facing today, as is proven by the ongoing social unrest which has been triggered 
by the huge disparity in wealth between the inner zones and the regions on the coast. 
However, the liberalization of the market and cheap labour costs are pushing many 
European industries to externalise their production. The result of that is a new 
orientation of migrations that would seem quite unexpected to the eyes of European 
readers: young unemployed Italians, some of them also with a university degree, 
have chosen to migrate to Tunis to work in call-centres or as technicians for 600 or 
800 dinars per month, that is 400 euros, but while profiting from the low cost of life 
in Tunisia.  
The articulation between the economic crisis and the “twofold spatial upheaval” 
forces us to reiterate the question - raised in the first chapter -“who is a migrant, here 
and now?”, and to critically interrogate how some practices of mobility are seen as 
practices of freedom and others “translated” as “migration”. The imbrication and the 
interferences between migrants’ upheavals and the Arab Uprisings suggest that for 
undoing the “discipline effect” on migrations – namely, the becoming discipline of 
migration as object of governmental knowledge – a militant research should take on 
migration as a strugglefield. This means to challenge, rework and unravel the 
boundaries of migration as a self-standing field of research. In fact, on the one hand 
migrant struggles are enmeshed and articulated with other sites of conflict which 
“exceed” the migrant’s condition and identity; and on the other hand it should be 
investigated how they open up new claims, and languages that could be appropriated 
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